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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 
•8? 


Digitized  by 

the  Internet  Archive 

in  2014 

https://archive.org/details/kaisersmemoirswiOOwill_0 


WILHELM  II 


The  DI)=i.^=\ 

Kaiser's  Memoirs 

WILHELM  II 

Emperor  of  Germany  1 888-191 8 


English  Translation  by 
THOMAS  R.  YBARRA 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 
1922 


) 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Copyright,  1922 
By  McClure  Newspaper  Syndicate 

Copyright,  1922 
By  Harper  &  Brothers 
Printed  in  the  U.  S,  A. 


First  Edition 

K-W 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  Bismarck    i 

II.  Caprivi   51 

III.  HOHENLOHE    59 

IV.  BuLOW    95 

V.  Bethmann    124 

VI.  My  Co-workers  in  the  Administration   171 

VII.  Science  and  Art    196 

VIII.  My  Relations  with  the  Church   208 

IX.  Army  and  Navy   223 

X.  The  Outbreak  of  War    246 

XI.  The  Pope  and  Peace    263 

XII.  End  of  the  War  and  My  Abdication   272 

XIII.  The  Enemy  Tribunal  and  the  Neutral  Tribunal   292 

XIV.  The  Question  of  Guilt    303 

XV.  The  Revolution  and  Germany's  Future   337 


I 


I 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


CHAPTER  I 


Bismarck 

PRINCE  BISMARCK'S  greatness  as  a  states- 
man and  his  imperishable  services  to  Prussia 
and  Germany  are  historical  facts  of  such  tremen- 
dous significance  that  there  is  doubtless  no  man 
in  existence,  whatever  his  party  affiliations,  who 
would  dare  to  place  them  in  question.  For  this 
very  reason  alone  it  is  stupid  to  accuse  me  of  not 
having  recognized  the  greatness  of  Prince  Bis- 
marck. The  opposite  is  the  truth.  I  revered  and 
idolized  him.  Nor  could  it  be  otherwise.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  with  what  generation  I 
grew  up — the  generation  of  the  devotees  of  Bis- 
marck. He  was  the  creator  of  the  German 
Empire,  the  paladin  of  my  grandfather,  and  all 
of  us  considered  him  the  greatest  statesman  of 
his  day  and  were  proud  that  he  was  a  German. 
Bismarck  was  the  idol  in  my  temple,  whom  I 
worshiped. 

But  monarchs  also  are  human  beings  of  flesh 
and  blood,  hence  they,  too,  are  exposed  to  the 
influences  emanating  from  the  conduct  of  others ; 
therefore,  looking  at  the  matter  from  a  human 
point  of  view,  one  will  understand  how  Prince 

I 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Bismarck,  by  his  fight  against  me,  himself  de- 
stroyed, with  heavy  blows,  the  idol  of  which  I 
have  spoken.  But  my  reverence  for  Bismarck,  the 
great  statesman,  remained  unaltered. 

While  I  was  still  Prince  of  Prussia  I  often 
thought  to  myself :  "I  hope  that  the  great  Chan- 
cellor will  live  for  many  years  yet,  since  I  should 
be  safe  if  I  could  govern  with  him."  But  my 
reverence  for  the  great  statesman  was  not  such  as 
to  make  me  take  upon  my  own  shoulders,  when 
I  became  Emperor,  political  plans  or  actions  of 
the  Prince  which  I  considered  mistakes.  Even 
the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878  was,  to  my  way  of 
thinking,  a  mistake,  likewise  the  "Kulturkampf." 
Moreover,  the  constitution  of  the  Empire  was 
drawn  up  so  as  to  fit  in  with  Bismarck's  extraor- 
dinary preponderance  as  a  statesman ;  the  big  cui- 
rassier boots  did  not  fit  every  man. 

Then  came  the  labor-protective  legislation.  I 
most  deeply  deplored  the  dispute  which  grew  out 
of  this,  but,  at  that  time,  it  was  necessary  for  me 
to  take  the  road  to  compromise,  which  has  gen- 
erally been  my  road  both  on  domestic  and  foreign 
politics.  For  this  reason  I  could  not  wage  the  open 
warfare  against  the  Social  Democrats  which  the 
Prince  desired.  Nevertheless,  this  quarrel  about 
political  measures  cannot  lessen  my  admiration 
for  the  greatness  of  Bismarck  as  a  statesman;  he 
remains  the  creator  of  the  German  Empire,  and 
surely  no  one  man  need  have  done  more  for  his 
country  than  that. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  great  matter  of  uni- 

2 


BISMARCK 


fying  the  Empire  was  always  before  my  eyes,  I 
did  not  allow  myself  to  be  influenced  by  the  agi- 
tations which  were  the  commonplaces  of  those 
days.  In  like  manner,  the  fact  that  Bismarck  was 
called  the  majordomo  of  the  Hohenzollerns  could 
not  shake  my  trust  in  the  Prince,  although  he,  per- 
haps, had  thoughts  of  a  political  tradition  for  his 
family.  As  evidence  of  this,  he  felt  unhappy,  for 
instance,  that  his  son  Bill  felt  no  interest  in  politics 
and  wished  to  pass  on  his  power  to  Herbert. 

HIS  GRANDFATHER'S  SUCCESSOR 

The  tragic  element  for  me,  in  the  Bismarck 
case,  lay  in  the  fact  that  I  became  the  successor 
of  my  grandfather — in  other  words,  that  I  skipped 
one  generation,  to  a  certain  extent.  And  that  is 
a  serious  thing.  In  such  a  case  one  is  forced  to 
deal  constantly  with  old  deserving  men,  who  live 
more  in  the  past  than  in  the  present,  and  cannot 
grow  into  the  future.  When  the  grandson  succeeds 
his  grandfather  and  finds  a  revered  but  old  states- 
man of  the  stature  of  Bismarck,  it  is  not  a  piece 
of  good  luck  for  him,  as  one  might  suppose,  and  I, 
in  fact,  supposed.  Bismarck  himself  points  that 
out  in  the  third  volume  of  his  memoirs  (p.  40), 
when  he  speaks,  in  the  chapter  about  Botticher,  of 
the  oldish  caution  of  the  Chancellor,  and  of  the 
young  Emperor. 

And  when  Ballin  had  the  Prince  cast  a  glance 
over  the  new  harbor  of  Hamburg,  Bismarck  him- 
self felt  that  a  new  era  had  begun  which  he  no 
longer  thoroughly  understood.  On  that  occasion 
a  3 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


the  Prince  remarked,  in  astonishment,  "Another 
world,  a  new  world!" 

This  point  of  view  also  showed  itself  on  the 
occasion  of  the  visit  of  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  at 
Friedrichsruh,  at  the  time  when  he  wished  to  win 
the  old  Imperial  Chancellor  over  to  favoring  the 
first  Navy  bill. 

As  for  me  personally,  I  have  the  satisfaction  of 
recalling  that  Bismarck  intrusted  to  me  in  1886 
the  very  delicate  Brest  mission,  and  said  of  me: 
"Some  day  that  man  will  be  his  own  Chancellor." 
This  shows  that  Bismarck  must  have  had  some 
belief  in  me. 

I  feel  no  grudge  against  him  for  the  third 
volume  of  his  reminiscences.  I  released  this  vol- 
ume after  I  had  sought  and  obtained  my  rights. 
To  withhold  the  volume  any  longer  would  have 
been  pointless,  since  the  main  contents  had  become 
known  already  through  indiscretions;  were  this 
not  true,  there  might  have  been  varying  opinions 
as  to  the  advisability  in  the  choice  of  the  time  for 
publication.  Bismarck  would  turn  over  in  his 
grave  if  he  could  know  at  what  time  the  third 
volume  appeared,  and  what  consequences  it  had. 
I  should  be  honestly  grieved  if  the  third  volume 
had  damaged  the  memory  of  the  great  Chancel- 
lor, because  Bismarck  is  one  of  the  heroic  figures 
whom  the  German  people  need  for  their  regener- 
ation. My  gratitude  and  reverence  for  the  great 
Chancellor  cannot  be  impaired  or  extinguished 
by  the  third  volume  nor  by  anything  else 
whatever. 

4 


/ 


BISMARCK 

In  the  first  half  of  the  'eighties  I  had  been  sum- 
moned to  the  Foreign  OfHce  at  the  behest  of  Prince 
Bismarck;  it  was  then  presided  over  by  Count 
Herbert  Bismarck.  Upon  reporting  myself  to  the 
Prince  he  gave  me  a  short  sketch  of  the  personages 
employed  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  when  he 
named  Herr  von  Holstein,  who  was  then  one  of 
the  most  prominent  collaborators  of  the  Prince, 
it  seemed  to  me  that  a  slight  warning  against  this 
man  ran  through  the  Prince's  words. 

I  got  a  room  all  to  myself,  and  all  the  docu- 
ments concerning  the  preliminary  history,  origin, 
and  conclusion  of  the  alliance  with  Austria  (An- 
drassy)  were  laid  before  me  in  order  that  I  might 
study  them.  I  went  often  to  the  home  of  the 
Prince  and  to  that  of  Count  Herbert 

THE  MAN  WITH  THE  HYENA'S  EYES 

When  I  had  thus  become  more  intimate  in 
the  Bismarck  circle  I  heard  more  open  talk  about 
Herr  von  Holstein.  I  heard  that  he  was  very 
clever,  a  good  worker,  inordinately  proud,  an  odd 
sort  of  man,  who  never  showed  himself  anywhere 
and  had  no  social  relations,  full  of  distrust,  much 
influenced  by  whims,  and,  besides  all  this,  a  good 
hater,  and,  therefore,  dangerous.  Prince  Bismarck 
called  him  "The  Man  with  the  Hyena's  Eyes," 
and  told  me  that  it  would  be  well  for  me  to  keep 
away  from  him.  It  was  quite  apparent  that  the 
bitter  attitude  which  the  Prince  showed  later  to- 
ward Holstein,  his  former  collaborator,  was  form- 
ing even  at  that  time. 

5 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

The  Foreign  Office  was  conducted  with  the 
strictest  discipline  by  Count  Herbert,  whose  rude- 
ness toward  his  employees  particularly  struck  me. 
The  gentlemen  there  simply  flew  when  they  were 
summoned  or  dismissed  by  the  Count,  so  much  so 
that  a  joking  saying  arose  at  the  time  that  "their 
coat  tails  stood  straight  out  behind  them."  The 
foreign  policy  was  conducted  and  dictated  by 
Prince  Bismarck  alone,  after  consultation  with 
Count  Herbert,  who  passed  on  the  commands  of 
the  Chancellor  and  had  them  transformed  into 
instructions.  Hence  the  Foreign  Office  was  noth- 
ing but  an  office  of  the  great  Chancellor,  where 
work  was  done  according  to  his  directions.  Able 
men,  with  independent  ideas,  were  not  schooled 
and  trained  there. 

This  was  in  contrast  to  the  General  Staff  under 
Moltke.  There  new  officers  were  carefully  de- 
veloped and  trained  to  independent  thinking  and 
action,  in  accordance  with  approved  principles, 
arid  by  dint  of  preserving  old  traditions  and  taking 
into  account  all  that  modern  times  had  taught. 
At  the  Foreign  Office  there  were  only  executive 
instruments  of  a  will,  who  were  not  informed  as 
to  the  important  interrelationship  of  the  questions 
turned  over  to  them  for  treatment,  and  could  not, 
therefore,  collaborate  independently.  The  Prince 
loomed  up  like  a  huge  block  of  granite  in  a 
meadow ;  were  he  to  be  dragged  away,  what  would 
be  found  beneath  would  be  mostly  worms  and 
dead  roots. 

I  won  the  confidence  of  the  Prince,  who  con- 

6 


BISMARCK 


suited  me  about  many  things.  For  instance,  when 
the  Prince  brought  about  the  first  German  colonial 
acquisitions  (Gross  and  Klein  Popo,  Togo,  etc.), 
I  informed  him,  at  his  wish,  concerning  the  state 
of  mind  created  in  the  public  and  the  navy  by  this 
move,  and  described  to  him  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  the  German  people  had  hailed  the  new 
road.  The  Prince  remarked  that  the  matter  hardly 
deserved  this. 

Later  on  I  spoke  often  with  the  Prince  about 
the  colonial  question  and  always  found  in  him  the 
intention  to  utilize  the  colonies  as  commercial  ob- 
jects, or  objects  for  swapping  purposes,  other  than 
to  make  them  useful  to  the  fatherland  or  utilize 
them  as  sources  of  raw  materials.  As  was  my  duty, 
I  called  the  Prince's  attention  to  the  fact  that  mer- 
chants and  capitalists  were  beginning  energet- 
ically to  develop  the  colonies  and  that,  therefore — 
as  I  had  learned  from  Hanseatic  circles — they 
counted  upon  protection  from  a  navy.  For  this 
reason,  I  pointed  out  that  steps  must  be  taken  for 
getting  a  fleet  constructed  in  time,  in  order  that 
German  assets  in  foreign  lands  should  not  be  with- 
out protection;  that,  since  the  Prince  had  un- 
furled the  German  flag  in  foreign  parts,  and  the 
people  stood  behind  it,  there  must  also  be  a  navy 
behind  it. 

BISMARCK'S  CONTINENTAL  PREPOSSESSIONS 

But  the  Prince  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  my  state- 
ments and  made  use  of  his  pet  motto :  "If  the  Eng- 
lish should  land  on  our  soil  I  should  have  them 

7 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


arrested."  His  idea  was  that  the  colonies  would 
be  defended  by  us  at  home.  The  Prince  attached 
no  importance  to  the  fact  that  the  very  assump- 
tion that  the  English  could  land  without  opposition 
in  Germany — since  Heligoland  was  English — was 
unbearable  for  Germany,  and  that  we,  in  order 
to  make  a  landing  impossible  from  the  start, 
needed  a  sufficiently  strong  navy,  and,  likewise, 
Heligoland. 

The  political  interest  of  the  Prince  was,  in  fact, 
concentrated  essentially  upon  continental  Europe ; 
England  lay  somewhat  to  one  side  among  the 
cares  that  burdened  him  daily,  all  the  more  so 
since  Salisbury  stood  well  with  him  and  had,  in 
the  name  of  England,  hailed  with  satisfaction  the 
Double  (i.  e.,  Triple)  Alliance,  at  the  time  of  its 
formation.  The  Prince  worked  primarily  with 
Russia,  Austria,  Italy,  and  Rumania,  whose  rela- 
tions toward  Germany  and  one  another  he  con- 
stantly watched  over.  As  to  the  prudence  and  skill 
with  which  he  acted.  Emperor  William  the  Great 
once  made  a  pointed  remark  to  von  Albedyll,  his 
chief  of  Cabinet. 

The  General  found  His  Majesty  much  excited 
after  a  talk  with  Bismarck,  to  such  an  extent  that 
he  feared  for  the  health  of  the  old  Emperor.  He 
remarked,  therefore,  that  His  Majesty  should 
avoid  similar  worry  in  future ;  that,  if  Bismarck 
was  unwilling  to  do  as  His  Majesty  wished.  His 
Majesty  should  dismiss  him.  Whereupon  the 
Emperor  replied  that,  despite  his  admiration  and 
gratitude  toward  the  great  Chancellor,  he  had 

8 


i 

BISMARCK 


already  thought  of  dismissing  him,  since  the  self- 
conscious  attitude  of  the  Prince  became  at  times 
too  oppressive.  But  both  he  and  the  country 
needed  Bismarck  too  badly.  Bismarck  was  the 
one  man  who  could  juggle  five  balls  of  which  at 
least  two  were  always  in  the  air.  That  trick, 
added  the  Emperor,  was  beyond  his  own  powers. 

Prince  Bismarck  did  not  realize  that,  through 
the  acquisition  of  colonies  for  Germany,  he  would 
be  obliged  to  look  beyond  Europe  and  be  auto- 
matically forced  to  act,  politically,  on  a  large 
scale — with  England  especially.  England,  to  be 
sure,  was  one  of  the  five  balls  in  his  diplomatic- 
statesmanly  game,  but  she  was  merely  one  of  the 
five,  and  he  did  not  grant  her  the  special  impor- 
tance which  was  her  due. 

For  this  reason  it  was  that  the  Foreign  Office 
likewise  was  involved  entirely  in  the  continental 
interplay  of  politics,  had  not  the  requisite  interest 
in  colonies,  navy,  or  England,  and  possessed  no 
experience  in  world  politics.  The  English 
psychology  and  mentality,  as  shown  in  the 
pursuit — constant,  though  concealed  by  all  sorts 
of  little  cloaks — of  world  hegemony,  was  to  the 
German  Foreign  Office  a  book  sealed  with  seven 
seals. 

SOURCE  OF  RUSSIAN  ENMITY 

Once  Prince  Bismarck  remarked  to  me  that  his 
main  object  was  to  not  let  Russia  and  England 
come  to  an  understanding.  I  took  the  liberty  of 
observing  that  the  opportunity  to  postpone  such 

9 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

an  understanding  for  a  long  time  lay  ready  to 
hand  in  1877-78,  when  the  Russians  might  have 
been  allowed  to  occupy  Constantinople — had  this 
been  done,  the  English  fleet  would  have  sailed  in 
without  further  ado  to  defend  Constantinople  and 
the  Russo-English  conflict  would  have  been  on. 
Instead,  I  continued,  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano 
was  forced  upon  the  Russians  and  they  were  com- 
pelled to  turn  about  at  the  very  gates  of  the  city 
which  they  had  reached  and  saw  before  them,  after 
frightful  battles  and  hardships. 

This,  I  went  on,  had  created  an  inextinguish- 
able hatred  in  the  Russian  army  against  us  (as  had 
been  reported  by  Prussian  officers  who  had  accom- 
panied the  Russian  army  on  the  Turkish  cam- 
paign, especially  Count  Pfeil) ;  moreover,  the 
above-mentioned  treaty  had  been  cast  aside  and 
the  Berlin  Treaty  substituted  for  it,  which  had 
burdened  us  even  more  with  the  hostility  of  the 
Russians,  who  looked  upon  us  as  the  enemy  of 
their  ^'just  interests  in  the  East."  Thus  the  con- 
flict between  Russia  and  England,  which  the 
Prince  desired,  had  been  relegated  far  into  the 
future. 

Prince  Bismarck  did  not  agree  with  this  judg- 
ment of  ^'his"  Congress,  concerning  the  results  of 
which  he,  as  the  ''honest  broker,"  was  so  proud; 
he  remarked  earnestly  that  he  had  wished  to  pre- 
vent a  general  conflagration  and  had  been  com- 
pelled to  offer  his  services  as  a  mediator.  When 
I,  later  on,  told  a  gentleman  at  the  Foreign  Office 
about  this  conversation,  he  replied  that  he  had 

10 


BISMARCK 


been  present  when  the  Prince,  after  signing  the 
Berlin  Treaty,  came  into  the  Foreign  Office  and 
received  the  congratulations  of  the  officials  assem- 
bled there.  After  he  had  listened  to  them  the 
Prince  stood  up  and  replied:  "Now  I  am  driving 
Europe  four-in-hai^d!"  In  the  opinion  of  the  said 
gentleman  the  Prince  was  mistaken  in  this,  since, 
even  at  that  time,  there  was  the  threat  of  a  Russo- 
French  friendship  in  place  of  the  Russo-Prussian 
— in  other  words,  two  horses  were  already  to  be 
counted  out  of  the  four-in-hand.  As  Russia  saw 
it,  Disraeli's  statecraft  had  turned  Bismarck's  work 
as  "honest  broker"  into  the  negotiation  of  an 
Anglo- Austrian  victory  over  Russia. 

Despite  considerable  differences  in  our  opinions, 
Prince  Bismarck  remained  friendly  and  kindly 
disposed  to  me,  and,  despite  the  great  difference  in 
our  ages,  a  pleasant  relationship  grew  up  between 
us,  since  I,  in  common  with  all  those  of  my  gener- 
ation, was  an  ardent  admirer  of  the  Prince  and 
had  won  his  trust  by  my  zeal  and  frankness — nor 
have  I  ever  betrayed  that  trust. 

During  the  time  of  my  assignment  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  Privy  Councilor  Raschdau,  among  others, 
discoursed  with  me  on  commercial  policy,  colonies, 
etc.  In  these  matters,  even  at  that  early  date,  my 
attention  was  called  to  our  dependence  upon  Eng- 
land, due  to  the  fact  that  we  had  no  navy  and  that 
Heligoland  was  in  English  hands.  To  be  sure, 
there  was  a  project  to  extend  our  colonial  posses- 
sions under  the  pressure  of  necessity,  but  all  this 
could  happen  only  with  England's  permission. 

n 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

» 

This  was  a  serious  matter,  and  certainly  an  un- 
worthy position  for  Germany. 

INTERCOURT  POLITICS 

My  assignment  at  the  Foreign  Office  brought 
a  very  unpleasant  happening  in  its  wake.  My 
parents  were  not  very  friendly  toward  Prince  Bis- 
marck and  looked  with  disfavor  upon  the  fact  that 
their  son  had  entered  into  the  Prince's  circle. 
There  was  fear  of  my  becoming  influenced  against 
my  parents,  of  superconservatism,  of  all  sorts  of 
perils,  which  all  sorts  of  tale  bearers  from  Eng- 
land and  "liberal  circles,"  who  rallied  around  my 
father,  imputed  against  me.  I  never  bothered  my 
head  with  all  this  nonsense,  but  my  position  in  the 
house  of  my  parents  was  rendered  much  more  diffi- 
cult for  me  and,  at  times,  painful.  Through  my 
work  under  Prince  Bismarck  and  the  confidence 
reposed  in  me — often  subjected  to  the  severest  tests 
— I  have  had  to  suffer  much  in  silence  for  the  sake 
of  the  Chancellor;  he,  however,  apparently  took 
this  quite  as  a  matter  of  course. 

I  was  on  good  terms  with  Count  Herbert  Bis- 
marck. He  could  be  a  very  gay  companion  and 
knew  how  to  assemble  interesting  men  around  his 
table,  partly  from  the  Foreign  Office,  partly  from 
other  circles.  However,  true  friendship  never 
ripened  between  us  two.  This  was  shown  particu- 
larly when  the  Count  asked  to  go  at  the  same 
time  that  his  father  retired.  My  request  that  he 
stay  by  me  and  help  me  to  maintain  tradition  in 
our  political  policy  elicited  the  sharp  reply  that 

12 


BISMARCK  % 


he  had  become  accustomed  to  report  to  his  father 
and  serve  him,  wherefore  it  was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion to  demand  that  he  come,  with  his  dispatch 
case  under  his  arm,  to  report  to  anybody  else  than 
his  father. 

When  Tsar  Nicholas  II,  he  who  has  been  mur- 
dered, came  of  age,  I  was  assigned  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Prince  Bismarck  to  confer  upon  the  heir- 
apparent  at  St.  Petersburg  the  Order  of  the  Black 
Eagle.  Both  the  Emperor  and  Prince  Bismarck 
instructed  me  concerning  the  relationship  of  the 
two  countries  and  the  two  reigning  dynasties  with 
each  other,  as  well  as  concerning  customs,  person- 
ages, etc.  The  Emperor  remarked  in  conclusion 
that  he  would  give  his  grandson  the  same  piece  of 
advice  that  was  given  him,  on  the  occasion  of  his 
first  visit  as  a  young  man  to  Russia,  by  Count 
Adlerberg,  viz,,  "In  general,  there  as  well  as  else- 
where, people  prefer  praise  to  criticism."  Prince 
Bismarck  closed  his  remarks  with  these  words: 
"In  the  East,  all  those  who  wear  their  shirts  outside 
their  trousers  are  decent  people,  but  as  soon  as  they 
tuck  their  shirts  inside  their  trousers  and  hang  a 
medal  around  their  necks,  they  become  pig-dogs." 

From  St.  Petersburg  I  repeatedly  reported  to 
my  grandfather  and  to  Prince  Bismarck.  Natu- 
rally, I  described,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  the 
impressions  which  I  got  I  noticed  especially  that 
the  old  Russo-Prussian  relations  and  sentiments 
had  cooled  to  a  marked  extent  and  were  no  longer 
such  as  the  Emperor  and  Prince  Bismarck  in  their 
talks  with  me  had  assumed.  After  my  return,  both 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

mj  grandfather  and  the  Prince  praised  me  for  my 
plain,  clear  report,  which  was  all  the  pleasanter 
for  me  since  I  was  oppressed  by  the  feeling  that, 
in  a  number  of  things,  I  had  been  forced  to  dis- 
illusion these  high  personages. 

TO  OFFER  DARDANELLES  TO  RUSSIA 

In  1886,  at  the  end  of  August  and  beginning  of 
September,  after  the  last  meeting  at  Gastein  of 
Emperor  William  the  Great  and  Prince  Bismarck 
with  Emperor  Franz  Josef,  where  I  also  was  pres- 
ent at  the  command  of  my  grandfather,  I  was 
commissioned  to  report  personally  to  Tsar  Alex- 
ander II  concerning  the  decisions  made  there  and 
to  take  up  with  him  the  questions  relating  to  the 
Mediterranean  and  Turkey.  Prince  Bismarck 
gave  me  his  instructions,  sanctioned  by  Emperor 
William;  they  dealt  most  especially  with  Rus- 
sia's desire  to  reach  Constantinople,  to  which  the 
Prince  meant  to  raise  no  obstacles.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  received  direct  instructions  to  offer  Russia 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles  (in  other 
words,  San  Stef ano  and  the  Berlin  Treaty  had  been 
dropped!).  There  was  a  plan  to  persuade  Turkey 
in  a  friendly  way  that  an  understanding  with  Rus- 
sia was  desirable  for  her  also. 

The  Tsar  received  me  cordially  at  Brest-Litovsk 
and  I  was  present  there  at  reviews  of  troops  and 
fortress  and  defensive  maneuvers,  which,  even 
then,  unquestionably  bore  an  anti-German  look. 

To  sum  up  my  conversations  with  the  Tsar,  the 
following  remark  by  him  is  of  importance:  "If 

14 


BISMARCK 


I  wish  to  have  Constantinople,  I  shall  take  it  when- 
ever I  feel  like  it,  without  need  of  permission  or 
approval  from  Prince  Bismarck."  After  this  rude 
refusal  of  the  Bismarck  offer  of  Constantinople, 
I  looked  upon  my  mission  as  a  failure  and  made 
my  report  to  the  Prince  accordingly. 

When  the  Prince  decided  to  make  his  offer  to 
the  Tsar,  he  must  have  altered  his  political  con- 
ceptions which  had  led  to  San  Stefano  and  the 
Congress  of  Berlin;  or  else,  on  account  of  the 
development  of  the  general  political  situation  in 
Europe,  he  considered  that  the  moment  had  come 
for  shuffling  the  political  cards  in  another  way  or, 
as  my  grandfather  had  put  it,  to  "juggle"  differ- 
ently. Only  a  man  of  the  world  importance  and 
diplomatic  ability  of  Prince  Bismarck  could  em- 
bark on  such  a  course.  Whether  the  Prince  had 
planned  his  big  political  game  with  Russia  in  such 
a  way  that  he  might,  first,  by  means  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Berlin,  prevent  a  general  war  and  cajole 
England,  and  then,  after  having  thus  hindered 
Russia's  Eastern  aspirations,  cater  to  these  aspira- 
tions later,  by  a  stroke  of  genius,  in  an  even  more 
striking  manner,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  say — 
Prince  Bismarck  never  told  anyone  about  his  great 
political  projects. 

If  the  above  is  true,  Bismarck,  trusting  abso- 
lutely to  his  statesmanlike  skill,  must  have  reck- 
oned upon  bringing  Germany  all  the  more  into 
Russian  favor  because  Russian  aspirations  were 
brought  to  fulfillment  by  Germany  alone — and 
that  at  a  moment  when  the  general  European  polit- 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


ical  situation  was  less  strained  than  in  1877-78. 
In  this  case,  nobody  except  Prince  Bismarck  could 
have  played  the  tremendous  game  to  a  successful 
end.  And  therein  lies  the  weakness  in  the  superi- 
ority of  great  men.  Had  he  also  informed  Eng- 
land of  his  offer  to  the  Tsar?  England  must  have 
been  opposed  to  it,  as  in  1878. 

In  any  event,  the  Prince  now  adopted  the  policy 
which  I  had  already  noted  when  I  realized  the  dis- 
illusion of  the  Russians  at  having  stood  before  the 
gates  of  Constantinople  without  being  allowed  to 
enter. 

PROPHECY  OF  RUSSIAN  DOWNFALL 

At  Brest-Litovsk,  in  the  course  of  the  constant 
military  preparations  of  all  kinds,  I  could  easily 
see  that  the  conduct  of  the  Russian  officers  toward 
me  was  essentially  cooler  and  haughtier  than  on 
the  occasion  of  my  first  visit  to  St.  Petersburg. 
Only  the  small  group  of  old  generals,  especially 
those  at  the  Russian  court,  who  dated  from  the 
days  of  Alexander  II,  and  who  knew  and  esteemed 
'  Emperor  William  the  Great,  still  showed  their 

reverence  for  him  and  their  friendly  feeling  to- 
ward Germany.  In  the  course  of  a  talk  with  one 
of  them  concerning  the  relations  between  the  two 
courts,  armies,  and  countries,  which  I  had  found 
undergoing  a  change  in  comparison  with  former 
,  times,  the  old  General  said :  "C'est  ce  vilain  con- 
gres  de  Berlin.  Une  grave  faute  du  Chancelier. 
II  a  detruit  rancienne  amitie  entre  nous,  plante  la 
mefiance  dans  les  coeurs  de  la  Cour  et  du  Gou- 
vernement,  et  fourni  le  sentiment  d'un  grave  tort 

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BISMARCK 


fait  a  rarmee  russe  apres  sa  campagne  sanglante  de 
1877,  pour  lequel  elle  vout  sa  revanche.  Et  nous 
voila  ensemble  avec  cette  maudite  Republique 
Frangaise,  pleins  de  haine  contre  vous  et  rempli 
d'idees  subversives,  qui  en  cas  de  guerre  avec  vous, 
nous  couteront  notre  dynastie."  ^ 

A  prophetic  foreshadowing  of  the  dov^nfall  of 
the  reigning  Russian  dynasty! 

From  Brest  I  went  to  Strassburg,  where  my 
grandfather  was  attending  the  Imperial  maneu- 
vers. In  spite  of  the  failure  of  my  mission  I  found 
calm  judgments  of  the  political  situation.  My 
grandfather  was  pleased  at  the  cordial  greetings 
from  the  Tsar,  which,  in  so  far  as  the  personal 
relationship  of  the  two  rulers  was  concerned, 
showed  no  change  of  heart.  Also,  to  my  surprise, 
I  received  a  letter  from  Prince  Bismarck  wherein 
he  expressed  gratitude  and  appreciation  to  me  for 
my  actions  and  my  report.  This  meant  all  the 
more  since  my  statements  could  not  have  been 
agreeable  to  my  grandfather  and  the  Chancellor. 
The  Congress  of  Berlin  had,  especially  in  Russian 
military  circles,  done  away  with  the  remnants  of 
the  brotherhood  in  arms  still  fostered  among  us 
and  had  engendered  a  hatred  against  everything 
Prussian  and  German,  stirred  up  by  association 

1  "It  is  that  confounded  Congress  of  Berlin.  A  serious  mistake  on 
the  part  of  the  Chancellor.  He  has  destroyed  the  old  friendship 
between  us,  sown  distrust  in  the  hearts  of  the  Court  and  the  Govern- 
ment, and  engendered  the  idea  of  a  great  injustice  done  the  Russian 
army  after  its  bloody  1877  campaign,  for  which  it  wishes  revenge. 
And  here  we  are  by  the  side  of  that  damned  French  Republic,  full 
of  hate  for  you  and  of  subversive  ideas,  which,  in  case  of  a  war 
against  you,  will  cost  us  our  dynasty." 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

with  French  ofBcers,  which  was  increased  by  the 
French  until  it  developed  into  the  desire  of  ven- 
geance by  means  of  arms.  That  was  the  soil  in 
which,  later,  the  World  War  ambitions  of  our 
foes  found  nourishment.  "Revanche  pour  Sedan," 
combined  with  "Revanche  pour  San  Stefano." 
The  words  of  the  old  General  at  Brest  have  re- 
mained unforgettably  engraved  upon  my  memory ; 
they  induced  me  to  bring  about  my  many  meetings 
with  Alexander  III  and  Nicholas  II,  at  which  my 
grandfather's  wish,  impressed  upon  me  on  his 
deathbed,  that  I  watch  over  our  relations  with 
Russia,  has  always  been  my  guiding  motive.  , 

RELIEF  AT  CHANCELLOR'S  DISMISSAL 

In  1890,  at  the  Narva  maneuvers,  I  was  obliged 
to  describe  minutely  to  the  Tsar  the  retirement  of 
Prince  Bismarck.  The  Tsar  listened  very  atten- 
tively. When  I  had  finished,  the  usually  very  cool 
and  reserved  sovereign,  who  seldom  spoke  about 
politics,  spontaneously  seized  my  hand,  thanked  me 
for  this  token  of  my  confidence,  regretted  that  I 
had  been  brought  into  such  a  situation  and  added, 
in  exactly  these  words :  "Je  comprends  parf aite- 
ment  ta  ligne  d'action;  le  Prince  avec  toute  sa 
grandeur  n'etait  apres  tout  rien  d'autre  que  ton 
employe  ou  fonctionnaire.  Le  moment  ou  il  re- 
fusait  d'agir  selon  tes  ordres,  il  f allait  le  renvoyer. 
Moi  pour  ma  part  je  me  suis  toujours  mefie  de  lui, 
at  je  ne  lui  ai  jamais  cru  un  mot  de  ce  qu'il  faisait 
savoir  ou  me  disait  lui-meme,  car  j'etais  sur  et 
savais  qu'il  me  blaguait  tout  le  temps.    Pour  les 

18 


BISMARCK 


rapports  entre  nous  deux,  mon  cher  Guillaume 
[this  was  the  first  time  that  the  Tsar  so  addressed 
me],  la  chute  du  Prince  aura  les  meilleures  con- 
sequences, la  mefiance  disparaitra.  J'ai  confidance 
en  toi.  Tu  peux  te  fier  a  moi."  ^ 

I  immediately  wrote  down  this  important  talk 
at  the  time  it  occurred.  I  am  objective  enough  to 
ask  myself  to  what  extent  the  courtesy  of  one  ruler 
to  another  and  possibly,  in  addition,  the  satisfac- 
tion at  the  elimination  of  a  statesman  of  Bismarck's 
importance,  can  have  influenced  the  Tsar,  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  in  making  the  above- 
mentioned  statement.  Prince  Bismarck's  belief  in 
the  Tsar's  trust  in  him  was,  subjectively,  undoubt- 
edly genuine;  and,  moreover,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  esteem  in  which  Alexander  III 
held  Bismarck's  ability  as  a  statesman. 

In  any  even,  the  Tsar  remained  true  to  his  word 
up  to  the  day  of  his  death.  This,  to  be  sure,  did 
little  to  change  Russia's  general  policy,  but  Ger- 
many, at  least,  was  safe  from  an  attack  from  that 
quarter.  The  straightforward  character  of  Alex- 
ander III  guaranteed  this — it  became  otherwise 
under  his  weak  son. 

Whatever  one's  attitude  may  be  toward  Bis- 

1  "I  understand  perfectly  your  line  of  action ;  the  Prince,  with  all 
his  greatness,  was,  after  all,  merely  your  employee  or  official.  As 
soon  as  he  refused  to  follow  your  orders,  it  was  necessary  to  dismiss 
him.  As  for  me,  I  always  distrusted  him,  and  I  never  believed  a 
word  of  what  he  had  told  me  or  said  to  me  himself,  for  I  was 
sure  and  knew  that  he  was  hoaxing  me  all  the  time.  As  to  the  rela-> 
tions  between  us  two,  my  dear  William,  the  downfall  of  the  Prince 
will  have  the  best  of  results;  distrust  will  disappear.  I  have  con- 
fidence in  you.   You  can  trust  me." 

3  19 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


marck's  Russian  policy,  one  thing  must  be  ac- 
knowledged: the  Prince,  despite  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  and  the  rapprochement  of  France  to  Rus- 
sia, was  able  to  avoid  serious  friction.  That  is 
equivalent  to  saying  that,  reckoning  from  the  time 
of  the  Berlin  Congress,  he  played  a  superior  diplo- 
matic and  statesmanlike  game  for  twelve  years 

(1 878-90)  V 

GERMANY  AS  PEACEMAKER 

One  must  also  lay  stress  upon  the  fact  that  it  was 
a  German  statesman  who,  in  1878,  prevented  a 
general  war,  even  at  the  cost  of  weakening  the 
relations  of  Germany  to  Russia,  in  the  justified 
belief  that  he  would  succeed,  being  a  statesman 
of  genius  who  knew  exactly  what  he  was  aiming 
at,  in  strengthening  these  relations  once  more,  or, 
at  least,  in  avoiding  conflicts  after  he  had  over- 
come the  crisis  threatening  all  Europe. 

He  succeeded  in  doing  that  for  twelve  years 
and  his  successors  at  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  state 
succeeded  in  doing  likewise  for  twenty-four  more 
years. 

When  I  was  a  Prince  I  purposely  held  aloof 
from  party  politics,  concentrating  my  entire  atten- 
tion upon  my  duties  in  the  different  army  branches 
to  which  I  was  assigned.  This  afforded  me  satis- 
faction and  filled  up  my  whole  life.  For  this 
reason  I  avoided,  while  I  was  Prince  of  Prussia, 
all  attempts  to  drag  me  into  party  activities.  Often 
enough  endeavors  were  made,  under  the  cloak  of 
harmless  functions,  teas  and  the  like,  to  ensnare 

20 


BISMARCK 


me  into  political  circles  or  for  electioneering  pur- 
poses.   But  I  always  held  aloof. 

The  outcome  of  the  treacherous  malady  which 
killed  Emperor  Frederick  III  was  frankly  told 
me  in  advance  by  German  physicians  called  into 
consultation  as  experts  by  the  English  physician, 
Sir  Morell  Mackenzie.  My  deep  grief  and  sor- 
row were  all  the  greater  because  it  was  almost 
impossible  for  me  to  speak  alone  with  my  beloved 
father.  He  was  guarded  like  a  prisoner  by  the 
English  physicians  and,  though  reporters  from  all 
countries  could  look  upon  the  poor  sick  man  from 
the  physicians'  room,  every  kind  of  obstacle  was 
placed  in  my  path  to  keep  me  from  my  father's  side 
and  even  to  prevent  me  from  keeping  in  constant 
touch  with  him  by  writing;  my  letters  were  often 
intercepted  and  not  delivered.  Moreover,  from 
among  the  group  of  watchers,  an  infamous,  organ- 
ized compaign  of  slander  was  conducted  in  the 
newspapers  against  me.  Two  journalists  were 
especially  active  in  this:  one  Herr  Schnidrowitz 
and  M.  Jacques  St.  Cere,  of  the  Figaro — a  Ger- 
man Jew — who  slandered  him  who  was  later 
Emperor  in  the  most  poisonous  way  in  France, 
until  the  "Petit  Sucrier"  trial  put  an  end  to  his 
activities. 

I  gave  the  dying  Emperor  his  last  joy  on  earth 
when  I  had  the  Second  Infantry  Brigade  march 
past  him,  led  by  me  in  person.  These  were  the 
first  and  last  troops  seen  by  Frederick  III  as  Em- 
peror. He  delighted  his  son  by  writing  on  this 
occasion,  on  a  little  card^  that  he  was  grateful  for 

21 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


having  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  these  troops  and 
proud  to  call  them  his  own.  This  event  was  a  ray 
of  light  during  the  gloomy  ninety-nine  days,  which 
brought  upon  me  also,  as  Crown  Prince,  much 
grief,  humiliation,  and  suspicion.  In  fulfillment 
of  my  duty  during  this  crisis,  I  kept  a  watchful 
eye  upon  all  happenings  in  military,  official,  and 
social  circles,  and  was  inwardly  outraged  at  the 
signs  of  slackness  which  I  noted  everywhere,  most 
especially  at  the  hostility  against  my  mother,  which 
was  becoming  more  and  more  noticeable.  More- 
over, I  was  naturally  deeply  hurt  at  the  constant 
campaign  of  slander  directed  against  me  which 
depicted  me  as  living  in  discord  with  my  father. 

HE  BECOMES  EMPEROR 

After  Emperor  Frederick  III  had  closed  his 
eyes  forever,  the  heavy  burden  of  governing  the 
Empire  fell  upon  my  youthful  shoulders.  First  of 
all  I  was  confronted  with  the  necessity  of  making 
changes  in  the  government  personnel  in  various 
quarters.  The  military  entourage  of  the  two  em- 
perors, as  well  as  the  body  of  officialdom,  had 
grown  too  old.  The  so-called  "maison  militaire" 
(military  household  of  Emperor  William  the 
Great)  had  been  retained  in  its  entirety  by  Em- 
peror Frederick  III,  without  being  required  to 
discharge  military  duties.  In  addition,  there  was 
the  entourage  of  Emperor  Frederick  III.  I  pro- 
ceeded to  dismiss,  in  the  friendliest  way,  all  those 
gentlemen  who  wished  to  go  into  retirement;  some 
of  them  received  positions  in  the  army,  a  few  of 

22 


BISMARCK 

the  younger  remained  in  my  service  for  the  tran- 
sition period. 

During  the  ninety-nine  days,  while  I  was  still 
Crown  Prince,  I  had  silently  concerned  myself 
with  those  personages  to  whom  I  proposed  later 
to  give  appointments,  since  the  physicians  had  left 
me  no  doubt  that  my  father  had  only  a  short  time 
to  live.  I  ignored  court  or  external  considera- 
tions; nothing  but  previous  achievements  and 
character  moved  me  to  my  choice.  I  did  away  with 
the  term  "maison  militaire''  and  transformed  it 
into  "Main  Headquarters  of  His  Majesty."  In 
choosing  my  entourage  I  took  the  advice  of  only 
one  man  in  whom  I  reposed  special  confidence, 
my  former  chief  and  brigade  commander.  Gen- 
eral— afterward  Adjutant  General — von  Versen,  a 
man  of  straightforward,  knightly,  rather  harsh 
character,  an  officer  of  the  old  Prussian  school,  a 
typical  chip  of  the  old  block.  During  his  military 
service  in  line  and  guard  regiments  he  had  noted 
with  an  observing  eye  the  court  influences  and  ten- 
dencies which  had  often  worked  to  the  disadvan- 
tage of  the  officer  corps  in  the  old  "maison 
militaire."  In  this  direction  the  circle  of  ladies 
of  high  position,  jokingly  known  among  the  officers 
as  "trente  et  quarante"  on  account  of  their  age, 
also  played  a  certain  part.  I  wished  to  eliminate 
such  influences. 

I  appointed  General  von  Wittich  my  First 
Adjutant  General  and  General  von  Hahnke,  com- 
mander of  the  Second  Infantry  Guard  Division, 
chief  of  my  Military  Cabinet.   The  latter  was  a 

23 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

friend  of  Emperor  Frederick  III  and,  while  I  was 
still  serving  with  the  First  Infantry  Guard  Regi- 
ment, he  was  my  brigade  commander.  These  two 
were  men  of  military  experience  and  iron  prin- 
ciples, who  shared  absolutely  the  sentiments  of 
their  master,  and  remained  bound  to  me  to  the  end 
of  their  lives  by  the  most  exemplary  fidelity. 

As  the  head  of  my  court  I  appointed  a  man 
known  to  me  from  his  youth,  the  former  Court 
Marshal  of  my  father,  Count  August  Eulenburg, 
who  remained  at  the  head  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Royal  House  until  his  death  in  June,  1921,  at  the 
age  of  eighty-two  years.  He  was  a  man  of  fine 
tact,  uncommon  ability,  clear  insight  in  court  as 
well  as  political  matters,  sincere  character,  and 
golden  fidelity  to  his  King  and  his  King's  family. 
His  manifold  abilities  would  have  enabled  him, 
to  the  same  degree  that  they  had  made  him  known 
as  Court  Marshal  throughout  Europe,  to  act  with 
equal  success  as  ambassador  or  as  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor. Working  with  unswerving  zeal,  endowed 
with  winning  politeness,  he  stood  by  me  with  help- 
ful counsel  in  many  matters — dynastic,  family, 
court,  public  life.  He  had  to  do  with  many 
men,  in  all  social  strata  and  all  walks  of  life, 
by  all  of  whom  he  was  revered  and  esteemed, 
and  he  was  treated  by  me  likewise  with  friend- 
ship and  gratitude. 

VICTORIA'S  HAND  IS  FELT 

After  consultation  with  Prince  Bismarck,  Herr 
von  Lucanus  from  the  Ministry  of  Public  Worship 

24 


BISMARCK 

and  Instruction,  was  appointed  chief  of  the  Civil 
Cabinet,  Prince  Bismarck  observed  jokingly  that 
he  was  pleased  with  this  choice,  since  Herr  von 
Lucanus  was  known  to  him  as  an  able  and  enthusi- 
astic huntsman,  which  was  always  a  good  recom- 
mendation for  a  civilian  official;  he  added  that  a 
good  huntsman  was  a  regular  good  fellow.  Herr 
von  Lucanus  took  over  his  post  from  His  Excel- 
lency von  Wilmowski.  He  discharged  his  duties 
admirably  and,  being  well  endowed  in  all  per- 
taining to  art,  technical  matters,  science,  and  pol- 
itics, he  was  to  me  a  counselor,  untiring  collabo- 
rator, and  friend.  He  combined  with  a  healthy 
knowledge  of  men  a  strong  dash  of  refined  humor, 
which  is  so  often  lacking  in  men  of  the  Germanic 
race. 

With  Prince  Bismarck  I  had  stood  on  very  good 
and  trustful  terms  ever  since  my  assignment  at 
the  Foreign  Office.  Then,  as  well  as  before,  I 
revered  the  powerful  Chancellor  with  all  the 
ardor  of  my  youth  and  was  proud  to  have  served 
under  him  and  to  have  the  opportunity  now  to 
work  with  him  as  my  Chancellor. 

The  Prince,  who  was  present  during  the  last 
hours  of  the  old  Emperor  and  had  listened  with 
me  to  the  latter's  political  testament  to  his  grand- 
son— /.  e.y  his  wish  as  to  the  special  care  to  be 
lavished  upon  relations  with  Russia — ^brought 
about  my  summer  trip  to  St.  Petersburg  as  my 
first  political  act  before  the  eyes  of  the  world,  in 
order  to  emphasize  our  relationship  to  Russia  in 
accordance  with  the  last  wish  of  my  dying  grand- 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

father.  He  also  had  "travel  arrangements"  drawn 
up  for  me. 

An  obstacle  was  placed  in  the  way  of  carrying 
out  this  plan  by  a  letter  from  Queen  Victoria  of 
England,  who,  upon  hearing  of  the  projected  visit 
to  St.  Petersburg,  expressed  to  her  eldest  grand- 
son, in  a  good-humored  but  authoritative  tone,  her 
disapproval  of  the  contemplated  journey.  She 
said  that  a  year  of  mourning  must  first  elapse,  after 
which  my  first  visit  was  due  to  her,  since  she  was 
my  grandmother,  and  to  England,  it  being  the 
native  country  of  my  mother,  before  other  lands 
should  be  considered.  When  I  placed  this  letter 
before  the  Prince,  he  gave  way  to  a  violent  fit  of 
anger.  He  spoke  about  "family  dictation  in  Eng- 
land," of  interference  from  that  quarter  which 
must  cease ;  the  tone  of  the  letter  showed,  he  said, 
how  the  Crown  Prince  and  Emperor  Frederick 
had  been  ordered  about  and  influenced  by  his 
mother-in-law,  wife,  etc.  Thereupon  the  Prince 
wished  to  draw  up  the  text  of  a  reply  to  the  Queen. 
I  remarked  that  I  would  prepare  the  appropriate 
answer,  steering  the  proper  middle  course  between 
the  grandson  and  the  Emperor,  and  that  I  would 
show  it  to  the  Prince  before  dispatching  it. 

The  answer  paid  heed  in  its  outward  form  to  the 
close  relationship  between  a  grandson  and  his 
grandmother,  who  had  carried  him  in  her  arms 
when  he  was  a  baby  and,  in  view  of  her  age  alone, 
commanded  great  respect — but,  in  its  essentials, 
it  laid  stress  upon  the  position  and  duty  of  the 
German  Emperor,  compelled  to  carry  out  uncon- 

26 


BISMARCK 


ditionally  a  command  of  his  dying  father  aflPecting 
Germany's  most  vital  interests.  It  stated  that  the 
grandson  was  obliged  to  respect  this  command  of 
his  grandfather  in  the  interest  of  the  country,  the 
representation  of  which  interests  had  now  devolved 
upon  him  by  the  will  of  God,  and  that  his  royal 
grandmother  must  leave  to  him  the  question  of 
deciding  in  what  manner  this  was  to  be  done.  I 
added  that,  otherwise,  I  was  her  loving  grandson, 
who  would  always  be  grateful  for  any  advice  from 
his  grandmother,  who  had  derived  so  much  ex- 
perience from  her  long  reign;  but  that  I  was, 
nevertheless,  in  matters  affecting  Germany,  com- 
pelled to  retain  my  freedom  of  action;  the  visit  to 
St.  Petersburg,  I  said,  was  politically  necessary, 
and  the  command  of  my  Imperial  grandfather  was 
consonant  with  the  close  family  relations  between 
me  and  the  Russian  Imperial  house;  therefore  it 
would  be  carried  out. 

The  Prince  approved  of  the  letter.  The  answer, 
which  arrived  after  a  while,  was  surprising.  The 
Queen  agreed  that  her  grandson  was  in  the  right ; 
he  must  act  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  his 
country ;  she  would  be  glad  to  see  him,  even  if  it 
were  later  on,  at  her  own  home.  From  that  day 
onward  my  relations  with  the  Queen,  who  was 
feared  even  by  her  own  children,  were  of  the  best 
imaginable;  from  that  day  onward  she  never 
treated  her  grandson  except  as  a  sovereign  of  equal 
rank  with  herself  1 

On  my  first  journeys  I  was  accompanied  by 
Count  Herbert,  as  the  representative  of  the  For- 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

eign  Office.  He  drew  up  the  speeches  and  con- 
ducted the  political  conferences,  in  so  far  as  they 
were  of  an  official  nature,  in  accordance  with  the 
instructions  of  his  father. 

CONFLICT  ON  TURKISH  POLICY 

Upon  my  return  from  Constantinople  in  1889 
I  described  to  the  Prince  at  his  request  my  impres- 
sions of  Greece,  where  my  sister  Sophie  was  mar- 
ried to  the  heir-apparent.  Crown  Prince  Constan- 
tine,  and  also  my  Constantinople  impressions.  In 
doing  this,  it  struck  me  that  Prince  Bismarck  spoke 
quite  disdainfully  of  Turkey,  of  the  men  in  high 
position  there,  and  of  conditions  in  that  land.  I 
thought  I  might  inspire  him  in  part  with  essen- 
tially more  favorable  opinions,  but  my  efforts 
were  of  little  avail.  Upon  asking  the  Prince  the 
reason  why  he  held  such  an  unfavorable  opinion, 
he  answered  that  Count  Herbert  had  reported  very 
disapprovingly  on  Turkey.  Prince  Bismarck  and 
Count  Herbert  were  never  favorably  inclined  to- 
ward Turkey  and  they  never  agreed  with  me  in 
my  Turkish  policy — the  old  policy  of  Frederick 
the  Great. 

During  the  last  period  of  his  tenure  of  office  as 
Chancellor,  Bismarck  declared  that  the  mainte- 
nance of  friendly  relations  with  Russia,  whose  Tsar 
reposed  special  trust  in  him,  was  the  most  impor- 
tant reason  for  his  remaining  at  his  post.  In  this 
connection  it  was  that  he  gave  me  the  first  hints 
concerning  the  secret  reinsurance  treaty  with  Rus- 
sia.   Up  to  then  I  had  heard  nothing  about  it, 

28 


BISMARCK 

either  from  the  Prince  or  the  Foreign  Office, 
although  it  happened  that  I  had  concerned  myself 
especially  with  Russian  matters. 

When  I  assumed  the  reins  of  government  owing 
to  the  early  death  of  my  father,  the  generation  of 
the  grandson,  as  I  have  already  remarked,  fol- 
lowed upon  the  generation  of  the  grandfather, 
which  meant  that  the  entire  generation  of  Emperor 
Frederick  was  overleaped.  This  generation, 
through  its  dealings  with  Crown  Prince  Frederick 
William,  was  imbued  with  many  liberal  ideas 
and  projects  of  reform  which  were  to  be  carried 
out  under  the  direction  of  the  Emperor  Frederick. 
Upon  his  death,  this  entire  generation,  especially 
the  politicians,  found  itself  deceived  in  its  hopes 
of  exerting  influence,  and  felt  itself,  to  a  certain 
extent,  in  the  position  of  an  orphan.  Those  be- 
longing to  it,  despite  the  fact  that  they  did  not 
know  my  inner  thoughts  and  aims,  adopted  a  dis- 
trustful and  reserved  attitude  toward  me,  instead 
of  transferring  their  interest  from  the  father  to  the 
son,  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  the  welfare  of 
the  fatherland. 

There  was  one  exception  to  this — a  representa- 
tive of  the  National  Liberals,  Herr  von  Benda — 
a  man  still  in  the  full  bloom  of  youth.  While  I 
was  still  Prince  I  had  made  his  acquaintance  at  the 
great  hare  hunts  got  up  by  Councilor  Dietze  at 
Barby.  There  Herr  von  Benda  had  won  my  affec- 
tion and  confidence  when  I,  surrounded  by  older 
men,  had  listened  to  discussions  on  political,  agri- 
cultural, and  national-economic  questions.   In  the 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

course  of  these,  Herr  von  Benda  held  my  attention 
by  means  of  his  independent,  interesting  judgment. 
I  accepted  with  pleasure  an  invitation  to  Benda's 
country  seat,  Rudow,  near  Berlin,  and  from  this 
arose  the  custom  of  a  regular  yearly  visit. 

The  hours  spent  in  the  family  circle  at  Rudow 
stand  out  pleasantly  in  my  memory.  His  talented 
daughters  used  to  regale  us  with  music.  The  polit- 
ical conversations  there  proved  Herr  von  Benda 
to  be  a  man  of  great  foresight,  which,  free  from 
partisan  considerations,  gave  him  an  open  mind 
as  to  the  general  needs  of  the  state  to  an  extent 
seldom  found  among  members  of  political  parties. 
He  gave  me  many  a  helpful  piece  of  advice  for 
the  future,  drawn  from  the  depths  of  his  faithful, 
genuinely  Prussian  heart,  by  which  he  was  attached 
firmly  to  the  family  of  his  sovereign ;  yet  he  was 
able  to  feel  broad  tolerance  for  other  parties. 

HIS  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  PARTIES 

The  later  periods  of  my  reign  proved  that  I  was 
not  hostile  to  any  party,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Ultra-Socialists;  also,  that  I  was  not  anti-Liberal. 
My  most  important  Finance  Minister  was  the 
Liberal,  Miquel;  my  Minister  of  Commerce  was 
the  Liberal,  Moeller;  the  leader  of  the  Liberals, 
Herr  von  Bennigsen,  was  Chief  President  of  Han- 
over. I  stood  very  close,  especially  in  the  second 
half  of  my  reign,  to  an  elderly  Liberal  deputy, 
whose  acquaintance  I  made  through  Herr  von 
Miquel.  This  man  was  Herr  Seydel  (Celchen), 
owner  of  an  estate  in  eastern  Germany — a  man 

30  V 


BISMARCK 


with  two  clever  eyes,  which  gazed  forth  from  a 
clean-shaven  face.  He  worked  with  Miquel  in 
railway  and  canal  questions,  and  was  a  thoroughly 
able,  simple,  practical  man — a  Liberal  with  a 
streak  of  conservatism. 

Naturally,  I  had  numerous  dealings  and  points 
of  contact  with  the  Conservative  party,  since  the 
gentlemen  of  the  country  nobility  often  met  me  at 
court  hunts  and  other  hunts,  or  else  came  to  court 
and  served  in  court  positions.  Through  them  I 
could  become  thoroughly  informed  on  all  agra- 
rian questions  and  learn  where  the  farmer's  shoe 
pinched  him. 

The  Free  Thinkers,  under  the  "unswerving" 
leader,  entered  into  no  relations  with  me ;  they  lim- 
ited themselves  to  opposition. 

In  my  conversations  with  Benda  and  Bennigsen 
we  often  spoke  of  the  future  of  Liberalism,  and, 
on  one  occasion,  Benda  made  this  interesting  ob- 
servation: "It  is  not  necessary  and  also  not  advis- 
able to  have  the  Prussian  heir-apparent  dabble  in 
Liberalism — ^we  have  no  use  for  that  sort  of  thing. 
He  must  be  essentially  conservative,  though  he 
must,  at  the  same  time,  combine  this  with  breadth, 
and  avoid  narrowness  and  prejudice  against  other 
parties." 

Bennigsen  agreed  with  me  when  I  spoke  to  him 
of  the  necessity  of  having  the  National  Liberals 
revise  their  program,  which — originally  bearing 
the  motto:  "Maintenance  of  the  German  Empire 
and  Freedom  of  the  Press" — had  long  since  rallied 
the  members  around  the  Liberal  banner — in  order 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

that,  by  such  revision,  the  proselytizing  power  of 
the  old  brand  of  Prussian  Liberalism  should  not 
be  lost  among  the  people.  Both  the  Prussian 
Liberals  and  the  Conservatives,  I  continued,  made 
the  mistake  of  remembering  too  well  the  old 
period  of  conflict  of  1 861-66;  and,  at  elections 
and  other  political  fights,  they  were  prone  to  fall 
back  into  the  habits  of  those  days.  That  period, 
I  said,  had  already  passed  into  history  and  come 
to  an  end  so  far  as  our  generation  was  concerned; 
the  present  had  begun  for  us  with  the  year  1870 
and  the  new  Empire;  our  generation  had  drawn 
a  line  under  the  year  1866;  we  must  build  anew 
upon  the  foundations  of  the  Empire;  political 
parties  must  shape  their  course  also  in  this  direc- 
tion and  not  take  over  from  the  past  stuff  that  was 
outworn  and,  moreover,  calculated  to  create  dis- 
cord. Unfortunately,  all  this  has  not  come  to 
pass.  Bennigsen  made  a  very  telling  point  when 
he  said:  "Woe  to  the  North  German  Liberals  if 
they  come  under  the  leadership  of  the  South  Ger- 
man Democrats,  for  that  will  mean  the  end  of 
real,  genuine  Liberalism!  Then  we  shall  get  the 
masked  democracy  arising  from  below,  for  which 
we  have  no  use  hereabout." 

The  Conservative  party,  honorable  and  faith- 
ful to  its  King,  unfortunately  has  not  always  pro- 
duced leaders  of  superior  endowments  who  were 
at  the  same  time  skillful,  tactically  trained  poli- 
ticians. The  agrarian  wing  was  at  times  too 
strongly  marked  and  was  a  burden  to  the  party. 
Moreover,  memories  of  the  period  of  conflict  were 

32 


BISMAIV^K 

still  too  lively.  I  counseled  union  with  the  Lib- 
erals, but  found  little  support.  I  often  pointed 
out  that  the  National  Liberals  in  the  Empire  were 
true  to  the  Empire  and  to  the  Emperor,  for  which 
reason  they  should  be  thoroughly  welcome  to  the 
Conservatives  as  allies;  that  I  could  not  and  did 
not  wish  to  govern  without  them  in  the  Em- 
pire, and  was  absolutely  unwilling  to  govern 
against  them;  that  North  German  conserva- 
tism was  misunderstood  in  some  parts  of  the 
Empire  because  of  differences  in  historical  de- 
velopment; and  that,  therefore,  the  National 
Liberals  were  the  natural  allies.  It  was  owing  to 
these  views  of  mine,  for  instance,  that  I  removed 
Court  Preacher  Stocker,  a  man  of  brilliant 
achievement  as  a  social  missionary,  from  his  post, 
since  he  made  a  demagogical  provocative  speech 
in  South  Germany,  aimed  against  the  Liberals 
there. 

The  Center  party  was  welded  together  by  the 
**Kulturkampf"  and  was  strongly  anti-Protestant 
and  hostile  to  the  Empire.  Notwithstanding  this, 
I  had  dealings  with  many  important  men  of  the 
party  and  managed  to  interest  them  in  practical 
collaboration  for  the  good  of  all.  In  this  Schor- 
lemer  (the  father)  was  especially  helpful  to  me. 
He  never  made  a  secret  of  his  Prussian  loyalty  to 
his  King.  His  son,  the  well-known  Minister  of 
Agriculture,  even  joined  the  Conservative  party. 
In  many  matters  the  Center  co-operated;  at  one 
period  it  possessed  in  its  old  leader,  Windthorst, 
the  keenest  politician  in  the  legislature.  Never- 

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THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

theless,  in  spite  of  all  this,  one  could  not  help 
being  aware  of  the  underlying  Centerist  conviction 
that  the  interests  of  the  Roman  Church  must 
always  be  maintained  and  never  relegated  to  a 
secondary  place. 

THE  BREAK  WITH  BISMARCK 

When  I  was  Prince  William  I  was  placed  for 
a  long  time  under  the  Chief  President  of  the 
Province  of  Brandenburg,  von  Achenbach,  in 
order  that  I  might  learn  about  home  administra- 
tion, get  experience  in  economic  questions,  and, 
moreover,  take  an  active  part  in  the  work. 
Spurred  on  by  the  captivating  discourses  of  Achen- 
bach, I  derived  from  this  period  of  my  life  a 
special  interest  in  the  economic  side  of  the  inner 
development  of  the  country,  whereas  the  purely 
judicial  side  of  the  administration  interested  me 
to  a  lesser  degree.  Improvements,  canal  construc- 
tion, highway  building,  forestry,  improvement  in 
all  kinds  of  transportation  facilities,  betterment 
of  dwellings,  introduction  of  machines  into  agri- 
culture and  their  co-operative  development — all 
of  these  were  matters  with  which  I  busied  myself 
later  on;  this  being  especially  true  of  hydraulic 
work  and  the  development  of  the  network  of  rail- 
ways, particularly  in  the  badly  neglected  territory 
of  Eastern  Germany. 

I  discussed  all  these  matters  with  the  Ministers 
of  State  after  I  had  ascended  the  throne.  In  order 
to  spur  them  on,  I  allowed  them  free  rein  in  their 
various  domains.   But  it  turned  out  that  this  was 

34 


BISMARCK 


hardly  possible  so  long  as  Prince  Bismarck  re- 
mained in  office,  since  he  reserved  for  himself  the 
main  deciding  voice  in  everything,  thereby  im- 
pairing the  independence  of  those  working  with 
him.  I  soon  saw  that  the  Ministers,  being  entirely 
under  Bismarck's  thumb,  could  not  come  out  in 
favor  of  "innovations"  or  ideas  of  the  "young 
master"  of  which  Bismarck  disapproved. 

The  Ministry,  in  short,  was  nothing  but  a  tool 
in  the  hands  of  Bismarck,  acting  solely  in  accord- 
ance with  his  wishes.  This  state  of  things  was,  in 
itself,  natural  enough,  since  a  Premier  of  such 
overwhelming  importance,  who  had  won  for  Prus- 
sia and  Germany  such  great  political  victories, 
naturally  dominated  his  Ministers  completely  and 
led  them  despotically.  Nevertheless,  I  found  my- 
self in  a  difficult  position ;  the  typical  answer  with 
which  my  suggestions  were  met  was :  "Prince 
Bismarck  does  not  want  that  done;  we  cannot  get 
him  to  consent  to  that;  Emperor  William  I  would 
not  have  asked  such  a  thing ;  that  is  not  in  accord- 
ance with  tradition,  etc."  I  understood  more  and 
more  that,  in  reality,  I  had  no  Ministry  of  State 
at  my  disposal ;  that  the  gentlemen  composing  it, 
from  long  force  of  habit,^  considered  themselves 
officials  of  Prince  Bismarck. 

Here  is  an  example  to  show  the  attitude  of  the 
Cabinet  toward  me  in  those  Bismarck  days:  The 
question  came  up  of  renewing  the  Socialist  law, 
a  political  measure  devised  by  Prince  Bismarck 
for  fighting  socialism.  A  certain  paragraph  therein 
was  to  be  toned  down,  in  order  to  save  the  law. 
4  35 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Bismarck  opposed  the  change.  There  were  sharp 
differences  of  opinion.  I  summoned  a  Crown 
Council.  Bismarck  spoke  in  the  antechamber 
with  my  adjutant;  he  declared  that  His  Majesty 
completely  forgot  that  he  was  an  officer  and  wore 
a  sword  belt;  that  he  must  fall  back  upon  the 
army  and  lead  it  against  the  Socialists,  in  case  the 
Socialists  should  resort  to  revolutionary  measures ; 
that  the  Emperor  should  leave  him  a  free  hand, 
which  would  restore  quiet  once  for  all.  At  the 
Crown  Council  Bismarck  stuck  to  his  opinion. 
The  individual  Ministers,  when  asked  to  express 
their  views,  were  lukewarm.  A  vote  was  taken — 
the  entire  Ministry  voted  against  me. 

This  vote  showed  me  once  more  the  absolute 
domination  exerted  by  the  Chancellor  over  his 
Ministers.  Deeply  dissatisfied,  I  talked  over  the 
matter  with  His  Excellency  Lucanus,  who  was  as 
much  struck  as  I  was  by  the  situation.  Lucanus 
looked  up  some  of  the  gentlemen  and  took  them 
to  task  for  their  attitude,  whereupon  they  made  it 
clear  that  they  were  "not  in  a  position"  to  oppose 
the  Prince  and  declared  that  it  was  quite  impos- 
sible for  anybody  to  expect  them  to  vote  against 
the  wishes  of  the  Prince. 

HANDLING  A  COAL  STRIKE 

The  great  Westphalian  coal  workers'  strike  in 
the  spring  of  1889  took  the  civil  administration 
by  surprise,  causing  great  confusion  and  bewilder- 
ment, especially  among  members  of  the  Westpha- 
lian provincial  administration.    From  all  sides 

36 


/ 


BISMARCK 


came  calls  for  troops;  every  mine  owner  wanted, 
if  possible,  to  have  sentries  posted  outside  his  room. 
The  commanders  of  the  troops  which  were  sum- 
moned immediately  made  reports  on  the  situation 
as  they  had  found  it. 

Among  these  was  one  of  my  former  barrack 
comrades,  belonging  to  the  Hussar  Guard  Regi- 
ment, von  Michaelis  by  name,  who  was  famous  as 
a  wit  He  rode,  alone  and  unarmed,  among  the 
striking  crowds  of  workers,  who — the  early  spring 
being  remarkably  warm — ^were  camped  upon  the 
hillsides,  and  soon  managed,  by  his  confidence- 
inspiring,  jovial  ways,  to  set  up  a  harmless  inter- 
course with  the  strikers.  By  questioning  them  he 
obtained  much  valuable  information  about  the 
grievances — real  and  imaginary — of  the  workers, 
as  well  as  about  their  plans,  hopes,  and  wishes  for 
the  future.  He  soon  won  for  himself  general  ap- 
preciation and  affection  among  the  workers  and 
handled  them  so  well  that  complete  quiet  reigned 
in  his  territory.  When  I,  on  account  of  nervous 
and  worried  telegrams  from  the  big  industrial 
leaders  and  officials  received  at  the  office  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  inquired  of  Michaelis  how 
the  situation  stood,  the  following  telegraphed  an- 
swer came  from  him:  "Everything  quiet  except- 
ing the  Government  officials." 

A  mass  of  material  was  collected,  during  the 
spring  and  summer,  from  the  announcements  and 
reports  received  which  showed  clearly  that  all  was 
not  well  in  industrial  circles;  that  many  a  wish 
of  the  workers  was  justified  and,  to  say  the  least, 

37 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

entitled  to  sympathetic  investigation  on  the  part 
both  of  the  employers  and  of  the  officials.  The 
realization  of  this,  which  was  confirmed  in  me  when 
I  questioned  my  former  private  teacher,  Privy 
Councilor  Dr.  Hinzpeter — a  man  particularly 
well  informed  on  social  phenomena,  especially 
those  in  his  own  province — caused  the  resolve  to 
ripen  in  me  to  summon  the  State  Council,  include 
employers  and  employees  in  its  deliberations,  and 
bring  about,  under  my  personal  direction,  a  thor- 
ough investigation  of  the  labor  question.  I  decided 
that  in  so  doing  guiding  principles  and  material 
were  to  be  acquired  which  would  serve  the  Chan- 
cellor and  the  Prussian  Government  as  a  basis  for 
working  out  appropriate  projects  for  new  laws. 

Inspired  by  such  thought  I  went  to  His  Excel- 
lency von  Botticher,  who  at  once  prophesied  op- 
position on  the  part  of  the  Chancellor  to  such 
action,  and  advised  strongly  against  it.  I  stuck 
to  my  ideas,  adducing  in  support  of  them  the 
maxim  of  Frederick  the  Great:  "Je  veux  etre  un 
Roi  des  gueux"  ("I  wish  to  be  King  of  the  rab- 
ble"). I  said  that  it  was  my  duty  to  take  care  of 
those  Germans  who  were  used  up  by  industry,  to 
protect  their  strength  and  better  their  chances  of 
existence. 

FURTHER  CONFLICT  WITH  CHANCELLOR 

The  predicted  opposition  from  Prince  Bismarck 
was  not  long  in  coming.  There  was  much  trouble 
and  fighting  before  I  put  through  what  I  wanted, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  some  of  the  big  industrial  j 

38 


BISMARCK 

iatcre8t«  rtngcd  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  Chaa- 
ccllor.  The  State  Council  met,  presided  over  by 
me.  At  the  opening  session  the  Chancellor  unex- 
pectedly appeared.  He  made  a  speech  in  which 
he  ironically  criticized  and  disapproved  the  whole 
undertaking  set  in  motion  by  me,  and  refused  his 
co-operation.  Thereupon  he  walked  out  of  the 
room. 

After  his  departure  the  strange  scene  had  its 
effect  on  the  assemblage.  The  fury  and  ruthless- 
ness  which  the  great  Chancellor  brought  to  the 
support  of  his  own  policy  and  against  mine,  based 
upon  his  absolute  belief  in  the  correctness  of  his 
own  judgment,  made  a  tremendous  impression 
upon  me  and  all  those  present.  Neverthless,  it 
stood  to  reason  that  I  was  deeply  hurt  by  what  had 
occurred.  The  assemblage  proceeded  to  take  up 
its  work  again  and  turned  out  a  wealth  of  material 
for  the  extension  of  that  social  legislation  called 
into  being  by  Emperor  William  the  Great,  which 
is  the  pride  of  Germany,  evincing,  as  it  does,  a 
protective  attitude  toward  the  laboring  classes  such 
as  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  other  land  on  earth. 

Thereupon  I  decided  to  summon  a  general  social 
congress.  Prince  Bismarck  opposed  this  also. 
Switzerland  was  contemplating  something  similar, 
and  had  thought  of  convening  a  congress  at  Berne. 
Roth,  the  Swiss  ambassador,  hearing  of  my  scheme, 
advised  canceling  the  invitations  to  Berne  and 
accepting  an  invitation  to  Berlin.  What  he  wished 
occurred.  Thanks  to  the  generosity  of  Herr  Roth, 
it  was  possible  to  convene  the  congress  at  Berlin. 

39 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

The  material  collected  as  a  result  of  it  was  worked 
out  and  applied  in  the  form  of  laws — only  in 
Germany,  however. 

Later  on  I  talked  with  Bismarck  concerning 
his  project  of  fighting  the  socialists,  in  case  they 
resorted  to  revolutionary  acts,  with  cannon  and 
bayonets.  I  sought  to  convince  him  that  it  was  out 
of  the  question  for  me,  almost  immediately  after 
William  the  Great  had  closed  his  eyes  after  a 
blessed  reign,  to  stain  the  first  years  of  my  Govern- 
ment with  the  blood  of  my  own  people.  Bismarck 
was  unmoved ;  he  declared  that  he  would  assume 
responsibility  for  his  actions;  that  all  I  need  do 
was  to  leave  the  thing  to  him.  I  answered  that  I 
could  not  square  such  a  course  with  my  conscience 
and  my  responsibility  before  God,  particularly  as 
I  knew  perfectly  well  that  conditions  among  the 
laboring  classes  were  bad  and  must  be  bettered  at 
all  costs. 

The  conflict  between  the  views  of  the  Emperor 
and  the  Chancellor  relative  to  the  social  question — 
i,  e,,  the  furtherance  of  the  welfare  of  the  laboring 
classes  of  the  population,  with  participation  therein 
by  the  state — ^was  the  real  cause  of  the  break  be- 
tween us,  and  caused  a  hostility  toward  me,  lasting 
for  years,  on  the  part  of  Bismarck  and  a  large 
part  of  the  German  nation  that  was  devoted  to 
him,  especially  of  the  official  class. 

This  conflict  between  the  Chancellor  and  me 
arose  because  of  his  belief  that  the  social  problem 
could  be  solved  by  severe  measures  and,  if  the 
worst  came  to  the  worst,  by  means  of  soldiers; 

40 


BISMARCK 

not  by  following  principles  of  general  love  for 
mankind  or  humanitarian  nonsense  which,  he  be- 
lieved, he  would  have  to  adopt  in  conformity  to 
my  views. 

BISMARCK'S  LABOR  VIEWS 

Bismarck  was  not  a  foe  to  the  laboring  classes — 
on  that  I  wish  to  lay  stress,  in  view  of  what  I  have 
previously  said.  On  the  contrary!  He  was  far  too 
great  a  statesman  to  mistake  the  importance  of  the 
labor  question  to  the  state.  But  he  considered  the 
whole  matter  from  the  standpoint  of  pure  expedi- 
ency for  the  state.  The  state,  he  believed,  should 
care  for  the  laborer,  as  much  and  in  whatever 
manner  it  deemed  proper;  he  would  not  admit  of 
any  co-operation  of  the  workers  in  this.  Agitation 
and  rebellion,  he  believed,  should  be  severely  sup- 
pressed ;  by  force  of  arms,  if  necessary.  Govern- 
ment protection  on  the  one  hand,  the  mailed  fist 
on  the  other — that  was  Bismarck's  social  policy. 

I,  however,  wished  to  win  over  the  soul  of  the 
German  workingman,  and  I  fought  zealously  to 
attain  this  goal.  I  was  filled  with  the  conscious- 
ness of  a  plain  duty  and  responsibility  toward  my 
entire  people — also,  therefore,  toward  the  labor- 
ing classes.  What  was  theirs  by  right  and  justice 
should  become  theirs,  I  thought;  moreover,  I 
believed  that  this  should  be  brought  about,  wher- 
ever the  will  or  power  of  the  employers  ceased, 
by  the  lord  of  the  land  and  his  Government,  in  so 
far  as  justice  or  necessity  demanded.  As  soon  as 
I  had  recognized  the  necessity  for  reforms,  to 

41 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

some  of  which  the  industrial  elements  would  not 
consent,  I  took  up  the  cudgels  for  the  laboring 
classes,  impelled  by  a  sense  of  justice. 

I  had  studied  history  sufficiently  to  guard  my- 
self against  the  delusion  of  believing  in  the  possi- 
bility of  making  an  entire  people  happy.  I  real- 
ized clearly  that  it  was  impossible  for  one  human 
being  to  make  a  nation  happy.  The  truth  is  that 
the  only  nation  which  is  happy  is  the  one  that  is 
contented,  or  at  least  is  willing  to  be  contented; 
a  willingness  which  implies  a  certain  degree  of 
realization  of  what  is  possible — a  sense  of  the 
practical,  in  short.  Unfortunately,  there  is  often 
a  lack  of  this. 

I  was  well  aware  that,  in  the  unbounded  de- 
mands of  the  Socialist  leaders,  unjustified  greed 
would  be  constantly  developed  anew.  But,  for  the 
very  reason  that  I  wished  to  be  able  to  combat 
unjustified  aspirations  with  a  clear  conscience  and 
in  a  convincing  way,  it  behooved  me  not  to  deny 
recognition  and  aid  to  justified  aspirations. 

GERMAN  SOCIAL  PROBLEMS 

The  policy  that  kept  in  view  the  welfare  of  the 
workers  unquestionably  imposed  a  heavy  burden 
upon  all  the  industrial  elements  of  Germany  in 
the  matter  of  competition  in  the  world  market, 
through  the  well-known  laws  for  the  protection  of 
workingmen.  This  was  especially  true  in  relation 
to  an  industrial  system  like  the  Belgian,  which 
could,  without  hindrance,  squeeze  the  last  drop 
out  of  the  human  reserves  of  Belgium  and  pay 

42 


BISMARCK 


low  wages,  without  feeling  any  pangs  of  con- 
science or  compassion  for  the  sinking  morale  of 
the  exhausted,  unprotected  people.  By  means  of 
my  social  legislation  I  made  such  conditions  im-  i 
possible  in  Germany,  and  I  caused  it  to  be  intro- 
duced also  in  Belgium,  during  the  war,  by  General 
von  Bissing,  in  order  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the 
Belgian  workers.  First  of  all,  however,  this  legis- 
lation is — to  use  a  sporting  term — a  handicap  upon 
German  industry  in  the  battle  of  world  competi- 
tion: it  alienated  many  big  leaders  of  industry, 
which,  from  their  point  of  view,  was  quite  natural. 
But  the  lord  of  the  land  must  always  bear  in  mind 
the  welfare  of  the  whole  nation;  therefore,  I  went 
my  way  unswervingly. 

Those  workers,  on  the  other  hand,  who  blindly 
followed  the  Socialist  leaders,  gave  me  no  word  of 
thanks  for  the  protection  created  for  them  nor  for 
the  work  I  had  done.  Between  them  and  me  lies 
the  motto  of  the  HohenzoUerns,  "Suum  cuique." 
That  means,  "To  each  his  own" — not,  as  the  Social 
Democrats  would  have  it,  "To  everyone  the  same!" 

I  also  harbored  the  idea  of  preventing  to  some 
extent  competitive  warfare,  at  least  in  the  indus- 
trial world  of  the  European  continent,  by  bringing 
about  a  sort  of  quota-fixing  in  foreign  lands, 
thereby  facilitating  production  and  making  possi- 
ble a  healthier  mode  of  life  among  the  working 
classes. 

There  is  great  significance  in  the  impression 
which  foreign  workers  get  in  studying  Germany's 
social  legislation.  A  few  years  before  the  war  peo- 

43 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

pie  in  England,  under  the  pressure  of  labor  trou- 
bles, awoke  to  the  conviction  that  better  care  must 
be  taken  of  the  workers.  As  a  result  of  this,  com- 
missions visited  Germany,  some  of  them  composed 
of  workingmen.  Guided  by  representative  Ger- 
mans, among  them  Socialists,  they  visited  the  in- 
dustrial regions,  factories,  benevolent  institutions, 
sanatoria  of  insurance  companies,  etc.,  and  were 
astonished  at  all  the  things  they  saw.  At  the  fare- 
well dinner  given  them  the  English  leader  of  the 
workingmen's  deputation  turned  to  Bebel  and 
made  this  concluding  remark: 

"After  all  we  have  seen  of  what  is  done  in  Ger- 
many for  the  workers,  I  ask  you :  Are  you  people 
still  Socialists?"  And  the  Englishmen  remarked 
to  a  German  that  they  would  be  quite  satisfied  if 
they  could  succeed,  after  long  fights  in  Parliament, 
in  putting  through  one  tenth  of  what  had  already 
been  accomplished  years  before  in  Germany  to- 
ward bettering  the  condition  of  the  laboring 
classes. 

I  had  observed  with  interest  these  visits  of  the 
English  deputations  and  marveled  at  their  igno- 
rance of  German  conditions.  But  I  marveled  even 
more  at  a  question  asked  by  the  English  Govern- 
ment, through  the  channel  of  the  English  Em- 
bassy, on  the  same  subject,  which  betrayed  an  abso- 
lutely amazing  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  progress 
made  in  Germany  in  the  province  of  social  reform. 
I  questioned  the  English  ambassador,  remarking 
that  England,  having  been  represented  in  1890  at 
the  Berlin  Social  Congress,  must  certainly  have 

44 


BISMARCK 


been  informed,  at  least  through  the  Embassy,  of 
the  Reichstag  debates,  which  had  dealt  in  a  de- 
tailed way  with  the  various  social  measures.  The 
ambassador  replied  that  the  same  thing  had  also 
occurred  to  him  and  caused  him  to  have  the  earlier 
records  of  the  Embassy  investigated,  whereupon  it 
had  transpired  that  the  Embassy  had  sent  the  full- 
est reports  on  the  subject  to  London  and  that  thor- 
ough reports  had  been  forwarded  home  concerning 
every  important  stage  in  the  progress  of  social  re- 
form; but,  "because  they  came  from  Germany, 
nobody  ever  read  them ;  they  were  simply  pigeon- 
holed and  remained  there  ever  since ;  it  is  a  down- 
right shame ;  Germany  does  not  interest  people  at 
home." 

Thus  the  Briton,  with  a  shrug  of  his  shoulders. 
Neither  the  British  King  nor  Parliament  had 
enough  conscience  or  time  or  desire  to  work  for 
the  betterment  of  the  working  class.  The  "policy 
of  encirclement"  for  the  annihilation  of  Germany, 
especially  of  its  industry,  and,  thereby,  of  its  work- 
ing population,  was,  in  their  eyes,  far  more  im- 
portant and  rewarding.  On  the  9th  of  November 
(191 8)  the  German  Radical  Socialist  leaders,  with 
their  like-minded  followers,  joined  forces  with  this 
British  policy  of  annihilation. 

'WELFARE  WORK"  AT  THE  COURT 

In  a  small  way,  in  places  where  I  had  influence, 
as,  for  instance,  in  the  administration  of  my  court 
and  in  the  Imperial  Automobile  Club,  I  laid  stress 
upon  the  social  point  of  view.    For  instance,  I 

45 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

caused  a  fund  to  be  established,  out  of  the  tips  paid 
for  visiting  palaces,  which  was  destined  solely  to 
the  benefit  of  the  domestic  staff,  and  which,  in  the 
course  of  time,  reached  a  magnificent  total.  From 
this  fund  the  domestics  and  their  families  received 
money  for  trips  to  bathing  resorts,  cost  of  taking 
cures,  burial  expenses,  dowries  for  their  children, 
confirmation  expenses,  and  similar  payments. 

When  I,  at  the  request  of  the  newly  founded 
Imperial  Automobile  Club,  took  it  under  my  pro- 
tection, I  accepted  an  invitation  to  a  luncheon  in 
the  beautiful  rooms  of  the  clubhouse,  built  by 
Ihne.  In  addition  to  magnates  like  the  Duke  of 
Ratibor,  the  Duke  of  Ujest,  etc.,  I  found  there  a 
number  of  gentlemen  from  Berlin's  high  financial 
circles,  some  of  whom  behaved  rather  wildly. 
When  the  conversation  turned  to  the  subject  of 
drivers,  I  suggested  establishing  a  fund  which,  in 
case  of  accident,  illness,  or  death  befalling  these 
men,  should  provide  means  of  livelihood  for  those 
whom  they  left  behind.  The  suggestion  met  with 
unanimous  approval,  and  the  fund  has  had  most 
excellent  results.  Later  on  I  brought  about  the 
establishment  of  something  similar  for  the  skip- 
pers and  pilots  attached  to  the  Imperial  Yacht 
Club  at  Kiel. 

Special  pleasure  was  aflPorded  me  by  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Children's  Home,  founded  by  me  at  Ahl- 
beck,  at  which,  in  peace  times,  between  May  and 
the  end  of  September  in  each  year,  a  large  number 
of  children  from  the  most  poverty-stricken  work- 
ing people's  districts  in  Berlin  were  accommo- 

46 


BISMARCK 

dated  in  successive  detachments,  each  lot  staying 
four  weeks.  This  home  is  still  under  the  tried 
direction  of  the  admirable  superintendent,  Miss 
Kirschner,  daughter  of  the  former  Chief  Burgo- 
master of  Berlin,  and  it  has  achieved  most  brilliant 
results,  both  in  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
domain.  Weakened,  pale,  needy  children  were 
transformed  there  into  fresh,  blooming,  happy  lit- 
tle beings,  concerning  whose  welfare  I  often  joy- 
fully convinced  myself  by  personal  visits. 

For  the  very  reason  that  I  have  spoken  of  my 
quarrel  with  Bismarck  as  a  result  of  labor  ques- 
tions, I  wish  to  add  to  what  I  have  already  said 
about  his  basic  position  in  the  matter— an  example 
showing  how  brilliantly  the  Prince  behaved  in 
something  that  concerned  the  workers.  In  this,  to 
be  sure,  he  was  impelled  by  nationalistic  motives, 
but  he  also  realized  at  once  that  it  was  necessary  to 
protect  a  large  element  against  unemployment, 
which  caused  him  to  intervene  with  the  full  weight 
of  his  authority. 

Sometime  around  1886,  while  I  was  still  Prince 
Wilhelm,  I  had  learned  that  the  great  Vulcan  ship- 
ping concern  at  Stettin  was  confronted,  owing  to 
lack  of  orders,  with  bankruptcy,  and  its  entire 
force  of  workmen,  numbering  many  thousands, 
with  starvation,  which  would  mean  a  catastrophe 
for  the  city  of  Stettin.  Only  by  an  order  for  the 
building  of  a  big  ship  could  the  Vulcan  shipyards 
be  saved. 

Spurred  on  some  time  before  by  Admiral  von 
Stosch,  who  wished  to  free  us  once  and  for  all 

47 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

/  from  the  English  shipbuilders,  the  Vulcan  people 

had  set  to  work  courageously  to  build  the  first  Ger- 
man armored  ship,  christened  by  my  mother  in 
1874  birthday,  on  which  occasion  I  was 

present.  Ever  since  that  time  the  warships  built 
at  the  Vulcan  yards  had  always  satisfied  naval 
experts — the  concern,  however,  seldom  built 
warships. 

THE  CHANCELLOR  IN  ACTION 

The  German  merchant  marine,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  not  dared  to  follow  the  path  courage- 
ously blazed  by  Admiral  von  Stosch.  And  now  the 
brave  German  shipyard  company  was  faced  with 
ruin,  since  the  North  German  Lloyd  had  refused 
its  offer  to  build  a  passenger  steamer,  alleging  that 
the  English,  because  of  their  years  of  shipbuilding 
traditions,  could  build  it  better.  It  was  a  serious 
emergency.  I  hastened  to  Prince  Bismarck  and 
laid  before  him  the  matter  as  I  have  described  it 
above. 

The  Chancellor  was  furious;  his  eyes  flashed, 
his  fist  came  crashing  down  on  the  table. 

"What!  Do  you  mean  to  say  that  these  shop- 
keepers would  rather  have  their  boats  built  in  Eng- 
land than  in  Germany?  Why,  thai  is  unheard  of! 
And  is  a  good  German  shipyard  to  fail  for  such  a 
reason?  The  devil  take  this  gang  of  traders!" 

He  rang  the  bell  and  a  servant  entered. 

"Have  Privy  Councilor  X  come  here  immedi- 
ately from  the  Foreign  Office!" 

In  a  few  minutes — during  which  the  Prince 

48 


BISMARCK 


stamped  up  and  down  the  room — the  man  sum- 
moned appeared. 

^'Telegram  to  Hamburg,  to  our  envoy — the 
Lloyd  in  Bremen  is  to  have  its  new  ship  built  by 
the  Vulcan  Company  in  Stettin!" 

The  Privy  Councilor  vanished  in  hot  haste, 
"with  his  coat  tails  sticking  straight  out  behind 
him."  The  Prince  turned  to  me  and  said:  "I  am 
greatly  obliged  to  you.  You  have  done  the  father- 
land, and  also  myself,  an  important  service. 
Henceforth  ships  will  be  built  only  in  our  yards — 
I'll  take  care  to  make  this  clear  to  the  Hanseatic 
crowd.  You  may  telegraph  to  the  Vulcan  people 
that  the  Chancellor  will  guarantee  that  the  ship 
will  be  built  in  the  Vulcan  yards.  May  this  be  the 
first  of  a  whole  lot  of  such  ships !  As  for  the  work- 
ers whom  you  have  thus  saved  from  unemploy- 
ment, I  hope  that  they  will  express  their  thanks  to 
you!" 

I  passed  on  the  news  to  Privy  Councilor  Schlu- 
tow  at  Stettin  and  great  was  the  joy  caused  thereby. 
This  was  the  first  step  upon  the  road  destined  to 
lead  to  the  construction  of  the  magnificent  Ger- 
man express  steamers. 

When  I  went,  after  I  had  ascended  the  throne 
in  1888,  to  Stettin,  in  order  to  place  honorary  in- 
signia on  the  flags  of  my  Pomeranian  Grenadiers, 
I  also  visited  the  Vulcan  shipyards,  at  the  invita- 
tion of  the  directors.  After  my  reception  by  the 
directors  outside  the  yards,  the  great  doors  were 
flung  open  and  I  walked  inside.  But,  instead  of 
work  and  pounding  hammers,  I  found  deep  silence. 

49 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

The  entire  body  of  workmen  was  standing  in  a 
half  circle,  with  bared  heads ;  in  the  middle  stood 
the  oldest  workman  of  all,  a  man  with  a  snow- 
white  beard,  bearing  a  laurel  wreath  in  his  hand. 

I  was  deeply  moved.  Schlutow  whispered  to  me : 
"A  little  pleasure  for  you,  which  the  workmen 
themselves  have  thought  up."  The  old  workman 
stepped  forward  and,  in  pithy,  plain  words,  ex- 
pressed to  me  the  gratitude  of  the  workmen  to  me 
for  having  saved  them,  and,  above  all,  their  wives 
and  children,  from  hardship  and  hunger,  by  my 
appeal  to  Bismarck  about  the  building  of  the  ship. 
As  a  token  of  their  gratitude,  he  asked  my  permis- 
sion to  hand  over  the  laurel  wreath.  Most  deeply 
moved,  I  took  the  wreath  and  expressed  my  pleas- 
ure at  receiving  my  first  laurels,  without  the  shed- 
ding of  a  drop  of  blood,  from  the  hands  of  honest 
German  workmen. 

That  was  in  the  year  1888!  In  those  days,  the 
German  laboring  classes  knew  how  to  appreciate 
the  blessing  of  labor. 


CHAPTER  II 


-  Caprivi 

WHEN  I  began  my  reign,  General  von 
Caprivi  was  Chief  of  the  Admiralty.  He 
was  the  last  general  to  hold  this  post.  I  at  once 
took  energetically  in  hand  the  development 
and  reform — in  fact,  one  may  say  the  foundation 
anew — of  the  Imperial  German  Navy,  based  on 
my  preliminary  studies  in  England  and  at  home. 
That  was  not  to  the  liking  of  the  General,  who 
was  able,  but  rather  self-willed,  and  not  entirely 
devoid  of  pride. 

Unquestionably  he  had  rendered  valuable  serv- 
ices in  mobilization,  improvement  of  the  officer 
corps,  and  the  improvement  and  development  of 
the  torpedo-boat  organization.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  building  of  ships  and  the  replacement  of  worn- 
out  material  were  in  a  deplorable  state,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  fleet  and  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
shipbuilding  industry,  which  was  growing  and 
looking  about  for  employment 

Being  an  old  Prussian  general,  Caprivi's  way 
of  thinking  was  that  of  his  day — that  of  his  com- 
rades of  1864,  1865,  1870,  1 87 1 — in  his  eyes,  the 
army  had  always  done  everything  and  would  con- 
5  51 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

tinue  to  do  so  in  the  future ;  therefore,  no  great  de- 
mands for  money  to  be  devoted  to  the  navy  should 
be  imposed  upon  the  country,  since,  should  this  be 
done,  there  was  danger  that  the  sums  destined  to 
the  army  might  be  decreased  and  its  development 
thereby  hampered.  This  idea,  from  v^hich  he  was 
not  to  be  dissuaded,  is  false.  The  amounts  granted 
did  not  flow  into  a  reservoir  from  which  they  might 
be  directed,  by  the  mere  turning  of  a  valve,  now 
into  army,  now  into  navy,  channels.  Whenever 
Caprivi  was  unwilling  to  demand  anything  for 
naval  construction,  in  order,  by  so  doing,  to  turn 
more  money  toward  the  army,  things  did  not  hap- 
pen as  he  foresaw.  By  his  action  the  army  re- 
ceived not  one  penny  more,  but  merely  whatever 
the  Minister  of  War  asked  for  and  received  in  ac- 
cordance with  his  budget. 

There  was  need  of  creating  a  Secretaryship  of 
State  for  the  Navy  which,  entirely  independent  of 
the  Ministry  of  War,  should  have  as  its  duty  to  de- 
mand and  obtain  for  the  navy  as  much  as  was 
required  for  the  protection  of  our  commerce 
and  colonies.  And  that  is  what  came  to  pass 
later  on. 

Caprivi  soon  came  to  me  with  the  request  that 
I  relieve  him  from  his  post.  He  stated  that  he  was 
not  satisfied  with  it  in  itself ;  that,  moreover,  I  had 
all  sorts  of  plans  for  the  future  affecting  the  navy 
which  he  considered  impossible  of  realization,  in 
the  first  place,  because  there  existed  no  means  of 
replacement  for  the  officer  corps — at  that  time  the 
yearly  influx  of  cadets  was  between  sixty  and 

52 


CAPRIVI 


eighty — and  a  large  navy  without  a  large  officer 
corps  was  unthinkable.  In  addition  to  this,  he  in- 
formed me,  he  had  soon  seen  in  the  course  of  the 
inspection  tours  of  His  Majesty  that  the  Emperor 
knew  more  about  naval  matters  than  he,  the  Gen- 
eral, which  placed  him  in  an  impossible  situation 
in  relation  to  his  subordinates. 

In  View  of  these  circumstances,  I  parted  with 
him,  placing  him  in  command  of  an  army  corps. 
Following  the  motto,  ^^The  navy  for  the  seamen!" 
I  chose,  for  the  first  time,  an  admiral  as  its  chief, 
a  step  which  was  received  in  maritime  circles  with 
great  joy.  The  man  chosen  was  Admiral  Count 
Monts. 

BISMARCK'S  SUCCESSOR 

When  I  was  soon  afterward  confronted  with  the 
rather  unexpected  retirement  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
I  found  the  choice  of  his  successor  a  difficult  one. 
Whoever  it  might  be  was  sure  to  have  a  hard  task, 
without  any  prospect  of  appreciation  for  what  he 
might  achieve;  he  would  be  looked  upon  as  the 
usurper  of  a  post  to  which  he  was  not  entitled, 
and  which  he  was  not  qualified  to  fill.  Crit- 
icism, criticism,  nothing  but  criticism — that  was 
sure  to  be  the  daily  bread  upon  which  the  new 
Chancellor  must  reckon;  and  he  was  also  cer- 
tain of  becoming  the  target  for  the  hostility  of  all 
those  who  favored  Prince  Bismarck  as  well  as  with 
that  of  the  many  who  previously  could  not  do 
enough  in  opposition  to  him.  There  was  bound 
to  be  a  strong  current  of  enmity  toward  the  new 

53 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Chancellor,  in  which  the  old  Prince  himself  would 
not  be  the  least  serious  factor. 

After  taking  all  this  into  consideration,  it  was 
decided  to  choose  a  man  belonging  to  Prince  Bis- 
marck's generation,  who  had  held  a  leading  posi- 
tion in  the  wars  and  had  already  filled  a  Govern- 
ment position  under  him.  Hence  Caprivi  was 
chosen.  His  age  was  a  guarantee  that  he  would  be 
a  careful  and  calm  adviser  for  the  ^^orphaned" 
young  Emperor. 

Very  soon  the  question  arose  of  the  extension  of 
the  reinsurance  treaty  with  Russia.  Caprivi  de- 
clared that,  out  of  consideration  for  Austria,  he 
was  unable  to  renew  it,  since  the  threat  against 
Austria  contained  therein,  when  it  became  known 
in  Vienna — as  it  almost  unavoidably  would — was 
such  as  to  lead  to  very  disagreeable  consequences. 
For  this  reason  the  treaty  lapsed.  To  my  way  of 
thinking,  it  had  already  lost  its  main  value  from 
the  fact  that  the  Russians  no  longer  stood  whole- 
heartedly behind  it.  I  was  confirmed  in  this  view 
by  a  memorial  written  by  Count  Berchem,  Under 
Secretary  of  State,  who  had  worked  with  Prince 
Bismarck. 

The  Agrarian  Conservatives  opposed  Caprivi 
as  a  man  without  landed  property  and  a  violent 
fight  raged  around  the  commercial  treaties.  These 
difficulties  were  greatly  enhanced  because  Prince 
Bismarck,  ignoring  his  former  maxims,  took  part 
in  the  fight  against  his  successor  with  all  his  char- 
acteristic energy.  Thus  arose  the  opposition  of 
the  Conservatives  against  the  Government  and  the 

54 


CAPRIVI 

Crown,  and  the  Prince  in  person  sowed  the  seed 
from  which  later  grew  the  "misunderstood  Bis- 
marck" and  that  "Reichsverdrossenheit"  (un- 
friendliness to  the  Empire)  so  often  taken  up  in 
the  newspapers.  The  "misunderstood  Bismarck" 
created  permanent  opposition  throughout  my  reign 
against  my  suggestions  and  aims  by  means  of  quo- 
tations, speeches,  and  writings,  as  well  as  by  pas- 
sive resistance  and  thoughtless  criticism.  Every 
thing  that  was  done  was  painted  in  black  colors, 
made  ridiculous,  and  criticized  from  top  to  bottom, 
by  a  press  that  placed  itself  quite  willingly  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Prince  and  often  out-Bismarcked 
Bismarck  in  its  behavior. 

This  phenomenon  became  most  apparent  at  the 
time  of  the  acquisition  of  Heligoland.  This 
island,  lying  close  in  front  of  the  great  waterways 
leading  to  the  principal  Hanseatic  commercial 
ports,  was,  in  the  hands  of  the  British,  a  constant 
menace  to  Hamburg  and  Bremen  and  rendered  im- 
possible any  project  for  building  up  a  navy. 
Owing  to  this,  I  had  firmly  resolved  to  win  back 
this  formerly  German  island  to  its  fatherland. 

THE  DEAL  FOR  HELIGOLAND 

The  way  to  cause  England  to  give  up  the  red 
rock  of  Heligoland  was  found  in  the  colonial  do- 
main. Lord  Salisbury  proved  inclined  to  ex- 
change the  "barren  rock"  for  Zanzibar  and  Witu 
in  East  Africa.  From  commercial  sources  and  the 
reports  of  the  commanders  of  German  cruisers 
and  gunboats  which  were  stationed  there  and 

55 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

cruised  along  the  coast  of  the  recently  acquired 
German  East  African  colonies,  I  knew  that,  as  soon 
as  Togo,  Dar-es-Salaam,  etc.,  rose  to  prosperity, 
the  importance  of  Zanzibar  on  the  coast  of  Africa 
as  the  principal  port  of  transshipment  would  be  a 
thing  of  the  past,  since,  as  soon  as  the  above-men- 
tioned harbors  were  made  deep  enough  and  pro- 
vided with  sufficient  cargo-loading  equipment  for 
trading  steamers,  there  would  no  longer  be  any 
need  of  ferrying  goods  coming  from  the  interioi 
in  dhows  to  Zanzibar,  in  order  to  have  them  again 
loaded  on  vessels  there,  since  they  could  be  loaded 
direct  at  the  new  harbors  along  the  coast. 

Therefore,  I  was  convinced  that  we  had,  first, 
an  acceptable  asset  for  swapping  purposes,  and, 
secondly,  a  good  opportunity  to  avoid  colonial  fric- 
tion with  England  and  come  to  a  friendly  under- 
standing with  her.  Caprivi  agreed,  the 'negotia- 
tions were  concluded,  and  one  evening,  shortly 
before  dinner,  I  was  able  to  tell  the  Empress  and 
a  few  intimates  the  exceedingly  joyful  tidings  that 
Heligoland  had  become  German. 

A  first  and  very  important  extension  of  the  Em- 
pire had  been  achieved — without  bloodshed — the 
first  condition  for  the  upbuilding  of  the  fleet  was 
fulfilled,  something  which  the  natives  of  the  Han- 
seatic  towns  and  the  rest  of  the  North  Germans  had 
wished  for  centuries  had  come  to  pass.  In  silence, 
an  important  event  had  occurred. 

Had  Heligoland  been  acquired  in  the  Chancel- 
lorship of  Prince  Bismarck,  it  would  probably 
have  been  valued  very  highly.   Having  happened 

56 


CAPRIVI 


under  Caprivi,  it  loosed  a  lot  of  criticism.  It  was 
merely  Caprivi,  the  usurper,  who  had  had  the 
audacity  to  sit  in  the  Prince's  chair,  and  the  'irre- 
sponsible," "ungrateful,"  "impulsive"  young  mas- 
ter who  had  done  such  a  thing!  Had  Bismarck 
only  wished,  he  could  have  had  the  old  rock  any 
day,  but  he  never  would  have  been  so  unskillful  as 
to  give  up  to  the  English  for  it  the  very  promising 
African  possessions,  and  he  never  would  have 
allowed  himself  to  be  thus  worsted.  That  was  the 
sort  of  thing  heard  almost  everywhere.  The  news- 
papers of  the  Prince  joined  loudly  in  this  sort  of 
criticism,  to  the  great  grief  of  the  people  of  the 
Hanseatic  cities. 

Curious  indeed  were  the  criticisms  occasioned 
by  the  swapping  of  Zanzibar  and  Witu,  which  ap- 
peared in  the  Bismarckian  press,  although  previ- 
ously, when  I  worked  under  him,  these  newspapers 
had  always  explained  that  he  had  not  much  belief 
in  the  value  of  colonies  in  themselves  and  looked 
upon  them  merely  as  objects  to  be  exchanged,  pos- 
sibly, for  something  else,  in  deals  with  the  British. 
His  successor  acted  according  to  these  ideas  in  the 
Heligoland  question,  and  was  most  violently  criti- 
cized and  attacked.  Not  until  the  World  War 
was  on  did  I  see  articles  in  the  German  press  which 
unreservedly  admitted  the  acquisition  of  Heligo- 
land to  be  an  act  of  far-sighted  politics  and  added 
reflections  as  to  what  would  doubtless  have  hap- 
pened if  Heligoland  had  not  become  German. 

The  German  nation  has  every  reason  to  be 
thankful  to  Count  Caprivi  for  this  achievement, 

57 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

since  thereby  the  building  of  its  navy  and  its  vic- 
tory at  the  Skagerrak  were  made  possible.  As  for 
the  German  navy,  it  long  ago  acknov^ledged  this. 

The  school  law  of  Count  Zedlitz  aroused  violent 
new  conflicts.  When  they  led  to  Zedlitz's  retire- 
ment, the  cry  arose  among  his  adherents:  "If  the 
Count  goes,  so  must  the  Chancellor." 

Caprivi  left  his  post,  in  a  calm,  dignified  man- 
ner. He  tried  honestly,  within  the  measure  of  his 
powers  and  abilities,  to  continue  the  traditions  of 
Prince  Bismarck.  In  this  he  found  little  support 
among  the  political  parties,  and,  for  this  reason,  all 
the  more  criticism  and  hostility  in  the  public  and 
among  those  who,  had  they  acted  for  the  right  and 
the  interests  of  the  state,  should  have  stood  by  him. 
Without  one  word  of  apology,  Caprivi,  in  noble 
silence,  lived  all  the  rest  of  his  life  in  almost  soli- 
tary retirement. 


58 


CHAPTER  III 


,  Hohenlohe 

AGAIN  I  was  confronted  with  the  difficult 
jf'^  task  of  choosing  a  Chancellor.  His  posi- 
tion and  activities  were  to  be  under  somewhat 
about  the  same  auspices  and  subject  to  the  same 
conditions  as  in  the  case  of  his  predecessor.  But 
now  there  was  more  of  a  desire  that  he  should  be  a 
statesman,  an  older  man,  of  course,  qualified  to  in- 
spire Prince  Bismarck  with  more  confidence  than 
a  mere  general  could  do. 

It  was  assumed  that  a  statesman  would  know  bet- 
ter how  to  walk  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Prince, 
politically  speaking,  and  provide  Bismarck  with 
less  opportunity  for  criticism  and  attacks.  These 
latter  had  tended  to  create  gradually  among  all 
Government  officials,  who  dated  mostly  from  the 
period  of  Bismarck,  an  unmistakable  nervousness 
and  dissatisfaction,  by  which  the  work  of  the  entire 
governmental  system  was  impaired  to  an  extent  by 
no  means  inconsiderable.  Moreover,  it  lent  to  the 
opposition  in  the  Reichstag  a  constantly  renewed 
strength  drawn  from  elements  previously  faithful 
to  the  Government,  and  made  itself  felt  in  a  detri- 
mental manner.   Especially  in  the  Foreign  Office, 

59 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

the  spirit  of  Holstein,  the  supposed  representative 
of  the  "old,  tried  Bismarckian  traditions,"  began 
to  assert  itself,  so  that  the  unwillingness  to  collabo- 
rate with  the  Emperor  became  particularly  strong 
and  the  belief  grew  up  that  it  was  necessary  to 
carry  on,  independently,  the  policy  of  Bismarck. 

After  mature  deliberation,  I  decided  to  intrust 
the  post  of  Chancellor  to  Prince  Hohenlohe,  who 
was  then  Governor  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  At  the 
outbreak  of  the  War  of  1870  he  had  succeeded,  as 
Bavarian  Minister,  in  getting  Bavaria  to  enter  the 
war  on  the  side  of  Prussia.  Ever  since  he  had  been 
highly  esteemed  by  Prince  Bismarck  on  account  of 
his  fidelity  to  the  Empire.  It  was  natural  to  ex- 
pect that  Bismarck's  opposition  would  cool  off 
when  confronted  with  such  a  successor.  Thus,  the 
choice  of  Hohenlohe  as  Chancellor  was  strongly 
influenced  by  consideration  for  Prince  Bismarck 
and  for  the  public  opinion  inspired  by  him. 

Prince  Hohenlohe  was  the  typical  old-style 
grand  seigneur.  He  was  thoroughly  urbane  by 
nature  and  in  his  dealings  with  others :  a  man  of  re- 
fined mind,  with  a  slight  touch  of  playful  irony 
sometimes  glinting  through,  keen  on  account  of  his 
years,  a  level-headed  observer  and  judge  of  men. 
Despite  the  great  difference  in  age  between  him 
and  me  he  got  along  very  well  with  me,  which  was 
shown  on  the  surface  by  the  fact  that  he  was  treated 
both  by  the  Empress  and  by  myself  as  our  uncle, 
and  addressed  as  such,  which  brought  about  a  cer- 
tain atmosphere  of  intimate  confidence  in  our  in- 
tercourse.  In  his  talks  with  me,  especially  in  giv- 

60 


HOHENLOHE 

ing  his  opinion  as  to  appointments  of  officials,  he 
offered  very  characteristic  descriptions  of  the  gen- 
tlemen being  discussed,  often  combined  with  phil- 
osophical observations  which  proved  that  he  had 
reflected  deeply  on  life  and  humanity,  and  which 
were  evidence  of  a  maturity  and  wisdom  grounded 
on  experience. 

Something  happened  during  the  first  period  of 
Hohenlohe's  regime  as  Chancellor  which  throws 
an  interesting  light  upon  the  relations  betv^^een 
France  and  Russia.  Having,  at  the  time  of  the 
fraternization  between  Russia  and  France,  re- 
ceived reliable  information  from  the  General 
Staff  as  well  as  from  our  Embassy  at  Paris  to  the 
effect  that  France  contemplated  withdrawing  a 
portion  of  her  troops  from  Algeria,  in  order  to 
shift  them  to  southern  France  either  against  Italy 
or  against  Alsace,  I  apprised  Tsar  Nicholas  II  of 
this  news,  adding  the  remark  that  I  should  be 
obliged  to  adopt  counter-measures  unless  the  Tsar 
could  dissuade  his  ally  from  so  provocative  a  step. 

SOME  DIPLOMATIC  FENCING 

At  that  time  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  was  Prince  Lobanoff,  formerly  ambassador 
at  Vienna,  well  known  for  his  pro-French  pro- 
clivities. During  the  summer  of  1895  ^e  had  vis- 
ited France  and  been  very  cordially  entertained. 
During  the  autumn,  just  as  I  was  staying  for  the 
hunting  at  Hubertusstock  on  the  Schorfheide  near 
Eberswalde,  Prince  Lobanoff,  on  his  return  jour- 
ney from  Paris,  requested  to  be  received  in  audi- 

61 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

encc,  at  the  behest  of  the  Tsar.  Upon  being  re- 
ceived by  me  he  described  the  calm  and  sensible 
frame  of  mind  which  he  had  found  in  Paris  and 
sought  to  quiet  me,  too,  with  regard  to  the  above- 
mentioned  troop  movements,  which,  according  to 
him,  were  mere  empty  rumor  and  chatter  without 
any  real  basis.  He  added  that  he  was  bringing  to 
me  the  most  quieting  assurances,  that  there  was  no 
reason  for  my  feeling  the  slightest  alarm.  I 
thanked  him  heartily  for  his  report,  remarking 
that  the  word  "alarm"  was  not  to  be  found  in  the 
dictionary  of  a  German  officer;  and  I  added  that, 
if  France  and  Russia  wished  to  make  war,  I  could 
not  prevent  it. 

Whereupon  the  Prince,  piously  casting  up  his 
eyes  toward  heaven,  made  the  sign  of  the  cross  and 
said:  "Oh,  la  guerre!  quelle  idee;  qui  y  pense? — 
cela  ne  doit  pas  etre"  ("Oh,  war!  what  an  idea; 
who  thinks  of  such  a  thing?  it  must  not  be").  To 
that  I  replied  that  I,  in  any  event,  was  not  think- 
ing about  it,  but  that  an  observer — and  he  need 
not  be  very  keen  eyed — must  assuredly  consider 
the  constant  celebrations  and  speeches,  as  well  as 
the  official  and  unofficial  visits  exchanged  between 
Paris  and  St.  Petersburg,  as  significant  symptoms 
which  could  not  be  ignored,  and  which  were  cal- 
culated to  arouse  great  dissatisfaction  in  Ger- 
many; that,  should  it  come  to  war,  against  my  own 
will  and  that  of  my  people,  I  felt  that,  trusting  in 
God  and  in  my  army  and  people,  it  would  be  pos- 
sible for  Germany  to  get  the  better  of  both 
opponents. 

62 


HOHENLOHE 

To  this  I  added  still  another  statement,  reported 
to  me  from  Paris,  which  had  been  made  by  a  Rus- 
sian officer  who  was  in  France  as  a  member  of  an 
officers'  deputation.  Having  been  asked  by  a 
French  comrade  whether  the  Russians  believed 
that  they  could  beat  the  Germans,  the  gallant  Slav 
replied:  "Non,  mon  ami,  nous  serons  battus  a 
plate  couture,  mais  qu'est-ce  que  ga  fait?  Nous 
aurons  la  Republique"  (^^No,  my  friend,  we  shall 
be  thoroughly  beaten,  but  what  does  that  matter? 
We  shall  get  a  republic"). 

At  first  the  Prince  eyed  me,  speechless,  then, 
shrugging  his  shoulders,  he  remarked:  "Oh,  la 
guerre,  il  ne  faut  pas  meme  y  penser"  ("Oh,  war, 
one  must  not  even  think  about  it").  The  officer 
had  merely  expressed  the  general  opinion  of  the 
Russian  intelligentsia  and  social  circles.  As  far 
back  as  my  first  visit  to  St.  Petersburg,  in  the  early 
'eighties,  a  grand  duchess  said  to  me  at  dinner, 
quite  calmly:  "Here  we  sit  all  the  time  on  a  vol- 
cano. We  expect  the  revolution  any  day!  The 
Slavs  are  not  faithful,  they  are  not  at  all  monarchi- 
cal, all  of  them  are  republicans  at  heart;  they  dis- 
guise their  sentiments,  and  they  lie,  every  one  of 
them,  all  the  time." 

Three  important  events,  related  to  foreign  pol- 
itics, came  within  the  period  of  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe's  incumbency  of  the  Chancellorship:  the 
opening,  in  1895,  ^f  the  Emperor  William  Canal 
(North  Sea-Baltic  Canal),  begun  under  Emperor 
William  the  Great,  to  which  squadrons  or  indi- 
vidual ships  representing  countries  all  over  the 

63 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


world  were  invited;  the  annexation,  in  1897,  of 
Tsing-tao ;  and,  third,  the  much-discussed  Kruger 
dispatch. 

THE  SEIZURE  OF  TSING-TAO 

Prince  Hohenlohe  played  an  especially  impor- 
tant role  in  the  annexation  of  Tsing-tao.  He,  too, 
was  of  the  opinion  that  Germany  needed  some 
coaling  stations  for  her  ships,  and  that  the  demands 
of  commercial  elements  that  the  opportunity  for 
opening  up  China  to  international  trade  be  not 
allowed  to  pass  were  justified.  It  was  resolved 
that,  under  unimpaired  Chinese  sovereignty  and 
after  payment  of  the  likin  (octroi,  or  internal  rev- 
enue tax),  a  trading  port,  with  a  marine  coaling 
station  as  protection,  was  to  be  founded,  wherein 
it  was  contemplated  to  allow  China  to  co-operate 
to  the  utmost  possible  extent. 

The  station  was  to  serve  the  ends  of  commerce, 
before  all  else,  the  military  measures  being  lim- 
ited solely  to  the  protection  of  the  trading  center 
as  it  developed;  they  did  not  constitute  an  end 
in  themselves  or  a  basis  for  further  military 
enterprises. 

Already  several  places  had  been  considered,  but 
these  had  proved,  upon  more  careful  investigation, 
to  be  unfitted,  mostly  because  they  had  either  bad 
connections  or  none  at  all  with  the  interior  regions, 
were  not  promising  from  a  commercial-political 
standpoint,  or  were  encumbered  by  privileges 
already  granted  to  other  foreign  countries.  Finally 
it  was  agreed — because  of  the  reports  of  Admiral 

64 


.  HOHENLOHE 

Tirpitz,  who  was,  at  that  time,  chief  of  the  East 
Asiatic  cruiser  squadron,  and  because  of  the  opin- 
ion of  the  geographical  expert,  Freiherr  von 
Richthofen,  who,  having  been  questioned  on  the 
subject,  had  drawn  a  most  promising  picture  of  the 
possibilities  of  development  in  Shantung — to  found 
a  settlement  on  the  bay  of  Kiao-Chau. 

The  Chancellor  proceeded  to  collect  data  on 
the  political  questions  which  arose  as  a  result  of 
this  and  which  must  be  taken  into  consideration. 
It  was  particularly  necessary  not  to  interfere  with 
Russia's  designs,  nor  to  disturb  her.  Further  in- 
formation was  obtained,  some  of  it  ffom  our  East 
Asiatic  division ;  from  this  source  favorable  reports 
came  in  as  to  anchorages  and  the  ice-free  nature  of 
the  bay  of  Kiao-Chau,  and  as  to  the  prospects,  if 
a  port  were  to  be  founded  there.  From  conversa- 
tions among  the  officers  of  the  Russian  China  divi- 
sion, which  had  come  to  our  ears  in  our  intercourse 
with  them,  it  was  learned  that  the  Russian  Ad- 
miral, in  accordance  with  orders  from  his  Govern- 
ment, had  anchored  one  winter  in  the  bay,  but 
had  found  it  so  desolate  and  so  atrociously  lone- 
some— there  were  no  tea  houses  with  Japanese 
geisha  girls,  which  the  Russians  deemed  abso- 
lutely indispensable  to  winter  quarters — that  the 
Russian  squadron  would  never  go  back  there  any 
more. 

It  was  also  reported  that  the  Russian  Admiral 
had  advised  his  Government  most  earnestly 
against  prosecuting  any  further  its  intention  of 
founding  a  settlement  on  this  bay,  since  there  was 

65 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

absolutely  no  advantage  to  be  derived  from  it. 
Hence,  the  Russians  had  no  intention  of  gaining  a 
foothold  there. 

This  last  piece  of  news  arrived  at  about  the 
same  time  as  the  answer  from  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister,  Count  Muravieff,  sent  through  the  Ger- 
man ambassador,  relative  to  the  sounding  of  Rus- 
sian opinion,  which  had  been  made  pursuant  to 
instructions  from  the  Chancellor.  Muravieff  set 
forth  that  Russia,  to  be  sure,  had  no  direct  claims, 
based  on  treaty  with  China,  to  the  bay,  but  that 
she,  nevertheless,  laid  claim  to  it  on  the  basis  of  the 
"droit  du  premier  mouillage"  ("right  of  first 
anchorage"),  since  the  Russian  ships  had  anchored 
there  before  those  of  any  other  fleet.  This  answer, 
it  will  be  seen,  ran  counter  to  the  report  of  our 
East  Asiatic  division  relative  to  the  statements 
made  by  the  Russian  Admiral. 

When  I,  with  Hollmann,  met  the  Chancellor,  in 
order  to  discuss  the  Russian  claim  to  Kiao-Chau, 
the  Prince  listened  to  the  reading  of  it  with  his 
little  ironical  smile,  and  remarked  that  he  had  been 
unable  to  find  any  jurist  at  the  Foreign  Office  who 
could  tell  him  anything  about  this  wonderful 
claim.  Was  the  navy  in  a  position  to  do  so?  Ad- 
miral Hollmann  declared  that  he,  in  all  his  experi- 
ence on  foreign  service,  had  never  heard  of  it;  that 
it  was  nonsense  and  an  invention  of  Muravieff, 
whose  only  motive  was  unwillingness  to  have  some 
other  nation  settle  on  the  shores  of  the  bay.  I  ad- 
vised that  Privy  Councilor  of  the  Admiralty 
Perels,  one  of  the  most  famous  living  experts  on 

66 


HOHENLOHE 

international  maritime  law  and  an  acknowledged 
authority  in  this  domain,  be  asked  to  deliver  an 
opinion,  in  order  to  clarify  the  question.  This  was 
done.  The  opinion  tore  Muravieff's  contention  to 
pieces,  corroborated  that  of  Hollmann,  and  com- 
pletely did  away  with  the  legend  about  the  '^right 
of  first  anchorage." 

Months  elapsed ;  my  August,  1897,  visit  to  Peter- 
hof  was  imminent.  In  agreement  with  the  Prince, 
my  uncle,  I  decided  to  discuss  the  entire  matter  in 
person  and  frankly  with  the  Tsar,  and,  if  possible, 
put  an  end  to  Muravieff's  notes  and  evasions.  The 
talk  took  place  at  Peterhof.  The  Tsar  stated  that 
he  had  no  interest  in  the  territory  south  of  the 
Tientsin-Peking  line,  which  meant  that  there  was 
no  reason  why  he  should  place  obstacles  in  our  path 
in  Shantung:  that  his  interest  was  concentrated 
upon  the  territory  on  the  Yalu,  around  Port  Ar- 
thur, etc.,  now  that  the  English  had  made  difficul- 
ties for  him  at  Mokpo ;  that  he  would,  in  fact,  be 
pleased  if  Germany  should  locate  herself  in  future 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Chih-li  as  Russia's 
welcome  neighbor. 

Afterward  I  had  a  talk  with  Muraviefif.  He 
employed  all  his  arts,  wriggled  back  and  forth  in 
his  statements,  and  finally  brought  up  his  famous  / 
"right  of  first  anchorage."  That  was  all  I  wanted. 
I  now  passed  to  the  offensive  myself,  striking  out 
at  him  squarely  with  the  opinion  delivered  by 
Perels.  When  I  had  told  him,  finally,  as  the 
Tsar  desired,  the  result  of  the  conversations 
between  us  two  sovereigns,  the  diplomat  was  even 
6  67 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


more  embarrassed,  lost  his  assumed  calm,  and 
capitulated. 

Thus  was  the  soil  prepared,  politically  speak- 
ing. In  the  autumn  came  the  news  from  Bishop 
Anzer  of  the  murder  of  the  two  German  Catholic 
missionaries  in  Shantung.  The  entire  German 
Catholic  world,  particularly  the  ^'colonials"  in  the 
Centerist  party,  demanded  energetic  measures. 
The  Chancellor  proposed  to  me  immediate  inter- 
vention. While  I  was  engaged  in  the  winter  hunt- 
ing at  Lotalingen,  I  consulted  with  him,  in  one  of 
the  little  towers  of  the  castle  there,  as  to  what  steps 
were  to  be  taken.  The  Prince  proposed  to  intrust 
Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  who  was  present,  with 
the  command  of  the  squadron  that  was  to  be  sent 
out  to  reinforce  the  East  Asiatic  Division.  I  in- 
formed my  brother  of  this  in  the  presence  of  the 
Chancellor,  whereat  the  Prince  and  the  other 
gentlemen  present  were  highly  pleased.  The 
Chancellor  sent  the  news  to  the  Foreign  Office 
and  to  the  new  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Herr  von  Biilow,  who  was  away  on  a 
journey. 

Kiao-Chau  was  occupied  in  November,  1897. 
In  December  of  that  year  Prince  Henry  sailed,  on 
board  the  Deutschland,  with  his  squadron  to  East- 
ern Asia,  where  he  later  took  over  the  command  of 
the  entire  East  Asiatic  Division.  On  the  6th  of 
March,  1898,  the  agreement  with  China  concern- 
ing Kiao-Chau  was  signed.  At  the  same  time,  Mr. 
Chamberlain  in  London  brought  up  before  the 
Japanese  ambassador,  Baron  Kato,  the  idea  of  the 

68 


HOHENLOHE 

conclusion  of  an  Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  in  order 
to  bar  Russia's  advance  in  the  East. 

QUEST  FOR  COALING  STATIONS 

One  will  naturally  inquire  why,  in  the  discus- 
sion of  our  audacious  move,  there  is  no  mention  of 
England,  since  she  was  certainly  deeply  interested 
therein.  Preliminaries,  however,  had  already  been 
gone  into  with  England.  In  order  to  meet  the 
necessity  for  German  coaling  stations,  I  had  in- 
tended to  found,  lease,  or  buy  some  in  agreement 
with  England,  so  far  as  might  be  possible.  In  view 
of  the  fact  that  my  uncle,  the  Chancellor,  was,  as 
a  member  of  the  Hohenlohe  family,  related  to 
Queen  Victoria,  known  to  her  personally  for  years 
and  highly  esteemed  by  her,  I  hoped  that  this 
might  tend  to  facilitate  the  negotiations  which 
were  entered  into  with  the  English  Government 
for  the  above-noted  purpose.  My  hope  was  dis- 
appointed. The  negotiations  dragged  along  with- 
out any  prospect  of  successful  termination. 

I  took  occasion,  therefore,  at  the  behest  of  the 
Chancellor,  to  discuss  the  matter  with  the  English 
ambassador  at  Berlin.  I  complained  of  the  treat- 
ment received  from  the  English  Government, 
which  everywhere  opposed  German  wishes,  even 
such  as  were  justified.  The  ambassador  agreed 
frankly  with  this,  and  expressed  his  astonishment 
at  England's  failure  to  meet  Germany  halfway, 
and  at  English  shortsightedness,  since,  when  a 
young,  rising  nation  like  Germany,  whose  develop- 
ment, after  all,  was  not  to  be  prevented,  turned 

69 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

directly  to  England  in  order  to  acquire  territory 
with  her  consent,  instead  of  going  straight  ahead 
or  allying  itself  with  other  nations,  it  was  certainly 
more  than  England  could  reasonably  ask. 

Moreover,  he  added  that,  since  England  already 
owned  almost  all  the  world,  she  could  certainly 
find  a  place  where  she  might  permit  Germany  to 
establish  a  station;  that  he  was  unable  to  under- 
stand the  gentlemen  in  Downing  Street;  that  in 
case  Germany  should  not  succeed  in  obtaining 
England's  approval,  she  would  probably  occupy, 
on  her  own  account,  such  places  as  were  suited  to 
her  ends,  since,  after  all,  there  was  no  law  against  it. 

I  laid  stress  upon  the  fact  that  this  agreed  en- 
tirely with  my  own  view  and,  in  conclusion,  I 
summed  up  my  standpoint  once  more  for  the  am- 
bassador: I  told  him  that  Germany  was  the  only 
country  in  the  world  which,  despite  its  colonial 
possessions  and  its  rapidly  growing  commerce, 
possessed  no  coaling  stations;  that  we  were  quite 
willing  to  acquire  these  with  England's  consent; 
that,  should  she  refuse  to  show  a  realization  of  our 
situation  and  fail  to  meet  us  halfway,  we  should 
be  compelled  to  turn  to  some  other  great  power,  in 
order,  with  its  help,  to  found  settlements. 

This  talk,  likewise,  was  fruitless.  Finally,  the 
negotiations  with  England  were  broken  off,  with- 
out result,  in  a  rather  impolite  manner.  There- 
upon the  Chancellor  and  I  decided  to  appeal  to 
Russia. 

The  occupation  of  Kaio-Chau  aroused  surprise 
and  anger  in  the  English  Government.  Having 

70 


HOHENLOHE 

refused  us  her  support,  England  had  definitely 
reckoned  on  the  belief  that  nobody  would  help 
Germany  in  attaining  her  goal.  Now  things  had 
turned  out  differently,  and  there  was  no  lack  of 
recriminations  from  London.  When  the  English 
ambassador  took  up  this  tone  he  was  referred  to 
the  conversation  with  me,  and  it  was  made  clear 
to  him  that  it  was  solely  the  fault  of  his  Govern- 
ment that  it  had  come  to  no  understanding  with 
Germany. 

England's  attitude  of  aloofness  surprised  us  at 
that  time.  An  occurrence  which,  then,  was  un- 
known to  me,  may  serve  to  throw  light  on  the 
matter. 

FINDS  SEED  OF  WORLD  WAR  i 

In  a  book  {The  Problem  of  Japan)  which  ap- 
peared anonymously  at  The  Hague  in  1918  and 
was  said  to  have  been  written  by  an  "Ex-Diplomat 
from  the  Far  East,"  an  excerpt  was  published  from 
a  work  of  the  American,  Professor  Usher  of  Wash- 
ington University  at  St.  Louis.  Usher,  like  his 
former  colleague,  Prof.  John  Bassett  Moore  of 

1  "Once  the  magnitude  of  Pan-Germanism  dawned  on  the  English 
and  French  diplomats,  once  they  became  aware  of  the  lengths  to 
which  Germany  was  willing  to  go,  they  realized  the  necessity  of 
strengthening  their  position,  and  therefore  made  overtures  to  the 
United  States,  which  resulted,  probably  before  the  summer  of  the  year 
1897,  in  an  understanding  between  the  three  countries.  There  seems 
to  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  no  papers  of  any  sort  were  signed,  that 
no  pledges  were  given  which  circumstances  would  not  justify  any  one 
of  the  contracting  parties  in  denying  or  possibly  repudiating.  Never- 
theless, an  understanding  was  reached  that  in  case  of  a  war  begun 
by  Germany  or  Austria  for  the  purpose  of  executing  Pan-Germanism, 
the  United  States  would  promptly  declare  in  favor  of  England  and 
France  and  would  do  her  utmost  to  assist  them." — Roland  G.  Usher, 
Pan-Germanism,  chap,  x,  p.  139. 

71 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Columbia  University,  New  York,  has  often  been 
called  into  consultation  as  an  adviser  on  foreign 
relations  by  the  State  Department  at  Washington, 
since  he  had  a  knowledge  possessed  by  few  other 
Americans  on  international  questions  affecting  the 
United  States.  Professor  Usher,  in  his  book  pub- 
lished in  191 3,  made  known,  for  the  first  time,  the 
existence  and  contents  of  an  ^'agreement"  or  "secret 
treaty"  between  England,  America,  and  France, 
dating  from  the  spring  of  1897.  In  this  it  was 
agreed  that,  in  case  Germany  or  Austria,  or  both 
of  them,  should  begin  a  war  for  the  sake  of  "Pan- 
Gerrnanism,"  the  United  States  should  at  once 
declare  in  favor  of  England  and  France  and 
go  to  the  support  of  these  powers  with  all  its 
resources.  Professor  Usher  cites  at  length  all  the 
reasons,  including  those  of  a  colonial  character, 
which  inevitably  imposed  upon  the  United  States 
the  necessity  of  taking  part,  on  the  side  of 
England  and  France,  in  a  war  against  Germany, 
which  Professor  Usher,  in  1913,  prophesied  as 
imminent!! 

The  unknown  author  of  The  Problem  of  Japan 
went  to  the  trouble  of  publishing  in  tabulated 
form  the  agreements  between  England,  France, 
and  America  in  1897,  in  order  thereby  to  show,  in 
a  way  easily  understood,  the  extent  of  the  recipro- 
cal obligations.  This  chapter  is  extraordinarily 
worth  reading;  it  gives  a  good  glimpse  into  the 
preliminary  history  and  preparation  of  the 
World  War  on  the  part  of  the  Entente,  which 
even  at  that  time  was  uniting  against  Germany, 

72 


HOHENLOHE 


although  not  yet  appearing  under  the  name  of 
Entente  Cordiale.  The  ex-diplomat  remarks  in 
this  connection : 

Here  is  a  treaty  that  Professor  Usher  alleges  to 
have  been  entered  into  as  long  ago  as  1897,  in  which 
every  phase  of  activity  and  participation  in  future 
events  by  England,  France,  and  the  United  States  is 
provided  for,  including  the  conquest  of  the  Spanish  de- 
pendencies, control  over  Mexico  and  Central  America, 
the  opening  of  China,  and  the  annexation  of  coaling 
stations.  And  all  these  measures  Professor  Usher 
wishes  us  to  believe  were  taken  to  defend  the  world 
against  Pan-Germanism. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  remind  Professor  Usher,  or 
anybody  else,  for  that  matter,  that  Pan-Germanism,  if 
we  go  so  far  as  to  assume  that  such  a  thing  actually 
exists,  had  certainly  never  been  heard  of  in  1897, 
which  time  Germany  had  not  yet  adopted  her  program 
for  naval  construction  on  a  large  scale,  the  same  hav- 
ing been  bruited  for  the  first  time  in  1898.  If,  there- 
fore, it  is  true  that  England,  France,  and  the  United 
States  harbored  the  mutual  designs  imputed  to  them 
by  Professor  Usher,  and  entered  into  an  alliance  to 
accomplish  them,  it  will  scarcely  do  to  attribute  the 
conception  of  the  idea  and  the  stimulus  to  its  con- 
summation to  so  feeble  a  pretext  as  the  rise  of  a  Pan- 
Germanism.  ^ 

Thus  the  ex-diplomat. 

This  is  truly  amazing.  A  definite  treaty  of  par- 
tition directed  against  Spain,  Germany,  etc.,  ar- 
ranged even  to  minute  details,  was  planned  be- 
tween Gauls  and  Anglo-Saxons,  in  a  time  of  the 
profoundest  peace,  and  concluded  without  the 

1  The  Problem  af  Japan,  by  an  Ex-Counselor  of  Legation  in  the 
Far  East,  chap,  viii,  p.  136,  note.  Published  by  C.  L.  Langenhuysen, 
Amsterdam  and  Rotterdam.  1918. 

73 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

slightest  twinge  of  conscience,  in  order  to  anni- 
hilate Germany  and  Austria  and  eliminate  their 
competition  from  the  world  market!  Seventeen 
years  before  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  this 
treaty  was  made  by  the  united  Anglo-Saxons  and 
its  goal  was  systematically  envisaged  throughout 
this  entire  period!  Now  one  can  understand  the 
ease  with  which  King  Edward  VII  could  pursue 
his  policy  of  encirclement;  for  years  the  principal 
actors  had  been  united  and  in  readiness.  When 
he  christened  the  compact  ^'Entente  Cordiale,"  its 
appearance  was  for  the  world,  especially  for  Ger- 
many, an  unpleasant  novelty,  but  in  the  countries 
on  the  other  side  it  was  merely  the  official  acknowl- 
edgment of  facts  long  known  there. 

In  view  of  this  agreement,  one  can  understand 
also  the  opposition  of  England  in  1897  to  an  agree- 
ment with  Germany  regarding  coaling  stations, 
and  the  anger  aroused  because  Germany  managed, 
in  agreement  with  Russia,  to  gain  a  firm  foothold 
in  China,  concerning  the  exploitation  of  which 
land  without  German  participation  a  tripartite 
treaty  had  already  been  made. 

Usher  talked  out  of  school  and  conclusively 
proved  at  whose  door  lies  the  guilt  for  the  World 
War.  The  treaty  directed  against  Germany — 
sometimes  called  the  "gentleman's  agreement" — 
of  the  spring  of  1897,  is  the  basis,  the  point  of  de- 
parture, for  this  war,  which  was  systematically  de- 
veloped by  the  Entente  countries  for  seventeen 
years.  When  they  had  succeeded  in  winning  over 
Russia  and  Japan  likewise  for  their  purposes,  they 

74 


I 


HOHENLOHE 

struck  the  blow,  after  Serbia  had  staged  the  Sara- 
jevo murder  and  had  thus  touched  the  match  to 
the  carefully  filled  powder  barrel. 

Professor  Usher's  statements  are  likewise  a  com- 
plete refutation  of  all  those  who  were  impelled, 
during  the  war,  to  find  the  reason  for  the  entry 
of  the  United  States  in  certain  military  acts  on  the 
part  of  Germany,  as,  for  instance,  the  Lusitania 
case,  the  expansion  of  U-boat  warfare,  etc.  None 
of  that  is  right.  The  recently  published,  excellent 
book  of  John  Kenneth  Turner,  Shall  It  Be  Again? 
points  out,  on  the  basis  of  convincing  proofs,  that 
Wilson's  alleged  reasons  for  going  to  war  and  war 
aims  were  not  the  real  ones.  America — or  rather 
President  Wilson — was  resolved  probably  from 
the  start,  certainly  from  191 5,  to  range  herself 
against  Germany  and  to  fight.  She  did  the  latter, 
alleging  the  U-boat  warfare  as  a  pretext,  in  reality 
under  the  influence  of  powerful  financial  groups, 
and  yielding  to  the  pressure  and  prayers  of  her 
partner,  France,  whose  resources  in  man  power 
were  becoming  more  and  more  exhausted.  Amer- 
ica did  not  wish  to  leave  a  weakened  France  along 
with  England,  whose  annexation  designs  on  Calais, 
Dunkirk,  etc.,  were  well  known  to  her. 

It  was  a  fateful  thing  for  Germany — let  this  be 
stated  here,  in  a  general  way — that  our  Foreign 
OflSce  was  unable  to  meet  the  broad  policy  of 
encirclement  of  England  and  the  cunning  of  Rus- 
sia and  France  with  an  equal  degree  of  diplomatic 
skill.  This  was  partly  because  it  had  not  really 
been  trained  under  Prince  Bismarck;  and  there- 

75 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


fore  when,  after  the  retirement  of  the  Prince  and 
Count  Herbert,  the  all-dominating  will  and  spirit 
were  lacking,  it  was  not  up  to  the  task  of  con- 
ducting foreign  affairs  on  its  own  independent 
initiative. 

Moreover,  it  is  difficult  in  Germany  to  train  up 
good  diplomats,  since  our  people  lack  the  taste  and 
endowment  for  diplomacy  which  have  shone  forth 
brilliantly  only  from  a  few  German  minds,  like 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Bismarck.  Unfavorable 
also  to  the  Foreign  Office  were  the  very  frequent 
changes  of  Secretaries  of  State.  Imperial  Chan- 
cellors, following  the  example  of  Bismarck,  main- 
tained their  influence  upon  the  Foreign  Office  and 
suggested  the  Secretaries  of  State  who  should 
direct  its  affairs.  I  acquiesced  in  the  proposals  of 
the  Imperial  Chancellors  as  to  these  posts,  since  I 
admitted  their  right  to  choose  themselves  their 
leading  collaborators  in  the  domain  of  foreign 
affairs.  That  these  frequent  changes  were  not  cal- 
culated to  work  toward  the  continuity  of  political 
policy  was  a  disadvantage  that  had  to  be  taken  into 
account. 

The  Foreign  Office  was  largely  influenced  by 
the  axiom :  "No  disagreeable  quarrels  with  other 
powers" — "surtout  pas  d'histoires"  ("above  all,  no 
yarns"),  as  the  French  general  said  to  a  company 
of  soldiers  which,  he  had  heard,  wished  to  mutiny. 
One  of  the  Secretaries  of  State  told  me  once  when, 
in  placing  some  matter  before  me,  I  had  called  his 
attention  to  the  apparently  serious  situation  in  con- 
nection with  some  foreign  question,  that  this  simply 

76 


HOHENLOHE 

must  be  righted,  that  the  Foreign  Ofiice  based  its  acts 
primarily  upon  the  maxim:  ^Xet  us  have  quiet." 

Given  this  attitude,  one  can  also  understand  the 
answer  which  the  German  representative  gave  to 
a  German  merchant  in  a  South  American  republic 
who  had  asked  him  for  help  and  intercession  with 
the  authorities,  since  his  shop  had  been  plundered 
and  his  property  stolen:  "Oh,  don't  bother  me 
with  these  things!  We  have  established  such 
pleasant  relations  with  this  republic;  any  action 
undertaken  in  your  behalf  would  only  serve  to  up- 
set them."  I  need  scarcely  add  that  whenever  such 
a  conception  of  duty  came  to  my  attention  I  re- 
moved the  official  concerned  from  his  post. 

The  Foreign  Office  enjoyed  general  unpopularity 
both  among  the  people  and  in  the  army.  I  worked 
continuously,  during  the  tenure  of  office  of  various 
Chancellors,  for  thorough  reform,  but  in  vain. 
Every  new  Chancellor,  especially  if  he  himself  did 
not  come  from  the  ranks  of  the  foreign  service, 
needed  the  Foreign  Office  in  order  to  work  himself 
into  foreign  affairs,  and  this  took  time.  But  once  he 
had  worked  himself  in  he  was  under  obligation  to 
the  officials,  and  was  reluctant  to  make  extensive 
changes,  burdened  as  he  was  by  other  matters  and 
lacking  detailed  knowledge  regarding  the  Foreign 
Office  personnel,  particularly  as  he  still  believed  that 
he  needed  the  advice  of  thosewho  were^orientated." 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  TSING-TAO 

But  let  us  return  to  Tsing-tao.  Here  everything 
was  done  to  promote  commerce  and  industry,  and 

77 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

done  jointly  with  the  Chinese;  the  flag  of  the  Chi- 
nese Empire,  moreover,  was  hoisted  over  the  Cus- 
tom House  at  Tsing-tao.  The  development  there 
was  such^that  the  port,  during  the  years  immedi- 
ately preceding  the  war,  ranked  sixth  among  all 
Chinese  trading  centers  in  the  commercial  register 
of  the  great  Chinese  merchants  and  of  the  mer- 
chants' guild  coming  just  after  Tientsin.  Tsing-tao 
was  a  prospering  German  commercial  colony, 
where  many  Chinese  worked  side  by  side  with  Ger- 
mans; it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  great  sample  ware- 
house of  German  abilities  and  German  achieve- 
ments, to  which  the  Chinese,  who  formerly  had 
not  known  Germany,  her  capabilities  of  achieve- 
ment, or  her  products,  could  repair  for  selec- 
tion and  emulation ;  it  was  a  contrast  to  the  naval 
stations  of  Russia  and  England,  which  were  purely 
military,  directed  solely  toward  domination  and 
conquest. 

The  rapid  rise  of  Tsing-tao  as  a  trading  center 
aroused  the  envy  of  the  Japanese  and  English,  but 
this  did  not  prevent  swarms  of  the  latter  from 
journeying,  with  their  families,  to  the  splendid 
beach,  enjoying  its  cool  air  and  the  beautiful 
Strand  Hotel,  and  devoting  themselves  to  playing 
polo  and  lawn  tennis  after  they  had  escaped  from 
the  heat  of  Hongkong,  Canton,  and  Shanghai. 
Envy  prompted  England  in  1914  to  demand  that 
Japan  should  take  Tsing-tao,  although  it  was  de 
facto  Chinese.  Japan  did  this  joyfully,  promis- 
ing to  return  it  to  China,  but  it  was  not  returned 
until  the  beginning  of  1922,  after  much  pressure, 

78 


HOHENLOHE 

although  Japan  had  agreed  with  America  that  she 
was  not  to  be  allowed  to  make  any  territorial 
changes  in  China  without  previous  consultation 
with  Washington. 

Thus  a  great  German  cultural  work  in  foreign 
lands,  which  stood  as  a  model  of  the  method  and 
manner  which  a  cultured  nation  should  employ  in 
extending  the  advantages  of  its  culture  to  another 
nation,  was  annihilated  by  English  commercial 
envy.  Some  day,  when  Hongkong  has  gone  the 
same  way,  England  will  repent  of  her  act  and  bit- 
terly reproach  herself  for  having  abandoned  her 
old  maxim,  in  accordance  with  which  she  has  acted 
for  so  many  years :  "White  men  together  against 
colored  men."  When  once  Japan  has  made  a  real- 
ity out  of  her  watchword,  "Asia  for  the  Asiatics," 
and  brought  China  and  India  under  her  sway, 
England  will  cast  her  eyes  about  in  search  of  Ger- 
many and  the  German  fleet. 

As  to  the  "yellow  peril,"  I  had  the  following 
interview  with  the  Tsar  later,  after  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  at  a  meeting  between  us. 

The  Tsar  was,  at  that  time,  visibly  impressed  by 
the  growing  power  of  Japan  and  its  constant 
menace  to  Russia  and  Europe,  and  requested  my 
opinion  concerning  this.  I  answered  that  if  the 
Russians  counted  themselves  among  the  cultured 
nations  of  Europe  they  must  be  ready  to  rally  to 
the  defense  of  these  nations  against  the  "yellow 
peril"  and  to  fight  for  and  by  the  side  of  Europe 
for  their  own  and  Europe's  existence  and  culture; 
But  that  if  the  Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 

79 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

sidered  themselves  Asiatics  they  would  unite  with 
the  ^^yellow  peril,"  and,  joining  forces  with  it, 
would  assail  Europe.  The  Tsar,  said  I,  must  bear 
this  in  mind  in  providing  for  the  defense  of  his 
land  and  organizing  his  army. 

When  the  Tsar  asked  me  what  course  I  thought 
the  Russians  would  take,  I  replied :  ^The  second." 

The  Tsar  was  outraged  and  wished  to  know  at 
once  on  what  I  based  this  opinion.  I  answered 
that  my  opinion  was  based  on  Russia's  construction 
\  .  of  railways  and  on  the  arraying  of  the  Russian 
army  along  the  Prussian-Austrian  frontier. 
Thereupon  the  Tsar  protested  that  he  and  his  house 
were  Europeans,  that  his  country  and  his  Russians 
would  certainly  cleave  to  Europe,  that  he  would 
look  upon  it  as  a  matter  of  honor  to  protect  Europe 
from  the  "yellow  men."  To  this  I  replied  that  if 
this  was  the  Tsar's  attitude  he  must  make  his  mili- 
tary preparations  conform  to  it  without  delay. 
The  Tsar  said  nothing. 

At  all  events,  I  sought  to  utilize  Tsar  Nicholas 
II's  worry  at  the  growing  power  of  Japan  to  the 
advantage  of  Germany  and  general  European  cul- 
ture. Russia,  despite  siding  with  Japan,  was  the 
first  nation  to  collapse  among  all  those  participat- 
ing in  the  war. 

REPROACHES  FOR  JAPAN 

The  able  statesmen  of  Japan,  of  whom  there  are 
quite  a  number,  must  be  in  some  doubt  as  to 
whether  they  ranged  their  country  on  the  right  side 
in  the  war.    Yes,  they  will  perhaps  ask  them- 

80 


HOHENLOHE 

selves  whether  it  would  not  have  been  more  advan- 
tageous for  Japan  to  have  prevented  the  World 
War.  This  would  have  been  within  her  powers, 
had  she  ranged  herself  firmly  and  unequivocally 
on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers,  from  which 
in  former  times  she  had  learned  so  willingly  and 
so  much. 

Had  Japan  adopted  soon  enough  such  an  orien- 
tation in  her  foreign  policy,  and,  like  Germany, 
fought  by  peaceful  means  for  her  share  in  world 
trade  and  activity,  I  should  have  put  the  "yellow 
peril"  away  in  a  corner  and  joyfully  welcomed  into 
the  circle  of  peacefully  inclined  nations  the  pro- 
gressive Japanese  nation,  the  "Prussians  of  the 
East."  Nobody  regrets  more  than  I  that  the 
"yellow  peril"  had  not  already  lost  its  meaning 
when  the  crisis  of  1914  arose.  The  experience 
derived  from  the  World  War  may  yet  bring  this 
about. 

Germany's  joint  action  with  France  and  Russia 
at  Shimonoseki  was  based  upon  Germany's  situa- 
tion in  Europe.  Wedged  in  between  on-marching 
Russia,  threatening  Prussia's  frontier,  and  France, 
fortifying  her  borders  anew  with  forts  and  groups 
of  fortresses,  confronted  with  a  friendship  between 
these  two  nations  resembling  an  alliance,  Berlin 
looked  with  anxiety  into  the  future.  The  warlike 
preparations  of  the  two  powers  were  far  ahead  of 
ours,  their  navies  far  more  modern  and  powerful 
than  the  German  navy,  which  consisted  of  a  few 
old  ships  almost  without  fighting  value.  There- 
fore it  seemed  to  us  wise  to  acquiesce  in  the  sugges- 

81 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

tion  of  this  strong  group,  in  order  that  it  might  not 
— should  we  decline — turn  immediately  to  Eng- 
land and  cause  the  entry  of  the  latter  into  the  com- 
bination. This  would  have  meant  the  formation, 
at  that  time,  of  the  combination  of  19 14,  which 
would  have  been  a  serious  matter  for  Germany. 
Japan,  on  the  other  hand,  was  about  to  go  over 
anyhow  to  England,  in  her  sympathies.  More- 
over, Germany's  making  common  cause  with  the 
Franco-Russian  group  offered  the  possibility  of 
achieving  gradually  a  more  trusting  and  less 
strained  relationship  in  Europe  and  of  living  side 
by  side  with  our  two  neighbors  there  in  more 
friendliness,  as  a  result  of  the  common  policy 
adopted  in  the  Far  East.  The  policy  adopted  by 
us  at  this  juncture  was  also  consistently  based  on 
the  maintenance  of  world  peace. 

In  the  entire  Kiao-Chau  question,  Prince  Ho- 
henlohe,  despite  his  age,  evinced  a  capacity  for 
sticking  steadily  to  his  purpose  and  a  degree  of 
resolution  which  must  be  reckoned  as  greatly  to 
his  credit. 

Unfortunately  in  the  matter  of  the  Kruger  dis- 
patch his  prudence  and  his  vision,  so  clear  on  other 
occasions,  abandoned  him :  only  by  so  assuming  is 
his  obstinate  insistence  on  the  sending  of  this  dis- 
patch to  be  understood.  The  influence  of  such  an 
energetic  and  eloquent  personage  as  Herr  von  Mar- 
schall,  former  State  Attorney,  may  have  been  so 
powerful,  the  siren  song  of  Herr  von  Holstein  so 
convincing,  that  the  Prince  yielded  to  them.  In 
any  event,  he  did  his  country  an  ill  turn  in  this 

82 


HOHENLOHE 


matter,  and  damaged  me  seriously  both  in  Eng- 
land and  at  home. 

THE  KRUGER  TELEGRAM  i 

Since  the  so-called  Kruger  dispatch  made  a  big 
stir  and  had  serious  political  consequences,  I  shall 
tell  the  story  of  it  in  detail. 

The  Jameson  raid  caused  great  and  increasing 
excitement  in  Germany.  The  German  nation  was 
outraged  at  this  attempt  to  overpower  a  little  na- 
tion, which  was  Dutch — and,  hence.  Lower  Saxon- 
German  in  origin — and  to  which  we  were  sym- 
pathetic because  of  racial  relationship.  I  was 
much  worried  at  this  violent  excitement,  which 
also  seized  upon  the  higher  classes  of  society,  fore- 
seeing possible  complications  with  England.  I  be- 
lieved that  there  was  no  way  to  prevent  England 
from  conquering  the  Boer  countries,  should  she  so 
desire,  although  I  also  was  convinced  that  such  a 
conquest  would  be  unjust.    But  I  was  unable  to 

1  Tremendous  excitement  was  caused  in  England  when  the  in- 
cident of  the  Kruger  message  became  known.  On  January  3,  1896, 
the  German  Emperor  telegraphed  as  follows  to  the  President  of  the 
South  African  Republic: 

"I  congratulate  you  most  sincerely  on  having  succeeded,  with  your 
people,  without  calling  on  the  help  of  foreign  powers,  by  opposing 
your  own  force  to  an  armed  band  which  broke  into  your  country  to 
disturb  the  peace,  in  restoring  quiet  and  in  maintaining  the  inde- 
pendence of  your  country  against  external  attack." 

On  January  6th,  in  conversation  with  Sir  Frank  Lascelles,  Baron 
von  Marschall  protested  against  the  view  of  the  English  press  that 
it  was  an  act  of  hostility  against  England  and  an  encroachment  on 
English  rights  for  the  German  Emperor  to  congratulate  the  head  of 
a  friendly  state  on  his  victory  over  an  armed  band  that  had  invaded 
his  land  in  defiance  of  international  law,  and  had  been  declared  to 
be  outside  the  pale  of  the  law  by  the  English  Government  itself. 
But  it  was  not  recorded  that  he  disavowed  the  Kaiser's  respon- 
sibility for  it, 

7  83 


V 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

overcome  the  reigning  excitement,  and  was  even 
harshly  fudged  by  my  intimates  on  account  of  the 
attitude  I  adopted. 

One  day  when  I  had  gone  to  my  uncle,  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor,  for  a  conference,  at  which  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Navy,  Admiral  Holl- 
mann,  was  present,  Freiherr  Marschall,  one  of  the 
Secretaries  of  State,  suddenly  appeared  in  high 
excitement,  with  a  sheet  of  paper  in  his  hand.  He 
declared  that  the  excitement  among  the  people — 
in  the  Reichstag,  even— had  grown  to  such  propor- 
tions that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  give  it  out- 
ward expression,  and  that  this  could  best  be  done 
by  a  telegram  to  Kruger,  a  rough  draft  of  which 
he  had  in  his  hand. 

I  objected  to  this,  being  supported  by  Admiral 
Hollmann.  At  first  the  Imperial  Chancellor  re- 
mained passive  in  the  debate.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  I  knew  how  ignorant  Freiherr  Marschall  and 
the  Foreign  Office  were  of  English  national  psy- 
chology, I  sought  to  make  clear  to  Freiherr  Mar- 
schall the  consequences  which  such  a  step  would 
have  among  the  English ;  in  this,  likewise.  Admiral 
Hollmann  seconded  me.  But  Marschall  was  not 
to  be  dissuaded. 

Then,  finally,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  took  a 
hand.  He  remarked  that  I,  as  a  constitutional 
ruler,  must  not  stand  out  against  the  national  con- 
sciousness and  against  my  constitutional  advisers; 
otherwise,  there  was  danger  that  the  excited  atti- 
tude of  the  German  people,  deeply  outraged  in  its 
sense  of  justice  and  also  in  its  sympathy  for  the 

84 


HOHENLOHE 

Dutch,  might  cause  it  to  break  down  the  barriers 
and  turn  against  me  personally.  Already,  he  said, 
statements  were  flying  about  among  the  people ;  it 
was  being  said  that  the  Emperor  was,  after  all,  half 
an  Englishman,  with  secret  English  sympathies; 
that  he  was  entirely  under  the  influence  of  his 
grandmother.  Queen  Victoria;  that  the  dictation 
emanating  from  England  must  cease  once  for  all ; 
that  the  Emperor  must  be  freed  from  English 
tutelage,  etc. 

SAYS  HE  SIGNED  AGAINST  HIS  WILL 

In  view  of  all  this,  he  continued,  it  was  his  duty 
as  Imperial  Chancellor,  notwithstanding  he  ad- 
mitted the  justification  of  my  objections,  to  insist 
that  I  sign  the  telegram  in  the  general  political 
interest,  and,  above  all  else,  in  the  interest  of  my 
relationship  to  my  people.  He  and  also  Herr  von 
Marschall,  he  went  on,  in  their  capacity  of  my  con- 
stitutional advisers,  would  assume  full  responsibil- 
ity for  the  telegram  and  its  consequences. 

Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  at  that  time  correspondent 
of  the  Times,  wrote,  in  the  Times  of  September 
nth,  that  Herr  von  Marschall,  directly  after  the 
sending  of  the  dispatch,  had  stated  to  him  that  the 
dispatch  did  not  give  the  personal  opinion  of  the 
Emperor,  but  was  a  governmental  act,  for  which 
the  Chancellor  and  he  himself  assumed  full 
responsibility. 

Admiral  Hollmann,  when  the  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor appealed  to  him  for  corroboration  of  this  point 
of  view  and  was  asked  by  him  to  uphold  it  to  me, 

85 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


declined  to  do  so  with  the  remark  that  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  world  would  unquestionably  attribute  the 
telegram  to  the  Kaiser,  since  nobody  would  believe 
that  such  a  provocative  thing  could  come  from  His 
Majesty's  elderly  advisers,  and  all  would  consider 
it  an  "impulsive"  act  of  the  "youthful"  Emperor. 

Then  I  again  tried  to  dissuade  the  gentlemen 
from  their  project.  But  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
and  Marschall  insisted  that  I  sign,  reiterating  that 
they  would  be  responsible  for  consequences.  It 
seemed  to  me  that  I  ought  not  to  refuse  after  their 
presentation  of  the  case.  I  signed. 

Not  long  before  his  death  Admiral  HoUmann 
recalled  the  occurrence  to  me  in  full  detail,  as  it 
is  described  here. 

After  the  Kruger  dispatch  was  made  public  the 
storm  broke  in  England,  as  I  had  prophesied.  I 
received  from  all  circles  of  English  society,  espe- 
cially from  aristocratic  ladies  unknown  to  me,  a 
veritable  flood  of  letters  containing  every  possible 
kind  of  reproach,  some  of  the  writers  not  hesitat- 
ing even  at  slandering  me  personally  and  insulting 
me.  Attacks  and  calumnies  began  to  appear  in  the 
press,  so  that  soon  the  legend  of  the  origin  of  the 
dispatch  was  as  firmly  established  as  the  amen  at 
church.  If  Marschall  had  also  announced  in  the 
Reichstag  what  he  stated  to  Chirol,  I  personally  ^ 
would  not  have  been  drawn  into  the  matter  to  such 
an  extent. 

In  February,  1900,  while  the  Boer  War  was  in 
progress  and  while  I  was  with  the  fleet  at  Heligo- 
land attending  the  maneuvers  of  ships  of  the  line, 

86 


HOHENLOHE 


after  having  been  present  at  the  swearing  in  of  re- 
cruits at  Wilhelmshafen  I  received  news  by  tele- 
graph from  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  via  Heligoland, 
that  Russia  and  France  had  proposed  to  Germany 
to  make  a  joint  attack  on  England,  now  that  she 
was  involved  elsewhere,  and  cripple  her  sea  traf- 
fic. I  objected  and  ordered  that  the  proposal  be 
declined. 

Since  I  assumed  that  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg 
would  present  the  matter  at  London  in  such  a  way 
as  to  make  it  appear  that  Berlin  had  made  the 
above  proposal  to  both  of  them,  I  immediately 
telegraphed  from  Heligoland  to  Queen  Victoria 
and  to  the  Prince  of  Wales  (Edward)  the  fact  of 
the  Russo-French  proposal,  and  its  refusal  by 
me.  The  Queen  answered  expressing  her  hearty 
thanks,  the  Prince  of  Wales  with  an  expression  of 
astonishment. 

Later,  Her  Majesty  let  me  know  secretly  that, 
shortly  before  the  receipt  of  my  telegram  from 
Heligoland  concerning  the  proposal  from  Paris 
and  St.  Petersburg,  the  false  version  of  the  matter 
foreseen  by  me  had  indeed  been  told,  and  that  she 
was  glad  to  have  been  able,  thanks  to  my  dispatch, 
to  expose  the  intrigue  to  her  Government  and  quiet 
it  as  to  the  loyal  attitude  of  Germany;  she  added 
that  she  would  not  forget  the  service  I  had  done 
England  in  troublous  times. 

DEAL  WITH  CECIL  RHODES 

When  Cecil  Rhodes  came  to  me,  in  order  to 
bring  about  the  construction  of  the  Cape-to-Cairo 

87 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Railway  and  Telegraph  line  through  the  interior 
regions  of  German  East  Africa,  his  wishes  were 
approved  by  me,  in  agreement  with  the  Foreign 
Office  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor;  with  the  pro- 
viso that  a  branch  railway  should  be  built  via 
Tabora,  and  that  German  material  should  be  used 
in  the  construction  work  on  German  territory. 
Both  conditions  were  acquiesced  in  by  Rhodes 
most  willingly.  He  was  grateful  at  the  fulfillment 
of  his  pet  ambition  by  Germany,  only  a  short  time 
after  King  Leopold  of  Belgium  had  refused  his 
request. 

Rhodes  was  full  of  admiration  for  Berlin  and 
the  tremendous  German  industrial  plants,  which 
he  visited  daily.  He  said  that  he  regretted  not 
having  been  in  Berlin  before,  in  order  to  have 
learned  about  the  power  and  efficiency  of  Ger- 
many, and  to  have  got  into  touch  with  the  German 
Government  and  prominent  Germans  in  commer- 
cial circles.  He  said  he  had  wished,  even  before 
the  Jameson  raid,  to  visit  Berlin,  but  had  been  pre- 
vented in  London  at  that  time  from  so  doing;  that, 
had  he  been  able  to  inform  us  before  of  his  plan 
to  get  permission  to  build  the  Cape-to-Cairo  line 
through  the  Boer  countries,  as  well  as  through  our 
colonies,  the  German  Government  would  probably 
have  been  able  to  help  him  by  bringing  persuasion 
to  bear  upon  Kruger,  who  was  unwilling  to  grant 
this  permission;  that  "the  stupid  Jameson  Raid" 
would  never  have  been  made,  in  that  case,  and  the 
Kruger  dispatch  never  written — as  to  that  dispatch, 
he  had  never  borne  me  a  grudge  on  account  of  it. 

88 


HOHENLOHE 

He  added  that  as  we,  in  Germany,  could  not  be 
correctly  informed  as  to  aim  and  actual  purposes, 
the  said  raid  must  have  looked  to  us  like  "an  act  of 
piracy,"  which  naturally  and  quite  rightly  had 
excited  the  Germans ;  that  all  he  had  wanted  was  to 
have  such  stretches  of  land  as  were  needed  for  his 
rail  lines — such,  in  fact,  as  Germany  had  just 
granted  to  him  in  the  interior  of  her  colonies — a 
demand  which  was  not  unjust  and  would  certainly 
have  met  with  German  support.  I  was  not  to 
worry,  he  added,  about  the  dispatch  and  not  bother 
myself  any  more  about  the  uproar  in  the  English 
press.  Rhodes  did  not  know  about  the  origin  of 
the  Kruger  dispatch  and  wanted  to  console  me, 
imagining  that  I  was  its  originator. 

Rhodes  went  on  to  advise  me  to  build  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  and  open  up  Mesopotamia,  after 
having  had  irrigation  simultaneously  introduced 
there.  He  said  that  this  was  Germany's  task,  just 
as  his  was  the  Cape-to-Cairo  line.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  building  of  this  line  through  our  terri- 
tory was  also  made  dependent  upon  the  cession  to 
us  of  the  Samoan  Islands,  Rhodes  worked  actively 
in  London  toward  having  them  turned  over  to  us. 

In  home  politics,  Prince  Hohenlohe,  as  Chan- 
cellor, showed  a  mildness  which  was  not  generally 
favorable.  Owing  to  his  long  acquaintanceship 
with  Herr  von  Hertling,  he  was  able  to  establish 
friendly  relations  with  the  Vatican.  His  mildness 
and  indulgence  were  also  exercised  toward  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  in  which,  as  an  expert  of  long  standing, 
he  showed  particular  interest.    But  he  got  little 

89 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


thanks  for  this,  since  the  French  element,  indirectly 
benefited  thereby,  behaved  with  ever-increasing 
arrogance. 

PEN  SKETCH  OF  HOHENLOHE 

Prince  Hohenlohe  loved  to  employ  mediation, 
compromise,  and  conciliation — toward  the  Social- 
ists likewise — and  he  employed  them  on  some  occa- 
sions when  energetic  measures  would  have  been 
more  fitting.  He  hailed  with  much  joy  my  Far 
East  trip  to  Constantinople  and  Jerusalem.  He 
was  pleased  at  the  strengthening  of  our  relations 
with  Turkey  and  considered  the  plan  for  the  Bag- 
dad Railway  arising  from  them  as  a  great  cultural 
work  worthy  of  Germany. 

He  also  gave  his  most  enthusiastic  approval  to 
my  visit  to  England  in  1899,  made  by  me  with  my 
wife  and  two  sons  at  the  desire  of  my  royal  grand- 
mother, who,  growing  steadily  weaker  on  account 
of  her  years,  wished  to  see  her  oldest  grandson  once 
more.  He  hoped  that  this  journey  might  serve  to 
efface  somewhat  the  consequences  of  the  Kruger 
dispatch  sent  by  him,  and  also  to  clarify  some  im- 
portant questions  by  means  of  conferences  between 
me  and  English  statesmen. 

In  order  to  avoid  any  unpleasantness  from  the 
English  press,  which,  angered  by  the  Boer  War 
and  the  partly  unjustified  attacks  of  certain  Ger- 
man newspapers,  had  been  answering  in  like  tone, 
the  Queen  had  commissioned  the  author  of  The 
Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,  Sir  Theodore  Martin, 
to  inform  the  English  press  of  Her  Majesty's  desire 

90 


HOHENLOHE 

that  a  friendly  reception  be  accorded  to  her  Im- 
perial grandson.  And  that  is  what  indeed  came  to 
pass.  The  visit  ran  its  course  harmoniously  and 
caused  satisfaction  on  all  sides.  I  held  important 
conferences  with  various  leading  men. 

Not  once  in  the  entire  visit  was  the  Kruger  dis- 
patch mentioned.  On  the  other  hand,  my  royal 
grandmother  did  not  conceal  from  her  grandson 
how  unwelcome  the  whole  Boer  War  was  to  her; 
she  made  no  secret  of  her  disapproval  and  aversion 
for  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  all  that  he  represented, 
and. thanked  me  again  for  my  prompt  and  sharp 
refusal  of  the  Russo-French  proposal  to  interfere 
and  for  my  immediate  announcement  of  this  pro- 
posal. One  could  easily  see  how  much  the  Queen 
loved  her  splendid  army  and  how  deeply  she  had 
been  grieved  by  the  heavy  reverses  suffered  by  it 
at  the  outset  of  the  war,  which  had  caused  by  no 
means  negligible  losses.  Referring  to  these,  the 
aged  Field  Marshal  Duke  of  Cambridge  coined 
the  fine  phrase :  "The  British  nobleman  and  officer 
have  shown  that  they  can  die  bravely  as 
gentlemen." 

On  my  departure,  the  Queen  bade  me  farewell 
with  cordial  and  grateful  greetings  to  her  "much- 
cherished  cousin,"  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  whose 
ability  and  experience,  she  hoped,  would  continue 
to  maintain  good  relations  between  our  two 
countries. 

My  report  entirely  satisfied  Prince  Hohenlohc 
as  to  the  success  of  my  journey;  at  the  same  time, 
however,  I  was  the  object  of  the  most  violent 

91 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

attacks  from  a  certain  section  of  the  press  and  from 
many  excited  ^'friends  of  the  Boers."  The  German 
lacks  the  very  thing  with  which  the  English  peo- 
ple has  been  inoculated,  and  to  which  it  has  been 
trained  by  long  political  self -discipline :  when  a 
fight  is  on,  even  though  it  be  merely  upon  the  field 
of  diplomacy,  the  Englishman  unquestioningly  fol- 
lows the  flag,  in  accordance  with  the  proverb: 
"You  can't  change  the  jockey  while  running." 

In  the  autumn  of  1900  Prince  Hohenlohe  re- 
tired from  the  Chancellorship,  since  the  work  had 
become  too  arduous  for  a  man  of  his  advanced  age. 
Moreover,  the  constant  quarrels  and  disputes  of 
the  political  parties  with  one  another  were  dis- 
agreeable to  him,  and  it  went  against  the  grain  with 
him  to  make  speeches  before  them  in  the  Reichstag. 
Equally  disagreeable  to  him  was  the  press,  part  of 
which  had  taken  the  bit  between  its  teeth  and 
imagined  that  it  could  conserve  the  Bismarckian 
tradition  by  quoting  sayings  by  Bismarck,  and  had 
greatly  jeopardized  relations  with  England,  espe- 
cially during  the  Boer  War. 

CHANCELLOR'S  RETIREMENT 

The  hope,  aroused  by  the  choice  of  Prince  Ho- 
henlohe as  Chancellor  and  his  assumption  of  the 
office,  that  Prince  Bismarck  would  place  less 
obstacles  in  his  path,  had  been  only  partly  fulfilled. 
The  atmosphere  had  been  much  relieved  and 
Prince  Bismarck  brought  to  a  much  milder  frame 
of  mind  by  my  reconciliation  with  him,  which  had 
received  outward  expression  in  his  solemn  entry 

92 


HOHENLOHE 

into  Berlin  and  his  staying  at  the  old  HohenzoUern 
palace,  but  his  adherents  and  those  rallying  around 
him  for  the  sake  of  opposition  were  not  to  be  dis- 
suaded from  their  activities.  Moreover,  the  politi- 
cal representatives  of  the  people  succeeded,  while 
I  was  on  my  way  to  Friedrichsruh  to  celebrate 
Bismarck's  eightieth  birthday,  in  refusing  to  pay 
homage  to  the  old  Imperial  Chancellor,  a  thing 
which  naturally  deeply  hurt  the  sensitive  Prince 
Hohenlohe  and  filled  him  with  indignation. 

He,  like  myself,  was  deeply  moved  by  the  death 
of  his  great  predecessor,  and  we,  together  with  the 
German  people,  sincerely  mourned  Prince  Bis- 
marck as  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  sons  of  Prussia 
and  Germany,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  had 
not  always  made  our  task  easy.  I  insisted  upon 
hurrying  back  from  my  trip  to  Norway  in  order 
to  pay  honor  to  him  who,  as  a  faithful  servant  of 
his  old  master,  had  helped  the  German  nation  to 
unity,  and  under  whom  I,  when  I  was  Prince,  had 
had  the  proud  privilege  of  working. 

It  is  said  that  one  of  the  reasons  why  Prince 
Hohenlohe  retired  from  his  post  was  the  advice 
of  his  son  Alexander,  who  was  much  at  his  father's 
house;  he  was  known  in  society  as  "the  Crown 
Prince,"  and  was  essentially  different  from  his 
lovable  father. 

Prince  Hohenlohe  could  look  back  upon  a  series 
of  successes  during  his  term  as  Chancellor:  the 
overcoming  of  the  disputes  concerning  the  "Citi- 
zens' Book  of  Laws,"  the  reform  of  the  military 
punishment  procedure,  the  Naval  law,  the  appoint- 

93 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

ment  of  Waldersee  to  the  command  in  China  at 
the  time  of  the  Boxer  War,  Tsing-tao,  and  the 
Yangste  Treaty.  ? 

He  bade  me  farewell  on  the  15th  of  October, 
1900.  Both  of  us  were  greatly  moved,  for  not  only 
was  the  Chancellor  and  faithful  co-worker  parting 
from  his  Emperor,  but  also  the  uncle  from  his 
nephew,  who  looked  up  with  grateful  esteem  to 
the  old  man.  At  the  age  of  seventy-five  years — an 
age  when  others  have  long  since  retired  to  rest  and 
contemplation — he  had  not  hesitated  to  obey  the 
summons  of  the  Emperor  to  subject  himself  to  even 
more  exacting  labors  and  devote  his  time  and 
strength  to  the  German  fatherland.  When  about 
to  leave  my  room,  he  grasped  my  hand  once  again 
with  the  request  that  I  might  grant  him,  during 
the  years  of  life  still  remaining  to  him  (which  he 
meant  to  spend  in  Berlin),  the  same  plain,  faithful 
friendship  which  he  had  so  long  noted  and  admired 
between  me  and  Admiral  von  Hollmann.  I  shall 
always  preserve  him  faithfully  in  my  memory. 


94 


CHAPTER  IV 


Billow 


,N  the  day  after  Prince  Hohenlohe's  farewell, 


V^_^  the  man  summoned  by  me  as  his  successor — 
Count  Billow,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, arrived.  His  choice  for  the  post  was  emi- 
nently fitting,  because  he  was  thoroughly  cognizant 
of  our  foreign  policy  and,  especially,  of  our  rela- 
tions with  England — which  policy  was  becoming 
constantly  livelier  and  more  complicated — and  be- 
cause he  had  already  proved  himself  a  skillful 
orator  and  ready  debater  in  the  Reichstag.  The 
fact  that  the  second  of  these  qualities  was  lacking 
in  his  predecessor  had  often  been  painfully  notice- 
able. When  Prince  Hohenlohe's  intention  to  re- 
tire became  known  in  the  Imperial  Council,  the 
Bavarian  ambassador  at  Berlin,  Count  Lerchen- 
feld,  very  pointedly  remarked  to  me  that  for 
Heaven's  sake  I  was  not  to  choose  another  South 
German,  since  South  Germans  were  not  fitted  for 
the  leading  post  at  Berlin ;  North  Germans  were 
naturally  better  able  to  fill  it  and,  therefore,  it 
would  be  better  for  the  Empire  to  select  a  North 
German. 

I  had  been  acquainted  personally  with  Biilow 


95 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

for  a  long  time,  ever  since  the  period  of  his  ambas- 
sadorship at  Rome  and  his  work  as  Secretary  of 
State.  Then  I  had  often  visited  him  at  his  home 
and  had  held  many  a  conference  with  him  in  his 
garden.  He  came  into  closer  relationship  with  me 
when  he  accompanied  me  on  my  journey  to  the 
Far  East,  where,  in  co-operation  with  the  ambas- 
sador, Freiherr  Marschall,  he  assisted  me  in  get- 
ting into  personal  touch  with  the  leading  men  of 
the  Turkish  Government.  Hence,  the  relations  of 
the  new  Chancellor  with  me  were  already  begun 
and,  to  a  certain  extent,  established,  since  we  had 
for  years  discussed  all  political  problems  and 
spheres.  Moreover,  he  stood  much  nearer  to  me 
in  age  than  his  predecessors,  most  of  whom  could 
have  been  my  grandfather.  He  was  the  first 
"young  Chancellor"  of  Germany.  And  this  made 
our  common  task  easier  for  both  of  us. 

When  I  was  in  Berlin,  scarcely  a  day  went  by 
without  my  taking  a  long  morning  walk  with  the 
Chancellor  in  the  garden  of  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor's palace,  during  which  outstanding  business 
was  cleared  up  and  problems  of  actuality  discussed. 
I  often  had  a  meal  with  him  and  always  found 
at  his  table,  where  I  was  most  hospitably  received 
by  the  Count,  his  amiable  wife  and  a  group  of  the 
most  interesting  men,  in  choosing  whom  the  Count 
was  a  master.  He  was  likewise  unsurpassed  in 
skillfully  conducting  conversation  and  in  the  witty 
handling  of  the  various  topics  that  arose.  To  me 
it  was  always  a  pleasure  to  be  in  the  company  of 
the  Chancellor  and  enjoy  his  bubbling  wit,  to 

96 


/ 

BULOW 

exchange  views  at  his  table  with  many  professors, 
savants,  and  artists,  as  well  as  Government  officials 
of  all  sorts,  in  informal,  unofficial  intercourse  and 
stimulating  exchange  of  ideas. 

The  Count  was  an  excellent  narrator  of  anec- 
dotes, drawn  both  from  books  and  his  own  personal 
experience,  which  he  told  in  several  languages.  He 
liked  to  tell  stories  of  the  days  when  he  was  a  diplo- 
mat, especially  about  his  stay  at  St.  Petersburg. 

BULOW  A  DISCIPLE  OF  BISMARCK 

The  Count's  father  was  an  intimate  friend  of 
Prince  Bismarck  and  had  been  one  of  his  closest 
co-workers.  Young  Biilow  also  had  begun  his 
career  under  the  great  Chancellor;  he  had  been 
brought  up  on  Bismarckian  ideas  and  traditions  and 
strongly  influenced  by  them,  but,  nevertheless,  had 
not  adhered  to  them  to  such  an  extent  as  to  lose 
his  independence. 

In  the  course  of  one  of  the  first  talks  which  I 
had  with  Biilow  as  Imperial  Chancellor  he  in- 
formed himself  concerning  my  ideas  of  how  best 
to  handle  the  English  and  have  dealings  with  them. 
I  told  him  that  I  considered  absolute  frankness 
the  most  important  thing  in  dealing  with  England 
and  Englishmen;  that  the  Englishman,  in  pre- 
senting his  point  of  view  and  working  for  his  in- 
terests, was  inconsiderate  to  the  point  of  brutality, 
for  which  reason  he  thoroughly  understood  any- 
body who  acted  similarly  toward  him ;  that  there 
must  be  no  playing  the  diplomatic  game,  or  "finess- 
ing," with  an  Englishman,  because  it  made  him 

97 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

distrust  those  with  whom  he  was  dealing  and  sus- 
pect that  they  were  not  honest  and  wished  secretly 
to  cheat  him ;  that  such  devious  methods  could  be 
successful  only  in  dealing  with  Latin  and  Slavic 
nations;  that,  once  the  Englishman  had  become 
suspicious,  there  was  nothing  more  to  be  done  with 
him,  despite  the  most  honeyed  words  and  most 
obliging  concessions ;  that  the  only  advice,  there- 
fore, which  I  could  give  the  Chancellor  was  that 
he  confine  himself  entirely  to  straightforwardness 
in  his  English  policy.  I  said  this  with  particular 
emphasis,  since  "finessing"  was  especially  dear  to 
the  diplomatic  character  of  Count  Biilow  and  had 
become  second  nature  to  him. 

I  also  took  occasion,  during  this  talk,  to  warn 
the  Chancellor  against  Holstein.  In  spite  of  my 
warning — which  was  merely  a  repetition  of  that 
given  me  before  by  Bismarck — Biilow  worked  a 
great  deal,  or  was  obliged  to  work,  with  Holstein. 
This  remarkable  man  had  been  able  gradually, 
especially  since  the  time  that  the  Foreign  Office 
had  been,  so  to  speak,  orphaned  by  Bismarck's  re- 
tirement, to  create  for  himself  a  position  that  be- 
came steadily  more  influential  and  to  maintain  it 
under  three  Chancellors  with  such  skill  that  he  was 
considered  indispensable. 

Holstein  was  unquestionably  possessed  of  great 
shrewdness,  seconded  by  a  phenomenal  memory 
and  a  certain  talent  for  political  combinations, 
which,  to  be  sure,  often  became  a  hobby  in  his  case. 
His  position  was  also  based  largely  on  the  fact  that 
he  was  looked  upon  in  many  quarters,  especially 

98 


BULOW 


among  the  older  officials,  as  the  "bearer  of  the 
Bismarckian  traditions/'  the  man  who  upheld  these 
in  the  teeth  of  '^the  young  master."  His  importance 
rested,  above  all,  on  his  wide  personal  knowledge 
in  the  entire  domain  of  the  foreign  service.  Since 
he  wielded,  on  account  of  this,  an  authoritative 
influence  on  all  proposals  relative  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  officials  and  hence,  also,  on  the  careers 
of  the  younger  officials,  it  may  be  easily  under- 
stood why  he,  little  by  little,  had  obtained  for  him- 
self a  dominating  position  at  the  Foreign  Office. 
But  he  sought  more  and  more  to  obtain,  at  the 
same  time,  a  decisive  influence  upon  the  conduct 
of  foreign  policy;  he  had,  in  fact,  become  the  guid- 
ing spirit  both  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  of  Ger- 
man foreign  policy. 

HOLSTEIN'S  SECRET  POWER 

The  serious  thing  about  this  was  that  he  exerted 
his  far-reaching  influence  entirely  from  under 
cover  and  avoided  all  official  responsibility  as  an 
adviser.  He  preferred  to  remain  in  the  dark  and 
exert  his  influence  from  there.  He  refused  every 
responsible  post — many  stood  open  to  him — every 
honorary  title,  every  promotion.  He  lived  in  com- 
plete seclusion.  For  a  long  time  I  tried  in  vain 
to  become  personally  acquainted  with  him,  for 
which  purpose  I  used  to  invite  him  to  meals,  but 
Holstein  declined  every  time.  Only  once,  in  the 
course  of  many  years,  did  he  consent  to  dine  with 
me  at  the  Foreign  Office,  and  it  was  characteristic 
of  him  that,  whereas  on  this  occasion  all  the  other 
s  99 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

gentlemen  present  wore  full  evening  dress,  he  ap- 
peared in  a  frock  coat  and  excused  himself  on  the 
plea  that  he  had  no  dress  coat. 

The  secrecy  with  which  he  surrounded  himself 
in  his  work,  so  as  not  to  be  held  responsible  for  it, 
became  apparent  also  at  times  in  the  character  of 
the  memorials  drawn  up  by  him;  they  were  un- 
questionably ingenious  and  attractive,  but  often  as 
involved  and  ambiguous  as  the  oracle  of  Delphi; 
there  were  occasions  when,  after  a  decision  had 
been  made  based  on  the  contents  of  one  of  these 
documents,  Herr  von  Holstein  would  prove  to  a 
nicety  that  he  meant  exactly  the  opposite  of  what 
had  been  thought. 

I  considered  it  a  serious  matter  that  an  irre- 
sponsible counselor  should  bring  to  bear  such 
powerful  influence,  especially  as  he  did  so  from 
under  cover  and,  hence,  in  doing  it,  eluded  the  offi- 
cials who  were  in  duty  bound  to  exert  influence, 
and  who  were  the  responsible  parties.  Often,  es- 
pecially in  the  von  Richthofen  era,  it  happened 
that  I  would  advise  a  foreign  ambassador  to  discuss 
some  political  question,  which  he  had  taken  up 
with  me,  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  he  would 
reply:  "J'en  parlerai  avec  mon  ami  Holstein" 
("I  shall  speak  about  it  with  my  friend  Holstein") . 
The  fact  alone  that  an  official  of  the  Foreign  Office 
dealt  with  foreign  ambassadors,  going  over  the 
head  of  his  superior,  did  not  seem  right  to  me; 
but  that  he  should  be  dubbed  by  these  foreigners 
"friend"  seemed  to  me  to  go  beyond  what  I  deemed 
advisable. 

ICO 


BULOW 

Matters  had,  in  fact,  developed  gradually  to 
such  a  stage  that  Holstein  conducted  a  good  part 
of  our  foreign  affairs.  To  be  sure,  he  still  listened 
to  the  Chancellor  in  connection  with  them,  but 
what  the  Emperor  thought  or  said  about  foreign 
affairs  was  rather  unimportant?  If  things  turned 
out  successfully,  the  Foreign  Office  reaped  the 
reward;  if  things  went  wrong,  then  it  was  the 
fault  of  the  "impulsive  young  master." 

In  spite  of  all  this,  Biilow,  too,  apparently 
thought  Herr  von  Holstein  indispensable  at  first; 
he  worked  together  with  him  for  a  long  time,  until 
at  last  he,  too,  found  unbearable  the  pressure  which 
this  strange  man  exerted  on  everybody.  To  Herr 
von  Tschirschky,  during  his  tenure  of  office  as  Sec- 
retary of  State,  belongs  the  merit  of  finally  bring- 
ing the  unendurable  situation  to  a  head.  On  being 
questioned  by  me,  he  declared  that  he  considered  it 
impossible  that  Herr  von  Holstein  remain  at  his 
post  any  longer,  since  he  was  embroiling  the  whole 
Foreign  Office,  seeking  to  eliminate  him,  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  entirely,  and  creating  all  kinds  of 
obstacles,  likewise,  for  the  Chancellor. 

DISMISSAL— AND  AN  ENEMY 

Thereupon  I  ordered  Herr  von  Tschirschky  to 
prepare  the  way  for  the  dismissal  of  Herr  von 
Holstein,  which  afterward  took  place,  with  the 
approval  of  the  Chancellor,  after  the  latter  had 
recovered  from  the  serious  break-down  in  health 
which  he  had  suffered  meanwhile.  Herr  von  Hol- 
stein himself  showed  what  manner  of  man  he  was 

lOI 


/ 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

6y  going  at  once  after  his  dismissal  to  Herr  Harden 
and  placing  himself  at  the  latter's  disposal  for  the 
campaign  against  the  Emperor. 

The  year  1901  gave  Count  Biilow  plentiful  op- 
portunities to  show  and  assert  himself  in  dealings 
with  England.  Count  Biilow  still  believed  strongly 
in  the  Bismarckian  theory  of  having  "two  irons  in 
the  fire" — L  e,,  in  making  friendly  agreements 
with  another  country  while  always  remaining  on 
good  terms  with  Russia — in  which  he  received 
support  from  the  many  pretended  adherents  of 
Bismarck. 

From  the  midst  of  the  Jubilee  celebration  of  the 
two  hundredth  coronation  anniversary,  I  was  called 
to  the  deathbed  of  my  grandmother,  Queen  Vic- 
toria, by  a  dispatch  announcing  to  me  the  serious 
condition  of  the  Queen.  I  hurriedly  made  the 
journey  with  my  uncle,  the  Duke  of  Connaught, 
who  was  at  Berlin  as  the  Queen's  representative  at 
the  festivities — he  was  the  favorite  son  of  the  Queen 
and  my  particular  friend,  and  a  son-in-law  of 
Prince  Frederick  Charles — and  I  was  cordially 
received  in  London  by  the  then  Prince  of  Wales 
and  the  royal  family.  As  my  carriage  drove  out  at 
a  trot  from  the  railway  station  a  plainly  dressed  man 
stepped  forward  from  the  closely  packed  crowd 
standing  there  in  absolute  silence,  to  the  side  of 
the  carriage,  bared  his  head,  and  said:  "Thank 
you,  Kaiser."  The  Prince  of  Wales,  later  Edward 
VII,  added :  "That  is  what  they  all  think,  and  they 
will  never  forget  this  coming  of  yours." 

Nevertheless,  they  did  forget  it,  and  quickly. 

102 


BULOW 


After  the  Queen  had  quietly  breathed  her  last  in 
my  arms,  the  curtain  fell  for  me  upon  many  memo- 
ries of  childhood.  Her  death  signified  the  close 
of  an  epoch  in  English  history  and  in  Germany's  re- 
lations with  England.  I  now  got  into  touch,  as  far 
as  possible,  with  prominent  personages,  and  noted 
everywhere  a  thoroughly  sympathetic,  friendly 
spirit,  which  made  no  secret  of  the  wish  for  good 
relations  with  Germany. 

At  the  farewell  banquet  impromptu  speeches 
were  made  by  King  Edward  VII  and  myself, 
which  were  cordial  in  tone  and  content,  and  did 
not  fail  to  make  an  impression  on  their  hearers. 
After  the  meal  the  English  ambassador  at  Berlin 
clasped  my  hand  and  said  that  my  speech  had 
touched  all  his  fellow  countrymen's  hearts,  because 
what  I  said  was  sincere  and  simple,  as  was  fitting 
for  Englishmen ;  that  the  speech  must  at  once  be 
made  public,  since  it  would  have  an  effect  through 
out  the  country,  which  was  grateful  for  my  com- 
ing; and  that  this  would  be  useful  to  the  relations 
between  the  two  countries.  I  answered  that  it  was 
a  matter  for  the  British  Government  and  the  King 
to  decide,  that  personally  I  had  no  objections  to 
having  the  speech  made  public. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  not  made  public,  and  the 
British  people  never  learned  of  my  words,  which 
were  the  sincere  expression  of  my  sentiments  and 
thoughts.  In  another  talk  later  on  with  me  at 
Berlin  the  same  ambassador  deeply  regretted  this, 
but  was  unable  to  say  what  the  reason  was  for  this 
omission. 

103 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

In  concluding  my  remarks  on  my  stay  in  Eng- 
land I  cannot  pass  over  the  fact  that  a  portion  of 
the  German  press  was  unfortunately  lacking  both 
in  tactful  appreciation  of  the  grief  of  the  English 
royal  family  and  people,  as  well  as  of  the  obliga- 
tions which  my  family  relationship  and  political 
considerations  imposed  upon  me. 

After  my  return  home  from  England  I  was  able 
to  report  to  the  Chancellor  on  the  good  impres- 
sions I  had  received,  and  particularly  that  opinion 
in  England  was  apparently  in  favor  of  an  under- 
standing and  of  closer  relations. 

Billow  expressed  himself  as  satisfied  with  the 
results  of  the  journey,  after  we  had  talked  at  length 
about  it  at  Homburg,  and  consulted  as  to  how  the 
situation  created  by  the  journey  should  be  put  to 
use.  I  suggested  that  we  should  unquestionably 
come  to  a  good  agreement,  if  an  alliance — ^which 
I  preferred — could  not  be  brought  about  In  any 
event,  a  firm  agreement  would  suffice,  I  said,  and 
would  suit  the  English ;  in  the  long  run  an  alliance; 
might  always  develop  from  it. 

The  opportunity  for  such  an  alliance  came  with 
unexpected  promptness.  While  I  was  at  Homburg 
von  der  Hohe  in  the  spring  of  1901,  Count  Metter- 
nich,  who  was  with  me  as  representative  of  the 
Foreign  Office,  brought  me  a  notification  from 
Berlin  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  inquired  there 
as  to  whether  Germany  was  ready  for  an  alliance 
with  England.  I  immediately  asked:  "Against 
whom?"— since,  if  England  so  suddenly  offered  to 
make  an  alliance  in  the  midst  of  peace,  it  was  plain 

104 


BULOW 

that  she  needed  the  German  army,  which  made 
it  worth  while  to  find  out  against  whom  the 
army  was  needed  and  for  what  reason  German 
troops  were  to  fight,  at  England's  behest,  by 
her  side.  Thereupon  the  answer  came  from 
London  that  they  were  needed  against  Russia, 
since  Russia  was  a  menace  both  to  India  and 
to  Constantinople. 

The  first  thing  I  did  was  to  call  London's  atten- 
tion to  the  old  traditional  brotherhood-in-arms  be- 
tween the  German  and  Russian  armies,  and  the 
close  family  ties  between  the  reigning  dynasties  of 
the  two  countries ;  in  addition,*  I  pointed  out  the 
dangers  of  a  war  on  two  fronts,  in  case  France 
came  in  on  the  side  of  Russia,  and  also  the  fact  that 
we  had  acted  jointly  with  France  and  Russia  in 
the  Far  East  (Shimonoseki,  1895)  and  that  there 
was  no  reason  to  unloose  a  conflict  with  Russia  at 
this  time,  when  we  were  in  the  midst  of  peace; 
that  the  superiority  in  number  of  the  Russian  army 
on  a  peace  footing  was  very  great  and  the  eastern 
frontiers  of  Prussia  seriously  threatened  by  the 
grouping  of  the  Russian  forces;  that  England 
would  not  be  in  a  position  to  protect  our  eastern 
province  from  a  Russian  attack,  since  her  fleet 
could  accomplish  little  in  the  Baltic  and  would 
be  unable  to  sail  into  the  Black  Sea ;  that,  in  case 
of  our  making  common  cause  against  Russia,  Ger- 
many would  be  the  only  one  who  would  be  in  great 
danger,  quite  independently  of  the  possibility  of 
the  entry  of  France  into  the  fight. 

Chamberlain  then  informed  us  that  a  firm  alli- 

105 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


ance  should  be  made,  by  which  England  would 
naturally  bind  herself  to  come  to  our  aid. 

BRITISH  ALLIANCE  FAILS 

I  had  also  pointed  out  that  the  validity  of  an 
alliance  could  only  be  assured  when  the  English 
Parliament  had  placed  its  approval  upon  it,  since 
the  Ministry  might  be  driven  from  office  by  the  will 
of  the  nation  as  expressed  in  Parliament,  whereby 
signature  of  the  Ministry  might  be  rendered  null 
and  void  and  the  alliance  invalidated,  and  that  we 
could  look  upon  the  Chamberlain  suggestion,  for 
the  time  being,  merely  as  a  purely  personal  project 
of  his  own. 

To  this  Chamberlain  replied  that  he  would  get 
backing  from  Parliament  in  due  time  and  would 
find  the  way  of  winning  the  Unionists  over  to  his 
idea;  that  all  needed  now  was  the  signature  of 
Berlin.  Matters  did  not  progress  as  far  as  that, 
because  Parliament  was  not  to  be  won  over  to 
Chamberlain's  plan ;  therefore  the  "plan''  came  to 
nothing.  Soon  afterward  England  concluded  her 
alliance  with  Japan  (Hayashi).  The  Russo-Jap- 
anese War  broke  out,  in  which  Japan — owing  to 
the  fact  that  it  fitted  in  with  her  schemes — played 
the  role  of  pawn  for  England's  interests,  which 
role  had  originally  been  reserved  for  Germany. 
By  this  war  Russia  was  thrown  from  the  east  back 
to  the  west,  where  she  might  concern  herself  again 
with  the  Balkans,  Constantinople,  and  India — 
which  was  to  Japan's  advantage — leaving  to  Japan 
a  free  hand  in  Korea  and  China. 

io6 


BULOW 


In  1905  came  my  journey  to  Tangier,  under- 
taken much  against  my  will.  It  came  about  as  fol- 
lows: Toward  the  end  of  March  I  intended,  as  in 
the  previous  year,  to  take  a  Mediterranean  trip  for 
the  sake  of  my  health,  for  which  I  proposed  to  avail 
myself  of  some  ship  running  empty  from  Cuxhaven 
to  Naples.  The  Hamburg  was  destined  by  Ballin 
for  this  purpose.  At  his  request  that  I  take  along 
some  other  guests,  since  the  steamer  was  quite 
empty,  I  invited  a  number  of  gentlemen,  among 
them  Privy  Councilor  Althoc,  Admiral  Mensing, 
Count  Piickler,  Ambassador  von  Varnbuhler,  Pro- 
fessor Schiemann,  Admiral  Hollmann,  etc. 

Soon  after  the  proposed  trip  became  known 
Billow  informed  me  that  there  was  a  strong  desire 
at  Lisbon  to  have  me  stop  there  and  pay  the  Por- 
tuguese court  a  visit.  To  this  I  agreed.  As  the 
date  of  departure  approached,  Biilow  expressed 
the  additional  wish  that  I  also  stop  at  Tangier  and, 
by  visiting  that  Moroccan  port,  strengthen  the 
position  of  the  Sultan  of  Morocco  in  relation  to 
the  French. 

This  I  declined,  since  it  seemed  to  me  that  the 
Morocco  question  was  too  full  of  explosive  matter 
and  I  feared  that  such  a  visit  would  work  out  dis- 
advantageously  rather  than  beneficially.  Biilow 
returned  to  the  attack,  without,  however,  persuad- 
ing me  of  the  necessity  or  advisability  of  the  visit 

AGAIN  KAISER  "GIVES  IN" 

During  the  journey  I  had  several  talks  with 
Prciherr  von  Schoen,  who  accompanied  me  as  rep- 

107 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

resentative  of  the  Foreign  Office,  as  to  the  advis- 
ability of  the  visit.  We  agreed  that  it  would  be 
better  to  drop  it.  I  telegraphed  this  decision  to 
the  Chancellor  from  Lisbon.  Biilow  replied  em- 
phatically that  I  must  take  into  consideration  the 
view  of  the  German  people  and  of  the  Reichstag, 
which  had  become  interested  in  the  project,  and 
that  it  was  necessary  that  I  stop  at  Tangier. 

I  gave  in,  with  a  heavy  heart,  for  I  feared  that 
this  visit,  in  view  of  the  situation  at  Paris,  might 
be  construed  as  a  provocation  and  cause  an  inclina- 
tion in  London  to  support  France  in  case  of  war. 
Since  I  suspected  that  Delcasse  wished  to  make 
Morocco  a  pretext  for  war,  I  feared  that  he  might 
make  use  of  the  Tangier  visit  for  this  purpose. 

The  visit  took  place,  after  much  difficulty  had 
been  experienced  in  the  open  roadstead  of  Tangier, 
and  it  met  with  a  certain  amount  of  friendly  par- 
ticipation by  Italian  and  Southern  French  anar- 
chists, rogues,  and  adventurers.  A  lot  of  Spaniards 
stood  upon  a  small  square,  amid  waving  banners 
and  loud  cries ;  these,  according  to  a  police  official 
who  accompanied  us,  were  an  assembly  of  Spanish 
anarchists. 

The  first  I  learned  about  the  consequences  of  my 
Tangier  visit  was  when  I  got  to  Gibraltar  and  was 
formally  and  frigidly  received  by  the  English,  in 
marked  contrast  to  my  cordial  reception  the  year 
before.  What  I  had  foreseen  was  justified  by  the 
facts.  Embitterment  and  anger  reigned  in  Paris, 
and  Delcasse  tried  to  rouse  the  nation  to  war ;  the 
only  reason  that  he  did  not  succeed  was  that  both 

io8 


BULOW 

the  Minister  of  War  and  the  Minister  of  the  Navy 
declared  France  not  yet  ready. 

The  fact  that  my  fears  were  justified  was  also 
corroborated  later  by  the  conversation  between 
Delcasse  and  the  editor  of  Le  Gaulois,  in  which 
the  Minister  informed  an  astonished  world  that, 
in  case  of  war,  England  would  have  sided  with 
France.  Thus,  even  as  far  back  as  that,  I  ran  the 
risk,  through  the  Tangier  visit  forced  upon  me,  of 
getting  blamed  for  the  unchaining  of  a  world  war. 
To  think  and  act  constitutionally  is  often  a  hard 
task  for  a  ruler  upon  whom  in  every  case  responsi- 
bility is  finally  saddled. 

In  October,  1905,  the  Paris  Matin  reported  that 
Delcasse  had  declared  in  the  Council  of  Ministers 
that  England  had  offered,  in  case  of  war,  to  land 
100,000  men  in  Holstein  and  seize  the  Kaiser  Wil- 
helm  Canal.  This  English  offer  was  repeated  once 
more  later  on,  with  the  suggestion  that  it  be  af- 
firmed in  writing.  And  the  well-known  Jaures, 
who  was  murdered  in  accordance  with  the  political 
ideas  of  Isvolsky  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914, 
knew  beforehand  about  the  statements  by  Delcasse 
published  in  the  Matin. 

The  downfall  of  Delcasse  and  the  accession  of 
Rouvier  to  his  post  are  to  be  ascribed  partly  to  the 
influence  of  the  Prince  of  Monaco.  During  the 
regatta  week  at  Kiel  the  Prince  had  assured  him- 
self, by  talks  with  me,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  and 
Government  officials,  of  the  sincerity  of  our  desire 
to  compromise  with  France  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  us  to  live  at  peace  with  each  other.  He 

109 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

stood  well  with  the  ambassador,  Prince  Radolin, 
and  worked  actively  toward  a  rapprochement  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

The  Prince  of  Monaco  himself  was  of  the  opin- 
ion that  Delcasse  was  a  menace  to  the  maintenance 
of  peace  and  hoped  that  he  would  soon  fall  and  be 
replaced  by  Rouvier,  who  was  a  prudent  politician 
thoroughly  inclined  to  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  Germany.  The  Prince  said  that  he  was  on 
good  terms  with  Rouvier  personally  and  would 
willingly  place  himself  at  the  disposal  of  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  as  a  go-between. 

NEGOTIATIONS  FRUITLESS 

Then  came  Delcasse's  fall,  and  Rouvier  became 
Minister.  At  once  I  caused  the  initiation  of  the 
measures  wherein  I  could  count  upon  the  support 
of  the  Prince  of  Monaco.  The  Chancellor  was 
instructed  to  prepare  a  rapprochement  with 
France.  And  I  particularly  told  Prince  Radolin, 
who  personally  received  his  instructions  in  Ber- 
lin, to  make  good  use  of  the  Rouvier  regime  for 
the  purpose  of  eliminating  all  possibilities  of  con- 
flict between  the  two  countries.  I  added  that  the 
reports  of  the  Prince  of  Monaco,  with  whom  he 
was  well  acquainted,  would  be  useful  to  him  in 
relations  with  Rouvier.  Prince  Radolin  proceeded 
with  zeal  and  pleasure  to  the  accomplishment  of 
this  worth-while  task. 

'  At  first  the  negotiations  went  well,  so  much  so 
that  I  began  to  hope  that  the  important  goal  would 
be  attained  and  the  evil  impression  caused  by  the 

no 


BULOW 


Tangier  visit  effaced  by  an  understanding.  In  the 
meantime,  the  negotiations  concerning  Morocco 
were  continued ;  they  were  concluded,  after  endless 
trouble,  by  the  summoning  of  the  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, based  upon  the  circular  note  of  Prince 
Biilow,  which  pointed  out  that  the  Most-Favored- 
Nation  Clause  No.  17  of  the  Madrid  Convention 
should  remain  in  force  and  that  the  reforms  in 
Morocco,  for  which  France  alone  was  working, 
should  be  carried  out,  in  so  far  as  necessary,  only 
in  agreement  with  the  signatory  powers  of  the 
Madrid  Conference.  These  events,  which  riveted 
general  attention  upon  themselves,  relegated  the 
special  negotiations  with  Rouvier  to  the  back- 
ground. 

With  regard  to  domestic  policy,  I  had  agreed 
with  the  Chancellor  that  his  main  task  was  to  be 
the  restoration  of  order  in  the  relations  between 
the  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  which  had  got  into  a 
bad  way  under  Hohenlohe,  and,  above  all,  to  rally 
the  Conservatives,  who  had  been  won  over  to  the 
opposition  by  the  Post-Bismarckians,  once  more  to 
the  support  of  the  Government.  The  Chancellor 
accomplished  this  task  with  great  patience  and 
tenacity.  He  finally  formed  the  famous  ^^bloc," 
which  arose  from  the  great  electoral  defeat  of  the 
Socialists. 

The  Conservative  party  had  many  members  who 
had  direcf  relations  with  the  court,  and  also  with 
me  personally,  so  that  it  was  easier  for  this  party 
than  for  any  other  to  become  informed  as  to  my 
plans  in  political  and  other  matters  and  to  discuss 

III 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

my  ideas  with  me  before  they  took  shape  in  proj- 
ects for  laws.  I  have  not  the  impression  that  this 
was  done  to  the  extent  that  was  possible ;  I  might 
perhaps  have  come  into  agreement  with  the  gentle- 
men, through  informal  conversations,  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  building  of  the  Central  Canal — op- 
posed, as  is  well  known,  by  the  Conservatives — as 
well  as  in  the  less  important  matters  of  the  con- 
struction of  the  Cathedral  and  the  Berlin  Opera 
House,  in  which  I  was  deeply  interested  for  the 
sake  of  the  Church  and  of  art. 

I  am  saying  nothing  new  if  I  remark  that  it  was 
by  no  means  easy  to  deal  with  the  gentlemen  of  the 
Conservative  party.  Through  their  traditional  serv- 
ices to  the  state  they  had  acquired  great  experi- 
ence and  independence  of  judgment,  and  had  thus 
formed  firm  political  convictions,  to  which  they 
held  faithfully  and  in  a  genuinely  conservative 
manner.  From  their  ranks  great  statesmen,  emi- 
nent Ministers,  a  brilliant  officer  corps,  a  model 
body  of  officials,  had  largely  been  produced. 
Therefore,  the  consciousness  of  their  own  merit 
was  not  without  justification;  in  addition,  their 
loyalty  to  their  King  was  unshakable.  The  King 
and  the  country  both  owed  them  gratitude. 

FINDS  FAULT  WITH  CONSERVATIVES 

Their  weakness  lay  in  the  fact  that  they  were  at 
times  too  conservative — that  is,  they  recognized  too 
late  the  demands  of  the  time  and  began  by  oppos- 
ing progress,  although  it  might  be  progress  advan- 
tageous to  themselves.  One  may  understand  this  in 


BULOW 

view  of  their  past,  but  the  fact  remains  that  it 
worked  to  the  detriment  of  their  relations  with 
me,  especially  during  my  reign,  when  the  develop- 
ment of  the  JEcapire,  particularly  of  industry  and 
commerce,  pushed  rapidly  forward;  and  I  desired 
—and  was  obliged — to  place  no  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  that  development,  but  to  promote  it.  When 
I  said  that  it  was  not  always  easy,  for  the  reasons 
adduced,  to  deal  with  the  Conservatives,  I  am  well 
aware  that  the  same  thing  is  maintained  about  me. 
Perhaps  this  is  because  I  stood  close  to  the  Con- 
servatives on  account  of  my  traditions,  but  was  not 
a  Conservative  for  party  reasons.  I  was  and  am, 
indeed,  in  favor  of  progressive  conservatism,  which 
preserves  what  is  vital,  rejects  what  is  outworn,  and 
accepts  that  portion  of  the  new  which  is  useful. 

Let  me  add  that  in  discussions  I  was  able  to 
endure  the  truth,  even  when  it  was  uncomfortable 
and  bitter,  better  than  people  are  aware,  provided 
it  was  told  to  me  tactfully. 

So  that,  when  it  is  maintained  that  I  and  the 
Conservatives  did  not  get  along  in  dealings  with 
each  other,  the  same  reason  was  at  the  root  of  the 
difficulty  on  both  sides.  It  would  have  been  better 
ito  arrive  oftener  at  an  understanding  with  me  in 
private  conversations,  for  which  I  was  always 
ready.  And  in  the  canal  question,  on  which  we 
could  not  agree,  who  was  better  qualified  than  the 
Conservative  to  understand  arid  appreciate  the  fact 
that  I  have  never  subscribed  to  the  pretty  couplet, 
"Unser  Konig  absolut,  wenn  er  unseren  Willen 
tut"  ("Absolute  our  King  may  be,  if  he  does  what 

113 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

we  decree")  ?  For,  had  I  acted  according  to  that 
principle — a  very  comfortable  one  for  me — the 
Conservatives,  in  view  of  their  belief  in  a  strong 
King  who  really  governs,  would  logically  have 
been  forced  to  oppose  me.  Surely  the  Conserva- 
tives must  have  respected  me  for  having  matched 
their  honorable  axiom  of  manly  pride  before  the 
thrones  of  Kings  with  mine  of  kingly  pride  before 
the  Conservative  party's  throne,  just  as  I  did  with 
regard  to  all  other  parties. 

In  any  event,  the  occasional  dififerences  with  the 
Conservative  party  and  with  individual  Conserv- 
atives cannot  make  me  forget  the  services  rendered 
by  men  of  this  very  party  to  the  House  of  Hohen- 
zoUern,  the  Prussian  'state,  and  the  German 
Empire. 

Billow  finally  did  the  great  trick  of  bringing 
Conservatives  and  Liberals  together  in  Germany, 
thus  getting  a  big  majority  for  the  parties  siding 
with  the  Government.  In  doing  so,  the  great  abil- 
ities of  the  Chancellor,  his  skill,  statecraft,  and 
shrewd  knowledge  of  men,  shone  forth  most 
brilliantly.  The  great  service  rendered  by  him  in 
achieving  this  success  won  him  thorough  apprecia- 
tion and  gratitude  from  his  country  and  fronl  my- 
self;  and,  in  addition,  an  increase  of  my  trust  in 
him.  The  boundless  delight  of  the  people  of 
Berlin  in  the  defeat  of  the  Social  Democrats  at  the 
polls  led  to  the  nocturnal  demonstration,  which  I 
shall  never  forget,  in  front  of  my  palace,  in  the 
course  of  which  my  automobile  had  to  force  a. way 
for  itself,  little  by  little,  amid  a  cheering  crowd  of 

H4 


BtiLOW 


many  thousands  surrounding  it.  The  Lustgarten 
was  packed  with  great  multitudes  of  people,  at 
whose  tumultuous  request  the  Empress  and  I  had 
to  appear  on  the  balcony  in  order  to  receive  their 
homage. 

The  Chancellor  was  present  at  the  visit  of  King 
Edward  VII  to  Kiel.  Among  the  many  guests  was 
the  former  Chief  Court  Marshal  of  the  Empress, 
Frederick,  Count  Seckendorff,  long  acquainted 
with  Edward  VII  through  his  many  visits  to  Eng- 
land, who  reposed  great  trust  in  the  Count.  This 
gentleman,  at  the  behest  of  Biilow,  with  whom  he 
was  friendly,  arranged  an  interview  between  the 
King  and  the  Chancellor. 

It  took  place  on  board  the  royal  English  yacht 
after  a  breakfast  to  which  I  and  the  Chancellor 
were  invited.  Both  gentlemen  sat  for  a  long  time 
alone  over  their  cigars.  Afterward  Biilow  reported 
to  me  what  had  transpired  at  the  interview.  In 
discussing  the  possible  conclusion  of  an  alliance 
between  Germany  and  England,  the  King,  he  told 
me,  had  stated  that  such  a  thing  was  not  at  all 
necessary  in  the  case  of  our  two  countries,  since 
there  was  no  real  cause  for  enmity  or  strife  between 
them.  This  refusal  to  make  an  alliance  was  a  plain 
sign  of  the  English  "policy  of  encirclement,"  which 
soon  made  itself  felt  clearly  and  disagreeably  at 
the  Algeciras  Conference.  The  pro-French  and 
anti-German  attitude  of  England,  which  there 
came  out  into  the  open,  was  due  to  special  orders 
from  King  Edward  VII,  who  had  sent  Sir  D. 
Mackenzie  Wallace  to  Algeciras  as  his  "super- 
9  115 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMQIRS 

vising  representative,"  equipped  with  personal 
instructions. 

From  hints  given  by  the  latter  to  his  friends  it 
turned  out  that  it  was  the  King's  wish  to  oppose 
Germany  strongly  and  support  France  at  every 
opportunity.  When  it  was  pointed  out  to  him  that 
it  might  be  possible,  after  all,  to  take  up  later  with 
Germany  this  or  that  question  and  perhaps  come 
to  an  understanding,  he  replied  that,  first  of  all 
came  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement;  that,  once  that 
was  assured,  an  "arrangement"  might  be  made  with 
Germany  also.  The  English  "arrangement"  con- 
sisted in  the  encirclement  of  Germany. 

HIS  FRIENDSHIP  WITH  BULOW 

The  relations  between  me  and  the  Chancellor 
remained  trustful  and  friendly  throughout  this 
period.  He  was  present  repeatedly  at  the  Kiel 
regatta.  Here,  he  found  occasion,  among  other 
matters,  to  confer  with  the  Prince  of  Monaco  and 
a  number  of  influential  Frenchmen,  who  were 
guests  aboard  the  Prince's  yacht,  among  whom 
doubtless  the  most  eminent  was  M.  Jules  Roche, 
the  leading  expert  on  European  budgets,  and  a 
great  admirer  of  Goethe.  He  always  carried  a 
copy  of  Faust  in  his  pocket. 

I  In  April,  1906,  came  the  unfortunate  collapse  in 
the  Reichstag  of  the  overworked  Chancellor.  As 
soon  as  I  received  the  news,  I  hurried  there  and 
was  glad  that  Privy  Councilor  Renvers  could  give 
me  encouraging  news  about  Billow's  condition. 
While  the  Prince  was  recuperating  during  the 

116 


BULOW 


summer  at  Norderney,  I  went  from  Heligoland, 
which  I  had  been  inspecting,  on  a  torpedo  boat  to 
the  island  and  surprised  the  Chancellor  and  his 
wife  at  their  villa.  I  spent  the  day  in  chatting  with 
the  Chancellor,  who  had  already  recovered  his 
health  to  an  encouraging  degree  and  was  browned 
by  the  sea  air  and  sunlight. 

In  the  late  autumn  of  1907  the  Empress  and  I 
paid  a  visit  to  Windsor,  at  the  invitation  of  King 
Edward  VII.  We  were  most  cordially  received 
by  the  English  royal  family  and  the  visit  went  off 
harmoniously.  After  this  visit  I  went  for  a  rest  to 
the  castle  of  Highcliffe,  belonging  to  General 
Stewart  Worthley,  situated  on  the  south  coast  of 
England,  opposite  The  Needles. 

Before  my  departure  for  England,  the  Chancel- 
lor, who  was  much  pleased  at  the  English  invita- 
tion, had  long  talks  with  me  as  to  the  best  way  for 
getting  on  a  better  footing  with  England,  and  had 
suggested  to  me  a  number  of  his  desires  and  proj- 
ects, to  serve  me  as  guides  in  my  conversations 
with  Englishmen.  During  my  visit  I  had  frequent 
occasion  to  discuss  the  subjects  agreed  upon  and 
conduct  conversations  as  desired  by  the  Chancellor. 
Cipher  telegrams  containing  my  reports  on  these 
conversations  went  regularly  to  Berlin  and  I  re- 
peatedly received  from  the  Chancellor  approving 
telegrams.  I  used  to  show  these  after  the  evening 
meal  to  my  intimates  who  accompanied  me  on  my 
visit;  these  men,  among  them  the  Chief  Court 
Marshal  Count  Eulenberg  and  Prince  Max  Egon 
Fiirstenberg,  read  them  and  rejoiced  with  me  at 

117 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


the  harmonious  understanding  between  me  and  the 
Chancellor. 

After  my  return  from  England  I  made  a  general 
report  to  the  Chancellor,  whereupon  he  expressed 
to  me  his  thanks  for  my  having  personally  troubled 
myself  so  much  and  worked  so  hard  toward  im- 
proving the  relations  between  the  two  countries. 

DEFENDS  FAMOUS  INTERVIEW  i 

A  year  later  came  the  incident  about  the  so- 
called  "interview,"  published  in  the  Daily  Tele- 
graph. Its  object  was  the  improvement  of  Ger- 
man-English relations.  I  had  sent  the  draft 
submitted  to  me  to  the  Chancellor  for  examina- 
tion through  the  representative  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  Herr  von  Jenisch.  I  had  called  atten- 
tion, by  means  of  notes,  to  certain  portions  which, 
to  my  way  of  thinking,  did  not  belong  therein 
and  should  be  eliminated.  Through  a  series  of 
mistakes  on  the  part  of  the  Foreign  Office,  when 

1  One  of  the  most  startling  incidents  of  the  Kaiser's  reign  was 
the  interview  with  him  printed  in  the  London  Daily  Telegraph  of 
Oct.  28,  1908.  In  it  he  said  that  "Englishmen,  in  giving  rein  to 
suspicions  unworthy  of  a  great  nation,"  were  "mad  as  March  hares"; 
and  that  "the  prevailing  sentiment  among  large  sections  of  the  middle 
and  lower  classes  of  my  own  people  is  not  friendly  to  England.  I 
am,  therefore,  so  to  speak,  in  a  minority  in  my  own  land,  but  it  is 
a  minority  of  the  best  e-lements,  just  as  it  is  in  England  with  respect 
to  Germany."  German  opinion  was,  he  admitted,  "bitterly  hostile" 
to  England  during  the  Boer  War,  and,  that  the  German  people,  if 
he  had  permitted  Boer  delegates  in  Berlin,  "would  have  crowned 
them  with  flowers."  He  asserted  that  he  had  formulated  a  plan 
of  campaign  in  South  Africa  which  Lord  Roberts  adopted  in  substance. 

The  Kaiser  was  quoted  in  this  interview  as  declaring  Germany 
needed  a  large  fleet  chiefly  on  account  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation. 

The  interview  was  republished  in  oflScial  German  organs,  and 
caused  as  great  a  stir  in  Germany  as  in  England.  There  were  many 
debates  on  it  in  the  Reichstag  and  one  or  two  "investigations." 

118 


BULOW 


the  matter  was  taken  up  at  my  request,  this  was 
not  done. 

A  storm  broke  loose  in  the  press.  The  Chancel- 
lor spoke  in  the  Reichstag,  but  did  not  defend  the 
Kaiser,  who  was  the  object  of  attack,  to  the  extent 
that  I  expected,  declaring,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
he  wished  to  prevent  in  future  the  tendency  toward 
"personal  politics"  which  had  become  apparent  in 
the  last  few  years.  The  Conservative  party  took 
upon  itself  to  address  an  open  letter  to  the  King 
through  the  newspapers,  the  contents  of  which 
are  known. 

During  these  proceedings,  I  was  staying  first  at 
Eckartsau,  with  Franz  Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  Aus- 
trian throne,  and  later  with  Kaiser  Franz  Joseph 
at  Vienna,  both  of  whom  disapproved  of  the  Chan- 
cellor's conduct.  From  Vienna  I  went  to  Donau- 
eschingen  to  visit  Prince  Fiirstenberg,  to  whom  the 
press  saw  fit  to  address  the  demand  that  he  should, 
being  an  honest,  upright  man,  tell  the  Emperor  the 
truth  for  once.  When  we  talked  over  the  whole 
matter,  the  Prince  advised  me  to  get  together,  at 
the  Foreign  Office,  the  dispatches  from  Highcliffe 
in  1907,  and  the  answers  to  them,  and  have  these 
laid  before  the  Reichstag. 

During  this  whole  affair  I  underwent  great 
mental  anguish,  which  was  heightened  by  the  sud- 
den death  before  my  eyes  of  the  intimate  friend  of 
my  youth.  Count  Hiilsen-Haeseler,  chief  of  the 
Military  Cabinet.  The  faithful,  self-sacrificing 
friendship  and  care  of  the  Prince  and  his  family 
were  most  welcome  to  me  in  these  bitter  days.  And 

119 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

letters  and  demonstrations  from  the  Empire,  part 
of  which  sided  with  me  and  severely  censured  the 
Chancellor,  were  a  consolation  to  me  during  that 
period. 

After  my  return,  the  Chancellor  appeared,  lec- 
tured me  on  my  political  sins,  and  asked  that  I 
sign  the  document  that  is  already  known,  which 
was  afterward  communicated  to  the  press.  I  signed 
it  in  silence  and  in  silence  I  endured  the  attacks  of 
the  press  against  myself  and  the  Crown. 

The  Chancellor  struck  a  serious  blow,  by  his 
conduct,  at  the  firm  confidence  and  sincere  friend- 
ship which  had  bound  me  before  to  him.  Un- 
doubtedly Prince  Biilow  thought  that,  handling 
the  matter  as  he  did  both  in  the  Reichstag  and  with 
me  personally,  he  could  best  serve  me  and  the 
cause,  especially  as  public  excitement  was  running 
very  high  at  that  time.  In  this  I  could  not  agree 
with  him,  all  the  more  so  since  his  actions  toward 
me  in  the  Daily  Telegraph  affair  stood  out  in  too 
sharp  contrast  to  the  complaisance  and  recognition 
which  Biilow  had  previously  manifested  toward 
me.  I  had  become  so  accustomed  to  the  amiability 
of  the  Prince  that  I  found  the  treatment  now  ac- 
corded me  incomprehensible. 

A  BREAK  WITH  BULOW 

The  relationship  between  Emperor  and  Chan- 
cellor, excellent  and  amicable  up  to  that  time,  was, 
at  all  events,  disturbed.  I  gave  up  personal  rela- 
tions with  the  Chancellor  and  confined  myself  to 
official  dealings.  After  consultation  with  the  Min- 

120 


BULOW 


ister  of  the  Royal  Household  and  the  chief  of  the 
Cabinet,  I  resolved  to  follow  Prince  Fiirstenberg's 
advice  as  to  getting  together  the  Highcliffe  dis- 
patches, and  charged  the  Foreign  Office  with  this 
task.  It  failed  of  accomplishment  because  the  dis- 
patches in  question  were  not  to  be  found. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  winter  the  Chancellor 
requested  an  audience  with  me.  I  walked  up  and 
down  with  him  in  the  picture  gallery  of  the  palace, 
between  the  pictures  of  my  ancestors,  of  the  battles 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  of  the  proclamation  of 
the  Empire  at  Versailles,  and  was  amazed  when 
the  Chancellor  harked  back  to  the  events  of  the 
autumn  of  1908  and  undertook  to  explain  his  atti- 
tude. Thereupon  I  took  occasion  to  talk  with  him 
about  the  entire  past.  The  frank  talk  and  the  ex- 
planations of  the  Prince  satisfied  me.  The  result 
was  that  he  remained  in  office. 

The  Chancellor  requested  that  I  dine  with  him 
that  evening,  as  I  had  so  often  done  before,  in  order 
to  show  the  outer  world  that  all  was  again  well. 
I  did  so.  A  pleasant  evening,  enlivened  by  the 
visibly  delighted  Princess  with  charming  amiabil- 
ity, and  by  the  Prince  with  his  usual  lively,  witty 
talk,  closed  that  memorable  day.  Alluding  to  the 
Prince's  audience  with  me,  a  wag  wrote  later  in  a 
newspaper,  parodying  a  famous  line:  "The  tear 
flows,  Germania  has  me  again." 

By  this  reconciliation  I  also  wished  to  show  that 
I  was  in  the  habit  of  sacrificing  my  own  sensitive- 
ness to  the  good  of  the  cause.  Despite  Prince 
Billow's  attitude  toward  me  in  the  Reichstag, 

121 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

which  was  calculated  to  pain  me,  I  naturally  never 
forgot  his  eminent  gifts  as  a  statesman  and  his 
distinguished  services  to  the  fatherland.  He 
succeeded,  by  his  skill,  in  avoiding  a  world 
war  at  several  moments  of  crisis,  during  the 
period  indeed,  when  I,  together  with  Tirpitz, 
was  building  our  protecting  fleet.  That  was  a 
great  achievement. 

A  serious  epilogue  to  the  above-mentioned  au- 
dience was  provided  by  the  Conservatives.  The 
Civil  Cabinet  informed  the  party  leaders  of  the 
Chancellor's  audience  and  what  happened  there, 
with  the  request  that  the  party  might  now  take 
back  its  "Open  Letter."  This  request — which  was 
made  solely  in  the  interest  of  the  Crown,  not  of 
myself  personally — ^was  declined  by  the  party. 
Not  until  1916,  when  the  war  was  under  way,  did 
we  get  into  touch  again,  through  a  delegate  of  the 
party,  at  Great  General  Headquarters. 

Just  as  the  Conservatives  did  not  do  enough  out 
of  respect  for  the  Crown  to  satisfy  me,  so  also  the 
Liberals  of  the  Left,  the  Democrats  and  the  So- 
cialists, distinguished  themselves  by  an  outburst  of 
fury,  which  became,  in  their  partisan  press,  a  veri- 
table orgy,  in  which  loud  demands  were  made  for 
the  limitation  of  autocratic,  despotic  inclinations, 
etc.  This  agitation  lasted  the  whole  winter,  with- 
out hindrance  or  objection  from  high  Government 
circles.  Only  after  the  Chancellor's  audience  did 
it  stop. 

Later,  a  coolness  gradually  arose  between  the 
Chancellor  and  the  political  parties.    The  Con- 

122 


BULOW 


servatives  drew  away  from  the  Liberals — rifts  ap- 
peared in  the  bloc.  Centrists  and  Socialists — but, 
above  all,  the  Chancellor  himself — brought  about 
its  downfall,  as  Count  Hertling  repeatedly  ex- 
plained to  me  later — for  the  last  time  at  Spa.  He 
was  proud  to  have  worked  energetically  toward 
causing  Billow's  downfall. 

When  matters  had  reached  an  impossible  pass, 
^the  Chancellor  drew  the  proper  conclusions  and 
recommended  to  me  the  choice  of  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  as  the  fifth  Chancellor  of  the  Empire.  After 
careful  consultations,  I  decided  to  acquiesce  in  the 
wish  of  Prince  Biilow,  to  accept  his  request  for 
'retirement,  and  to  summon  the  man  recommended 
by  him  as  his  successor. 


/ 
I 


CHAPTER  V 


Bethmann 

I HAD  been  well  acquainted  since  my  youth  with 
Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg.  When  I  was  in 
active  service  for  the  first  time  in  1877,  as  Lieuten- 
ant in  the  Sixth  Company  of  the  First  Infantry. 
Guard  Regiment,  it  was  quartered  once  at  Hohen- 
finow,  the  home  of  old  Herr  von  Bethmann,  father 
of  the  Chancellor.  I  was  attracted  by  the  pleasant 
family  circle  there,  which  was  presided  over  by 
Prau  von  Bethmann,  a  most  worthy  lady,  born  of 
Swiss  nationality,  amiable  and  refined. 

Often,  as  Prince  and  later  as  Emperor,  I  went 
to  Hohenfinow  to  visit  the  old  gentleman,  and  I 
was  received  on  every  occasion  by  the  young  head 
of  the  rural  district  administration;  at  that  time 
neither  of  m  imagined  that  he  would  become  Im- 
perial Chancellor  under  me. 

From  these  visits  an  intimate  relationship  sprang 
up  little  by  little,  which  served  to  increase  steadily 
my  esteem  for  the  diligence,  ability,  and  noble 
character  of  Bethmann,  which  were  much  to  my 
liking.  These  qualities  clung  to  him  throughout 
his  career. 

As  Chief  President  and  as  Imperial  Secretary  of 

124 


BETHMANN 

State  for  the  Interior  Bethmann  gave  a  good  ac- 
count of  himself,  and,  while  occupying  the  last- 
named  post,  made  his  appearance  successfully  be- 
fore the  Reichstag. 

Co-operation  with  the  Chancellor  was  easy  for 
me.  With  Bethmann  I  kept  up  my  custom  of  daily 
visits  whenever  possible,  and  of  discussing  fully 
with  him,  while  walking  in  the  garden  of  the 
Chancellor's  palace,  on  politics,  events  of  the  day, 
special  bills,  and  occurrences  and  of  hearing  re- 
ports from  him.  It  was  also  a  pleasure  for  me  to 
visit  the  Chancellor's  home,  since  Bethmann's 
spouse  was  the  very  model  of  a  genuine  German 
wife,  one  whose  simple  distinction  earned  the 
esteem  of  every  visitor,  while  her  winning  kind- 
ness of  heart  spread  around  her  an  atmosphere  of 
cordiality.  During  the  Bethmann  regime  the  cus- 
tom of  holding  small  evening  receptions,  instituted 
by  Prince  Biilow  and  most  enjoyable  to  me,  was 
continued,  and  this  enabled  me  to  keep  on  associat- 
ing informally  with  men  of  all  circles  and  walks 
of  life. 

,  In  the  journeys  which  the  Chancellor  had  to 
make  in  order  to  introduce  himself,  he  won  esteem 
everywhere  by  his  distinguished  calm  and  sincere 
methods  of  expression.  Such  foreign  countries  gs 
were  not  hostile  to  us  considered  him  a  factor  mak- 
ing for  political  stability  and  peace,  to  the  main- 
tenance and  strengthening  of  which  he  devoted  his 
most  zealous  efforts.  This  was  entirely  to  my 
liking. 

In  foreign  politics  he  busied  himself  from  the 

125 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

start  with  the  position  of  England  in  relation  to 
Germany  and  with  the  "policy  of  encirclement"  of 
King  Edward  VII,  which  had  made  itself  felt 
more  and  more  since  Reval,  and  was  a  source 
of  worry  to  Bethmann.  This  was  likewise  true  of 
the  growing  desire  for  revenge  and  enmity  of 
France,  and  the  unreliability  of  Russia.  During 
his  regime  as  Chancellor  it  became  clear  that  Italy 
was  no  longer  to  be  reckoned  with  militarily;  the 
work  of  Barrere  in  that  country  made  "extra  tours" 
chronic. 

Upon  assuming  office,  Herr  von  Bethmann  found 
the  situation  with  regard  to  France  cleared  up  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  German-French  Morocco 
Agreement  had  been  signed  on  February  9,  1909. 
By  recognizing  thereby  the  political  predominance 
of  France  in  Morocco  Prince  Biilow  had  put  the 
finishing  touch  to  the  German  political  retreat 
from  Morocco.  The  standpoint  which  had  deter- 
mined the  trip  to  Tangier  and,  in  addition,  the  Al- 
geciras  Conference,  was  thereby  definitely  aban- 
doned. The  great  satisfaction  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment over  this  victory  was  expressed  in  a  man- 
ner unwelcome  to  us  by  the  conferring  of  the  cross 
of  the  Legion  of  Honor  upon  Prince  Radolin  and 
Herr  von  Schoen. 

RECEIVES  BRITISH  ROYALTY 

On  the  same  day  King  Edward  VII,  with  Queen 
Alexandra,  made  his  first  official  visit  to  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  and  his  wife  at  their  capital  city  of 
Berlin — eight  years  after  his  accession  to  the 

126 


BETHMANN 


throne!  Berlin  received  the  exalted  gentleman 
with  rejoicing  ( !!)  and  showed  no  signs  of  dissatis- 
faction at  his  unfriendly  policy. 

The  King  did  not  look  well ;  he  was  tired  and 
aged,  and  suffered,  moreover,  from  a  severe  attack 
of  catarrh.  Nevertheless,  he  accepted  the  invita- 
tion of  the  municipal  authorities  of  Berlin  to  in- 
formal tea  at  the  City  Hall.  From  his  description, 
which  was  corroborated  by  Berlin  gentlemen,  the 
function  must  have  been  satisfactory  to  both 
parties. 

I  informed  my  uncle  of  the  signing  of  the  Ger- 
man-French Morocco  Agreement  and  the  news 
seemed  to  please  him.  When  I  added,  "I  hope  this 
agreement  will  be  a  stepping  stone  to  a  better 
understanding  between  the  two  countries,"  the 
King  nodded  his  head  approvingly  and  said,  "May 
that  be  so!"  If  the  King  had  co-operated  toward 
this,  my  project  would  probably  not  have  failed. 
Nevertheless,  the  visit  of  Their  English  Majesties 
engendered  a  more  friendly  atmosphere  for  the 
time  being,  which  greeted  Herr  von  Bethmann 
upon  his  assuming  ofiice. 

During  his  term  of  office  Herr  von  Bethmann 
had  plenty  of  foreign  matters  to  handle,  connected 
with  the  well-known  events  of  1909-14.  Con- 
cerning this  period  a  mass  of  material  has  been 
published  in  different  quarters,  for  instance,  in  the 
book.  Causes  of  the  World  War,  by  Secretary 
of  State  von  Jagow.  In  the  Belgian  Documents 
the  attitude  of  the  German  Government  in  the 
various  complications  is  described  from  a  neutral 

127 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


standpoint.  I  had  based  this  attitude  on  the 
following : 

Caution  on  the  one  hand,  on  the  other,  support  of 
our  Austro-Hungarian  allies  whenever  there  is  a  plain 
threat  against  their  position  as  a  world  power,  com- 
bined with  counsels  of  moderation  in  action.  Efforts  in 
the  role  of  "honest  broker"  everywhere,  activity  as  a 
go-between  wherever  peace  seems  endangered.  Firm 
assertion  of  our  own  interests. 

In  viev^  of  the  "encirclement"  ambitions  of  our 
opponents,  v^e  were  in  duty  bound,  for  the  sake 
of  self-preservation,  to  work  steadily  at  the  same 
time  toward  building  up  our  army  and  navy  for 
purposes  of  defense,  because  of  the  central  location 
of  Germany  and  her  open,  unprotected  frontiers. 
This  period  of  history  is  also  well  described  in 
Stegemann's  book,  and  HelfiFerich  and  Friedjung 
also  depict  the  prewar  days  interestingly. 

"EDWARD  THE  ENCIRCLER" 

The  death  of  the  "encircler,"  Edward  VII— of 
whom  it  was  said  once,  in  a  report  of  the  Belgian 
Embassy  at  Berlin,  that  "the  peace  of  Europe  was 
never  in  such  danger  as  when  the  King  of  England 
concerned  himself  with  maintaining  it" — called 
me  to  London,  where  I  shared  with  my  close  rela- 
tions, the  members  of  the  English  royal  family,  the 
mourning  into  which  the  passing  of  the  King  had 
thrown  the  dynasty  and  the  nation.  The  entire 
royal  family  received  me  at  the  railway  station  as 
a  token  of  their  gratitude  for  the  deference  to  fam- 
ily ties  shown  by  my  coming. 

128 


BETHMANN 


King  George  drove  with  me  to  Westminster 
Hall,  where  the  gorgeously  decorated  coffin  re- 
posed upon  a  towering  catafalque,  guarded  by 
household  troops,  troops  of  the  line,  and  detach- 
ments from  the  Indian  and  Colonial  contingents, 
all  in  the  traditional  attitude  of  mourning — heads 
bowed,  hands  crossed  over  the  butts  and  hilts  of 
their  reversed  arms.  The  old,  gray  hall,  covered 
by  its  great  Gothic  wooden  ceiling,  towered  im- 
posingly over  the  catafalque,  lighted  merely  by  a 
few  rays  of  the  sun  filtering  through  narrow  win- 
dows. One  ray  flooded  the  magnificent  coffin  of 
the  King,  surmounted  by  the  English  crown,  and 
made  marvelous  play  with  the  colors  of  the  pre- 
cious stones  adorning  it. 

Past  the  catafalque  countless  throngs  of  men, 
women,  and  children  of  all  classes  and  strata  in  the 
nation  passed  in  silence,  many  with  hands  folded 
to  bid  a  reverent  farewell  to  him  who  had  been  so 
popular  as  a  ruler.  A  most  impressive  picture,  in 
its  marvelous  medieval  setting. 

I  went  up  to  the  catafalque,  with  King  George, 
placed  a  cross  upon  it,  and  spoke  a  silent  prayer, 
after  which  my  right  hand  and  that  of  my  royal 
cousin  found  each  other,  quite  unconsciously  on  our 
part,  and  met  in  a  firm  clasp.  This  made  a  deep 
impression  on  those  who  witnessed  it,  to  such  an 
extent  that,  in  the  evening,  one  of  my  relations  said 
to  me :  ^^Your  handshake  with  our  King  is  all  over 
London :  the  people  are  deeply  impressed  by  it,  and 
take  it  as  a  good  omen  for  the  future." 

"That  is  the  sincerest  wish  of  my  heart,''  I  replied. 

129 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

As  I  rode  through  London  behind  the  coffin  of 
my  uncle  I  was  a  witness  of  the  tremendous  and 
impressive  demonstration  of  grief  on  the  part  of 
the  vast  multitude — estimated  at  several  millions 
— on  streets,  balconies,  and  roofs,  every  one  of 
whom  was  clad  in  black,  every  man  of  whom  stood 
with  bared  head,  among  all  of  whom  reigned  per- 
fect order  and  absolute  stillness.  Upon  this  som- 
ber, solemn  background  the  files  of  British  soldiers 
stood  out  all  the  more  gorgeously.  In  splendid 
array  marched  the  battalions  of  the  English 
Guards:  Grenadiers,  Scots  Guards,  Coldstreams, 
Irish  Guards — in  their  perfectly-fitting  coats, 
white  leather  facings,  and  heavy  bearskin  head- 
gear; all  picked  troops  of  superb  appearance  and 
admirable  martial  bearing,  a  joy  to  any  man  with 
the  heart  of  a  soldier.  And  all  the  troops  lining 
the  path  of  the  funeral  cortege  stood  in  the  attitude 
of  mourning  already  described. 

During  my  stay  I  resided,  at  the  special  desire 
of  King  George,  in  Buckingham  Palace.  The 
widow  of  the  dead  King,  Queen  Alexandra,  re- 
ceived me  with  moving  and  charming  kindness, 
and  talked  much  with  me  about  bygone  days ;  my 
recollections  stretched  back  to  my  childhood,  since 
I,  while  still  a  little  boy,  had  been  present  at  the 
wedding  of  my  dead  uncle. 

THE  PICHON  CONVERSATION 

The  King  gave  a  banquet  to  the  many  princely 
guests  and  their  suites,  as  well  as  for  the  representa- 
tives of  foreign  nations,  at  which  M.  Pichon  was 

130 


BETHMANN 


also  present.  He  was  introduced  to  me  and,  in 
conversation  with  him,  I  told  him  of  the  wishes 
which  the  Imperial  Chancellor  had  communicated 
to  me  regarding  our  interests  in  Morocco  and  some 
other  political  matters,  which  M.  Pichon  readily- 
agreed  to  carry  out.  All  other  combinations  con- 
nected in  various  quarters  with  this  talk,  belong  in 
the  domain  of  fancy. 

Although  the  period  between  1909  and  1914  de- 
manded extraordinary  attention  to  foreign  events, 
interior  development  was,  nevertheless,  promoted 
zealously,  and  efforts  made  to  meet  the  demands 
of  commerce,  transportation,  agriculture,  and  in- 
dustry, which  were  growing  rapidly.  Unfortu- 
nately endeavors  in  this  direction  were  made  much 
more  difficult  by  the  discord  among  political  parties. 

The  Chancellor  wished  to  accomplish  every- 
thing possible  of  accomplishment.  But  his  inclina- 
tion to  get  to  the  bottom  of  problems  and  his  desire 
to  deal  only  with  what  was,  from  his  meticulous 
critical  standpoint,  thoroughly  matured,  tended, 
in  the  course  of  time,  to  hamper  progress.  It  was 
difficult  to  bring  him  to  make  decisions  before  he 
was  thoroughly  convinced  of  their  being  absolutely 
free  from  objection.  This  made  working  with  him 
tiresome  and  aroused  in  those  not  close  to  him  the 
impression  of  vacillation,  whereas,  in  reality,  it 
was  merely  overconscientiousness  carried  too  far. 

In  addition,  the  Chancellor  eventually  devel- 
oped a  strong  and  growing  inclination  toward 
domination ;  in  discussions  this  tended  to  make  him^ 
obstinate  and  caused  him  to  lay  down  the  law  to 

10  131 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

those  thinking  otherwise  as  dogmatically  as  a 
school  teacher.  This  brought  him  many  enemies 
and  often  made  things  hard  for  me.  A  boyhood 
friend  of  the  Chancellor,  to  whom  I  spoke  once 
about  this,  replied,  with  a  smile,  that  it  had  been  so 
with  him  even  in  school ;  there  Herr  von  Bethmann 
had  constantly  taught  and  school-mastered  his  fel- 
low students,  of  whom  my  informant  was  one,  so 
that  finally  his  classmates  had  nicknamed  him  "the 
governess."  He  added  that  this  trait  was  a  mis- 
fortune for  Bethmann,  but  that  it  had  so  grown 
into  his  very  being  that  he  would  never  be  able  to 
get  rid  of  it. 

An  example  of  this  is  Bethmann's  relationship 
to  Herr  von  Kiderlen,  whom  he  desired  to  have  as 
Secretary  of  State,  despite  my  emphatic  objections. 
Herr  von  Kiderlen  was  an  able  worker  and  a  man 
of  strong  character,  who  always  sought  to  assert 
his  independence.  He  had  been  about  one  year  in 
ofSce  when  Herr  von  Bethmann  came  to  me  one 
day,  complained  of  Kiderlen's  obstinacy  and  in- 
subordination, and  asked  me  to  appeal  to  his  con- 
science. I  declined,  with  the  observation  that  the 
Chancellor  had  chosen  Kiderlen  against  my  wishes 
and  must  now  manage  to  get  along  with  him ;  that 
the  maintenance  of  discipline  at  the  Foreign  Office 
was  a  duty  devolving  upon  the  Chancellor,  in 
which  I  had  no  desire  to  interfere. 

FINDS  FAULT  WITH  BETHMANN 

Meanwhile,  Bethmann's  inadequacy  to  the  post 
of  Chancellor  became  evident.   Deep  down  in  his 

132 


BETHMANN 


heart  he  was  a  pacifist  and  was  obsessed  with  the 
aberration  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
England.  I  can  perfectly  well  understand  that  a 
man  of  pacifist  inclinations  should  act  thus  in  the 
hope  of  avoiding  a  war  thereby.  His  object  was 
entirely  in  accord  with  my  policy.  The  ways  and 
means  whereby  Bethmann  sought  to  achieve  it 
were,  in  my  opinion,  unsuitable.  Nevertheless,  I 
backed  his  endeavors.  But  I  certainly  did  not 
believe  that  real  success  would  result.  It  became 
ever  more  apparent,  while  he  was  Chancellor,  that 
he  was  remote  from  political  realities.  Yet  he 
always  knew  everything  better  than  anybody  else. 
Owing  to  this  overestimation  of  his  own  powers  he 
stuck  unswervingly  to  his  ideas,  even  when  things 
all  turned  out  differently  from  what  he  had 
expected. 

His  reports  were  always  admirably  prepared, 
brilliant  in  form,  and,  heiice,  impressive  and  at- 
tractive. And  in  this  there  was  an  element  of 
danger.  In  his  opinion  there  was  always  but  one 
solution,  the  one  which  he  proposed!  The  ap- 
parent solidity  and  thoroughness  of  his  reports  and 
suggestions,  the  illuminating  treatment  of  the  mat- 
ters reported  upon  from  every  angle,  the  references 
to  experts,  to  foreign  and  native  statesmen  and  dip- 
lomats, etc.,  easily  led  to  the  impression  that  solely 
the  Bethmann  solution  was  worthy  of  considera- 
tion. In  spite  of  these  thorough  preparations,  he 
made  mistake  after  mistake. 

Thus  he  had  an  actual  share  in  our  misfortune. 
When  I  returned  from  my  Norwegian  trip  in  191 4 

133 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

he  did  not  place  his  resignation  in  my  hands,  to  be 
sure,  but  he  admitted  that  his  political  calculations 
had  gone  wrong.  Nevertheless,  I  left  him  in  office, 
even  after  his  Reichstag  speech  and  the  English 
declaration  of  war  of  August  4,  1914,  because  I 
considered  it  most  serious  to  change  the  highest 
official  in  the  Empire  at  the  most  critical  mo- 
ment in  German  history.  The  unanimous  atti- 
tude of  the  nation  in  the  face  of  the  challenge 
from  the  Entente  might  have  been  impaired  by 
such  action. 

Moreover,  both  the  Chancellor  and  the  chief 
of  the  Civil  Cabinet  maintained  that  they  had  the 
working  classes  behind  them.  I  was  loath  to  de- 
prive the  working  classes,  which  behaved  in  an 
exemplary  manner  in  1914,  of  the  statesman  whom, 
I  had  been  told,  they  trusted. 

The  theory,  constantly  repeated  to  me  in  1914 
by  the  chief  of  the  Civil  Cabinet  and  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Foreign  Office,  that  only  Bethmann 
had  the  support  of  the  working  classes,  was  finally 
supplemented  further  by  reports  to  me  that  the 
Chancellor  enjoyed  the  confidence  in  foreign 
countries  which  was  necessary  to  the  conclusion  of 
peace.  Thus  it  came  about  that  Bethmann  always 
stayed  in  office,  until,  finally,  the  Crown  Prince 
made  the  well-known  investigation  among  the 
party  leaders  which  showed  that  the  above-men- 
tioned theory  was  mistaken.  This  mistake  was 
made  all  the  clearer  to  me  when  I  read,  at  the 
time  of  Bethmann's  dismissal — to  which  other  fac- 
tors also  contributed — the  most  unfavorable  opin- 

134 


BETHMANN 


ions  of  him,  especially  in  the  Social  Democratic 
and  Democratic  press. 

I  do  not  wish  to  blame  Bethmann  with  these 
frank  remarks,  nor  to  exonerate  others ;  but,  when 
such  important  matters  are  discussed,  personal 
considerations  must  be  ignored.  I  never  doubted 
the  nobility  of  Bethmann's  sentiments. 

May  I  be  allowed  to  say  a  few  words  here  con- 
cerning the  reform  in  the  Prussian  franchise,  since 
the  handling  of  this  by  Herr  von  Bethmann  is 
characteristic  of  his  policy  of  vacillation.  During 
the  winter  of  1914-15,  when,  following  the  bril- 
liant summer  campaign,  the  hard,  severe  winter 
trench-fighting  had  brought  military  movements 
to  a  standstill,  the  extraordinary  achievements  of 
all  the  troops  and  the  spirit  which  I  had  found 
among  officers  and  men,  both  at  the  front  and  in 
the  hospitals,  made  such  a  profound  impression  on 
me  that  I  resolved  to  provide,  for  the  tried,  mag- 
nificent "Nation  in  Arms,"  something  in  the  politi- 
cal domain,  when  it  returned  home,  which  should 
prove  that  I  recognized  what  it  had  done  and 
wished  to  give  the  nation  joy. 

I  often  touched  upon  this  theme  in  conversations 
and  suggested  reforms  in  the  Prussian  franchise; 
the  man,  said  I,  who  returned  home,  after  a  strug- 
gle like  this,  with  the  Iron  Cross — perhaps  of  both 
classes — must  no  longer  be  "classified"  at  the  polls. 

At  this  juncture  a  memorial  was  submitted  to  me 
by  Herr  von  Loebell  which  proposed  a  reform  in 
the  Prussian  franchise  on  similar  grounds.  The 
concise,  clear,  and  convincing  treatment  of  the  sub- 

135 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

ject  pleased  me  so  much  that  I  had  a  number  of 
gentlemen  read  the  memorial,  which  took  up,  in 
its  original  form,  only  general  points  of  view, 
without  going  into  detail,  and  I  was  pleased  to  see 
that  it  found  approval  with  all  whom  I  questioned 
concerning  it. 

I  had  my  thanks  expressed  to  Herr  von  Loebell 
through  the  chief  of  the  Cabinet,  von  Valentini, 
and  caused  Loebell  to  work  out  the  matter  in  de- 
tail and  make  suggestions.  This  was  done  in  the 
spring  of  191 5.  The  memorial  was  very  thorough 
and  dealt  with  a  number  of  possibilities  for  the 
franchise,  without  advising  any  one  system.  It 
was  approved  by  me,  and  sent  by  the  chief  of  the 
Cabinet  to  the  Chancellor,  with  the  command 
that  it  be  discussed,  in  the  course  of  the  year, 
by  the  Ministers,  and  that  their  vote  on  it — pos- 
sibly, also,  some  suggestions  from  them — be  laid 
before  me.  The  franchise  law,  of  course,  was 
not  to  be  proposed  until  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace. 

EARLY  GERMAN  VICTORIES 

Immediately  after  that  I  went  to  Pless.  The 
battle  of  Gorlice-Tarnow,  with  its  smashing  vic- 
tory over  the  enemy,  brought  on  the  Galician- 
Polish  campaign,  leading  to  the  reconquest  of 
Lemberg,  Przemysl  and  the  capture  of  Warsaw, 
Ivangorod,  Modlin,  Brest-Litovsk,  etc.,  and  com- 
pletely engaged  my  attention.  I 

The  Lusitania  case,  too,  cast  its  shadow  over 
events,  and  Italy  severed  her  alliance  with  us.  So 

136 


BETHMANN 

it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  the  franchise  me- 
morial was  pushed  into  the  background. 

The  next  winter,  and  the  summer  of  191 6,  like- 
wise, with  their  fighting  on  all  fronts,  the  terrible 
battle  of  the  Somme,  and  the  brilliant  Rumanian 
autumn  and  winter  campaign,  took  me  to  all  sorts 
of  places  on  the  western  and  eastern  fronts,  even 
as  far  as  Nisch — where  the  first  memorable  meet- 
ing with  the  Bulgarian  Tsar  took  place — and  to 
Orsova,  so  that  I  had  no  opportunity  to  take  up 
the  matter  of  franchise  reform  with  the  care  that 
its  importance  demanded. 

In  the  spring  of  191 7  I  asked  the  Chancellor  to 
draw  up  an  announcement  of  the  reform,  to  be 
made  to  the  nation  at  Easter,  since  I  assumed  that 
the  Ministers  had  long  since  discussed  it.  The 
Chancellor  drew  up  the  text  of  the  proclamation 
at  Hamburg,  in  agreement  with  the  chief  of  the 
Cabinet  and  myself ;  he  proposed  that  the  method 
of  voting  be  left  open  for  the  time  being,  since  he 
was  not  yet  quite  sure  about  this.  The  Easter 
proclamation  appeared ;  it  was  based,  like  previous 
treatments  of  the  matter,  on  the  idea  that  the  re- 
form was  not  to  be  introduced  until  after  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  because  most  of  the  voters  were 
away  facing  the  enemy. 

Party  and  press  did  what  they  could  to  postpone 
the  accomplishment  of  my  purpose  by  recrimina- 
tions and  strife,  by  bringing  up  the  question  of  the 
Prussian  Reichstag  franchise,  and  by  the  demand 
for  the  introduction  of  the  franchise  bill  while  the 
war  was  still  in  progress.  Thus  the  question  em- 

137 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

barked  upon  its  well-known  and  not  very  pleasant 
course,  which  dragged  itself  out  on  account  of  the 
interminable  negotiations  in  the  Landtag.  It  was 
not  until  after  the  retirement  of  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  that  I  learned  through  Loebell  that  the  me- 
morial of  191 5  had  never  been  submitted  to  the 
Ministers,  but  had  lain  untouched  for  a  year  and  a 
half  in  a  desk  drawer;  that  the  Chancellor,  influ- 
enced by  the  desires  expressed  in  the  country,  had 
dropped  the  various  systems  proposed  and  concen- 
trated upon  the  general  (Reichstag)  franchise,  of 
the  eventual  introduction  of  which  he  was,  doubt- 
less, inwardly  convinced. 

In  any  event,  the  original  basic  idea  was  thor- 
oughly bungled  by  Bethmann's  dilatoriness  and 
the  strife  among  the  parties.  What  I  wanted  was 
to  present  a  gift  of  honor,  of  my  own  free  will,  on 
its  triumphal  return  home,  to  my  victorious  army, 
to  my  "Nation  in  Arms,"  my  brave  Prussians,  with 
whom  I  had  stood  before  the  enemy. 

CHANCELLOR'S  DIPLOMATIC  POWER 

One  of  the  results  of  Bethmann's  marked  in- 
clination toward  control  was  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  was,  under  him,  a  mere 
helper,  so  much  so  that  the  Foreign  Office  was 
almost  affiliated  with  the  office  of  the  Chancellor, 
a  state  of  affairs  that  made  itself  felt  most  especially 
in  the  use  made  of  the  press  department.  Beth- 
mann  likewise  asserted  his  independence  decidedly 
in  his  relations  with  me.  Basing  himself  upon  the 
fact  that,  constitutionally,  the  Chancellor  alone  is 

138 


BETHMANN 


responsible  for  foreign  policy,  he  ruled  as  he 
pleased.  The  Foreign  Ofiice  was  allowed  to  tell 
me  only  what  the  Chancellor  wished,  so  that  it 
happened  sometimes  that  I  was  not  informed  con- 
cerning important  occurrences. 

The  fact  that  this  was  possible  is  to  be  laid  at 
the  door  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire.  And 
this  is  the  right  place  for  saying  a  word  concern- 
ing the  relations  between  the  Emperor  and  the 
Chancellon  In  what  follows  I  do  not  refer  to  my 
relationship  to  Herr  von  Bethmann,  but,  quite 
impersonally,  to  the  difficulties  in  the  relation- 
ship of  the  German  Emperor  to  the  Imperial 
Chancellors,  which  are  caused  by  the  Imperial 
Constitution. 

I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  following  points : 

1.  According  to  the  Constitution  of  the  Em- 
pire, the  Chancellor  is  the  director  and  representa- 
tive of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Empire,  for  which 
he  assumes  full  responsibility;  he  has  this  policy 
carried  out  by  the  Foreign  Office,  which  is  sub- 
ordinated to  him,  after  he  has  reported  on  it  to  the 
Emperor. 

2.  The  Emperor  has  influence  on  foreign  pol- 
icy only  in  so  far  as  the  Chancellor  grants  it  to  him. 

3.  The  Emperor  can  bring  his  influence  to 
bear  through  discussions,  information,  suggestion, 
proposals,  reports,  and  impressions  received  by  him 
on  his  travels,  which  then  take  rank  as  a  supple- 
ment to  the  political  reports  of  the  ambassadors  or 
ministers  to  the  countries  which  he  has  personally 
visited. 

139 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

4.  The  Chancellor  may  act  pursuant  to  such 
action  by  the  Emperor,  and  may  make  it  the  basis 
of  his  decisions,  whenever  he  is  in  agreement  with 
the  Emperor's  point  of  view.  Otherwise  he  is  sup- 
posed to  maintain  his  own  point  of  view  and  carry 
it  out  (Kruger  dispatch). 

5.  According  to  the  Constitution,  the  Emperor 
has  no  means  of  compelling  the  Chancellor  or  the 
Foreign  Office  to  accept  his  views.  He  cannot 
cause  the  Chancellor  to  adopt  a  policy  for  which 
the  latter  feels  that  he  cannot  assume  responsibil- 
ity. Should  the  Emperor  stick  to  his  view,  the 
Chancellor  can  offer  his  resignation  or  demand  that 
he  be  relieved  of  his  post. 

6.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Emperor  has  no  con- 
stitutional means  of  hindering  the  Chancellor  or 
the  Foreign  Office  from  carrying  out  a  policy 
which  he  thinks  doubtful  or  mistaken.  All  he  can 
do,  if  the  Chancellor  insists,  is  to  make  a  change  in 
the  Chancellorship. 

7.  Every  change  of  Chancellors,  however,  is 
a  serious  matter,  deeply  affecting  the  life  of  the 
nation,  and  hence,  at  a  time  of  political  compli- 
cations and  high  tension,  an  extremely  serious 
step,  an  ultima  ratio  (last  resort)  which  is  all  the 
more  daring  in  that  the  number  of  men  quali- 
fied to  fill  this  abnormally  difficult  post  is  very 
small. 

The  position  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  which 
was  based  on  the  towering  personality  of  Prince 
Bismarck,  had  assumed  a  serious  preponderance 
through  the  constantly  growing  number  of  posts 

140 


BETHMANN 


under  the  Empire,  over  all  of  which  the  Chancel- 
lor was  placed  as  chief  and  responsible  head. 

DISCLAIMS  RESPONSIBILITY 

If  this  is  borne  in  mind,  it  is  absolutely  impossi- 
ble that  anybody  should  still  hold  the  Emperor 
alone  responsible  for  everything,  as  was  done 
formerly,  especially  toward  the  end  of  the  war 
and  after  the  war,  by  critical  know-it-alls  and 
carping  revolutionists,  both  at  home  and  in  the 
Entente  countries.  That,  quite  apart  from  every- 
thing personal,  is  a  proof  of  complete  igno- 
rance of  the  earlier  Constitution  of  the  German 
Empire. 

The  visit  of  the  Tsar  to  Potsdam  in  November, 
1910,  went  off  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  concerned, 
and  was  utilized  by  the  Chancellor  and  Herr  von 
Kiderlen  to  get  into  touch  with  the  newly  ap- 
pointed Foreign  Minister,  Sazonoff,  whom  the 
Tsar  had  brought  with  hirn.  Apparently,  the  Rus- 
sian ruler  enjoyed  himself  among  us,  and  he  took 
an  active  part  in  the  hunt  arranged  in  his  honor, 
at  which  he  proved  himself  an  enthusiastic  hunts- 
man. The  result  of  the  conferences  between  the 
two  statesmen  seemed  to  promise  well  for  the 
future;  both,  after  they  had  felt  each  other  out, 
harbored  the  hope  of  favorable  relations  between 
the  two  countries. 

During  my  spring  visit  to  Corfu,  the  Melissori 
troubles  began,  which  riveted  Greek  attention 
upon  themselves.  Corfu  was  well  informed  of  the 
constant  smuggling  of  arms  from  Italy  by  way  of 

141 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Valona  into  Albania,  and  there  was  a  feeling  in 
Greek  circles  that  machinations  from  across  the 
Adriatic,  as  well  as  from  Montenegro,  were  not 
without  responsibility  for  what  was  happening. 
It  was  also  felt  that  the  new  Turkish  Government 
had  not  been  wise  in  its  handling  of  the  Albanians, 
who  were  very  sensitive  and  suspicious  ;  the  former 
Sultan  Abdul-Hamid  had  realized  this  very  well 
and  understood  admirably  how  to  get  along  with 
the  Albanians  and  to  keep  them  quiet.  Neverthe- 
less, there  was  no  fear  that  more  serious  compli- 
cations would  ensue. 

At  the  beginning  of  191 1  I  received  a  most  cor- 
dial invitation  from  King  George  of  England  to 
be  present  at  the  unveiling  of  the  statue  of  Queen 
Victoria,  the  grandmother  of  both  of  us.  There- 
fore I  went  in  the  middle  of  May  to  London  with 
the  Empress  and  our  daughter.  The  reception  on 
the  part  of  the  English  royal  family  and  the  people 
of  London  was  cordial. 

The  unveiling  festivities  were  well  arranged  and 
very  magnificent.  The  big,  round  space  in  front 
of  Buckingham  Palace  was  surrounded  by  grand- 
stands, which  were  filled  to  overflowing  by  invited 
guests.  In  front  of  them  were  files  of  soldiers  of 
all  arms  and  all  regiments  of  the  British  army,  in 
full  parade  uniform,  the  cavalry  and  artillery  be- 
ing on  foot.  All  the  banners  of  the  troops  were 
arrayed  at  the  foot  of  the  statue. 

The  royal  family,  with  their  guests  and  their 
suites,  was  grouped  around  the  statue.  King 
George  made  a  dedication  speech  which  had  a 

142 


BETHMANN 

good  effect,  in  which  he  made  mention  also  of  the 
German  Imperial  couple. 

Then,  amid  salutes  and  greetings,  the  statue  was 
unveiled;  the  Queen,  in  marble,  seated  upon  a 
throne,  became  visible,  surmounted  by  a  golden 
figure  of  victory.  It  was  an  impressive  moment. 
Afterward  the  troops  marched  past,  the  Guards  in 
the  van,  then  the  Highlanders — who,  with  their 
gayly  colored,  becoming  costume,  gave  an  espe- 
cially picturesque  touch  to  the  military  spectacle 
— then  the  rest  of  the  soldiers.  The  march  past 
was  carried  out  on  the  circular  space,  with  all  the 
troops  constantly  wheeling:  the  outer  wings  had 
to  step  out,  the  inner  to  hold  back — a  most  diffi- 
cult task  for  troops.  The  evolution  was  carried 
out  brilliantly;  not  one  man  made  a  mistake.  The 
Duke  of  Connaught,  who  had  made  all  the  mili- 
tary arrangements,  deservedly  won  unanimous 
applause. 

FESTIVITIES  IN  ENGLAND 

The  remainder  of  our  stay  in  England  was  de- 
voted to  excursions ;  we  also  enjoyed  the  hospital- 
ity of  noble  English  families,  at  whose  homes 
there  was  an  opportunity  to  hold  intercourse  with 
many  members  of  English  nobility. 

Special  enjoyment  in  the  domain  of  art  was  pro- 
vided by  the  King  to  his  guests  by  a  theatrical  per- 
formance at  Drury  Lane  Theater.  A  well-known 
English  play,  "Money,"  was  performed,  by  a  com- 
pany especially  assembled  for  the  occasion,  con- 
sisting of  the  leading  actors  and  actresses  of 

143 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

London.  As  a  surprise,  a  curtain  fell  between  the 
acts,  painted  especially  for  the  occasion  by  a  lady, 
which  depicted  King  George  and  me,  life  size,  on 
horseback,  riding  toward  each  other  and  saluting 
militarily.  The  picture  was  executed  with  much 
dash  and  was  enthusiastically  acclaimed  by  the 
audience. 

The  performance  of  the  actors  and  actresses  in 
^^Money"  was  veritably  masterly,  since  all  con- 
cerned played  their  roles,  even  the  smallest,  to  per- 
fection.  In  fact,  it  was  a  classic  performance. 

Another  day  I  attended,  at  the  Olympia  track, 
the  sports  of  the  British  army  and  navy,  which  in- 
cluded admirable  individual  feats  on  foot  and 
horseback,  as  well  as  evolutions  by  bodies  of  troops 
in  close  formation. 

In  describing  the  unveiling  of  the  statue,  as  well 
as  the  funeral  of  King  Edward  VII,  I  have  con- 
cerned myself  purposely  with  the  externals  and 
pomp  that  are  characteristic  of  such  occasions  in 
England.  They  show  that,  in  a  land  under  par- 
liamentary rule,  a  so-called  democratic  land,  more 
importance  is  attached  to  well-nigh  medieval 
magnificence  than  in  the  young  German  Empire. 

The  French  actions  in  Morocco,  which  were  no 
longer  such  as  could  be  reconciled  with  the  Al- 
geciras  Agreement,  had  once  more  engaged  the 
attention  of  the  diplomats.  For  this  reason  the 
Chancellor  had  requested  me  to  find  out,  as  soon 
as  opportunity  should  arise,  what  King  George 
thought  about  the  situation. 

I  asked  him  if  he  thought  that  the  French 

144 


BETHMANN 

methods  were  still  in  accordance  with  the  Alge- 
ciras  Agreement.  The  King  remarked  that  the 
agreement,  to  tell  the  truth,  no  longer  was  in  force, 
and  that  the  best  thing  to  do  would  be  to  forget  it; 
that  the  French,  fundamentally,  were  doing  noth- 
ing different  in  Morocco  from  what  the  English 
had  previously  done  in  Egypt;  that,  therefore, 
England  would  place  no  obstacles  in  the  path  of 
the  French,  but  would  let  them  alone;  that  the 
thing  to  do  was  to  recognize  the  ^^f  ait  accompli"  of 
the  occupation  of  Morocco  and  make  arrange- 
ments, for  commercial  protection,  with  France. 

To  the  very  end  the  visit  went  off  well,  and  the 
inhabitants  of  London,  of  all  social  strata,  ex- 
pressed their  good  will  every  time  the  guests  of 
their  King  showed  themselves. 

Thus  the  German  Imperial  couple  was  enabled 
to  return  home  with  the  best  of  impressions. 
When  I  informed  the  Chancellor  of  these,  he  ex- 
pressed great  satisfaction.  From  the  remarks  of 
King  George  he  drew  the  inference  that  England 
considered  the  Algeciras  Agreement  no  longer 
valid  and  would  not  place  any  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  French  occupation  of  Morocco. 

From  this  the  policy  followed  by  him  and  the 
Foreign  Office  arose  which  led  to  the  Agadir  case, 
the  last  and  equally  unsuccessful  attempt  to  main- 
tain our  influence  in  Morocco.  The  situation  be- 
came more  serious  during  the  Kiel  regatta  week. 
The  Foreign  Office  informed  me  of  its  intention  to 
send  the  Panther  to  Agadir.  I  gave  expression  to 
strong  misgivings  as  to  this  step,  but  had  to  drop 

145 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

them  in  view  of  the  urgent  representations  of  the 
Foreign  Office. 

In  the  first  half  of  191 2  came  the  sending  of  Sir 
Ernest  Cassel  with  a  verbal  note  in  which  Eng- 
land offered  to  remain  neutral  in  case  of  an  "un- 
provoked" attack  upon  Germany,  provided  Ger- 
many agreed  to  limit  her  naval  construction  pro- 
gram and  to  drop  her  new  Naval  bill,  the  latter 
being  darkly  hinted  at.  Owing  to  our  favorable 
answer  to  this  Lord  Haldane  was  intrusted  with 
the  negotiations  and  sent  to  Berlin.  The  negotia- 
tions finally  fell  through,  owing  to  the  constantly 
more  uncompromising  attitude  of  England  (Sir 
E.  Grey),  who  finally  disavowed  Lord  Haldane 
and  withdrew  his  own  verbal  note,  because  Grey 
wa&  afraid  to  offend  the  French  by  a  German- 
English  agreement  and  jeopardize  the  Anglo- 
French-Russian  understanding. 

Here  are  the  details  of  the  case: 

On  the  morning  of  January  29,  191 2,  Herr  Bal- 
Hn  had  himself  announced  to  me  at  the  palace  in 
Berlin  and  asked  for  an  audience.  I  assumed  that 
if  was  a  case  of  a  belated  birthday  greeting,  there- 
fore I  was  not  a  little  astonished  when  Ballin,  after 
a  short  speech  of  congratulation,  said  that  he  had 
come  as  an  emissary  of  Sir  Ernest  Cassel,  who  had 
just  arrived  in  Berlin  on  a  special  mission  and 
wished  to  be  received. 

I  asked  whether  it  was  a  political  matter,  and 
why,  if  so,  the  meeting  had  not  been  arranged 
through  the  English  ambassador.  Ballin's  answer 
was  to  the  effect  that,  from  hints  dropped  by  Cas- 

146 


BETHMANN 


sel,  he  knew  the  matter  to  be  of  great  importance, 
and  the  explanation  for  Cassel's  acting  without  the 
intervention  of  the  ambassador  was  because  the 
earnest  desire  had  been  expressed  in  London  that 
the  official  diplomatic  representatives,  both  the 
English  and  the  German,  should  not  be  apprised 
of  the  affair. 

I  declared  that  I  was  ready  to  receive  Cassel 
at  once,  but  added  that,  should  his  mission  have  to 
do  with  political  questions,  I  should  immediately 
summon  the  Chancellor,  since  I  was  a  constitu- 
tional monarch  and  not  in  a  position  to  deal  with 
the  representative  of  a  foreign  power  alone  with- 
out the  Chancellor. 

Ballin  fetched  Cassel,  who  handed  me  a  docu- 
ment which,  he  stated,  had  been  prepared  with  the 
^'approval  and  knowledge  of  the  English  Govern- 
ment." I  read  the  short  note  through  and  was  not 
a  little  surprised  to  see  that  I  was  holding  in  my 
hand  a  formal  offer  of  neutrality  in  case  Germany 
became  involved  in  future  warlike  complications, 
conditioned  upon  certain  limitations  in  the  carry- 
ing out  of  our  program  of  naval  construction, 
which  were  to  be  the  subject  of  mutual  confer- 
ences and  agreements.  Walking  with  Ballin  into 
the  next  room,  I  handed  over  the  document  for 
him  to  read.  After  he  had  done  so  both  of  us  ex- 
claimed in  the  same  breath:  '^A  verbal  notel" 

It  was  plainly  apparent  that  this  "verbal  note" 
was  aimed  at  the  forthcoming  addition  to  our 
Naval  law  and  designed  in  some  way  to  delay  or 
frustrate  it.  No  matter  how  the  rnatter  was  inter- 
u  147 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

preted,  I  found  myself  confronted  with  a  peculiar 
situation,  which  also  amazed  Ballin.  It  reminded 
me  of  the  situation  at  Cronberg-Friedrichshof  in 
1905,  when  I  was  obliged  to  decline  the  demand, 
made  to  me  personally  by  the  English  Under  Sec- 
retary, Hardinge,  that  we  should  forego  our  naval 
construction. 

SURPRISE  AT  BRITISH  NOTE 

Now,  an  intimate  business  friend  of  Edward 
VII  appears,  without  previous  announcement 
through  official  diplomatic  channels,  before  the 
German  Emperor  with  a  "verbal  note"  inspired 
by  the  English  Government,  with  explicit  instruc- 
tions to  evade  all  the  diplomatic  officials  of  both 
countries.  He  hands  over  an  offer  from  the  Eng- 
lish Government  to  maintain  neutrality  in  future 
warlike  complications  provided  certain  agree- 
ments regarding  limitation  of  naval  construction 
are  made.  And  this  is  done  by  England,  the 
mother  of  "Constitutionalism"!  When  I  pointed 
this  out  to  Ballin,  he  exclaimed:  "Holy  Constitu- 
tionalism! What  has  become  of  you?  That  is 
^personal  politics'  with  a  vengeance!" 

I  agreed  with  Ballin  to  send  at  once  for  Herr 
von  Bethmann,  in  order  that  he  might  learn  what 
was  transpiring  and  decide  what  to  do  in  this 
peculiar  situation. 

Bethmann  was  called  up  on  the  telephone  and 
soon  appeared.  At  first  the  situation  aroused  in 
him  likewise  a  certain  degree  of  astonishment;  it 
was  interesting  to  watch  the  play  of  expression  on 

148 


BETHMANN 


his  face  as  he  was  told  about  the  matter.  The 
Chancellor  suggested  that  Grand  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  also  be  summoned,  for  the  proper  dis- 
patching of  the  business,  and  recommended  that 
an  answer  be  drawn  up  in  English,  in  the  same 
manner  and  form  as  the  note  delivered  by  Cassel, 
and  that  it  be  handed  to  Sir  Ernest,  who  wished  to 
return  home  that  night.  (English  was  chosen  be- 
cause there  was  fear  of  obscurity  and  misunder- 
standing if  the  note  were  translated  in  London.) 
The  Chancellor  asked  me  to  draw  up  the  note,  since 
I  knew  English  best.  After  some  objection  I  had 
to  make  up  my  mind  to  be  myself  the  writer  of 
the  answer. 
And  now  the  following  scene  took  place : 
I  sat  at  the  writing  table  in  the  adjutant's  room; 
the  other  gentlemen  stood  around  me.  I  would 
read  a  sentence  from  the  note  aloud  and  sketch  out 
an  answer,  which  was,  in  turn,  read  aloud.  Then 
criticisms  were  made  from  right  and  left:  one 
thought  the  sentence  too  complaisant,  another  too 
abrupt;  it  was  thereupon  remodeled,  recast,  im- 
proved, and  polished.  The  Chancellor  particularly 
subjected  my  grammar  and  style  to  much  torture, 
owing  to  his  habit  of  probing  things  philosophi- 
cally, to  his  methods  of  profound  thoroughness, 
which  caused  him  to  be  most  particular  with  every 
word,  in  order  that  it,  having  been  studied  from 
every  angle,  should  later  on  afford  nobody  cause 
for  criticism. 

After  hours  of  work  the  note  was  finally  finished 
and,  having  been  passed  a  couple  of  times  from 

149 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

hand  to  hand  and  then  read  aloud  by  me  half  a 
dozen  times  more,  it  was  signed. 

When  our  group  broke  up,  the  Chancellor  asked 
Sir  Ernest  who  was  to  be  expected  from  England 
to  conduct  the  negotiations.  Cassel  replied  that  it 
would  certainly  be  a  Minister,  which  one  he  did 
not  know — perhaps  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  Min- 
ister of  the  Navy,  since  the  question  was  a  naval 
one.  Then  the  Chancellor  arranged  further  with 
him  that  the  unofficial  method  should  be  retained 
and  that  Ballin  should  undertake  to  transmit  all 
the  news  regarding  the  matter  which  should  ema- 
nate from  England. 

Sir  Ernest  expressed  his  lively  gratitude  for  his 
cordial  reception  and  his  satisfaction  at  the  tenor 
of  our  reply.  Later  Ballin  informed  me  from  his 
hotel  that  Cassel  had  expressed  himself  as  com- 
pletely satisfied  over  the  successful  outcome  of  his 
mission,  and  that  he  would  report  to  his  Govern- 
ment the  good  impression  made  upon  him. 

When  I  thereupon  conferred  on  the  matter  with 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz  wc  both  agreed  that  the 
Naval  bill  was  in  danger  and,  therefore,  that  we 
must  be  very  careful. 

DIPLOMATIC  PREPAREDNESS 

In  perfect  secrecy  the  material  was  collected 
which  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  was  to  present  at  the 
negotiations;  it  consisted  of  a  short  historical 
sketch  of  the  development  of  the  fleet  and  of  the 
increasingly  difficult  tasks  devolving  upon  it;  the 
Naval  law  and  its  aims,  nature,  enactment,  and  ex- 

150 


BETHMANN 


tension;  finally,  the  contemplated  Naval  bill,  its 
meaning  and  the  method  of  putting  it  through. 

The  Chancellor  asked  that  the  main  negotiations 
should  be  conducted  at  the  palace  in  my  presence. 
In  addition,  I  agreed  with  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
that  he  should  speak  English,  as  far  as  possible, 
and  that  I,  in  case  of  difficult  technical  expres- 
sions, would  interpret. 

Until  England  made  known  the  name  of  the 
negotiator,  our  time  was  spent  in  suppositions,  and 
Ballin  informed  us  of  combinations  in  connection 
with  which  a  number  of  names,  even  that  of  Grey, 
came  up. 

At  last  the  news  arrived,  through  Ballin,  that 
Haldane — the  Minister  of  War,  previously  a  law- 
yer— had  been  intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  the 
negotiations  and  would  soon  arrive.  General 
amazement!  Just  imagine,  ^'mutatis  mutandis," 
that  Germany  had  sent  her  Minister  of  War  (at 
that  time  von  Heeringen)  to  London,  instead  of 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  for  the  discussion  of  a  naval 
matter! 

When  this  point  was  discussed  with  Bethmann 
and  Tirpitz  a  number  of  suppositions  were  ad- 
vanced; the  Chancellor  said  that  Haldane  was 
known  in  England  as  a  student  of  Goethe  and  as  a 
man  versed  in  German  philosophy  and  knowing 
the  German  language,  so  that  his  choice  was  a 
piece  of  politeness  toward  us.  Tirpitz  observed 
that  Haldane  had  formerly  spent  some  time  in 
Berlin  and  worked  with  General  von  Einem  at  the 
War  Ministry,  and  hence  knew  the  state  of  affairs 

151 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

in  Germany.  I  suggested  that  all  that  was  very 
well,  but  that  the  choice  of  Haldane  showed  that 
England  looked  upon  the  question  as  purely  politi- 
cal, since  he  knew  only  superficially  about  naval 
affairs ;  that  the  whole  thing  was  probably  directed 
against  Germany's  naval  policy  in  general  and  the 
new  Naval  bill  in  particular;  that  it  would  be 
well,  therefore,  not  to  forget  this,  in  order  that  the 
whole  thing  might  not  develop  into  a  foreign 
assault  upon  our  right  of  self-determination  as  to 
the  strength  of  our  defensive  measures. 

Haldane  arrived  and  was  received  as  an  Im- 
perial guest.  Ballin,  who  accompanied  him, 
solved  the  riddle  of  Haldane's  choice  on  the  basis 
of  information  received  by  him  from  England. 

He  said  that  when  Cassel  had  got  back  to  Lon- 
don, reported  on  his  reception,  and  handed  over 
the  German  reply,  the  impression  made  was  so 
favorable  that  no  further  doubt  was  entertained 
there  as  to  the  satisfactory  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions and  their  conclusion  in  the  form  of  an  agree- 
ment; that,  thereupon  a  keen  dispute  had  arisen 
among  the  Ministers,  especially  between  Churchill 
and  Grey,  as  to  who  should  go  to  Berlin  and  affix 
his  name  to  this  great  historical  document,  in  case 
the  object  should  be  achieved  of  making  Germany 
completely  give  up  the  further  development  of 
her  fleet;  that  Churchill  thought  himself  the  right 
man  for  the  job,  since  he  was  at  the  head  of  the 
navy.  But  Grey  and  Asquith  would  not  let  their 
colleague  reap  the  glory,  and,  for  this  reason,  Grey 
stood  for  a  while  in  the  foreground — another 

152 


BETHMANN 


proof  that  it  was  politics  rather  than  the  number 
of  ships  which  was  to  play  the  leading  role. 

SELECTION  OF  CHURCHILL 

After  a  while,  however,  it  was  decided  that  it 
was  more  fitting  to  Grey's  personal  and  official  im- 
portance to  appear  only  at  the  termination  of  the 
negotiations,  to  affix  his  name  to  the  agreement, 
and — as  it  was  put  in  the  information  transmitted 
from  England  to  Ballin — '^to  get  his  dinner  from 
the  Emperor  and  to  come  in  for  his  part  of  the 
festivities  and  fireworks" — which,  in  good  Ger- 
man, means  to  enjoy  the  "Bengal  light 
illumination." 

As  it  had  been  decided  that  Churchill  was  not  to 
get  this  in  any  event,  it  was  necessary  to  choose 
somebody  for  the  negotiations  who  was  close  to 
Asquith  and  Grey  and  who,  possessing  their  com- 
plete confidence,  was  willing  to  conduct  the  nego- 
tiations as  far  as  the  beginning  of  the  "fireworks" ; 
one  who,  moreover,  was  already  known  at  Berlin 
and  not  a  stranger  in  Germany.  Churchill,  to  be 
sure,  qualified  in  this,  for  he  had  been  present  a 
few  times  at  the  Imperial  maneuvers  in  Silesia 
and  Wiirttemberg  as  a  guest  of  the  Emperor.  Bal- 
lin guaranteed  the  reliability  of  his  London  source 
of  information. 

Before  the  negotiations  began  I  once  more 
pointed  out  to  Secretary  of  State  von  Tirpitz  that 
Haldane,  in  spite  of  being  just  then  Minister  of 
War,  probably  had  prepared  himself  for  his  task, 
and  had  surely  received  careful  instructions  from 

153 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

the  English  Admiralty,  in  which  the  spirit  of 
Fisher  was  paramount.  In  his  Handbook  for 
English  Naval  Officers,  Fisher  had  stated,  among 
other  precepts  well  worthy  of  being  remembered, 
one  which  is  characteristic  of  the  Admiral,  his  de- 
partment and  its  spirit,  which  runs,  word  for  word, 
as  follows :   "If  you  tell  a  lie,  stick  to  it." 

Moreover,  I  said  to  Tirpitz,  we  must  not  forget 
what  an  amazing  adaptability  the  Anglo-Saxons 
had,  which  fitted  them  for  occupying  positions 
which  had  no  relation  to  their  previous  life  and 
training.  Furthermore,  the  interest  in  England  in 
the  navy  was  generally  so  intense  that  almost  every 
educated  man  was  an  expert  up  to  a  certain  point 
on  naval  questions. 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  Haldane  proved 
himself  admirably  well  informed  and  a  skillful, 
tenacious  debater,  and  his  brilliant  qualities  as  a 
lawyer  came  to  the  fore.  The  conversation  lasted 
several  hours,  and  brought  about  a  general  clarify- 
ing, as  well  as  a  preliminary  agreement  as  to  post- 
ponement of  time  limits  of  ship  construction,  etc. 
The  details  concerning  it  are  deposited  in  docu- 
ments at  the  Imperial  Naval  Office.  Tirpitz  was 
splendid. 

After  some  more  conferences — at  which,  like- 
wise, Ballin  was  present — Haldane  returned  to 
England.  Ballin  informed  me  that  Haldane  had 
expressed  himself  to  him  as  entirely  satisfied  with 
the  outcome  of  his  mission,  and  had  stated  that  in 
about  a  week  or  two  the  first  draft  of  the  agree- 
ment could  be  sent  to  us. 

154 


BETHMANN 


Time  passed — the  date  set  for  the  introduction 
of  the  Naval  bill  approached.  Tirpitz  suggested, 
in  case  the  agreement  were  concluded  previously, 
that  the  Naval  bill  be  altered  accordingly;  other- 
wise, that  it  be  introduced  without  alteration. 

SUSPECTS  ENGLISH  PURPOSES 

At  last  we  received,  not  the  draft  of  the  agree? 
ment,  but  a  document  asking  all  sorts  of  question;* 
and  expressing  a  desire  for  all  sorts  of  data,  a 
reply  to  which  required  many  consultations  and 
much  reflection.  Little  by  little  the  suspicion 
grew  in  me  chat  the  English  were  not  in  earnest 
with  regard  to  the  agreement,  since  question  fol- 
lowed question  and  details  were  sought  which  had 
nothing  directly  to  do  with  the  agreement.  Eng- 
land withdrew  more  and  more  from  her  promises, 
and  no  draft  of  the  agreement  came  to  hand. 

In  Berlin  a  big  agitation  set  in  against  the  Naval 
bill,  Tirpitz  and  myself  on  the  part  of  the  Foreign 
Office,  and  from  other  quarters,  both  qualified  and 
unqualified.  The  Chancellor  also,  who  hoped  to 
achieve  the  agreement  and  aflSx  his  name  to  a  docu- 
ment which  would  free  Germany  from  ^^encircle- 
ment"  and  bring  her  into  a  regular  and  better  re- 
lationship with  England,  came  out  in  favor  of 
dropping  the  Naval  bill.  But  that  would  simply 
have  meant  allowing  a  foreign  power  enormous 
influence  in  matters  of  German  national  defense 
and  jeopardizing  thereby  the  national  right  of  self- 
determination  and  our  readiness  for  battle  in  case 
of  a  war  being  forced  upon  us.  Had  we  allowed 

155 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

this  it  would  have  amounted  to  our  consenting  to 
permit  England,  Germany's  principal  foe,  to  grant 
us  whatever  she  wished,  after  consulting  her  own 
interests,  without  receiving  ourselves  the  guar- 
anty of  any  equivalent  concession. 

In  this  confused  state  of  affairs  differences  of 
opinion  and  violent  disputes  arose,  which,  espe- 
cially in  those  circles  which  really  knew  little 
about  the  navy,  were  conducted  with  much  vio- 
lence and  not  always  in  a  practical  manner.  Ad- 
miral von  Tirpitz,  all  through  that  winter,  which 
was  so  hard  a  one  for  him  and  me,  fought  his  fight 
like  a  genuine,  patriotic  officer,  realizing  the  situa- 
tion and  seeing  through  his  opponents  with  clear 
vision  and  supporting  me  with  complete  convic- 
tion to  the  limit  of  his  ability.  All  the  Gov- 
ernment officials  agreed  that  no  foreign  country 
could  be  allowed  any  voice  in  helping  decide  what 
we  had  or  had  not  to  do  toward  insuring  our 
protection. 

The  hope  of  bringing  about  the  agreement  grew 
ever  fainter;  England  continually  showed  lessen- 
ing interest  and  kept  eliminating  important  parts 
of  her  original  verbal  note.  And  so  it  came  about 
that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  and  I  realized  that  the 
whole  proposal  was  merely  a  "maneuver." 

The  fight  over  the  German  Naval  bill  grew 
steadily  hotter.  I  happened  at  this  time  to  meet 
at  Cuxhaven  Doctor  von  Burchard,  President  of 
the  Hamburg  Senate,  whom  I  respected  greatly, 
as  he  was  the  very  model  of  an  aristocratic  citizen 
of  a  Hanseatic  city,  and  who  had  often  been  con- 

iS6 


BETHMANN 

suited  by  me  in  political  matters.  I  described  to 
him  the  entire  course  of  the  affair  and  the  disputes 
in  Berlin  as  to  the  introduction  or  nonintroduc- 
tion  of  the  bill,  and  asked  him  then  to  tell  me,  with 
his  usual  complete  frankness,  what  he  thought  the 
right  thing  to  do  in  the  interest  of  the  national 
welfare,  since  I  greatly  desired  to  hear  an  objec- 
tive opinion,  uninfluenced  by  the  rival  camps  of 
Berlin. 

Doctor  Burchard  replied  in  his  clear,  keen, 
pointed,  convincing  manner  that  it  was  my  duty 
toward  the  people  and  the  fatherland  to  stick  to 
the  bill ;  that  whosoever  spoke  against  its  introduc- 
tion was  committing  a  sin  against  them ;  that  what- 
ever we  thought  necessary  to  our  defense  must  be 
unconditionally  brought  into  being;  that,  above 
all  else,  we  must  never  permit  a  foreign  country 
to  have  the  presumption  to  interfere  with  us ;  that 
the  English  ofifer  was  a  feint  to  make  us  drop  the 
Naval  bill;  that  this  must,  in  no  circumstances,  be 
allowed ;  that  the  German  nation  would  not  under- 
stand why  its  right  of  self-determination  had  been 
sacrificed ;  that  the  bill  must  unquestionably  be  in- 
troduced ;  that  he  would  work  in  its  favor  in  the 
Federal  Council  (as  indeed  he  did  in  a  brilliant, 
compelling  speech)  and  also  otherwise  press  its 
acceptance  in  Berlin ;  that  the  English  would  nat- 
urally resort  to  abuse,  but  that  this  made  no  differ- 
ence, since  they  had  been  doing  so  for  a  long  time; 
that  they  certainly  would  not  get  into  a  war  for 
such  a  cause ;  that  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  was  merely 
doing  his  duty  and  fulfilling  his  obligations,  and 

157 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

that  I  should  support  him  in  every  way;  that  the 
Chancellor  must  give  up  opposing  the  measure, 
otherwise  he  would  run  the  risk  of  finally  forfeit- 
ing public  esteem  on  account  of  being  "pro- 
English." 

Thus  spoke  the  representative  of  the  great  com- 
mercial city,  which  was  threatened  before  all 
others  in  case  of  war  with  England.  The  genuine 
Hanseatic  spirit  inspired  his  words. 

Strangely  enough,  this  opinion  of  Doctor 
Burchard  concerning  the  English  offer  has  re- 
cently been  corroborated  to  me  in  Holland  by  a 
Dutchman  who  heard  from  Englishmen  at  that 
time  the  English  point  of  view.  I  and  Tirpitz 
guessed  right — the  offer  of  neutrality,  in  case  naval 
expansion  was  curbed,  was  a  political  maneuver. 

COUNTERCHARGES  OF  CHEATING 

Soon  news  also  came  from  Ballin  that  the  mat- 
ter was  not  going  well  in  England :  that,  according 
to  information  received,  a  dispute  had  arisen  about 
the  agreement;  that  there  was  dissatisfaction  with 
Haldane,  who,  it  was  said,  had  let  himself  be 
cheated  by  Tirpitz!  This  was  plain  evidence  of 
the  indignation  felt  because  Tirpitz  had  not 
walked  into  the  trap  and  simply  let  the  bill  drop, 
and  that  Haldane  had  been  unable  to  serve  up  the 
bill  to  the  English  Cabinet  on  a  platter  at  tea  time. 
It  is  useless  to  say  that  there  was  any  "cheating"  on 
Germany's  part,  but  the  reproach  leveled  at  Hal- 
dane justifies  the  suspicion  that  his  instructions 
were  that  he  should  seek  to  "cheat"  the  Germans. 

158 


BETHMANN 


Since  his  fellow  countrymen  thought  that  the  re- 
verse was  true,  one  can  but  thank  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  most  sincerely  for  having  correctly 
asserted  the  German  standpoint  to  the  benefit  of 
our  fatherland. 

Toward  the  end  of  March  the  fight  about  the 
bill  took  on  such  violence  that  finally  the  Chan- 
cellor, on  the  22d,  asked  me  for  his  dismissal  as  I 
stepped  out  of  the  vault  in  the  Charlottenburg 
Park.  After  long  consultation  and  after  I  had 
told  him  Doctor  Burchard's  view,  the  Chancellor 
withdrew  his  request. 

When,  some  time  afterward,  I  paid  a  visit  to 
Herr  von  Bethmann  in  his  garden,  I  found  him 
quite  overcome  and  holding  in  his  hand  a  message 
from  London.  It  contained  the  entire  disavowal 
of  the  verbal  note  delivered  by  Cassel,  the  with- 
drawal of  the  offer  of  neutrality,  as  well  as  of 
every  other  offer,  and  at  the  end  the  advice  that  I 
dismiss  Herr  von  Bethmann  from  the  Imperial 
Chancellorship,  since  he  enjoyed  to  a  marked  de- 
gree the  confidence  of  the  British  Government! 
Tears  of  anger  shone  in  the  eyes  of  the  Chancellor, 
thus  badly  deceived  in  his  hopes;  the  praise  ac- 
corded to  him  by  a  foreign  government  with  which 
Germany  and  he  had  just  had  such  painful  experi- 
ences hurt  him  deeply.  For  the  second  time  he 
offered  me  his  resignation ;  I  did  not  accept  it,  but 
sought  to  console  him.  I  then  ordered  that  the 
ambassador  in  London  be  asked  how  he  could  have 
accepted  and  forwarded  such  a  message  under  any 
conditions. 

159 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Now  the  Chancellor  was  in  favor  of  the  bill,  but 
it  was  honorably  proposed  with  the  limitation 
which  it  had  been  decided  to  impose  upon  it  in 
case  of  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement.  In  Eng- 
land, on  the  other  hand,  the  full  naval  construction 
program  was  carried  out. 

This  "Haldane  episode"  is  characteristic  of 
England's  policy.  This  whole  maneuver,  con- 
ceived on  a  large  scale,  was  engineered  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  hampering  the  development  of  the  Ger- 
man fleet,  while,  simultaneously,  in  America, 
which  had  an  almost  negligible  merchant  fleet;  in 
France,  whose  navy  was  superior  in  numbers  to 
the  German;  in  Italy,  in  Russia,  which  also  had 
ships  built  abroad — vast  construction  programs 
were  carried  out  without  eliciting  one  word  of  pro- 
test from  England.  And  Germany,  wedged  in  be- 
tween France  and  Russia,  certainly  had  to  be  at 
least  prepared  to  defend  herself  on  the  water 
against  those  nations. 

DEFENDS  NAVAL  PROGRAM 

For  this  our  naval  construction  program  was  ab- 
solutely necessary ;  it  was  never  aimed  against  the 
English  fleet,  four  or  five  times  as  strong  as  ours, 
and  assuring  England's  superiority  and  security, 
to  equal  the  strength  of  which  no  sensible  man  in 
Germany  ever  dreamed.  We  needed  our  fleet  for 
coast  defense  and  the  protection  of  our  commerce; 
for  this  purpose  the  lesser  means  of  defense,  like 
U-boats,  torpedo  boats,  and  mines,  were  not  suffi- 
cient. In  addition  the  coast  batteries  on  the  Baltic 

1 60 


BETHMANN 


were  so  antiquated  and  miserably  equipped  that 
they  would  have  been  razed  within  forty-eight 
hours  by  the  massed  fire  of  the  heavy  guns  of  mod- 
ern battleships.  Thus,  our  Baltic  coast  was  prac- 
tically defenseless.  To  protect  it  the  fleet  was 
necessary. 

The  Skagerrak  (Jutland)  battle  has  proved 
what  the  fleet  meant  and  what  it  was  worth.  That 
battle  would  have  meant  annihilation  for  England 
if  the  Reichstag  had  not  refused  up  to  1900  all 
proposals  for  strengthening  the  navy.  Those 
twelve  lost  years  were  destined  never  to  be 
retrieved. 

Before  we  take  our  leave  of  Haldane  I  wish  to 
touch  upon  another  episode  in  his  activities.  In 
1906  he  came,  with  the  permission  of  the  German 
Government,  to  Berlin,  to  inform  himself  concern- 
ing the  Prussian  defense  conditions,  recruiting, 
General  Staff,  etc.  He  busied  himself  at  the  Min- 
istry of  War,  where  the  Minister,  General  von 
Einem,  personally  gave  him  information.  After 
about  two  or  three  weeks'  work  there  he  returned, 
well  satisfied,  to  England. 

When,  after  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  the 
^^pro-German"  Haldane,  the  friend  of  Goethe,  was 
boycotted  and  treated  with  such  hostility  that  he 
could  no  longer  show  himself  in  public,  he  had  a 
defense  written  of  his  term  of  office  as  Minister 
of  War  by  the  well-known  litterateur  and  journal- 
ist, Mr.  Begbie,  entitled  Vindication  of  Great 
Britain.  Therein  his  services  toward  forming  a, 
regular  General  Staff  and  preparing  the  British 

161 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

army  for  the  World  War  are  placed  in  a  bright 
light  and  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  skill  with  which 
he  utilized  the  permission  obtained  from  the 
Prussian  War  Ministry  in  order  to  learn  in 
Germany  about  military  matters  and  to  reorgan- 
ize the  British  army  and  General  Staff,  to  the 
minutest  detail  and  on  the  German  model,  for 
the  coming  war  against  the  erstwhile  German 
hosts. 

Here  we  see  the  sly,  adroit  lawyer,  who,  shel- 
tered under  the  hospitality  of  a  foreign  country, 
studies  its  military  arrangements  in  order  to  forge 
weapons  against  it  out  of  the  material  and  knowl- 
edge thus  acquired.  Quite  characteristically  the 
book  is  dedicated  to  King  Edward  VII,  whose 
intimate,  emissary,  and  tool  Haldane  was.  In 
those  days  Berlin  saw  in  Haldane's  mission  a 
"rapprochement"  with  England,  toward  which 
Germans  were  always  bending  their  efforts; 
in  reality,  however,  it  was  a  "reconnoitering 
expedition"  under  the  very  roof  of  the  German 
cousin.  England'  showed  her  gratitude  by 
the  World  War,  which  Haldane  helped  to 
prepare;  in  this  case  Haldane  "cheated"  the 
Germans ! 

That  is  the  history  of  the  Haldane  mission. 
Later  it  was  summarily  maintained  by  all  sorts  of 
ignorant  dabblers  in  politics,  belonging  to  the 
press  and  the  general  public,  that  the  promising 
"rapprochement"  with  England  through  Haldane 
had  been  wrecked  by  the  obstinacy  of  the  Emperor 
and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  and  by  theii:  clinging  to 

162 


BETHMANN 

the  Naval  bill  against  the  wishes  of  all  "sensible 
counselors !" 

KINGSHIP  OF  ALBANIA 

At  that  time  [in  191 2]  the  question  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  independent  Albanian  state  and  the 
choice  by  the  Powers  of  a  head  for  it,  was  brought 
to  my  attention  also.  A  number  of  candidates 
lusting  for  a  crown  had  already  presented  them- 
selves before  the  tribunal  of  the  Powers,  without 
getting  themselves  accepted;  a  number  of  candi- 
dates, considered  by  the  Powers,  were  declined  by 
the  Albanians.  I  looked  upon  the  matter  in  itself 
with  indifference,  and  was  of  the  opinion  that — as 
in  the  case  of  every  "creation  of  a  nation" — the 
greatest  possible  attention  should  be  paid  to  his- 
torical development,  also  to  geographical  peculiar- 
ities and  the  customs  of  the  inhabitants. 

In  this  peculiar  land  there  has  never  been  any 
united  nation  under  one  ruler  and  one  dynasty. 
In  valleys,  encircled  and  cut  oflf  by  high  mountain 
ranges,  the  Albanian  tribes  live  separated  to  a  con- 
siderable degree  from  one  another.  Their  political 
system  is  not  unlike  the  clan  system  of  the  Scotch. 
Christians  and  Mohammedans  are  represented  in 
equal  numbers. 

The  custom  of  "vendetta"  is  an  ancient  one,  sanc- 
tified by  tradition,  which  is  no  less  true  of  robbery 
and  cattle  stealing.  Agriculture  is  still  in  a  back- 
ward stage  of  development,  farming  is  in  its  in- 
fancy, the  implements  used  therein  date  from 
before  the  flood. 

12  163 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

The  head  man  of  the  clan  dispenses  justice  in  the 
open,  under  the  village  tree,  as  it  used  to  be  done 
once  upon  a  time  among  the  ancient  Germans. 
Every  man  is  armed  and  most  are  excellent  shots. 
Whenever  the  head  man  of  the  clan  turns  up  while 
on  a  horseback  tour  through  his  territory  in  some 
hamlet,  the  inhabitants  expect  a  blessing  from  him 
in  the  form  of  jingling  coins,  which  sometimes  are 
scattered  about  by  him  from  the  saddle.  This,  of 
course,  is  particularly  customary  at  the  outset  of 
a  new  Government's  term,  and  great  is  the  dis- 
satisfaction when  it  does  not  happen. 

Up  to  the  time  of  the  Balkan  War  many  Al- 
banians entered  the  Turkish  service,  where  they 
rose  to  high  importance,  being  greatly  prized  on 
account  of  their  diligence  and  keen  intelligence, 
as  well  as  their  tenacious  energy.  They  supplied 
the  Turkish  administration  with  a  large  number  of 
officials,  also  with  a  certain  percentage  in  the  dip- 
lomatic corps  and  the  army.  The  young  Albanian 
nobles  were  proud  to  serve  in  a  splendid  company 
of  palace  guards  of  the  Sultan,  which  scarcely  had 
an  equal  for  size,  martial  appearance,  and  manly 
beauty.  These  were  partly  relatives  of  the  Sultan, 
since  the  latter  used  to  have  noble  Albanian  women 
of  the  principal  clans  in  his  harem  in  order  that 
he — protected  by  blood  brotherhood — might  be 
safe  from  the  "vendettas"  of  the  clans,  and,  also, 
that  he  might  find  out  everything  that  might  serve 
to  influence  the  feelings  of  the  Albanian  chieftains. 
The  desires  of  the  Albanians  which  reached  him 
by  this  road — for  instance,  as  to  supplies  of  arms 

164 


BETHMANN 

and  ammunition,  school  houses,  building  of  high- 
ways, etc.---were  thereupon  granted  in  an  incon- 
spicuous manner.  Thus  the  Sultan  was  enabled 
to  keep  the  usually  turbulent  Albanians  quiet  and 
loyal  by  means  of  '^family  ties." 

With  this  knowledge  of  the  state  of  affairs  as 
a  foundation,  I  sought  to  bring  my  influence  to 
bear  toward  having  a  Mohammedan  Prince 
chosen,  if  possible — perhaps  an  Egyptian  Prince 
— not  forgetting  that  he  should  have  a  well-lined 
purse,  which  is  an  absolute  necessity  in  Albania. 
My  advice  was  not  heeded  by  the  ^'Areopagus  of 
the  Powers,"  whose  members  were  not  bothering 
themselves  with  the  interests  of  the  Albanians,  but 
seeking,  first  of  all,  for  pretexts  and  opportunities 
for  fishing  in  the  troubled  Albanian  waters  in  such 
a  way  as  to  benefit  their  own  countries. 

OPPOSED  CHOICE  OF  GERMAN 

Therefore,  I  was  not  at  all  pleased  when  the 
choice  fell  upon  Prince  William  of  Wied.  I 
esteemed  him  as  a  distinguished,  knightly  man  of 
lofty  sentiments,  but  considered  him  unfitted  for 
the  post.  The  Prince  knew  altogether  too  little 
about  Balkan  affairs  to  be  able  to  undertake  this 
thorny  task  with  hope  of  success.  It  was  particu- 
larly unpleasant  to  me  that  a  German  Prince 
should  make  a  fool  of  himself  there,  since  it  was 
apparent  from  the  start  that  the  Entente  would 
place  all  sorts  of  obstacles  in  his  path.  Upon  being 
questioned  by  the  Prince,  I  told  my  cousin  all  my 
doubts,  laying  stress  upon  the  difficulties  awaiting 

165 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

him,  and  advised  him  urgently  to  decline.  I  could 
not  command  him,  since  the  Prince  of  Wied,  as 
head  of  the  family,  had  the  final  word  in  the 
matter. 

After  the  Prince's  acceptance  of  the  candidacy 
offered  him  by  the  Powers,  I  received  him  in  the 
presence  of  the  Chancellor.  A  certain  irresolution 
in  the  bearing  of  the  Prince,  who  contemplated 
his  new  task  with  anything  but  enthusiasm, 
strengthened  the  resolve  in  me  and  the  Chancellor 
to  try  hard  once  more  to  dissuade  the  young  candi- 
date from  ascending  the  recently  invented  Al- 
banian "throne."  But  in  vain.  The  ambitious, 
mystically  excited  wife  of  the  Prince  saw  in  Al- 
bania the  fulfillment  of  her  wishes.  And  "ce  que 
femme  veut,  Dieu  le  veut"  ("what  woman  wishes, 
God  wishes"). 

Carmen  Sylva  [the  Queen  of  Rumania]  also 
worked  toward  having  him  accept ;  she  went  so  far, 
in  fact,  as  to  publish  an  article  in  the  newspapers 
beginning  "Fairyland  Wants  Its  Prince." 

So  even  the  best  meant  warnings  were  useless.  I 
had  also  strongly  advised  the  Prince  not  to  go  to 
Albania  before  the  settlement  of  the  financial 
question,  since  the  reasons  which  had  led  me  to 
suggest  the  selection  of  a  rich  ruler  now  came  to 
the  fore.  The  Prince  was  not  very  wealthy  and 
the  Powers  had  to  supply  him  with  a  "donation," 
concerning  the  amount  of  which,  and  the  method 
of  paying  it  by  installments,  an  unpleasant  quarrel 
arose.  At  last  a  part  payment  was  made. 

Danger  lurked  for  the  Prince  and  his  eventual 

i66 


BETHMANN 

Government  in  the  person  of  Essad  Pasha,  an  un- 
reliable, intriguing,  greedy  soldier  of  fortune,  who 
himself  had  designs  on  the  Albanian  throne  and 
held  sway  over  a  certain  number  of  armed  ad- 
herents. From  the  start  he  was  an  opponent  of 
the  new  Prince  and  he  plotted  secretly  with  Italy, 
which  was  not  favorably  inclined  toward  the 
Prince  of  Wied.  Now,  it  would  have  been  quite 
natural  and  a  matter  of  course  if  the  new  ruler 
had  taken  with  him  in  his  suite  men  from  Ger- 
many whom  he  knew  and  who  were  faithful  to 
him.  But  he  did  not.  An  Englishman  and  an 
Italian  were  attached  to  his  person  as  "secretaries" 
and  they  had  nothing  better  to  do  than  to  work 
against  his  interests,  to  give  him  bad  advice  and 
to  intrigue  against  him. 

REQUIREMENTS  OP  A  RULER 

During  the  time  that  the  Prince  of  Wied  was 
making  his  preparations  the  excellently  written 
pamphlet  of  an  Austrian  General  Staff  officer, 
dealing  with  his  travels  in  Albania,  appeared. 
The  officer  described,  in  a  lively  and  clear  style, 
the  geographical  and  climatic  drawbacks,  the 
population  and  customs,  the  general  poverty  and 
backwardness  of  the  land. 

He  pointed  out  that  a  future  ruler  of  the  land 
must  ill  no  circumstances  reside  on  the  coast,  but 
must  show  himself  to  the  inhabitants  and  travel 
about  in  the  country.  Owing  to  the  primitive 
means  of  transportation,  he  went  on,  the  lord  of 
the  land  must  sit  all  day  on  horseback  and  ride 

167 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

through  his  domain,  having  at  his  saddle  bow  the 
famous  '^bag  of  sequins"  mentioned  in  all  Oriental 
tales  and  legends,  in  order  to  sway  public  opinion 
in  his  favor  in  the  places  visited  by  the  expected 
shower  of  gold.  The  ruler  must  be  sure,  the  author 
continued,  to  bind  some  of  the  clans  of  the  region 
closely  to  himself,  so  as  to  have  at  his  beck  and  call 
an  armed  force  for  asserting  his  will  and  overcom- 
ing any  opponents  wishing  to  rebel,  since  this  was 
the  only  way  to  maintain  his  power,  in  view  of  the 
utter  lack  of  ^^troops"  or  an  ^^army"  in  the  Euro- 
pean sense  of  the  word. 

This  meant  that  the  ruler  of  Albania  must  lead 
at  first  a  nomadic,  horseback  life,  and,  in  addition, 
provide  himself  with  a  wandering  camp,  with  tents 
and  other  accessories  and  the  necessary  horses. 
Plenty  of  men  adapted  to  this  sort  of  life  might 
have  been  found  in  his  squadron  of  the  Third 
Guard  Uhlan  Regiment,  since  many  of  his  Uhlans, 
who  were  very  fond  of  the  Prince,  had  declared 
that  they  were  ready  to  accompany  him  as  volun- 
teers. Surely,  they  would  have  served  him  better 
and  been  more  useful  to  him  than  what  he  did  in 
preparing  to  take  over  the  overlordship  of  Al- 
bania, without  knowledge  of  the  country. 

I  advised  my  cousin  urgently  to  study  this 
pamphlet  and  to  follow  its  recommendations,  espe- 
cially with  regard  to  his  residence,  which  should 
be  fixed  at  some  point  as  far  as  possible  from  the 
warships  of  the  Powers,  in  order  that  he  might  not 
be  forced  to  act  under  their  pressure  and  arouse 
suspicion  among  the  Albanians  that  their  ruler 

i68 


BETHMANN 

needed  these  ships  for  protection  against  his  sub- 
jects. Did  the  Prince  ever  read  the  pamphlet? 
In  any  event,  the  course  adopted  by  him  subse- 
quently was  contrary  to  its  advice  and  the  advice 
given  him  by  me. 

The  Prince  and  his  wife  journeyed  to  Albania, 
and  things  turned  out  as  I  had  foreseen.  Accord- 
ing to  reports  describing  the  arrival  of  the  sover- 
eign couple,  the  Princess,  although  she 'was  a 
German,  addressed  the  assembled  Albanians  from 
her  balcony  in  French,  since  they  understood  no 
German !  The  "court"  remained  at  Durazzo  under 
the  guns  of  the  foreign  ships.  The  Prince  did  not 
travel  on  horseback  through  the  land,  nor  did  he 
scatter  gold  sequins  about — not  even  from  his  bal- 
cony on  the  day  of  his  arrival — nor  did  he  push 
Essad  out  of  the  way.  So  the  adventure  ended  as 
one  might  imagine. 

I  have  gone  into  some  detail  in  describing  my 
opinion  and  attitude  toward  the  question  of  the 
choice  of  the  ruler  of  Albania  because,  from  every 
possible  quarter,  false  rumors  have  been  circulated 
for  the  purpose  of  imputing  to  me  motives  which 
were  utterly  foreign  to  me.  In  this  matter,  also,  I 
gave  honest  advice  when  questioned,  based  on 
sound  knowledge  of  mankind. 

The  year  191 2  also  witnessed  the  meeting  with 
the  Tsar  at  Baltisch-Port,  whither  I  repaired  on 
board  my  yacht  at  the  invitation  of  Nicholas  II. 
Our  two  yachts  anchored  side  by  side,  so  that  visit- 
ing from  ship  to  ship  was  easy.  The  Tsar,  his 
children,  and  his  entire  entourage  vied  with  one 

169 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


another  in  evidences  of  good  will  and  hospitality. 
The  Russian  and  German  escorting  squadrons 
were  inspected,  turn  and  turn  about,  by  the  Tsar 
and  myself  together,  and  we  took  our  meals  either 
at  the  Tsar's  table  or  mine. 

We  spent  one  morning  on  land  near  Baltisch- 
Port.  The  Eighty-fifth  "Viborg"  Infantry  Regi- 
ment, whose  commander  I  was,  had  been  drawn  up 
in  a  field  and  was  inspected  first  in  parade  forma- 
tion, then  in  company  and  battalion  exercises, 
which  were  carried  out  in  as  satisfactory  a  manner 
as  was  the  parade  with  which  the  evolutions  were 
brought  to  a  close. 

The  regiment,  composed  of  four  battalions, 
made  an  excellent  impression.  It  was  in  field 
equipment — brown-gray  blouses  and  caps — and 
the  latter,  worn  jauntily  cocked  over  one  ear  by  all, 
gave  to  the  sun-browned,  martial  faces  of  the 
strong  young  soldiers  a  bold  air  which  brought 
joy  to  the  heart  of  every  soldier  who  gazed  upon 
them. 

In  the  course  of  the  brilliant  and  uncommonly 
amiable  reception  which  I  met  with  on  this  occa- 
sion I  received  no  hint  of  the  Balkan  alliance,  con- 
cluded a  short  time  before. 

It  was  my  last  visit  in  Russia  before  the  out- 
break of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  VI 


My  Co-workers  in  the  Administration 

IT  behooves  me  to  remark  that  I  found  particular 
pleasure  in  working  with  His  Excellency  von 
Stephan  and  in  dealing  with  him.  He  was  a 
man  of  the  old  school,  who  fitted  in  so  well  with 
me  that  he  always  grasped  my  ideas  and  sugges- 
tions and  afterward  carried  them  out  with  energy 
and  power,  owing  to  his  firm  belief  in  them.  A 
man  of  iron  energy  and  unflagging  capacity  for 
work  and  joyousness ;  endowed,  moreover,  with  re- 
freshing humor,  quick  to  perceive  new  possibil- 
ities, never  at  a  loss  for  expedients,  well  versed  in 
political  and  technical  matters,  he  seemed  to  have 
been  born  especially  for  creative  co-operation.  I 
trusted  him  implicitly,  and  my  trust  in  him  was 
never  betrayed.  I  learned  much  from  my  associa- 
tion with  this  stimulating,  shrewd  counselor. 

The  Post-Office  Department  reached  an  un- 
imagined  degree  of  excellence  and  aroused  the  ad- 
miration of  the  whole  world.  The  great  invention 
of  the  telephone  was  utilized  to  the  limit,  was  ap- 
plied extensively  to  the  public  service,  and  was 
developed  so  as  to  facilitate  it.  Likewise  in  the 
domain  of  building  Stephan  brought  about  a  de- 

171 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

cided  improvement,  which  received  my  approval 
•  and  support. 

All  great  state  building  projects  depended  on 
the  vote  of  the  investigating  "Academy  of  Build- 
ing," which,  at  that  time,  was  a  slow-moving,  cum- 
brous, and  backward  body.  I  had  already  had  ex- 
periences of  my  own  with  it.  The  "White  Draw- 
ing Room,"  originally  merely  provisional,  had 
been  put  up  without  much  attention  to  style — it 
had  been  intended  at  first  for  an  Indian  mas- 
querade, a  "Lalla  Rookh"  festival,  in  honor  of 
the  Grand  Duchess  Charlotte,  daughter  of  Fred- 
erick William  III,  and  her  husband,  later  Tsar 
Nicholas  I.  An  investigation  instituted  at  my 
order  showed  the  material  to  be  spurious  and  in- 
ferior ;  the  structure  was  in  the  worst  possible  state 
of  decay  and  in  danger  of  collapse ;  a  new  one  was 
needed. 

With  the  co-operation  and  collaboration  of  the 
Empress  Frederick,  projects  and  plans  were  made, 
and,  finally,  a  big  model  was  provided  by  Building 
Councilor  Inne — the  "modern  Schliiter,"  as  the 
Empress  Frederick  used  to  call  him — ^which  won 
unanimous  approval.  Only  the  Building  Acad- 
emy opposed  wearisome  objections,  stating  that  the 
"White  Drawing  Room"  ought  to  be  preserved  "in 
its  old  historical  beauty,"  and  required  no  altera- 
tions. When  the  new  structure  was  completed, 
However,  it  also  met  with  the  approval  of  the  gen- 
tlemen who  had  been  formerly  so  critical. 

Herr  von  Stephan  also  was  at  loggerheads  with 
the  Academy  of  Building.    He  wanted  to  alter 

172 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

many  post  offices,  or  build  entirely  new  ones,  espe- 
cially in  the  big  cities,  but,  in  view  of  the  fearful 
slowness  and  devotion  to  red  tape  of  the  aforesaid 
official  body,  he  used  to  receive  no  answers  at  all, 
or  else  refusals,  when  he  brought  these  matters  to 
its  attention.  The  rule  of  thumb  was  supreme 
there.  Herr  von  Stephan  was  of  the  opinion  that, 
in  its  buildings  as  well  as  in  other  directions,  the 
youthful  German  Empire  must  give  an  impression 
of  power,  and  that  the  Imperial  post  offices  must 
be  built  accordingly;  he  believed  that  they  should 
harmonize  with  the  general  style  of  the  towns 
where  they  were  located,  or,  at  least,  conform  to 
the  style  of  the  oldest  and  most  important  build- 
ings there.  Nor  could  I  do  otherwise  than  agree 
with  such  a  view. 

ACADEMY'S  SHACKLES  BROKEN 

At  last  there  Came  a  rupture  with  the  aforemen- 
tioned Academy.  His  Excellency  von  Stephan 
lost  patience  and  informed  me  that  he  had  freed 
his  office,  and  the  buildings  erected  by  it,  from  the 
supervision  of  the  Academy;  that  he  had  even 
formed  a  committee  from  among  his  own  archi- 
tects and  officials  for  supervising  purposes;  and 
that  all  he  asked  of  me  was  to  subject  the  more  im- 
portant plans  for  buildings  to  a  final  inspection. 
I  did  so  willingly. 

Stephan  was  an  enthusiastic  huntsman,  so  that  I 
had  additional  opportunities,  while  on  the  court 
hunts,  to  enjoy  association  with  this  refreshing, 
unchanging,  faithful  official  and  counselor. 

173 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Among  the  Ministers  whom  I  particularly 
esteemed  His  Excellency  Miquel  took  first  place. 
He  it  was  who,  as  my  Finance  Minister,  put 
through  for  Prussia  the  great  reform  which  placed 
the  land  on  a  sound  basis  and  helped  it  toward 
prosperity.  Intercourse  with  this  astute  political 
expert  gave  me  great  pleasure,  and  a  wealth  of 
teaching  and  stimulus. 

The  degree  to  which  Miquel  was  versed  in  all 
possible  matters  was  astounding.  In  conversation 
he  was  brisk,  humorous,  and  keen  in  elucidating 
and  arguing  on  a  subject,  in  addition  to  which  a 
strong  historical  bent  rani,  like  a  red  thread, 
through  his  quotations.  In  history  and  ancient 
languages  he  was  marvelously  well  equipped,  so 
that,  in  his  reports,  he  was  able  often  to  hark  back 
to  the  times  of  the  Romans  and  quote  from  his  store 
of  knowledge — not  out  of  Biichmann^ — pieces  of 
Latin  in  support  of  his  arguments.  Even  when  he 
was  instructing  he  was  never  tiresome  on  account 
of  his  brilliant  dialectics,  but  used  to  hold  his 
hearers  spellbound  to  the  very  end. 

It  was  His  Excellency  Miquel  likewise  who  in- 
cited me  to  favor  the  great  canal  projects  and  sup- 
ported me  when  the  Prussian  Conservatives  op- 
posed the  Central  [Rhine-Weser-Elbe]  Canal, 
and  caused  the  failure  of  the  plan  to  build  it.  He 
lent  strength  to  the  King  and  made  the  latter 
decide  not  to  let  up  in  this  fight  until  victory  was 
won.  He  knew,  as  I  did,  what  blessings  the  canals 


German  philologist  who  compiled  a  well-known  book  of 
quotations. 

174 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

in  Holland  and  the  splendid  canal  network  of 
France  had  brought  to  those  lands  and  what  a  re- 
lief they  were  to  the  ever  more  hard-pressed  rail- 
ways. In  the  World  War  we  might  have  had  a 
splendid  east-to-west  artery  of  transportation  for 
ammunition,  wounded,  siege  material,  supplies, 
and  the  like,  which  would  have  made  it  possible,  by 
thus  relieving  the  railways,  for  the  latter  to  trans- 
port troops  on  an  even  greater  scale — moreover, 
this  would  have  lessened  the  shortage  of  coal.  In 
time  of  peace  also,  for  which  the  canal  was  des- 
tined, it  would  have  been  most  beneficial. 

Minister  von  Miquel  was  a  most  ardent  enthusi- 
ast for  the  Imperial  German  idea  and  the  German 
Empire  of  the  Hohenzollerns :  I  lent  an  attentive 
ear  to  his  spirited  handling  of  this  theme.  He  was 
a  man  who,  clinging  to  the  old  tradition,  thought 
in  a  great  German,  Imperial  way;  he  was  fully 
adequate  to  the  requirements  and  demands  of  the 
new  era,  rightly  appreciating  when  these  were  of 
value. 

From  the  start  I  concerned  myself  with  the 
completion  of  the  railway  system.  From  the  re- 
ports relating  to  national  defense  and  the  com- 
plaints of  the  General  Staff,  as  well  as  from 
personal  observation,  I  knew  of  the  absolutely 
incredible  neglect  suffered  by  East  Prussia  in  the 
matter  of  railways.  The  state  of  affairs  was  abso- 
lutely dangerous,  in  view  of  the  steady,  though 
gradual,  reinforcing  of  the  Russian  troops  facing 
our  frontier,  and  the  development  of  the  Russian 
railway  system. 

175 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


During  the  last  years  of  his  reign  Emperor 
William  the  Great  had  commanded  Field  Mar- 
shal Moltke  to  report  on  the  situation,  since  the 
Russian  armies,  under  the  influence  of  France,  were 
being  posted  ever  more  conspicuously  on  the  east- 
ern frontier  of  Prussia,  arousing  apprehension  as 
to  the  possibility  of  irruptions  of  great  masses  of 
Russian  cavalry  into  Prussia,  Posen,  and  Silesia. 
Quartermaster-General  Count  Waldersee  and  I 
were  present  at  the  reading  of  this  report.  From 
it  came  the  resolve  to  shift  Prussian  troops  east- 
ward and  to  push  toward  completion  the  neglected 
railway  system. 

The  measures  ordained  by  Emperor  William  I 
and  begun  by  him  required  time,  particularly  as 
the  new  railway  bridges  over  the  Vistula  and 
Nogat  had  to  be  built  by  the  military  authorities 
in  the  teeth  of  strong  official  opposition  (May- 
bach).  Since  the  railways  were  considered  a  "na- 
tional pocketbook,"  there  was  a  desire  to  build 
only  "paying"  lines,  which  caused  prejudice 
against  outlays  for  military  lines  designed  for 
the  defense  of  the  fatherland,  since  it  diminished 
the  fine  surplus  funds  by  which  such  great  store 
was  laid. 

Not  until  my  reign  were  the  plans  of  Emperor 
William  I  brought  to  realization.  Anyone  tak- 
ing up  a  railway  map  of  1888  will  be  amazed  at 
the  lack  of  railway  connection  in  the  east,  particu- 
larly in  East  Prussia,  especially  if  he  compares  it 
with  a  1 914  map  showing  the  development  in  the 
intervening  years.    If  we  had  had  the  old  net- 

176 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

work,  we  should  have  lost  our  eastern  territory 
in  1914. 

Unquestionably,  Minister  von  Maybach  ren- 
dered valuable  services  in  the  promotion  and  de- 
velopment of  the  railway  system.  He  had  to  take 
into  account  the  wishes  and  demands  of  the  rapidly 
developing  industrial  sections  of  Western  Ger- 
many, in  doing  which  he  naturally  considered 
military  desires  also,  as  far  as  he  could.  But  dur- 
ing his  regime  Eastern  Germany  was  very  badly 
treated  with  regard  to  railway  lines,  bridges,  and 
rolling  stock.  Had  there  been  mobilization  at 
that  time,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  transfer 
hundreds  of  locomotives  to  the  east  in  order  to 
maintain  schedules  capable  of  meeting  even  part 
of  the  requirements  of  the  General  Staff.  The 
only  means  of  communication  with  the  east  were 
the  two  antiquated  trestle  bridges  at  Dirschau  and 
Marienburg.  The  General  Staff  became  insistent, 
which  brought  quarrels  between  it  and  Maybach. 

Not  until  Minister  Thielen  came  into  office  was 
there  a  change,  occasioned  by  his  self-sacrificing 
work,  for  which  thanks  are  due  him.  Realizing 
correctly  what  the  military  requirements  were,  he 
pushed  forward  the  completion  of  the  eastern  rail- 
ways. Thielen  was  an  able,  diligent,  thoroughly 
reliable  official  of  the  old  Prussian  type,  faithful 
to  me  and  enjoying  my  high  esteem.  In  common 
with  Miquel,  he  stood  faithfully  by  the  side  of 
his  sovereign  in  the  fight  for  the  Central  Canal. 
Characteristic  of  him  were  the  words  which  he 
said  in  my  presence,  before  a  big  assembly  of 

177 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


people,  at  the  opening  of  the  Elbe-Trave  Canal: 
"The  Central  Canal  must  and  will  be  built."  Re- 
lations between  him  and  me  remained  harmonious 
until  his  retirement. 

Despite  the  railway  construction  work  in  the 
western  part  of  Germany,  there  were  in  that  region 
likewise  serious  gaps  in  the  network  of  railways, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  mobilization  and  deploy- 
ment of  troops,  which  had  long  since  needed 
remedying.  The  Rhine,  as  far  up  as  Mainz,  was 
crossed  by  one  railway  bridge  only;  the  Main 
could  be  crossed  only  at  Frankfort.  For  a  long 
time  the  General  Staff  had  been  demanding  the 
remedying  of  these  conditions.  Fortunately,  gen- 
eral traffic  moved  in  the  same  direction — for  in- 
stance, if  a  traveler  coming  from  the  west  wished 
to  reach  one  of  the  watering  places  in  the  Taunus 
Mountains,  or  some  place  on  the  railway  along 
the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  he  had  to  go  as  far 
as  Frankfort,  and  then  return  in  the  same  direc- 
tion whence  he  had  come,  although  at  Mainz  he 
had  almost  been  opposite  Wiesbaden. 

Minister  Budde  was  the  man  chosen  for  the 
accomplishment  of  this  work.  As  chief  of  the 
railway  department  of  the  General  Staff  he  had 
long  since  attracted  my  attention  by  his  extraordi- 
nary capacity  for  work,  his  energy,  and  his  prompt- 
ness in  making  decisions.  He  had  often  reported 
to  me  on  the  gaps  in  our  railway  system,  which 
would  hamper  quick  deployment  of  troops  on 
two  fronts,  and  always  pointed  out  the  prepara- 
tions being  made  by  Russia  and  France,  which  we 

178 


1 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

were  in  duty  bound  to  meet  with  preparations  of 
equal  scope,  in  the  interests  of  the  national  defense. 

The  first  consideration,  of  course,  in  railway 
construction  had  been  the  improvement  and  facili- 
tation of  industry  and  commerce,  but  it  had  not 
been  able  to  meet  the  immeasurably  increased 
demands  of  these,  since  the  great  network  of 
canals,  designed  to  relieve  the  railways,  was  not 
in  existence.  The  war  on  two  fronts,  which 
threatened  us  more  and  more — and  for  which  our 
railways  were,  technically  speaking,  not  yet  ready, 
partly  from  financial-technical  reasons — made 
necessary  that  more  careful  attention  should  be 
paid  to  military  requirements.  Russia  was  build- 
ing, with  French  billions,  an  enormous  network 
of  railways  against  us,  while  in  France  the  rail- 
ways destined  to  facilitate  the  deployment  of 
forces  against  Germany  were  being  indefatigably 
extended  by  the  completion  of  three-track  lines — 
something  as  yet  totally  unknown  in  Germany. 

Minister  Budd^^  set  to  work  without  delay.  The 
second  great  railway  bridge  over  the  Rhine  at 
Mainz  was  constructed,  likewise  the  bridge  over 
the  Main  at  Costheim,  and  the  necessary  switches 
and  loops  for  establishing  communication  with  the 
line  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  and  with 
Wiesbaden ;  also  the  triangle  at  Biebrich-Mosbach 
was  completed.  Budde's  talents  found  brilliant 
scope  in  the  organization  and  training  of  the  rail- 
way employees,  whose  numbers  had  grown  until 
they  formed  a  large  army,  and  in  his  far-sighted 
care  for  his  subordinates. 
13  179 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

I  respected  this  vigorous,  active  man  with  all 
my  heart,  and  deeply  regretted  that  a  treacherous 
ailment  put  an  end  to  his  career  in  the  very  midst 
of  his  work. 

In  His  Excellency  von  Breitenbach  I  acquired 
a  new  and  valuable  aid  and  co-worker  in  my  plans 
regarding  the  railways.  In  the  course  of  years  he 
developed  into  a  personage  of  high  eminence. 
Distinguished  and  obliging,  of  comprehensive  at- 
tainments, keen  political  insight,  great  capacity 
for  work  and  untiring  industry,  he  stood  in  close 
relationship  to  me. 

His  co-operation  with  the  General  Staff  in  mili- 
tary matters  was  due  to  his  tl  orough  belief  in  the 
necessity  of  strengthening  our  means  of  defense 
against  possible  hostile  attacks.  Plans  were  made 
for  the  construction  of  three  new  Rhine  bridges, 
at  Riidesheim,  Neuwied,  and  the  Loreley,  which 
were  not  completed  until  during  the  war^ — they 
were  named,  respectively,  after  the  Crown  Prince, 
Hindenburg,  and  Ludendorff.  In  the  east,  great 
extensions  of  railway  stations,  bridges,  and  new 
railway  lines  were  built,  some  of  them  while  the 
war  was  in  progress. 

Other  important  works  carried  out  by  Breiten- 
bach in  the  west  were  the  great  railway  bridge  at 
Cologne,  to  replace  the  old  trestle  bridge;  a  new 
bridge,  by  the  Beyen  Tower,  for  freight  traffic; 
and  new  railways  in  the  EiflPel  Mountains.  More- 
over, at  my  special  suggestion,  a  through  line  was 
built  from  Giessen  to  Wiesbaden,  which  included 
reconstruction  of  the  stations  at  Homburg  and 

i8o 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

Wiesbaden  and  the  building  of  a  loop  around 
Frankfort  and  Hochst.  In  addition,  trains  were 
provided  with  through  cars  from  Flushing  to  the 
Taunus. 

To  show  that  it  is  impossible  to  please  every- 
body, I  wish  to  observe  in  passing  that  we  were 
violently  attacked  by  the  hotel  proprietors  of 
Frankfort,  who  were  naturally  not  at  all  pleased 
at  this  elimination  of  Frankfort  and  of  the  neces- 
sity, existing  previously,  for  passengers  to  change 
trains  there,  since  they  lost  thereby  many  custom- 
ers formerly  obliged  to  spend  a  night  in  some 
Frankfort  hotel.  This  element  brought  particu- 
larly strong  opposition  to  bear  against  the  loop 
line  around  Hochst. 

The  battle  concerning  the  Central  Canal  was 
decided  at  last  in  favor  of  my  plans.  Under 
Breitenbach,  construction  on  it  was  pushed  for- 
ward by  sections  with  great  energy.  Those  por- 
tions of  this  canal  which  it  had  been  possible  to 
place  in  operation  have  fully  met  expectations. 

During  this  period,  also,  the  extraordinarily 
difficult  extension  and  deepening  of  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Canal,  almost  equivalent  to  building  an 
entirely  new  waterway,  was  brought  to  comple- 
tion, likewise  the  great  Emden  sea  lock.  These 
were  remarkable  achievements  in  the  domain  of 
bridge  and  lock  construction,  which  aroused  the 
admiration  of  the  world;  in  the  matter  of  locks, 
for  instance,  those  built  at  this  time  far  surpassed 
the  locks  of  the  Panama  Canal  in  size.  The  diffi- 
cult tasks  were  brilliantly  and  thoroughly  com- 

i8i 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

pleted  by  the  officials  in  charge;  in  so  far  as 
the  construction  work  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
Empire,  it  was  carried  out  mostly  with  the  super- 
vising co-operation  of  the  Prussian  Ministry  of 
Transportation. 

I  often  went  to  Breitenbach's  home,  where  I 
had  an  opportunity,  thanks  to  him,  of  having  in- 
teresting talks  on  commercial-political  and  eco- 
nomic subjects  with  a  highly  intelligent  circle,  of 
meeting  a  lot  of  eminent  men  and  discussing 
important  questions.  The  plans  and  sketches  of 
all  the  larger  railway  stations,  locks,  and  bridges 
were  submitted  to  me  before  the  work  of  building 
or  rebuilding  them  was  begun,  and  reports  con- 
cerning them  were  made  to  me. 

I  have  intentionally  gone  into  detail  in  this  mat- 
ter in  order  to  show  the  following:  First,  how  a 
monarch  can  and  must  influence  the  development 
of  his  realm  by  personal  participation;  second, 
how,  if  he  makes  his  selections  quite  indepen- 
dently of  party  reasons,  he  can  place  able  men  at 
the  head  of  the  various  departments;  third,  how, 
by  the  honest  co-operation  of  these  men  with  the 
sovereign,  whose  complete  confidence  they  enjoy, 
brilliant  results  can  be  achieved.  Everything  that 
we  did  together  was  aboveboard  and  honest;  noth- 
ing mattered  but  the  welfare  and  development  of 
the  fatherland,  its  strengthening  and  equipment 
for  competition  in  the  world  market. 

As  was  natural,  I  had  close  and  lasting  relations 
in  the  regular  course  of  events  with  the  Ministry 
of  Public  Worship  and  Instruction.    Herr  von 

182 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

Gossler  and  Herr  von  Trott  may  surely  be  con- 
sidered the  most  important  and  prominent  occu- 
pants of  this  post.  In  this  Ministry  a  co-worker 
almost  without  equal  arose  in  the  person  of  Min- 
istry Director  Althoff,  a  man  of  genius. 

I  had  been  made  acquainted  with  the  dark  side 
of  the  high-school  system  of  education  by  my  own 
school  experiences.  The  predominantly  philo- 
logical character  of  the  training  led,  in  the  whole 
educational  system  as  wxll,  to  a  certain  one- 
sidedness. 

When  I  was  at  the  Cassel  High  School  in 
1874-77  I  had  observed  that,  although  there  was 
great  enthusiasm  for  1870-71  and  the  new  Empire 
among  the  boys,  there  was,  nevertheless,  a  distinct 
lack  of  the  right  conception  of  the  German  idea, 
of  the  feeling  "civis  Germanus  sum"  (^^I  am  a 
German  citizen") — which  I  impressed  later  upon 
my  people  at  the  laying  of  the  foundation-stone  of 
the  Saalburg.  To  create  such  sentiments  and 
awaken  them  in  the  rising  generation  and  to  lay 
the  foundations  for  them  firmly  in  the  young 
hearts  was  a  task  somewhat  beyond  the  powers  of 
the  teaching  stafif,  in  view  of  the  fossilized,  anti-. 
quated  philological  curriculum. 

There  was  great  neglect  in  the  department  of 
German  history,  which  is  exactly  the  study  through 
which  young  hearts  may  be  made  to  glow,  through 
which  the  love  of  one's  native  country,  its  future 
and  greatness,  may  be  aroused.  But  little  was 
taught  of  more  recent  history,  covering  the  years 
since  18 15.    Young  philologists  were  produced, 

183 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

but  no  German  citizens  qualified  for  practical 
co-operation  toward  building  up  the  flourishing 
young  Empire. 

In  other  words,  no  youths  who  were  consciously 
Germans  were  being  turned  out.  In  a  small  read- 
ing club  composed  of  my  classmates  I  often  tried 
to  inculcate  the  idea  of  the  Greater  Germany,  in 
order  to  eliminate  parochial  and  similar  concep- 
tions which  hampered  the  German  idea.  Admiral 
Werner's  Book  of  the  German  Fleet  was  one  of 
the  few  works  by  means  of  which  the  living  feel- 
ing for  the  German  Empire  could  be  fanned  into 
flame. 

Another  thing  that  struck  me,  in  addition  to 
the  one-sidedness  of  the  education  in  the  schools, 
was  the  tendency,  among  youths  planning  their 
careers  in  those  days,  to  turn  their  attention  to 
becoming  Government  officials,  and  always  con- 
sider the  profession  of  lawyer  or  judge  the  most 
worthy  goal. 

This  was  doubtless  due  to  the  fact  that  the  con- 
ditions obtaining  in  the  Prussia  of  olden  days 
still  had  their  effect  in  the  youthful  German  Em- 
pire. As  long  as  the  state  consisted,  so  to  speak, 
of  government  and  administration,  this  tendency 
among  German  youths  in  the  shaping  of  their  lives 
was  understandable  and  justified;  since  we  were 
living  in  a  country  of  officials,  the  right  road  for 
a  young  man  to  select  was  the  service  of  the  state. 
British  youths  of  that  time,  self-reliant  and  made 
robust  by  sports,  were  already  talking,  to  be  sure, 
of  colonial  conquests,  of  expeditions  to  explore 

184 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

new  regions  of  the  earth,  of  extending  British 
commerce ;  and  they  were  trying,  in  the  guise  of 
pioneers  of  their  country,  to  make  Great  Britain 
still  stronger  and  greater,  by  practical,  free  action, 
not  as  paid  hirelings  of  the  state.  But  England 
had  long  been  a  world  empire  when  we  were  still 
a  land  of  officials;  therefore,  the  youth  of  Britain 
could  seek  more  remote  and  important  goals  than 
the  German. 

Now  that  Germany  had  entered  into  world 
economics  and  world  politics,  however,  as  a  by  no 
means  negligible  factor,  the  aspirations  of  German 
youth  should  have  undergone  a  more  prompt 
transformation.  For  this  reason  it  was  that  I,  dur- 
ing the  later  years  of  my  reign,  used  to  compare, 
with  a  heavy  heart,  the  proud  young  Britons,  who 
had  learned  much  less  Latin  and  Greek  than  was 
required  among  us,  with  the  children  of  Germany, 
pale  from  overstudy.  To  be  sure,  there  were  even 
then  enterprising  men  in  Germany — brilliant 
names  can  be  cited  among  them — but  the  concep- 
tion of  serving  the  fatherland,  not  by  traveling 
along  a  definite,  officially  certified  road,  but  by 
independent  competition,  had  not  yet  become  suffi- 
ciently generalized.  Therefore  I  held  up  the 
English  as  an  example,  for  it  seems  to  me  better 
to  take  the  good  where  one  finds  it,  without  preju- 
dice, than  to  go  through  the  world  wearing 
blinkers. 

With  these  considerations  as  a  basis  I  won  for 
my  German  youths  the  School  Reform  against 
desperate  opposition  from  the  philologists,  inside 

i8s 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

and  outside  the  Ministry  and  school  circles.  Un- 
fortunately, the  reform  did  not  take  the  shape 
which  I  hoped,  and  did  not  lead  to  the  results 
which  I  had  expected. 

The  Germanic  idea  in  all  its  splendor  was  first 
revealed  and  preached  to  the  astonished  German 
people  by  Chamberlain  in  his  Foundations  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century.  But,  as  is  proved  by  the  col- 
lapse of  the  German  people,  this  was  in  vain. 
To  be  sure,  there  was  much  singing  of  ^'Deutsch- 
land  liber  alles,"  but  Germans,  obeying  the  com- 
mands of  their  enemies,  allowed  the  Emperor  to 
fall  and  the  Empire  to  be  broken  to  pieces;  and, 
placing  themselves  under  the  orders  of  Russian 
criminals  vastly  inferior  to  them  in  culture,  they 
stabbed  their  own  army  in  the  back  while  it  was 
still  fighting  valiantly. 

Had  Germans  of  all  classes  and  conditions  been 
educated  to  feel  joy  and  pride  in  their  fatherland, 
such  a  degradation  of  a  great  nation  would  have 
been  unimaginable. 

This  degradation — which,  it  must  be  admitted, 
occurred  under  remarkable,  extremely  difficult 
circumstances — is  all  the  more  difficult  to  under- 
stand in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  youth  of  Ger- 
many, although  it  was  impaired  in  health  by 
overstudy,  and  not  so  toughened  by  sports  as  the 
English,  achieved  brilliant  feats  in  the  World 
War,  such  as  were  nowhere  equaled  before. 

The  years  1914-18  showed  what  might  have 
been  made  out  of  the  German  people  had  it  only 
developed  its  admirable  qualities  in  the  right  di- 

186 


MY  CO-WORKERS 


rection.  The  4th  of  August,  1914,  the  heroes  of 
Langemark,  countless  splendid  figures  from  all 
classes,  rise  up  from  the  chaos  of  the  long  war  to 
show  what  the  German  can  do  when  he  throws 
away  Philistinism  and  devotes  himself,  with  the 
enthusiasm  which  so  seldom  reveals  itself  com- 
pletely in  him,  to  a  great  cause.  May  the  German 
people  never  forget  these  incarnations  of  its  better 
self;  may  it  emulate  them  with  its  full  strength 
by  inculcating  in  itself  the  true  German  spirit! 

In  the  post  of  Minister  of  Justice  I  found  His 
Excellency  Friedberg,  the  intimate,  faithful  friend 
of  my  father,  whom  I  had  known  ever  since  my 
youth,  when  he  was  a  welcome  guest  in  the  home 
of  my  parents.  This  simple,  afifable  man  enjoyed 
with  me  the  same  consideration  which  had  been 
shown  him  by  my  parents. 

In  later  years  I  had  frequent  and  welcome  deal- 
ings with  His  Excellency  Beseler,  who  also  en- 
abled me  to  hear  informal  discussion  at  his  house 
of  many  an  interesting  legal  problem  by  promi- 
nent lawyers,  and  to  come  into  touch  with  legal 
luminaries.  I  felt  no  particular  inclination  toward 
the  lawyers  in  themselves — since  pedantry,  remote- 
ness from  actualities  and  doctrinaire  leanings 
often  assert  themselves  in  the  domain  of  the  law 
altogether  too  much  for  my  taste — but  the  com- 
pilation of  the  Citizens'  Law  Book  interested  me 
greatly.  I  was  present  at  sessions  dealing  with  it, 
and  was  proud  that  this  fundamental  German 
work  should  have  been  brought  to  completion  in 
my  reign. 

187 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

When  I  met  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  Eng- 
land, while  I  was  on  a  visit  to  that  country,  at  the 
home  of  Lord  Haldane,  I  asked  that  great  jurist 
what  he  thought  of  the  administration  and  inter- 
pretation of  the  law  in  Germany.  His  answer  ran 
thus:  "You  pronounce  judgment  too  much  ac- 
cording to  the  letter  of  the  law;  we  according  to 
the  spirit  and  content  of  the  law." 

I  have  of ter  pointed  out  how  unfortunate  it  was 
that  we  have  not  been  able  to  introduce,  in  police 
cases — connected  with  traffic,  streets,  etc. — the 
prompt  procedure  of  the  English  "police  court." 
For,  in  England,  punishment  in  such  cases  is  meted 
out  on  the  very  next  day,  whereas  in  Germany 
months  often  elapse,  what  with  gathering  of  evi- 
dence and  examination  of  witnesses,  until,  finally, 
some  insignificant  sentence  is  pronounced  long 
after  the  case  has  been  forgotten.  I  should  also 
have  liked  to  introduce  into  Germany  the  heavy 
penalties  for  libels  published  in  the  press  which 
are  customary  in  England. 

I  have  often  pointed  out  how  unfortunate  it  was 
Prince,  with  Minister  of  Finance  Scholz,  and  had 
taken  part  in  sessions  wherein  that  famous  man, 
His  Excellency  Meinecke,  figured.  Meinecke  was 
Under  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Finance  Ministry 
and  had,  therefore,  much  to  do  with  other  Min- 
isters, since  finances  were  an  important  thing 
everywhere.  He  had  achieved  a  certain  degree  of 
fame  because  he — as  he  thought — was  always  able 
smilingly  to  find  the  best  way  out  of  tight  places. 

Scholz  w^as  faithful  to  his  duty  and  able,  but  he 

i88 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

did  not  succeed  in  making  the  dry  substance  of 
taxes  and  the  like  particularly  interesting  and 
pleasant  to  me,  nor  was  there  any  change  in  this 
state  of  affairs  until  the  versatile  Miquel  took 
charge  of  the  Finance  Ministry.  When  Miquel 
reported  to  nie  concerning  the  Prussian  financial 
reform,  he  suggested  three  plans :  one  modest,  one 
medium,  one  ambitious.  To  the  delight  of  the 
Minister  I  decided,  without  hesitation,  for  the 
third.  Both  the  monarch  and  the  Minister  were 
filled  with  satisfaction  when  the  reform  was  car- 
ried out. 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Herr  von  Putt- 
kamer,  had  been  forced  to  retire  during  the  ninety- 
nine  days,  to  the  great  sorrow  of  him  who  was  then 
Crown  Prince.  He  was  an  able,  tried  old  Prus- 
sian official ;  one  of  those  Pomeranians  of  the  old 
school,  filled  with  loyalty  to  the  King — a  noble- 
man through  and  through.  Rumor  had  it  that 
the  Empress  Frederick  had  driven  him  from  office 
by  a  plot,  but  this  is  not  true.  The  Empress,  with 
her  inclination  to  English  Liberalism,  doubtless 
did  not  like  the  old-time  Prussian  Conservative, 
yet  she  was  not  at  all  to  blame  for  his  going. 
Prince  Bismarck  pushed  him  aside,  perhaps  out 
of  consideration  for  the  Empress  Frederick. 

I  was  deeply  interested  in  forestry  and  its  im- 
provement along  practical  lines,  especially  as  new 
gold  reserves  could  be  created  for  the  state  by 
reforestation. 

Next  to  Herr  von  Podbielski,  the  ablest  Min- 
ister of  Agriculture  and  Forests  was  Freiherr  von 

189 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Schorlemer.  Just  as  Herr  von  Podbielski  bent 
his  efforts  toward  creating  great  stretches  of  for- 
ests in  the  east,  in  order  to  keep  off  the  east  wind 
by  a  compact  forest  zone  and  thus  improve  our 
climate,  and,  at  the  same  time,  provide  a  natural 
protection  against  Russian  attacks,  so  Herr  von 
Schorlemer  opened  up  the  eastern  forest  reserva- 
tions by  extensive  construction  of  roads,  and  by 
thus  facilitating  the  transportation  of  wood  helped 
Germany  greatly  in  making  headway  in  competi- 
tion against  wood  from  Russia. 

Both  Ministers  sought,  in  co-operation  with  me, 
to  improve  our  splendid  Prussian  forestry  person- 
nel and  better  living  conditions  among  them,  and 
to  help  toward  promotions  in  their  ranks — all  of 
which  these  officials,  zealous  in  their  work  and 
faithful  to  their  King,  fully  deserved. 

The  influx  of  large  sums  into  the  state's  pocket- 
book  depended  indeed  on  the  honesty,  industry, 
and  reliability  of  these  men.  I  expected  much 
toward  the  restoration  of  the  fatherland  from  the 
statesmanlike  shrewdness  and  ability  of  Herr  von 
Schorlemer,  who  was  always  quite  conscious  of 
the  goal  at  which  he  was  aiming.^ 

I  learned  much  about  forestry  from  Head  For- 
esters Preiherr  von  Hovel  (Joachimsthal,  Schorf- 
heide)  and  Freiherr  Speck  von  Sternburg  (Szitt- 
kohnen,  Rominten)  on  my  many  hunting  expedi- 
tions with  these  excellent  huntsmen  and  admin- 
istrators. 

^  His  recent  death,  which  snatched  him  away  in  the  midst  of 
beneficial  labors,  is  a  serious  loss  to  the  fatherland. 

190 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

Let  me  say  a  word  here  regarding  a  Russian 
curiosity  in  the  domain  of  preserving  wild  game. 
The  Tsar,  who  had  heard  a  great  deal  about  the 
fine  antlers  of  the  stags  at  Rominten,  wished  to 
have  some  of  the  same  sort  at  Spala,  in  Poland. 
Freiherr  von  Sternburg  was  sent  to  the  Spala 
hunting  lodge  one  summer  in  order  to  give  advice 
regarding  this  project. 

He  was  received  very  cordially  by  a  general, 
who  had  charge  of  the  hunting  there  and  lived  at 
the  lodge.  Sternburg  noticed  that  all  the  apart- 
ments, even  those  not  inhabited,  were  always  kept 
heated.  When  he  spoke  of  the  enormous  waste 
of  wood  occasioned  by  this,  the  general  shrugged 
his  shoulders  and  remarked  that  one  never  could 
tell,  the  Tsar  might  put  in  an  appearance  some 
day,  after  all.  A  gamekeeper,  who  was  a  German, 
was  assigned  to  Sternburg,  since  the  general  did 
not  know  his  way  about  on  the  reservation  and  was 
quite  ignorant  of  game  feeding. 

In  the  course  of  his  tours  about  the  place  Stern- 
burg observed  a  number  of  places  where  meadows 
could  be  turned  into  pastures  or  good  feeding 
places  could  be  installed.  He  drew  attention  to 
the  need  of  such  arrangements,  having  noticed  that 
the  deer  had  already  begun  to  shed  their  horns  to 
a  considerable  extent,  thereby  causing  much  dam- 
age to  the  trees. 

But  the  gamekeeper  shook  his  head  sadly  and 
remarked  that  he  had  already  reported  all  that, 
but  in  vain,  since  the  hay  for  the  deer  had  to  be 
brought  by  rail  from  the  Black  Sea  and  the  ship- 

191 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


ments  sometimes  either  did  not  arrive  at  all  or 
were  greatly  delayed  and  arrived  spoiled.  But 
nothing  would  be  done  to  alter  this,  continued  the 
gamekeeper,  since  too  many  people  made  a  good 
thing  out  of  this  transporting  of  the  hay,  which 
was  paid  for  at  huge  prices. 

He  also  told  how — after  he  had  called  attention 
to  the  many  splinters  of  wood  found  in  the  intes- 
tines of  the  deer,  in  order  to  prove  that  they  were 
insufficiently  fed  and  that  feeding  places  must  be 
provided — a  committee  of  animal  doctors  had'  been 
brought  from  St.  Petersburg  to  investigate  the 
matter.  The  said  committee  lived  and  ate  for 
weeks  in  Spala  at  the  Tsar's  expense,  shot  many 
deer,  examined  them,  and  held  sessions;  and  the 
upshot  of  all  this  was  a  report  that  the  animals 
had  wood  in  their  stomachs,  which  proved  that 
they  could  live  on  wood,  for  which  reason  feeding 
places  would  be  superfluous  and  the  hay  from  the 
Black  Sea  would  suffice  to  supplement  the  wood. 
And  there  the  matter  remained,  in  spite  of  Stern- 
burg's  visit! 

When  I  heard  this  yarn,  I  involuntarily  thought 
of  an  anecdote  which  Prince  Bulow  especially  de- 
lighted to  tell  in  connection  with  his  sojourn  at  St. 
Petersburg.  While  there,  he  had  attended  the 
salon  of  Madame  Durnovo,  where  society  used 
often  to  gather.  One  day  a  prominent  general 
was  complaining  to  the  hostess  that  he  had  been 
trapped  in  a  money  matter,  which  had  brought 
him  much  unpleasantness  from  "above."  Appar- 
ently he  wished,  by  his  mournful  description, 

192 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

to  arouse  sympathy  for  his  bad  luck,  but  Ma- 
dame Durnovo  retorted,  in  her  rough  way: 
"Mon  cher  General,  quand  on  fait  des  saletes,  il 
faut  qu'elles  reussissent!"  ("My  dear  General, 
when  you  play  dirty  tricks  it  is  necessary  that  they 
be  successful!") 

As  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Imperial  Postal 
Department  likewise,  Herr  von  Podbielski,  after 
I  had  chosen  him  and  declined  a  number  of  other 
candidates,  did  excellent  work,  treading  worthily 
in  the  footsteps  of  Stephan.  Very  practical;  en- 
dowed with  the  business  sense  and  a  great  knowl- 
edge of  business;  well  versed  and  clever  in  finan- 
cial matters ;  of  innate  administrative  talent,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  quick  to  fight;  caustically  witty; 
a  good  speaker  and  debater — he  worked  with  zeal 
and  skill,  often  as  a  pioneer,  particularly  in  matters 
of  world  postal  service,  wireless  telegraphy,  etc. 
This  former  colonel  in  the  Ziethen  Hussars  made 
a  name  for  himself  in  the  service  of  his  fatherland 
which  will  never  be  forgotten. 

An  amusing  contrast  to  his  career  is  that  of  a 
Russian  Hussar  officer  under  Nicholas  I.  This 
Tsar,  being  full  of  anger  against  the  Holy  Synod, 
had  driven  away  the  man  at  the  head  of  it.  Shortly 
afterward  he  inspected  the  Hussar  Body  Guard 
Regiment,  commanded  by  Colonel  Count  Protas- 
soff.  The  immense  satisfaction  of  the  Tsar  at  the 
splendid  appearance  and  maneuvering  of  the  fine 
regiment  found  expression  in  the  words,  amazing 
alike  to  the  commander  and  his  men :  "Thou  hast 
maneuvered  thy  regiment  magnificently,  and,  as 

193 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

a  token  of  my  satisfaction,  I  name  thee  Procurator 
of  the  Holy  Synod,  which  thou  must  put  into  good 
shape  for  me!" 

Mention  must  be  made  here  of  another  excellent 
and  worthy  man,  Minister  Moller.  He  came  from 
Bielefeld,  like  Hinzpeter,  and  was  bound  to  my 
old  teacher  by  lasting  ties  of  friendship.  In  the 
legislature  he  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Na- 
tional Liberals,  by  whom  he  was  highly  esteemed, 
as  he  was  in  the  Reichstag,  on  account  of 
his  upright,  distinguished  Westphalian  character- 
istics and  his  great  experience  in  the  commercial- 
political  domain. 

When  Imperial  Chancellor  Biilow  suggested 
Moller  to  me  as  Minister  I  remarked  that  he  was 
a  party  man  and  member  of  the  Reichstag.  The 
Chancellor  said  that  the  National  Liberals  would 
be  pleased  at  Moller's  appointment.  I  observed 
that  the  state  Ministry  of  the  Prussian  King  could 
not  and  must  not  be  a  party  Ministry,  but  must 
stand  above  the  parties  in  entire  independence  of 
them;  that  I  esteemed  Moller  personally  very 
much,  but,  should  he  become  Minister,  every 
member  of  the  legislature  would  have  the  am- 
bition to  become  one  likewise;  that,  through- 
Moller's  appointment,  the  ambitions  of  the  other 
parties  to  obtain  ministerial  chairs  would  also 
be  aroused  and  nobody  could  foresee  the  conse- 
quences; that,  moreover,  Moller  would  be  greatly 
missed  in  the  Reichstag,  from  which  I  did  not 
wish  to  take  him  on  account  of  his  influence  with 
all  parties. 

194 


MY  CO-WORKERS 

Despite  these  objections  and  my  advice  against 
it,  Billow  stuck  to  his  idea.  Moller  became  Min- 
ister, and,  as  such,  stood  very  wtW  with  me.  But 
what  I  had  prophesied  occurred  comparatively 
soon:  Minister  Moller  was  obliged  to  retire  by 
circumstances  partially  connected  with  the  inner 
workings  of  his  party. 

14 


CHAPTER  VII 


Science  and  Art  / 

THE  broad  and  many-sided  field  whose  care 
devolved  upon  the  Ministry  of  Public  Wor- 
ship and  Instruction — embracing  art,  science,  re- 
search, medical  matters,  etc. — always  aroused 
my  lively  interest  and  enlisted  my  efiforts  in  its 
behalf. 

Special  pleasure  was  afforded  me  by  the  devel- 
opment of  the  Technical  High  School.  The  in- 
creasing importance  of  technical  matters  drew  ever 
larger  numbers  of  the  ablest  youths  to  institu- 
tions of  learning  of  this  description,  and  the 
achievements  of  the  teachers  there  and  of  the 
young  engineers  who  were  graduated  constantly 
brought  new  laurels  to  the  German  name. 

Among  the  teachers  at  Charlottenburg  one  of  the 
most  prominent  and  best  known  all  over  the  world 
was  Professor  Doctor  Slaby.  Until  his  death  he  had 
constant  dealings  with  me  and  kept  me  informed 
concerning  the  newest  inventions  by  means  of  cap- 
tivating discourses.  These  were  given  not  only  in 
his  laboratory,  but  also  in  the  quiet  hunting  lodge  in 
the  forests  of  Brandenburg,  where  I,  together  with 
the  Empress,  surrounded  by  a  few  intimates,  used 

196 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

to  listen  eagerly  to  Slaby's  words.  Slaby  was  also 
dear  to  me  as  an  individual  and  caused  me  much 
mental  enjoyment  by  his  simple,  clear  views  on 
every  possible  sort  of  thing  in  this  world,  which  he 
could  always  express  in  the  most  stimulating  and 
enthralling  manner.  Slaby  meant  much  to  me, 
and  I  felt  grateful  affection  for  him  up  to  the  time 
of  his  death. 

Influenced  by  the  achievements  of  the  technical 
high  schools  and  of  such  men  as  Slaby,  Intze,  and 
so  on,  I  resolved  to  grant  the  high  schools  the  same 
privilege  of  representation  in  the  Prussian  upper 
house  as  was  enjoyed  by  the  universities.  But  the 
universities  protested  vehemently  against  this  to 
the  Minister  of  Public  Worship  and  Instruction, 
and  there  ensued  a  violent  fight  against  the  clas- 
sical-scientific arrogance  of  the  savants,  until  I 
finally  enforced  my  will  by  a  decree.  Slaby 
received  the  news  from  me  by  telegraph  in  his 
laboratory  while  he  was  delivering  a  lecture, 
and  gave  it  to  the  students,  who  burst  into  wild 
cheers.  The  technical  high  schools  have  shown 
themselves  worthy  of  the  honor  conferred  upon 
them. 

In  view  of  the  constantly  more  violent  fight  for 
the  markets  of  the  world  and  its  outlets,  it  became 
necessary,  in  order  to  utilize  the  wisdom  of  the 
leaders  of  German  science  in  this  direction,  to  pro- 
vide them  with  more  freedom,  quiet,  possibility 
for  working,  and  materials.  Many  savants  of 
importance  were  hampered  in  research  work  by 
their  activities  as  teachers,  so  that  the  only  time 

197 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


they  had  left  over  for  research  was  their  vacation. 
This  state  of  afifairs  resulted  in  overwork  and  over- 
burdening, which  had  to  be  stopped. 

CHEMICAL  RESEARCH 

Attention  was  turned  first  to  improvements  in 
the  domain  of  chemistry.  Minister  von  Trott  and 
Director  of  the  Ministry  Althoff,  having  grasped 
the  state  of  affairs  with  clear  understanding,  made 
possible  for  me  the  establishment  of  the  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  Society  and  drew  up  the  statutes  gov- 
erning it.  In  the  short  time  of  its  existence  it  has 
achieved  brilliant  results  and  given  me  an  oppor- 
tunity, at  its  general  meetings,  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  eminent  men  in  all  branches  of 
knowledge  with  whom  I  thereafter  entered  into 
regular  intercourse.  I  also  visited  their  labora- 
tories, where  I  could  follow  the  progress  of  their 
labors.  New  laboratories  were  founded,  others 
subsidized  from  the  contributions  of  the  senate 
and  members  of  the  organization. 

I  was  proud  of  this  creation  of  mine,  since  it 
proved  a  boon  to  the  fatherland.  The  inventions 
due  to  the  research  of  its  members  benefited  the 
entire  nation.  It  was  a  peace-time  achievement 
with  a  great  and  most  promising  future,  which, 
under  the  guidance  of  Herr  von  Trott,  was  in  most 
excellent  hands;  unfortunately,  the  war  robbed 
me  of  this  joy,  along  with  all  others.  Nowadays 
I  must  do  without  the  intercourse  with  my  men 
of  learning  of  my  association,  and  that  is  a  cruel 
blow  to  me.    May  it  continue  to  live  and  labor 

198 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

for  the  benefit  of  research  and  the  good  of  the 
fatherland  1 

I  had  to  face  a  severe  fight  in  getting  Professor 
Harnack  summoned  to  Berlin.  The  theologians 
of  the  Right  and  the  Orthodox  element  protested 
vehemently.  After  I  had  again  obtained  full  in- 
formation from  Hinzpeter  and  he  had  closed  his 
opinion  with  the  v^ords  that  it  would  be  most 
regrettable  for  Berlin  and  Prussia  if  I  backed 
down,  I  insisted  upon  the  summoning  of  Harnack, 
and  summoned  he  was. 

Nowadays  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the 
opposition  to  him.  What  a  man  Harnack  is! 
What  an  authoritative  position  he  has  won  for 
himself  in  the  world  of  the  mind !  What  benefit, 
what  knowledge,  intercourse  with  this  fiery  in- 
tellect has  brought  to  me!  What  wonders  he  has 
achieved,  as  head  of  the  Royal  Library  and  dean 
of  the  senate  of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Society,  where 
he,  the  theologian,  delivered  the  most  learned 
and  most  substantial  talks  on  exact  sciences,  re- 
search, inventions,  and  chemistry.  I  shall  always 
look  back  with  pleasure  on  the  personality  of 
Harnack  and  on  his  labors. 

Professor  Erich  Schmidt  of  the  University  of 
Berlin  was  also  a  friend  of  mine  and  was  often  at 
my  home ;  I  owe  many  an  enjoyable  evening  to  the 
learned  discourses  of  this  savant. 

Professor  Schiemann  enjoyed  my  particular 
confidence.  An  upright  man,  a  native  of  the  Baltic 
Provinces,  a  champion  of  the  Germanic  idea 
against  Slavic  arrogance,  a  clear-sighted  politi- 

199 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

cian  and  brilliant  historian  and  writer,  Schiemann 
was  constantly  asked  by  me  for  advice  on  political 
and  historical  questions.  To  him  I  owe  much 
good  counsel,  especially  regarding  the  East.  He 
was  often  at  my  home  and  often  accompanied  me 
on  journeys — as,  for  instance,  to  Tangier — and  he 
heard  from  me  in  our  talks  much  important  con- 
fidential matter  not  yet  known  to  others  on  polit- 
ical questions.  His  unshakable  capacity  for  keep- 
ing his  mouth  shut  justified  my  trust  in  him.  It 
was  a  source  of  satisfaction  to  me  to  appoint  this 
tried  man  curator  of  the  University  of  Dorpat, 
after  the  liberation  of  the  Baltic  Provinces.  * 

KAISER'S  RUSSIAN  FORESIGHT 

How  well  he  and  I  agreed  in  our  political  views 
regarding  Russia  is  illustrated  by  the  following 
incident:  After  the  Peace  of  Portsmouth,  between 
Russia  and  Japan,  brought  about  by  me  in  con- 
junction with  President  Roosevelt  in  1905,  there 
was  much  official  (Foreign  Office)  and  unofficial 
puzzling  of  heads  at  Berlin  as  to  what  political 
line  Russia  would  take.  In  general  it  was  thought 
that  Russia,  angered  at  her  defeat,  would  lean 
toward  the  West — and  hence  toward  Germany — 
in  order  to  find  there  new  connections  and  strength 
to  help  her  in  striking  a  blow  for  revenge  against 
Japan  and  reconquest  of  her  lost  territory  and 
prestige. 

My  opinion  was  quite  different — but  I  could  not 
make  the  official  world  share  it.  I  emphasized 
the  following  points:  That  the  Russians  were 

200 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

Asiatics  and  Slavs;  being  the  first,  they  would 
be  inclined  to  favor  Japan,  in  spite  of  their  defeat; 
being  the  second,  they  would  like  to  ally  them- 
selves with  those  who  had  proved  themselves 
strong.  Hence  I  thought  that,  after  a  while,  Rus- 
sia, despite  the  Bjoko  Agreement,  would  join 
Japan,  not  Germany,  and  turn  later  against  Ger- 
many. On  account  of  these  "fantastic"  ideas,  I 
was  actually  ridiculed,  officially  and  unofficially. 

I  summoned  Schiemann  and  questioned  him  on 
this  subject,  without  revealing  to  him  what  I 
thought  about  it.  I  was  much  pleased  when  his 
answer  agreed  absolutely  with  the  views  held  by 
me.  For  a  long  time  Schiemann  and  I  stood  al- 
most alone  when  this  weighty  matter  of  foreign 
politics  came  up  in  discussions. 

The  event  justified  us.  The  so-called  "Russian 
experts"  of  Berlin,  as  well  as  the  official  world, 
were  mistaken. 

-  During  the  very  first  years  of  my  reign  there 
was  occasion  for  much  important  building  work. 

First,  there  was  the  question  of  erecting  a  worthy 
monument  over  the  tomb  of  my  grandparents. 
Since  the  old  mausoleum  at  Charlottenburg  was 
inadequate,  it  was  necessary  to  erect  an  addition. 
Unfortunately,  the  funds  left  by  Emperor  William 
the  Great  for  such  "extra  construction" — the  so- 
called  Extra  Construction  Fund — had  been  used 
up  during  the  ninety-nine  days  on  something  else. 
Hence  I  was  obliged  to  burden  the  Crown  revenues 
with  unforeseen  building  expenses.  The  mauso- 
leum of  my  parents  at  Marly  was  erected  by  the 

201 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Empress  Frederick,  according  to  her  own  sketches 
and  designs,  and  for  this,  too,  I  had  to  provide  the 
funds. 

A  thorough  examination  of  the  royal  palaces — 
including  those  in  the  provinces — had  revealed, 
particularly  at  the  palace  in  Berlin,  such  deplor- 
able conditions  in  sanitation,  comfort,  and  so  on, 
that  there  could  be  no  more  delay  in  remedying 
them.  In  the  course  of  my  thirty  years'  reign  I 
restored  these  palaces  to  good  condition — work- 
ing in  accordance  with  carefully  prepared  bud- 
gets, examined,  corrected,  and  supervised  by 
myself  with  the  help  of  architects  (such  as  Ihne), 
and  of  artists,  with  due  regard  for  the  traditions 
of  my  ancestors — all  of  which  gave  me  much 
trouble  and  tried  my  patience,  but  also  provided 
me  with  a  great  deal  of  enjoyment. 

ARCHITECTURAL  INTERESTS 

In  restoring  the  Berlin  palace,  the  Empress 
Frederick,  with  her  sure,  keen  eye  for  the  proper 
style  and  her  sound  judgment,  helped  materially 
in  offsetting  the  harm  and  neglect  dating  from 
bygone  days.  My  mother's  expression  of  her  view 
ought  surely  to  be  of  general  interest:  ^*Any  style 
is  good  so  long  as  it  is  pure."  Ihne  used  to  call 
the  eclecticism  of  the  'nineties  "a  peu  pres  style" 
(the  "almost  style").  The  restoration  of  the  Pic- 
ture Gallery,  the  last  work  of  Herr  Ihne — who 
died,  unfortunately,  all  too  soon — was  not  com- 
pleted until  during  the  first  half  of  the  war.  The 
palace  of  my  forefathers,  erected  at  much  pains 

202 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

and  a  source  of  pride  to  me,  was  later  bombarded, 
stormed,  sacked,  and  devastated  by  revolutionary 
hordes. 

These  artistic  building  enterprises,  as  well  as  the 
already-mentioned  restoration  of  the  White 
Drawing  Room,  belong  among  the  duties  of  repre- 
sentation devolving  upon  every  Government,  be 
it  absolute,  constitutional,  or  democratic  in  form. 
They  afford  a  criterion  of  the  national  culture  and 
are  a  means  of  encouraging  artists  and,  through 
them,  the  development  of  art. 

During  my  vacations  I  busied  myself  with  arch- 
aeology and  was  active  in  excavation  work.  Here 
I  kept  in  view  one  basic  idea :  to  discover  the  roots 
from  which  ancient  Greek  art  developed  and  to 
erect  or  find  a  bridge  in  the  endeavor  to  establish 
the  cultural  influence  of  the  East  on  the  West. 
It  appeared  to  me  that  Assyriology  was  important, 
since  from  it  might  be  expected  an  elucidation  and 
vitalizing  of  the  Old  Testament,  and,  hence,  of 
the  Holy  Scriptures.  Therefore,  I  accepted  with 
pleasure  the  offer  of  the  presidency  of  the  German 
Orient  Society  and  devoted  myself  to  the  study  of 
its  work,  which  I  promoted  to  the  best  of  my 
ability,  never  missing  one  of  its  public  lectures  on 
the  results  of  its  explorations.  I  had  much  to  do 
with  those  at  the  head  of  it,  and  caused  detailed 
reports  to  be  made  to  me  of  the  excavations  at 
Nineveh,  Assur,  and  Babylon,  in  Egypt  and  in 
Syria,  for  the  protection  and  facilitation  of  which 
I  often  personally  brought  influence  to  bear  on 
the  Turkish  Government. 

203 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Professor  Delitzsch,  a  member  of  the  society 
gave  his  well-known  and  much-attacked  lecture 
on  ''Babel  and  Bible,"  which,  unfortunately,  fell 
upon  the  ears  of  a  public  as  yet  too  ignorant  and 
unprepared,  and  led  to  all  sorts  of  misinterpreta- 
tions, some  of  them  in  church  circles. 

I  strove  hard  to  clear  up  the  matter.  Since  I 
realized  that  the  importance  of  Assyriology,  then 
enlisting  the  efforts  of  many  prominent  men,  in- 
cluding clergymen  of  both  religions,  was  not  yet 
understood  and  appreciated  by  the  general  public, 
I  had  my  trusted  friend  and  brilliant  theater  di- 
rector. Count  Hiilsen-Haesler,  produce  the  play 
"Assurbanipal,"  after  long  preparation,  under  the 
auspices  of  the  German  Orient  Society.  Assyri- 
ologists  of  all  countries  were  invited  to  the  dress 
rehearsal;  in  the  boxes,  all  mixed  up  together, 
were  professors,  Protestant  and  Catholic  clergy- 
men, Jews  and  Christians.  Many  expressed  to  me 
their  thanks  for  having  shown,  by  this  perform- 
ance, how  far  research  work  had  already  pro- 
gressed and  for  having,  at  the  same  time,  revealed 
more  clearly  to  the  general  public  the  importance 
of  Assyriology. 

My  sojourn  at  Corfu  likewise  afforded  me  the 
pleasure  of  serving  archaeology  and  of  busying 
myself  personally  with  excavation.  The  acci- 
dental discovery  of  a  relief  head  of  a  Gorgon  near 
the  town  of  Corfu  led  me  to  take  charge  of  the 
work  myself.  I  called  to  my  aid  the  experienced 
excavator  and  expert  in  Greek  antiques.  Professor 
Dorpfeld,  who  took  over  the  direction  of  the  ex- 

204 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

cavation  work.  This  savant,  who  was  as  enthu- 
siastic as  I  for  the  ancient  Hellenic  world,  became 
in  the  course  of  time  a  faithful  friend  of  mine 
and  an  invaluable  source  of  instruction  in  ques- 
tions relating  to  architecture,  styles,  and  so  on 
among  the  ancient  Greeks  and  Achaeans. 

"ILIAD"  AS  A  GUIDE  BOOK 

It  was  a  joy  to  hear  Dorpf  eld  read  and  elucidate 
the  old  Homeric  poems,  and  establish,  by  means 
of  a  map  and  following  the  hints  and  descriptions 
of  the  poet,  the  location  of  the  old  Achaean  settle- 
ments destroyed  later  by  the  Doric  migration.  It 
appeared  that  the  names  of  the  old  places  had 
often  been  transferred  by  the  dispossessed  inhab- 
itants to  the  new  places.  This  made  the  identifi- 
cation of  the  location  more  difficult.  Neverthe- 
less, Dorpfeld  had  rediscovered  the  location  of  a 
whole  series  of  them,  with  the  help  of  his  Homer, 
which  he  carried  in  his  hand  like  a  Baedeker,  hit- 
ting upon  it  by  following  the  minute  geographical 
descriptions  given  by  Homer. 

This  interested  me  so  much  that  I  took  a  trip 
by  water,  with  the  Empress,  in  the  company  of 
Dorpfeld,  in  order  to  put  the  matter  to  the  test. 
We  went  to  Leukas  (Ithaca)  and  visited,  one  after 
another,  the  places  made  famous  by  the  ^^Odys- 
sey,"  while  Dorpfeld  read  from  his  Homer  the 
descriptive  text  referring  to  each.  I  was  amazed 
and  had  to  admit  that  the  region  and  the  descrip- 
tion tallied  exactly. 

The  excavations  begun  by  me  in  Corfu  under 

205 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Dorpfeld's  direction  had  valuable  archaeological 
results,  since  they  produced  evidence  of  an  ex- 
tremely remote  epoch  of  the  earliest  Doric  art. 
The  relief  of  the  Gorgon  has  given  rise  already 
to  many  theories — probable  and  improbable — 
combined,  unfortunately,  with  a  lot  of  superfluous 
acrimonious  discussion.  From  all  this,  it  seems  to 
me,  one  of  the  piers  for  the  bridge  sought  by  me 
between  Asia  and  Europe  is  assuming  shape. 

I  sent  reports  regularly  to  the  Archaeological 
Society,  and  I  also  brought  the  well-known  Pro- 
fessor Caro  from  Athens  to  work  with  me.  I  was 
busy  with  preparations  for  lectures  to  be  deliv- 
ered before  the  society  during  the  winter  of 
1914-15,  and  with  searching  discussions  on  many 
disputed  questions,  which  I  hoped  to  bring  toward 
a  solution  "sine  ira  et  studio."  It  was  a  pleasure 
to  me  to  be  visited  almost  regularly,  at  Corfu,  by 
English  and  American  archaeologists,  former  pu- 
pils of  Dorpfeld,  who  helped  zealously  in  throw- 
ing light  on  the  difficult  problems  which  often 
came  up.  Since  they  were  at  work  in  Asia  Minor, 
I  was  deeply  interested  in  hearing  what  impor- 
tance they  attached  to  the  Asiatic  influence  on  early 
Greek  art — as  a  result  of  their  discoveries — and 
how  readily  they  recognized  a  connection  with  the 
East  in  the  finds  made  at  Corfu.  In  1914,  Pro- 
fessor Duhn  of  Heidelberg  visited  the  excavations 
at  Corfu  and,  after  thorough  investigation,  gave 
his  support  to  the  views  held  by  Dorpfeld  and  me. 
I  shall  tell  in  a  separate  piece  of  writing  about  the 
result  of  my'  Corfu  excavations. 

206 


SCIENCE  AND  ART 

That  was  the  sort  of  thing  which,  in  the  spring 
of  1914,  occupied  the  thoughts  of  the  German 
Emperor,  who,  lusting  for  robbery  and  conquest, 
is  accused  of  having  bloodthirstily  brought  on  the 
World  War.  While  I  was  exploring  and  discussing 
Gorgons,  Doric  columns,  and  Homer,  they  were 
already  mobilizing  against  us  in  the  Caucasus  and 
Russia.  And  the  Tsar,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year,  when  asked  about  his  travel  plans,  had  re- 
plied :  "Je  resterai  chez  moi  cette  annee,  car  nous 
aurons  la  guerre  (^^I  shall  stay  at  home  this  year, 
for  we  are  going  to  have  war  I") 


CHAPTER  VIII 


My  Relations  with  the  Church 

MUCH  has  been  written  and  said  about  my 
relations  with  the  Church.  Even  when  I 
was  still  a  prince  and  a  student  at  Bonn,  I  realized 
the  harmful  influence  of  the  "Kulturkampf"  in  its 
last  phase.  The  religious  rift  did  so  much  toward 
antagonism  that  once,  for  example,  I  was  directly 
boycotted,  while  on  a  hunting  expedition,  by  mem- 
bers of  leading  noble  Rhenish-Westphalian  fam- 
ilies of  the  Rhineland  belonging  to  the  Ultra- 
Montane  party.  Even  as  far  back  as  that  I  re- 
solved, in  the  interests  of  the  national  welfare,  to 
work  toward  creating  a  modus  vivendi  such  as 
would  make  it  possible  for  people  professing  the 
two  creeds  to  live  peacefully  with  each  other.  The 
"Kulturkampf,"  as  such,  had  come  to  an  end  be- 
fore the  beginning  of  my  reign. 

I  strove  patiently  and  earnestly  to  be  on  good 
terms  with  the  Bishops,  and  I  was  on  very  friendly 
terms  with  several,  especially  Cardinal  Kopp, 
Archbishop  Simar,  Doctor  Schulte,  Prince-Bishop 
Bertram,  Bishop  Thiel,  and,  last  but  not  least. 
Archbishop  Faulhaber  and  Cardinal  von  Hart- 
mann.  All  of  these  were  men  far  above  the  aver- 

208 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 


age  and  an  ornament  to  the  episcopate,  who  gave 
proof  during  the  war  of  their  patriotic  devotion 
to  Emperor  and  Empire.  This  shows  that  I  had 
succeeded  in  clearing  away  the  mists  of  the  "Kul- 
turkampf"  and  enabling  my  Catholic  subjects, 
like  others,  to  rejoice  in  the  Empire,  in  accordance 
with  the  motto,  "suum  cuique"  ("to  each  his  own") . 

I  was  bound  particularly  closely  all  my  life  to 
Cardinal  Kopp,  Prince-Bishop  of  Breslau.  He 
always  served  me  loyally,  so  that  my  relationship 
to  him  was  most  trusting.  Of  much  value  to  me 
was  his  mediation  in  dealings  with  the  Vatican, 
where  he  stood  in  high  honor,  although  he  cham- 
pioned absolutely  the  German  point  of  view, 

FRIENDSHIP  FOR  POPE  LEO  XIII 

Probably  little  is  known  by  the  general  public 
of  the  friendly,  trusting  relationship  that  existed 
between  me  and  Pope  Leo  XIII.  A  prelate  who 
was  close  to  him  told  me  later  that  I  had  won  the 
confidence  of  the  Pope  on  my  first  visit  by  the 
absolute  frankness  which  I  showed  toward  him 
and  with  which  I  told  him  things  which  others 
intentionally  kept  from  his  ears. 

Receptions  by  the  Pope  were  conducted  with 
tremendous  pomp.  Swiss  and  Noble  Guards,  in 
brilliant  uniforms,  servants,  chamberlains,  and 
ecclesiastical  dignitaries,  were  present  in  large 
numbers — a  miniature  representation  of  the  might 
of  tfie  Roman  Catholic  Church. 

After  I  had  traversed  the  courts,  halls,  and  draw- 
ing-rooms, in  which  all  these  men  had  arrayed 

209 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

themselves,  I  seated  myself  opposite  the  Pope 
himself,  in  his  little,  one-windowed  study.  The 
distinguished  gentleman,  with  the  fine,  noble- 
featured  old  face,  whose  eyes  gazed  piercingly  at 
his  visitor,  made  a  deep  impression  upon  me.  We 
discussed  many  timely  subjects.  I  was  greatly 
pleased  that  the  Pope  spoke  appreciatively  and 
gratefully  of  the  position  occupied  in  Germany  by 
the  Catholic  religion  and  its  adherents,  adding  the 
assurance  that  he,  for  his  part,  would  contribute 
toward  having  the  German  Catholics  yield  to  no 
other  Germans  in  love  for  their  fatherland  and  in 
loyalty. 

Pope  Leo  XIII  gave  evidences  of  friendliness 
toward  me  whenever  he  could.  For  instance,  on 
the  occasion  of  one  of  my  visits  to  Rome,  he  ac- 
corded my  suite  and  servants  the  honor  of  a  special 
audience;  he  sent  Prince-Bishop  Kopp  as  Papal 
Delegate  on  the  occasion  of  the  consecration  by  me 
of  the  portal  which  I  had  had  added  to  the  ca- 
thedral at  Metz,  and  was  so  kind  as  to  inform  me 
of  the  naming  of  Archbishop  Fischer  of  Cologne 
as  Cardinal,  which  was  done  to  celebrate  that  day. 

On  the  occasion  of  the  Papal  Jubilee  in  1903 
to  celebrate  the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  his  ac- 
cession to  the  Papacy,  I  sent  a  special  mission  to 
convey  my  congratulations  to  the  Pope,  at  the 
head  of  which  was  Freiherr  von  Loe,  for  many 
years  intimately  acquainted  with  him. 

Not  long  after  that — and  only  a  few  months 
before  his  death — I  paid  my  third  and  last  visit 
to  the  Pope.   Though  he  was  very  weak,  this 

210 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 


ninety-three-year-old  man  came  up  to  me,  hold- 
ing both  his  hands  outstretched.  Concerning  this 
visit,  which  was  characterized  by  great  cordiality  on 
both  sides,  I  immediately  jotted  down  some  notes, 
which  recently  came  into  my  possession  again. 

The  Pope  said,  among  other  things,  that  he  could 
not  but  give  his  full  approval  to  the  principles 
according  to  which  I  governed ;  that  he  had  fol- 
lowed with  interest  my  methods  of  governing  and 
recognized  with  pleasure  that  I  had  built  up  my 
rule  on  a  foundation  of  firm  Christianity;  that 
such  lofty  religious  principles  underlay  it  that  it 
behooved  him  to  ask  the  blessing  of  Heaven  upon 
myself,  my  dynasty,  and  the  German  Empire,  and 
to  grant  me  his  apostolic  benediction. 

"SWORD  OF  CATHOLIC  CHURCH" 

It  was  of  interest  to  me  that  the  Pope  said  to 
me  on  this  occasion  that  Germany  must  become 
the  sword  of  the  Catholic  Church.  I  remarked 
that  the  old  Roman  Empire  of  the  German  nation 
no  longer  existed  and  that  conditions  had  changed. 
But  he  stuck  to  his  words. 

Then  the  Pope  went  on  to  say  that  he  must 
thank  me  once  more  for  my  unflagging  attention 
to  the  welfare  of  my  Catholic  subjects;  that  he 
had  heard  about  this  from  so  many  sources  that  he 
was  glad  to  tell  me  personally  how  grateful  both 
he  and  the  German  Catholics  were  for  this  atten- 
tion to  their  interests ;  that  he  could  assure  me  that 
my  Catholic  subjects  would  stand  by  me,  in  good 
and  bad  times,  with  absolute  fidelity.   "lis  reste- 

15  211 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

ront  absolument  et  infailliblement  fideles"  ("They 
will  remain  absolutely  and  infallibly  faithfuP'). 

I  rejoiced  greatly  at  these  words  of  appreciation 
from  such  an  exalted  source.  I  answered  that  I 
considered  it  the  duty  of  a  Christian  sovereign  to 
care  for  his  subjects  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  irre- 
spective of  creed;  that  I  could  assure  him  that, 
during  my  reign,  everybody  could  profess  his 
religion  without  interference  and  fulfill  his  duties 
toward  his  ecclesiastical  overlord;  that  this  was 
a  fundamental  principle  of  my  life,  from  which  I 
could  not  be  swerved. 

Because  I  showed  my  Catholic  fellow  country- 
men from  the  very  beginning  that  I  wished  to 
allow  them  complete  freedom  in  the  exercise  of 
their  religion,  a  quieter  spirit  was  engendered  in 
the  land  and  the  aftermath  of  the  "Kulturkampf" 
disappeared  more  and  more.  But  I  did  not  con- 
ceal from  myself  the  fact  that,  despite  all  polite- 
ness and  friendliness,  the  prelates,  with  the  sole 
exception  of  Cardinal  Kopp,  still  continued  to 
look  upon  me  as  the  Emperor,  and  I  was  com- 
pelled to  take  into  account  that,  in  the  Catholic 
south  and  west,  this  idea  would  never  quite  vanish. 
Grateful  acknowledgment  has  repeatedly  been 
made  to  me  of  the  fact  that  the  Catholics  were  as 
well  ofif,  during  my  reign,  as  they  could  possibly 
desire;  but  the  constantly  more  uncompromising 
attitude  of  the  Church  on  mixed  marriages,  and 
that  of  the  Centrist  party  in  politics,  were  cer- 
tainly a  sign  that  the  antiheretical  tendency  still 
lived  beneath  the  peaceful  surface. 

212 


.    MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 

This  made  all  the  more  intense  my  desire  for 
the  firm  union  of  the  Protestant  Churches — first, 
in  Prussia,  then  in  Germany,  finally,  in  all 
Europe.  My  endeavors,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Chief  Ecclesiastical  Councilor,  the  General  Su- 
perintendent, and  so  on,  to  find  means  of  effecting 
this  union,  were  most  earnest.  I  hailed  the  Eisen- 
ach Conference  with  joy  and  followed  its  pro- 
ceedings with  interest.  I  assembled  all  the  Gen- 
eral Superintendents  for  the  consecration  of  the 
Church  at  Jerusalem  and  also  was  able  to  greet  in- 
vited deputations  from  Sweden,  Norway,  and  so 
forth;  and  I  did  likewise  on  the  occasion  of  the 
consecration  of  the  Berlin  cathedral,  where, 
among  many  other  deputations,  the  Church  of 
England  was  represented  by  the  Bishop  of  Ripon 
(W.  Boyd-Carpenter),  the  pastor  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria of  England,  equally  prominent  as  a  writer 
and  preacher. 

Whenever  possible,  I  worked  toward  com- 
promise, closer  relations  and  union,  yet  nothing 
definite  resulted.  Though  church  union  in  Prus- 
sia has  been  a  success,  Lutherans  and  Reform- 
ists kept  apart  in  other  sections  of  the  fatherland. 
Many  local  rulers  kept  sharp  watch  over  their 
rights  in  relation  to  religions  and,  owing  to  this, 
were  hostile  to  a  closer  union  of  the  different 
creeds  within  their  territory.  Therefore,  despite 
my  endeavors,  the  German  Protestant  Church 
was  not  able  to  unite  and  make  common  cause 
against  the  elements  hostile  to  it.  Only  through 
the  emergency  brought  on  by  the  revolution  was 

213 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

this  made  possible.  On  Ascension  Day,  1922,  to 
my  great  joy,  the  ^^German  Evangelical  Church 
Union"  was  solemnly  formed  at  the  Schloss 
Church  at  Wittenberg. 

DOCTOR  DRYANDER'S  INFLUENCE 

During  the  first  years  of  my  military  service  at 
Potsdam  I  had  felt  deeply  the  inadequacy  of  the 
sermons,  v^hich  often  dealt  only  with  dry  dog- 
matic matter  and  paid  too  little  attention  to  the 
person  of  Christ.  In  Bonn  I  became  acquainted 
with  Doctor  Dryander,  who  made  an  impression 
on  me  lasting  throughout  my  life.  His  sermons 
were  free  from  dogma,  the  person  of  Christ  was 
their  pivotal  point,  and  "practical  Christianity" 
was  brought  into  the  foreground. 

Later  I  brought  him  to  Berlin  and  soon  had 
him  appointed  to  a  post  at  the  Cathedral  and  in 
my  palace.  Dryander  was  by  my  side  for  years, 
until  long  after  the  9th  of  November,  standing 
close  to  me  spiritually,  and  bringing  to  me  spir- 
itual consolation.  We  often  talked  on  religious 
matters  and  thrashed  out  thoroughly  the  tasks  and 
the  future  of  the  Protestant  Church.  The  views 
of  Dryander — mild,  yet  powerful,  clear,  and  of 
truly  evangelical  strength — made  of  him  a  pillar 
and  an  ornament  of  his  Church,  and  a  faithful  co- 
worker with  the  Emperor,  to  whom  he  was  closely 
bound,  in  the  interests  of  the  Church  and  its 
development. 

Since  the  9th  of  November,  Doctor  Dryander 
also  has  been  exposed  to  persecutions,  but  he  has 

214 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 


stood  his  ground  courageously;  the  hopes,  beliefs, 
and  trust  of  his  King  are  with  him  and  the  Evan- 
gelical Church!  The  Church  must  again  raise 
up  the  broken  nation  inwardly  according  to  the 
gospel  of  ^^Ein'feste  Burg  ist  unser  Gott" 

I  cannot  allow  to  pass  without  remark  the  in- 
fluence exerted  by  the  work — translated  at  my  in- 
stigation— of  the  English  missionary  Bernard 
Lucas,  entitled  Conversations  with  Christ;  as  well 
as  the  sermons  on  Jesus  by  Pastor  Schneller 
(Jerusalem),  and  the  collections  of  sermons 
called  The  Old  God  Still  Lives  and  From  Deep 
Trouble,  by  Consistorial  Councilor  Conrad. 
These  brought  us  much  inspiration  and  comfort 
by  their  vital  ability  to  absorb  and  hold  readers 
and  hearers. 

The  fact  that  I  could  deal  with  religious  and 
church  questions  with  complete  objectivity  "sine 
ira  et  studio"  is  due  to  my  excellent  teacher.  Pro- 
fessor Doctor  Hinzpeter,  a  Westphalian  Calvin- 
ist.  He  caused  his  pupil  to  grow  up  and  live  with 
the  Bible,  eliminating,  at  the  same  time,  all  dog- 
matic and  polemical  questions;  owing  to  this, 
polemics  in  religion  have  remained  alien  to  me, 
and  expressions  like  that  autocratic  one,  "ortho- 
dox," are  repulsive  to  me.  As  to  my  own  religious 
convictions,  I  set  forth  what  they  were  years  ago, 
in  a  letter  to  my  friend,  Admiral  HoUmann, 
made  public  at  the  time,  part  of  which  is  repro- 
duced at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

I  was  enabled  to  bring  joy  to  the  hearts  of  my 
Catholic  subjects  when  I  presented  the  plot  of 

215 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

ground  known  as  the  "Dormition,"  acquired  by  mc 
from  the  Sultan  in  1898  as  a  result  of  my  sojourn 
in  Jerusalem,  to  the  German  Catholics  there.  The 
worthy,  faithful  Father  Peter  Schmitz,  representa- 
tive of  the  Catholic  Society  in  Jerusalem,  ex- 
pressed to  me  the  heartfelt  thanks  of  the  German 
Catholics  on  the  spot  in  eloquent  words  at  the 
ceremony  of  taking  possession.  . 

THE  CHURCH  IN  JERUSALEM 

When  I  conferred  with  him  as  to  future  build- 
ing operations  and  as  to  the  selection  of  persons 
to  occupy  the  place,  the  old  expert  on  Jerusalem 
advised  me  to  select  none  of  the  order  of  monks 
there,  since  all  were  more  or  less  mixed  up  in  the 
intrigues  and  quarrels  concerning  the  "loci 
sacri"  (sacred  spots).  After  my  return  a  delega- 
tion of  the  German  Knights  of  Malta,  under 
Count  Praschma,  appeared  before  me  to  express 
their  gratitude.  The  design  for  the  church,  made 
by  a  very  talented  Cologne  architect  and  skill- 
fully adapted  to  the  local  style,  was  submitted  to 
me.  After  the  completion  of  the  church  I  de- 
cided that  the  Benedictine  monks  of  Beuron 
should  take  over  the  "Dormition";  they  did  so  in 
1906,  also  taking  over  the  monastery  built  next 
the  new  St.  Mary's  Church. 

I  was  on  friendly  terms  for  many  years  with 
the  Benedictine  monks  of  the  Beuron  Congrega- 
tion, with  whose  Archabbot,  Wolter,  I  had  be- 
come acquainted  at  Sigmaringen.  In  mediaeval 
times  the  order  always  stood  well  with  the  Ger- 

216 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 


man  Emperors,  of  whom  scarcely  one  failed  to 
visit,  in  connection  with  his  journeys  to  Rome, 
the  magnificently  situated  Monte  Cassino.  When 
the  Benedictine  monks  asked  permission  to  estab- 
lish a  settlement  on  the  Rhine  I  had  the  splendid 
Romanesque  abbey  of  Maria  Laach — unused  at 
the  time — turned  over  to  them.  The  order, 
which  counts  among  its  members  excellent  artists, 
including  Father  Desiderius,  has  brought  new 
glory  to  the  abbey,  which  had  fallen  into  neglect 
and  decay,  by  magnificent  interior  decorations. 
Often  have  I  visited  Maria  Laach  and  rejoiced  in 
the  progress  of  its  restoration,  as  well  as  in  con- 
versations with  the  intelligent  abbots  and  in  the 
hearty,  simple  reception  on  the  part  of  the  faith- 
ful brethren. 

When  I  visited  the  monastery  of  Monte  Cassino 
I  became  acquainted,  in  the  person  of  Archabbot 
Monsignor  Krug,  with  a  man  of  extraordinary 
mental  gifts  and  comprehensive  culture,  who  had 
traveled  a  great  deal  about  the  world.  He  could 
express  himself  with  equal  fluency  in  Italian,  Eng- 
lish, and  French,  and  his  mother  tongue,  German. 
In  his  address  to  King  Victor  Emmanuel  of  Italy 
and  me,  he  pointed  out  that  nearly  all  the  German 
Emperors,  as  well  as  the  Lombard  Kings  before 
them,  had  paid  visits  to  Monte  Cassino.  He  pre- 
sented me  with  a  magnificent  collection  of  copies 
of  documents  of  the  time  of  the  Emperor  Freder- 
ick II,  taken  from  the  library  of  the  order,  and  I 
reciprocated  by  presenting  him  with  the  works  of 
Frederick  the  Great. 

217 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Agriculture  flourishes  in  the  environs  of  the 
monasteries  maintained  by  the  Benedictine  Order, 
being  carried  on  by  the  lay  brothers  with  all  the 
latest  improvements,  to  the  benefit  of  the  back- 
ward peasantry  of  the  region;  and  in  the  country 
and  town  communities  of  the  order  church  singing 
and  organ  playing  are  zealously  cultivated  by  the 
monks,  who  have  attained  a  high  degree  of  artistic 
skill.  The  art  of  the  goldsmith  also  flourishes 
among  the  monks,  likewise  art  embroidery  among 
the  Benedictine  nuns. 

I  caused  to  be  reproduced  in  its  full  size  the 
Labarum  (standard)  of  the  Emperor  Constantine 
the  Great,  designed  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
searches made  by  Monsignor  Wilpert:  one  copy  I 
presented  to  the  Pope,  another  to  my  Palace 
Chapel  at  Berlin.  The  latter  was  stolen  from  the 
chapel  by  the  mob  during  the  days  of  the  revolu- 
tion. The  metal  work  was  done  entirely  by  monks, 
the  embroidery  by  nuns  of  the  order,  both  excel- 
lently. One  of  the  places  inhabited  by  nuns  of  this 
order  is  the  convent  of  Saint  Hildegard,  above 
Riidesheim,  which  I  visited  in  1917. 

My  letter  to  Admiral  Hollmann  was  due  to  the 
excitement  aroused  by  a  lecture  entitled  "Babel 
and  Bible,"  delivered  by  Professor  Delitzsch  be- 
fore the  German  Orient  Society,  of  which  Admiral 
Hollmann  was  one  of  the  Board  of  Managers. 

SCHOLARSHIP  AND  RELIGION 

The  first  part  of  the  letter,  which  deals  primar- 
ily with  Professor  Delitzsch's  statements,  has  been 

218 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 

omitted  from  the  reproduction  of  the  letter  printed 
below : 

Feb.  iSy  1903- 

My  Dear  Hollmann  : 

I  should  now  like  to  return  once  again  to  my  own 
standpoint  regarding  the  doctrine  or  view  of  revela- 
tion, as  I  have  often  set  it  forth  to  you,  my  dear  Holl- 
man,  and  other  gentlemen.  I  distinguish  between  two 
different  kinds  of  revelation:  a  progressive,  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  historical  revelation,  and  a  purely  religious 
one,  paving  the  way  to  the  future  coming  of  the 
Messiah. 

Of  the  first,  this  is  to  be  said:  There  is  not  the  small- 
est doubt  in  my  mind  that  God  constantly  reveals  Him- 
self through  the  human  race  created  by  Him.  He  has 
"breathed  His  breath  into  mankind,"  or,  in  other 
words,  given  it  a  piece  of  Himself,  a  soul.  He  follows 
the  development  of  the  human  race  with  a  Father's 
love  and  interest;  for  the  purpose  of  leading  it  forward 
and  benefiting  it,  he  "reveals"  Himself  in  some  great 
savant  or  priest  or  king,  whether  among  the  heathens, 
Jews,  or  Christians. 

Hammurabi  was  one  of  these,  likewise  Moses, 
Abraham,  Homer,  Charlemagne,  Luther,  Shakespeare, 
Goethe,  Kant,  Emperor  William  the  Great.  These 
men  were  selected  by  Him  and  made  worthy  of  His 
grace ;  of  achieving  for  their  people,  both  in  the  spirit- 
ual and  the  physical  domain,  splendid  and  imperish- 
able things,  in  accordance  with  His  will.  How  often 
did  my  grandfather  clearly  emphasize  that  he  was 
but  an  instrument  in  the  hand  of  the  Lord. 

The  works  of  great  minds  are  gifts  of  God  to  the 
peoples  of  the  earth,  in  order  that  they  may  improve 
themselves  on  these  models  and  grope  forward,  by 
means  of  them,  through  the  confusion  of  that  which 
is  still  unexplored  here  below.  God  has  certainly  re- 
vealed Himself  in  different  ways  to  different  peoples, 

219 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


according  to  their  standing  and  degree  of  culture,  and 
He  is  still  doing  it  now.  For,  just  as  we  are  overcome 
most  by  the  greatness  and  majesty  of  the  splendor  of 
Creation  when  we  contemplate  it,  and  are  amazed  at 
the  greatness  of  God  as  revealed  therein,  so  also  may 
we,  in  contemplating  whatever  is  great  or  splendid  in 
the  works  of  a  man  or  a  people,  recognize  therein  with 
gratitude  the  splendor  of  the  revelation  of  God.  He 
works  directly  upon  us  and  among  us!  The  second 
kind  of  revelation,  the  more  religious  kind,  is  that 
which  leads  to  the  coming  of  the  Lord.  It  is  intro- 
duced from  Abraham  onward,  slowly  but  with  fore- 
sight, all-wise  and  all-knowing ;  for  without  it  mankind 
would  have  been  doomed. 

And  now  begins  the  most  astounding  influence,  the 
revelation  of  God.  The  tribe  of  Abraham,  and  the 
people  descended  from  it,  consider  the  holiest  thing  of 
all,  unescapable  in  its  logical  consequences,  the  belief 
in  one  God.  This  belief  they  must  have  and  cultivate. 
Scattered  by  the  captivity  in  Egypt,  the  separate  parts 
are  welded  together  by  Moses  for  the  second  time,  and 
still  they  try  to  maintain  their  "monotheism."  The 
direct  intervention  of  God  is  what  brings  regeneration 
to  this  people. 

KAISER'S  THEOLOGY 

And  thus  it  goes  through  the  centuries,  until  the 
Messiah  announced  and  foreshadowed  by  the  Prophets 
and  Psalmists  shall  at  last  appear.  The  greatest  revela- 
tion of  God  in  the  world  I  For  He  Himself  appeared 
in  the  body  of  His  Son;  Christ  is  God,  God  in  human 
form.  He  saved  us.  He  inspires  us,  we  are  led  to 
follow  Him,  we  feel  His  fire  burning  within  us,  His 
pity  strengthening  us.  His  dissatisfaction  destroying 
us,  but  also  His  intercession  saving  us.  Sure  of  vic- 
tory, building  solely  upon  His  word,  we  go  through 
work,  scorn,  grief,  misery,  and  death,  for  in  Him  we 
have  the  revealed  word  of  God,  and  God  never  lies. 

220 


MY  RELATIONS  WITH  THE  CHURCH 


That  is  my  view  of  this  question.  The  Word,  espe- 
cially for  us  of  the  Evangelical  faith,  has  become  every- 
thing on  account  of  Luther ;  and  Delitzsch,  as  a  good 
theologian,  should  not  forget  that  our  great  Luther 
taught  us  to  sing  and  believe:  *'Das  Wort  sie  sollen 
lassen  stehn"  ( "The  Word  they  must  allow  to  stand"  ) . 

It  is  self-evident  that  the  Old  Testament  contains  a 
large  number  of  parts  which  are  of  purely  human-his- 
torical character  and  not  *'God's  revealed  Word.'* 
These  are  purely  historical  descriptions  of  events  of 
all  sorts,  which  occur  in  the  life  of  the  people  of  Israel 
in  the  domain  of  politics,  religion,  morals,  and  spiritual 
life. 

For  instance,  the  giving  out  of  the  Law  on  Mount 
Sinai  can  be  looked  upon  only  symbolically  as  having 
been  inspired  by  God,  since  Moses  had  to  turn  to  a 
revival  of  laws  perhaps  known  of  old  (possibly  drawn 
from  the  Code  of  Hammurabi),  in  order  to  bring 
coherence  and  solidarity  to  the  framework  of  his 
people,  which  was  loose  and  little  capable  of  resistance. 
Here  the  historian  may  perhaps  find  a  connection, 
either  in  sense  or  words,  with  the  laws  of  Hammurabi, 
the  friend  of  Abraham,  which  may  be  logically  right; 
but  this  can  never  affect  the  fact  that  God  had  inspired 
Moses  to  act  thus,  and,  to  that  extent,  had  revealed 
Himself  to  the  people  of  Israel. 

Therefore,  my  view  is  that  our  good  professor 
should  rather  avoid  introducing  and  treating  of  re- 
ligion as  such  in  his  lectures  before  our  association,  but 
that  he  may  continue,  unhindered,  to  describe  what- 
ever brings  the  religion,  customs,  and  so  on  of  the 
Babylonians,  and  so  on,  into  relation  with  the  Old 
Testament. 

As  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  am  led  by  the  above  to 
the  following  conclusion : 

(a)  I  believe  in  one  only  God. 

(b)  We  men  need,  in  order  to  teach  Him,  a  Form, 
especially  for  our  children. 

221 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


(c)  This  Form  has  been,  up  to  now,  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, as  we  now  know  it.  This  Form  will  be  essentially 
changed  by  research,  inscriptions,  and  excavations ;  but 
that  will  cause  no  harm,  nor  will  the  fact  that,  thereby, 
much  of  the  halo  of  the  Chosen  People  will  disappear, 
cause  any  harm.  The  kernel  and  content  remain  al- 
ways the  same :  God  and  His  influence. 

Religion  was  never  a  result  of  science,  but  something 
flowing  from  the  heart  and  being  of  man,  through  his 
relations  with  God. 

With  heartiest  thanks  and  many  greetings,  I  remain 
always 

Your  sincere  friend, 

(Signed)  WiLHELM  I.  R. 


CHAPTER  IX 


Army  and  Navy 

MY  close  relations  with  the  army  are  a  matter 
of  common  knowledge.  In  this  direc- 
tion I  conformed  to  the  tradition  of  my  family. 
Prussia's  kings  did  not  chase  cosmopolitan  mi- 
rages, but  realized  that  the  welfare  of  their  land 
could  only  be  assured  by  means  of  a  real  power 
protecting  industry  and  commerce.  If,  in  a  num- 
ber of  utterances,  I  admonished  my  people  to 
"keep  their  powder  dry"  and  "their  swords 
sharp,"  the  warning  was  addressed  alike  to  foe  and 
friend.  I  wished  our  foes  to  pause  and  think  a 
long  time  before  they  dared  to  engage  with  us.  I 
wished  to  cultivate  a  manly  spirit  in  the  German 
people ;  I  wished  to  make  sure  that,  when  the  hour 
struck  for  us  to  defend  the  fruits  of  our  industry 
against  an  enemy's  lust  of  conquest,  it  should  find 
a  strong  race. 

In  view  of  this  I  attached  high  value  to  the 
educational  duty  of  the  army.  General  com- 
pulsory military  service  has  a  social  influence  upon 
men  in  the  mass  equaled  by  nothing  else.  It 
brings  together  rich  and  poor,  sons  of  the  soil 
and  of  the  city;  it  brings  acquaintanceship  and 

223 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


mutual  understanding  among  young  people 
whose  roads,  otherwise,  would  lead  them  far 
apart;  the  feeling  that  they  are  serving  one  idea 
unites  them. 

And  think  what  we  made  out  of  our  young  men! 
Pale  town  boys  were  transformed  into  erect, 
healthy,  sport-hardened  men;  limbs  grown  stiff 
through  labor  were  made  adroit  and  pliable. 

I  stepped  direct  from  brigade  commander  to 
king — to  repeat  the  well-known  words  of  King 
Frederick  William  III.  Up  to  then  I  had  climbed 
the  steps  of  an  officer's  career.  I  still  think  with 
pleasure  of  my  pride  when,  on  the  2d  of  May, 
1869,  during  the  spring  parade,  I  first  stood  in  the 
ranks  before  my  grandfather.  Relations  with  the 
individual  man  have  always  seemed  valuable  to 
me,  and,  therefore,  I  particularly  treasured  the 
assignments,  during  my  military  service,  where  I 
could  cultivate  such  relations.  My  activities  as 
commander  of  a  company,  a  squadron,  and  a  bat- 
tery, likewise  as  head  of  a  regiment,  are  unforget- 
able  to  me. 

I  felt  at  home  among  my  soldiers.  In  them  I 
placed  unlimited  trust.  The  painful  experiences 
of  the  autumn  of  191 8  have  not  diminished  this 
trust.  I  do  not  forget  that  a  part  of  the  German 
people,  after  four  years  of  unprecedented  achieve- 
ments and  privations,  had  become  too  ill  to  with- 
stand being  corrupted  by  foes  within  and  without. 
Moreover,  the  best  of  the  Germans  lay  under  the 
green  sod ;  the  others  were  thrown  into  such  con- 
sternation by  the  events  of  the  revolution  which 

224 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 


had  been  held  to  be  impossible  that  they  could  not 
spur  themselves  to  act. 

Compulsory  military  service  was  the  best  school 
for  the  physical  and  moral  toughening  of  our  peo- 
ple. It  created  for  us  free  men  who  knew  their 
own  value.  From  these  an  excellent  corps  of  non- 
commissioned officers  was  formed;  from  the  latter, 
in  turn,  we  drew  our  Government  officials,  the  like 
of  whom,  in  ability,  incorruptibility  and  fidelity  to 
duty  no  other  nation  on  earth  can  show. 

BELIEVES  OFFICERS  STILL  LOYAL 

And  it  is  from  these  very  elements  that  I  receive 
nowadays  signs  of  loyalty,  every  one  of  which  does 
me  good.  My  old  Second  Company  of  the  First 
Infantry  Guard  Regiment  has  shared,  through 
good  and  evil  days,  the  vicissitudes  of  its  old  cap- 
tain. I  saw  them  for  the  last  time  in  191 3,  in  close 
formation — still  one  hundred  twenty-five  strong — 
under  that  excellent  sergeant,  Hartmann,  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  celebration  of  the  twenty-fifth  anni- 
versary of  my  accession  to  the  throne. 

In  view  of  its  proud  duty  as  an  educator  and 
leader  of  the  nation  in  arms,  the  officer  corps  oc- 
cupied a  particularly  important  position  in  the 
German  Empire.  The  method  of  replacement, 
which,  by  adoption  of  the  officers'  vote,  had  been 
lodged  in  the  hands  of  the  various  bodies  of  offi- 
cers themselves,  guaranteed  the  needed  homo- 
geneity. Harmful  outcroppings  of  the  idea  of 
caste  were  merely  sporadic ;  wherever  they  made 
themselves  felt  they  were  instantly  rooted  out. 

225 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

I  entered  much  and  willingly  into  relations  with 
the  various  officer  corps  and  felt  like  a  comrade 
among  them.  The  materialistic  spirit  of  our  age, 
to  be  sure,  had  not  passed  over  the  officer  corps 
without  leaving  traces ;  but,  on  the  whole,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  nowhere  else  were  self-discipline, 
fidelity  to  duty,  and  simplicity  cultivated  to  such 
an  extent  as  among  the  officers. 

A  process  of  weeding  out  such  as  existed  in  no 
other  profession  allowed  only  the  ablest  and  best 
to  reach  positions  of  influence.  The  commanding 
generals  were  men  of  a  high  degree  of  attainment  ^ 
and  ability  and — what  is  even  more  important — 
men  of  character.  It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  single 
out  individuals  from  among  them. 

Though  the  man  in  the  ranks  at  the  front  was 
always  particularly  close  to  my  heart,  I  must, 
nevertheless,  give  special  prominence  to  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  as  a  school  for  the  officer  corps.  I  have 
already  remarked  that  Field  Marshal  Count 
Moltke  had  known  how  by  careful  training  to 
build  up  men  who  were  not  only  up  to  require- 
ments, technically  speaking,  but  also  qualified  for 
action  demanding  willingness  to  assume  responsi- 
bility, independence  of  judgment,  and  far-sighted- 
ness. 'To  be  more  than  you  seem"  is  written  in 
the  preface  to  the  Pocket  Manual  for  the  General 
Staff  Officer. 

Field  Marshal  Count  Moltke  laid  the  founda- 
tions for  this  training;  and  his  successors — Count 
Waldersee,  that  great  genius.  Count  SchliefiFen, 
and  General  von  Moltke — built  upon  them.  The 

226 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

result  was  the  General  Staff,  which  accomplished 
unprecedented  feats  in  the  World  War,  and 
aroused  admiration  throughout  the  world. 

I  soon  realized  that  the  greatest  possible  im- 
provement of  our  highly  developed  technical  de- 
partment was  absolutely  necessary  and  would  save 
precious  blood.  Wherever  possible,  I  worked  to- 
ward the  perfection  of  our  armament  and  sought 
to  place  machinery  in  the  service  of  our  army. 

Among  new  creations,  the  very  first  place  is 
taken  by  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  army  in  the  field. 
In  bringing  this  into  being  I  was  obliged  to  over- 
come much  opposition — particularly,  strange  to 
relate,  in  the  ranks  of  the  artillery  itself.  It  is  a 
source  of  great  satisfaction  to  me  that  I  put  this 
matter  through.  It  laid  the  foundation  for  the 
carrying  out  of  operations  on  a  large  scale,  and  it 
was  long  before  our  foes  could  catch  up  with  us  in 
this  direction. 

BETTER  MILITARY  EQUIPMENT 

Mention  must  also  be  made  of  the  machine 
gun,  which  developed  from  modest  beginnings  to 
being  the  backbone  of  the  infantry's  fighting 
powers;  the  replacement  of  the  rifle  by  the  ma- 
chine gun  multiplied  the  firing  power  of  the  in- 
fantry while,  at  the  same  time,  diminishing  its 
losses. 

Nor  can  I  pass  over  without  mention  the  intro- 
duction of  the  movable  field  kitchen,  which  I  had 
seen  for  the  first  time  at  some  maneuvers  of  the 
Russian  army.    It  was  of  the  greatest  value  in 
16  227 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


maintaining  the  fighting  efficiency  of  the  army, 
since  the  possibility  of  getting  sufficient  nourish- 
ment kept  our  troops  fresh  and  healtl^. 

All  human  work  remains  unfinished.  Never- 
theless, it  may  be  said,  without  exaggeration,  that 
the  German  army  which  marched  to  battle  in 
1914  was  an  instrument  of  warfare  without  an 
equal.  *v 

Whereas,  at  my  accession  to  the  throne,  I  had 
found  the  army  in  a  condition  which  merely  re- 
quired development  upon  the  foundations  already 
laid,  the  navy,  on  the  other  hand,  was  in  the  first 
stage  of  development.  After  the  failure  of  all  the 
attempts  of  Admiral  Hollmann  to  move  the  recal- 
citrant Reichstag  to  adopt  a  slowly  progressing, 
systematic  strengthening  of  German  sea  power — 
largely  due  to  the  cheap  catchwords  of  Deputy 
Richter  and  the  lack  of  understanding  of  the  Lib- 
erals of  the  Left,  who  were  fooled  by  them — the 
Admiral  requested  me  to  retire  him.  Deeply 
moved,  I  acceded  to  his  request;  this  plain,  loyal 
man,  the  son  of  a  genuine  Berlin  bourgeois  family, 
had  become  dear  to  me  through  his  upright  char- 
acter, his  devotion  to  duty,  and  his  attachment  to 
me.  My  friendship  with  him,  based  upon  this 
estimate,  lasted  for  many  years  up  to  the  moment 
of  the  Admiral's  sudden  death;  it  often  caused  me 
to  visit  this  faithful  man,  endowed  with  fine  Ber- 
lin wit,  at  his  home,  and  there  to  associate  with 
him  as  head  of  the  German  Orient  Society,  as 
well  as  to  see  him,  in  a  small  circle  of  intimates, 
at  my  own  home,  or  to  take  him  with  me  as  a 

228 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

treasured  traveling  companion.  He  was  one  of 
the  most  faithful  of  my  faithful  friends,  always 
remaining  the  same  in  his  disinterestedness,  never 
asking  anything  for  himself.  Happy  the  city 
which  can  produce  such  citizens !  I  preserve  a 
grateful  memory  of  this  tried  and  trusted  friend. 

Admiral  Tirpitz  succeeded  Hollmann.  In  his 
very  first  repeats,  which  laid  the  foundation  of  the 
first  Naval  law,  he  showed  himself  thoroughly  in 
accord  with  me  in  the  belief  that  the  sanction  of  the 
Reichstag  for  the  building  of  warships  was  not  to 
be  gained  by  the  old  form  of  procedure.  As  I  have 
already  pointed  out,  the  opposition  was  not  to  be 
convinced;  the  tone  of  the  debates  conducted  by 
Richter  was  unworthy  of  the  importance  of  the 
subject;  for  instance,  the  gunboat  obtained  in  the 
Reichstag  by  the  Poles,  under  Herr  von  Kosciel- 
sky,  was  jokingly  dubbed  Koscielska.  Ridicule 
was  the  weapon  used,  though  the  future  of  the 
fatherland  was  in  question. 

It  was  necessary  that  the  representative  of  the 
navy  should  have  a  solid  phalanx  behind  him,  both 
among  the  Ministers  of  State  and  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, and  that  it  should,  from  absolute  conviction, 
energetically  support  him  and  the  cause.  There- 
fore, there  was  need  of  communicating  to  the 
Reichstag  members,  still  rather  ignorant  in  naval 
matters,  the  details  of  the  great  work;  moreover,  a 
great  movement  must  be  engineered  among  the 
people,  among  the  "general  public,"  indifferent  as 
yet,  to  arouse  its  interest  and  enthusiasm  for  the 
navy,  in  order  that  pressure  from  the  people  itself 

229 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

might  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Reichstag  mem- 
bers. To  this  end,  an  energetic  propaganda  was 
needed,  through  a  well-organized  and  well-di- 
rected press,  as  well  as  through  eminent  men  of 
science  at  the  universities  and  technical  high 
schools. 

FIGHT  IN  THE  REICHSTAG 

There  was  need  of  a  complete  change  in  the 
whole  method  of  handling  the  matter  in  the  Reichs- 
tag. There  must  be  no  more  bickerings  about 
individual  ships  and  docks.  In  making  up  the 
military  budget,  no  arguments  arose  over  the 
strength  of  the  army,  unless  it  was  a  matter  of  new 
formations.  The  makeup  of  the  navy,  like  that  of 
the  army,  must  be  settled  by  law  once  for  all,  its 
right  of  existence  recognized  and  protected.  The 
units  composing  it  must  no  longer  be  a  matter  for 
debate.  Moreover,  not  only  the  officer  corps  but 
that  of  noncommissioned  officers  must  be 
strengthened  and  trained,  in  order  to  be  ready  for 
service  on  the  new  ships.  At  the  beginning  of  my 
reign,  sixty  to  eighty  cadets,  at  the  most,  were  en- 
rolled every  year;  in  the  last  few  years  before  the 
war  several  hundred  asked  admission.  Twelve 
precious  years,  never  to  be  retrieved,  were  lost  by 
the  failure  of  the  Reichstag;  it  is  even  harder  to 
create  a  navy  overnight  than  an  army. 

The  goal  to  be  striven  for  was  implied  in  the 
law,  which  expressed  the  "idea  of  risk";  the  aim 
was  to  cause  even  the  strongest  hostile  fleet  to  think 
seriously  before  it  came  to  blows  with  the  German 

230 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

fleet,  in  view  of  the  heavy  losses  that  were  to  be 
feared  in  a  battle,  which  put  the  foe  in  danger  of 
becoming  too  weak  for  other  tasks.  The  ^'idea  of 
risk"  was  brilliantly  vindicated  in  the  Skager-Rak 
(Jutland)  battle;  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  his  im- 
mense superiority,  dared  not  risk  a  second  battle. 
Trafalgar  was  already  dim ;  its  laurels  must  not  be 
completely  lost. 

The  total  number  of  units  (ships)  on  hand — it 
was  principally  a  matter  of  ships  of  the  line — was 
taken  as  a  basis  for  the  Naval  law,  although  these, 
with  the  exception  of  the  four  ships  of  the  Bran- 
denburg class,  were  little  better  than  old  iron. 

The  Naval  law  was  looked  upon  by  many  lay- 
men, in  view  of  the  numbers  involved,  as  a  naval 
increase.  In  reality,  however,  this  was  a  false 
view,  since  the  so-called  existing  fleet  was  abso- 
lutely no  longer  a  fleet.  It  was  slowly  dying  of  old 
age — as  Hollmann  said  when  he  retired ;  included 
in  it  were  almost  the  oldest  ships  still  in  service  in 
all  Europe. 

Now  that  the  Naval  law  was  gradually  coming 
into  force,  lively  building  operations  set  in,  launch- 
ings  were  reported  in  the  press,  and  there  was  joy 
among  those  under  the  dominion  of  the  "rage  du 
nombre"  at  the  growing  number  of  ships.  But 
when  it  was  made  clear  to  them  that  as  soon  as  the 
new  ships  were  ready  the  old  ones  must  be  elim- 
inated, so  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  total  number 
of  ships  of  fighting  value  would,  at  first,  not  be  in- 
creased, they  were  greatly  disillusioned.  Had  the 
necessary  ships  been  built  in  time  during  the  wasted 

231 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

twelve  years  the  Naval  law  v^ould  have  found  a 
quite  different,  usable  basis  already  in  existence. 
But  as  matters  now  stood  it  was  really  a  question 
of  the  complete  rebuilding  of  the  entire  German 
fleet. 

The  large  number  of  ships,  to  which  those  which 
had  to  be  eliminated  were  added,  was  a  fallacy. 
Therefore  the  English  made  a  mistake  when  they 
merely  took  account  of  the  number  of  ships — since 
that  fitted  in  well  with  the  propaganda  against 
Germany — but  paid  no  attention  to  age  or  type, 
arriving  thus  at  a  total  that  was  far  too  high,  and, 
by  such  misleading  methods,  artificially  nourish- 
ing the  so-called  apprehension  at  the  growth  of  the 
German  navy. 

Admiral  Tirpitz  now  went  ahead  with  the  pro- 
gram approved  by  me.  With  iron  energy  and  mer- 
ciless sacrifice  of  his  health  and  strength  he  soon 
was  able  to  inject  efficiency  and  power  into  the 
handling  of  the  naval  question.  At  my  command 
he  went,  after  the  drafting  of  the  Naval  law,  to 
Friedrichsruh,  the  residence  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
in  order  to  convince  the  latter  of  the  necessity  for 
having  a  German  navy. 

The  press  worked  zealously  toward  the  intro- 
duction of  the  Naval  law,  and  political  economists, 
experts  on  commerce  and  politics  and  so  forth, 
placed  their  pens  at  the  service  of  the  great  na- 
tional cause,  the  necessity  for  a  navy  having  been 
by  now  widely  realized. 

In  the  meantime  the  English,  too,  helped — 
though  quite  unconsciously — toward  bettering  the 

232 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

Naval  law's  chance  of  being  passed.  The  Boer 
War  had  broken  out,  and  had  aroused  among  the 
German  people  much  sympathy  for  the  little  coun- 
try and  much  indignation  on  account  of  England's 
violent  assault  upon  it.  Thereupon  the  news  came 
of  the  utterly  unjustified  capture  of  two  German 
steamers  on  the  East  African  coast  by  English  war- 
ships.   Indignation  was  general. 

The  news  of  the  stopping  of  the  second  steamer 
happened  to  be  received  by  the  Secretary  of  State, 
von  Billow,  at  the  very  moment  when  Tirpitz  and 
I  were  with  him.  As  soon  as  Biilow  had  read  the 
dispatch  aloud,  I  quoted  the  old  English  proverb, 
"It's  an  ill  wind  that  blows  nobody  good,"  and 
Tirpitz  exclaimed,  "Now  we  have  the  wind  we 
need  for  bringing  our  ship  into  port.  The  Naval 
law  will  go  through.  Your  Majesty  must  present 
a  medal  to  the  captain  of  the  English  ship  in  grati- 
tude for  having  put  it  through." 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  ordered  up  cham- 
pagne and  the  three  of  us  drank  joyously  to  the 
new  law,  its  acceptance,  and  the  future  German 
fleet,  not  forgetting  to  express  our  thanks  to  the 
English  navy,  which  had  proved  so  helpful  to  us. 

Many  years  later,  on  my  return  from  Lowther 
Castle,  where  I  had  been  hunting  with  Lord  Lons- 
dale, I  was  invited  to  dine  with  Lord  Rosebery, 
the  great  Liberal  statesman  and  former  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  also  known  through  his  re- 
searches in  the  history  of  Napoleon,  at  his  beauti- 
ful country  estate  of  Dalmeny  Castle,  situated  close 
to  the  sea,  not  far  from  the  great  Forth  bridge. 

233 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Among  the  guests  was  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton, 
a  Scotchman,  well  known  on  account  of  his  part  in 
the  Boer  War,  with  whom  I  had  become  ac- 
quainted when  he  was  a  guest  at  the  Imperial 
German  maneuvers,  the  Lord  Provost  of  Edin- 
burgh, and  a  captain  of  the  English  navy,  who  was 
commander  of  the  naval  station  there. 

The  last  sat  next  Admiral  Freiherr  von  Sen- 
den,  directly  across  the  table  from  me,  and  at- 
tracted my  attention  by  the  obvious  embarrassment 
which  he  manifested  in  his  talk  with  the  Admiral, 
which  he  conducted  in  a  low  voice.  After  dinner 
Admiral  von  Senden  introduced  the  captain  to  me, 
whereat  the  Englishman's  embarrassment  caused 
him  to  behave  even  more  awkwardly  than  before, 
and  aroused  my  attention  because  of  the  worried 
look  of  his  eyes  and  his  pale  face. 

After  the  conversation,  which  turned  on  various 
maritime  topics,  had  come  to  an  end,  I  asked  Frei- 
herr von  Senden  what  the  matter  was  with  the 
man ;  the  Admiral  laughed  and  replied  that  he  had 
elicited  from  his  neighbor,  during  the  meal,  that 
he  had  been  the  commander  of  the  ship  which  had 
captured  the  two  German  steamers  in  the  Boer 
War,  and  that  he  had  been  afraid  that  I  might  find 
this  out.  Senden  had  thereupon  told  him  that  he 
was  entirely  mistaken  about  this;  that  had  His 
Majesty  learned  who  he  was  he  could  rest  assured 
that  he  would  have  been  very  well  treated  and 
thanked  into  the  bargain. 

"Thanked?  What  for?"  queried  the  English- 
man. 

234 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

*Tor  having  made  the  passage  of  the  Naval  law 
so  much  easier  for  the  Emperor!" 

One  of  the  prime  considerations  in  the  passage 
of  the  Naval  law — as  also  for  all  later  additions, 
and,  in  general,  for  the  whole  question  of  warship 
construction — ^was  the  question  whether  the  Ger- 
man shipbuilding  industry  would  be  in  a  position 
to  keep  pace  with  the  naval  program;  whether,  in 
fact,  it  would  be  able  to  carry  it  out  at  all.  Here, 
too.  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  worked  with  tireless 
energy.  Encouraged  and  fired  with  enthusiasm 
by  him,  the  German  shipbuilding  yards  went  at 
the  great  problem,  filled  with  German  audacity, 
and  solved  it  with  positively  brilliant  results, 
greatly  distancing  their  foreign  competitors.  The 
admirable  technical  endowment  of  the  German  en- 
gineers, as  well  as  the  better  education  of  the  Ger- 
man working  classes,  contributed  in  full  measure 
toward  this  achievement. 

FEVERISH  HASTE  FOR  NAVY 

Consultations,  conferences,  reports  to  me,  service 
trips  to  all  shipbuilding  yards,  were  the  daily 
bread  of  the  indefatigable  Tirpitz.  But  the 
tremendous  trouble  and  work  were  richly  re- 
warded. The  people  woke  up,  began  to  have 
a  thought  for  the  value  of  the  colonies  (raw- 
materials  provided  by  ourselves  without  foreign 
middlemen!)  and  for  commercial  relations, 
and  to  feel  interest  in  commerce,  navigation, 
shipping,  etc. 

And,  at  last,  the  derisive  opposition  stopped 

235 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

cracking  its  jokes.  Tirpitz,  always  ready  for  bat- 
tle, wielded  a  sharp  blade  in  fighting,  never  joked 
and  allowed  nobody  to  joke  with  him,  so  that  his 
opponents  no  longer  felt  like  laughing.  Things 
went  particularly  badly  with  Deputy  Richter 
when  Tirpitz  brilliantly  snubbed  and  silenced  him 
by  quoting  a  patriotic  saying,  dating  from  the 
'forties,  of  old  Harkort — whose  district  Richter 
represented — concerning  the  need  for  a  German 
fleet.  Now  it  was  the  turn  of  the  other  side  of  the 
Reichstag  to  laugh. 

And  so  the  great  day  dawned.  The  law  was 
passed,  after  much  fighting  and  talking,  by  a  great 
majority.  The  strength  of  the  German  navy 
was  assured;  naval  construction  was  to  be 
accomplished. 

By  means  of  construction  and  keeping  an  in- 
creased number  of  ships  in  service  a  fleet  soon 
sprang  into  being.  In  order  to  maneuver,  lead,  and 
train  its  personnel  a  new  book  of  regulations  and 
signal  code  were  needed — at  the  beginning  of  my 
reign  these  had  been  worked  out  merely  for  one 
division — four  ships — since  at  that  time  a  larger 
number  of  units  never  navigated  together  in  the 
German  navy — /.  e.,  a  larger  number  were  not  kept 
in  service.  And  even  these  were  out  of  service  in 
the  autumn,  so  that,  in  winter,  there  was  (with  the 
exception  of  cruisers  in  foreign  waters)  absolutely 
no  German  navy.  All  the  care  expended  during 
the  summer  season  on  training  of  crews,  officers, 
noncommissioned  oflScers,  engine-room  crews,  and 
stokers,  as  well  as  on  rigging  and  upkeep  of  ships, 

236 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

was  as  good  as  wasted  when  the  ships  were  retired 
from  service  in  the  autumn ;  and  when  spring  came 
and  they  were  put  back  into  commission  things 
had  to  be  started  at  the  beginning  again.  The  re- 
sult was  that  any  degree  of  continuity  in  training 
and  of  coherence  among  the  crews  with  relation 
to  each  other  and  their  ships — of  *'ship  spirit,"  in 
short — could  not  be  maintained.  This  was  main- 
tained only  on  board  the  ships  stationed  in  foreign 
waters.  Therefore,  after  the  necessary  heating 
equipment,  etc.,  had  been  put  in,  I  ordered  that 
ships  be  kept  in  service  also  through  the  winter, 
which  was  a  veritable  boon  to  the  development  of 
the  fleet. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  necessary  number  of  units 
needed  by  the  new  regulations.  Admiral  von  Tir- 
pitz,  in  view  of  the  shortage  of  ships  of  the  line, 
had  already  formed  into  divisions  all  the  sorts  of 
vessels  available,  including  gunboats  and  dispatch 
boats,  and  carried  out  evolutions  with  them,  so  that 
when  the  replacement  of  line  ships  began  to  take 
place  the  foundations  for  the  new  regulations  had 
already  been  laid.  The  latter  were  then  constantly 
developed  with  the  greatest  energy  by  all  the  offi- 
cials concerned  and  kept  pace  with  the  growth  of 
the  fleet. 

Hard  work  was  done  on  the  development  of  that 
important  weapon,  the  torpedo  boat.  At  that  time 
we  were  filled  with  joyful  pride  that  a  German 
torpedo-boat  division  was  the  first  united  torpedo 
squadron  ever  to  cross  the  North  Sea.  It  sailed, 
under  the  command  of  my  brother,  Prince  Henry, 

237 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

to  take  part  in  the  celebration  of  Queen  Victoria's 
Golden  Jubilee  (1887). 

COLONEL  GOETHAL'S  VISIT 

The  development  of  Heligoland  and  its  fortifi- 
cations as  a  point  of  support  for  small  cruisers  and 
torpedo  boats — also,  later  on,  for  U-boats — ^was 
also  taken  in  hand,  after  the  necessary  protective 
work  for  preserving  the  island  had  been  con- 
structed by  the  state — in  connection  with  which 
work  the  Empire  and  Prussia  fought  like  cat  and 
dog. 

On  account  of  the  growth  of  the  fleet  it  became 
necessary  to  widen  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal. 
After  a  hard  struggle  we  caused  the  new  locks  to 
be  built  of  the  largest  possible  size,  capable  of 
meeting  the  development  of  dreadnaughts  for  a 
long  time  to  come.  There  the  far-sighted  policy  of 
the  Admiral  was  brilliantly  vindicated. 

This  found  unexpected  corroboration  by  a  for- 
eigner. Colonel  Goethals,  the  builder  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  requested  through  the  United 
States  Government  permission  to  inspect  the 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  and  its  new  locks.  Permis- 
sion was  most  willingly  granted.  After  a  meal 
with  me,  at  which  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  was  pres- 
ent, the  Admiral  questioned  the  American  engi- 
neer (who  was  enthusiastic  over  our  construction 
work)  concerning  the  measurements  of  the  Panama 
locks,  whereupon  it  transpired  that  the  measure- 
ments of  the  locks  of  the  Panama  Canal  were  much 
smaller  than  those  of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal. 

238 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

To  my  astonished  question  as  to  how  that  could  be 
possible,  Goethals  replied  that  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, upon  inquiry  by  him,  had  given  those 
measurements  for  ships  of  the  line.  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  then  remarked  that  this  size  would  be  far 
from  adequate  for  the  future,  and  that  the  newer 
type  of  dreadnaughts  and  superdreadnaughts 
would  not  be  able  to  go  through  the  locks,  conse- 
quently the  canal  would  soon  be  useless  for  Ameri- 
can and  other  big  battleships.  I^The  Colonel 
agreed,  and  remarked  that  this  was  already  true 
of  the  newest  ships  under  construction,  and  he  con- 
gratulated His  Excellency  upon  having  had  the 
courage  to  demand  and  put  through  the  big  locks 
of  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  which  he  had  looked 
upon  with  admiration  and  envy.5 

In  like  manner  the  very  backward  and  anti- 
quated Imperial  docks  [the  old  tinker's  shops,  as 
Tirpitz  called  them]  were  rebuilt  and  developed 
into  model  modern  plants  and  the  arrangements 
for  the  workers  were  developed  so  as  to  further  the 
welfare  of  the  latter  along  the  most  approved  lines. 
Only  those  who,  like  myself,  have  followed  and 
seen  with  their  own  eyes  from  the  very  beginning 
the  origin  and  development  of  all  these  factors 
necessary  to  the  building  up — nay,  the  creation 
anew — of  the  fleet  can  form  anything  like  a  proper 
idea  of  the  enormous  achievement  of  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  and  his  entire  corps  of  assistants. 

The  office  of  the  Imperial  Naval  Department 
was  also  a  new  creation ;  the  old  "Oberkommando" 
was  eliminated  when  it  was  divided  into  the  two 

239 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

main  branches  of  Admiralty  Staff  and  Imperial 
Naval  Department.  Both  of  these  (as  in  the 
army)  were  directly  under  the  supreme  war  com- 
mander in  chief — this  meant  that  there  was  no 
longer  any  official  between  the  Emperor  and  his 
navy. 

COMING  OF  THE  DREADNAUGHT 

When  Admiral  Fisher  evolved  an  entirely  new 
type  of  ship  for  England  in  the  shape  of  the 
^^dreadnaught" — thereby  surprising  the  world  as  if 
he  had  launched  a  sudden  assault  upon  it — and 
thought  that  he  had  thus  given  England,  once  for 
all,  an  unapproachable  naval  superiority  which 
the  rest  of  the  powers  could  never  meet,  there  was 
naturally  great  excitement  in  all  naval  circles. 
The  idea,  to  be  sure,  did  not  originate  with  Fisher, 
but  came — in  the  form  of  an  appeal  to  ship- 
builders of  the  whole  world — from  the  famous 
Italian  engineer  Cuniberti,  who  had  made  public 
a  sketch  in  Fred  Jane's  Illustrated  Naval  Atlas. 

At  the  first  conference  regarding  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  "dreadnaught"  type  of  big  fighting 
ship  by  England  I  at  once  agreed  with  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz  that  it  had  robbed  all  pre-dread- 
naughts  of  their  value  and  consigned  them  to  the 
scrap  heap,  especially  the  German  ships,  which  it 
had  been  necessary  to  keep  considerably  smaller, 
on  account  of  the  measurements  of  our  old  locks, 
than  the  ships  of  other  navies,  particularly  the 
English. 

Thereupon  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  remarked  that 

240 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

this  would  also  apply  to  the  English  fleet  itself  as 
soon  as  the  other  nations  had  followed  Fisher's  ex- 
ample; that  England  had  robbed  her  enormous 
pre-dreadnaught  force,  upon  which  her  great  su- 
periority lasted,  of  its  fighting  value,  which  would 
necessitate  her  building  an  entirely  new  fleet  of  big 
fighting  ships,  in  competition  with  the  entire 
world,  which  would  do  likewise;  that  this  would 
be  exceedingly  costly;  that  England,  in  order  to 
maintain  her  notorious  "two-Power  standard," 
would  have  to  exert  herself  to  such  an  extent  that 
she  would  look  with  more  disfavor  than  ever  on 
new  warships  built  by  other  nations,  toward  whom 
she  was  unfriendly,  and  begin  to  make  objections; 
then  this  would  be  especially  true  if  we  started 
building,  but  would  be  in  vain,  since,  with  the 
existing  types  of  ships  in  our  fleet,  we  could  not 
expect  to  fight  against  big  battleships,  but  were 
forced,  "nolens  volens,"  to  follow  England  along 
this  road. 

The  war  fully  confirmed  Admiral  Tirpitz's 
opinion.  Every  one  of  our  ships  not  in  the  big 
fighting-ship  class  had  to  be  retired  from  service. 

When  the  first  German  big  fighting  ship  was 
placed  in  service  there  was  a  loud  outcry  in  the 
land  of  the  British.  The  conviction  gradually 
dawned  that  Fisher  and  his  shipbuilders  had 
counted  absolutely  on  the  belief  that  Germany 
would  not  be  able  to  build  any  big  fighting  ships. 
Therefore  the  disappointment  was  all  the  greater. 
Why  such  an  assumption  was  made  is  beyond  com- 
prehension, since,  even  at  that  time,  German  ship- 

241 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

builders  had  already  built  the  great  ocean  grey- 
hounds, far  surpassing  our  warships  of  the  line  in 
tonnage,  which  had  occasioned  painfully  notice- 
able competition  to  the  English  steamship  lines. 
Our  big  fighting  ships,  despite  their  small  number, 
showed  themselves,  at  the  Skager-Rak  (Jutland) 
battle,  not  only  equal  to  their  English  opponents, 
but  superior  to  them  both  in  seaworthiness  and  in 
standing  up  under  gunfire. 

IMPATIENT  FOR  U-BOATS 

The  building  of  U-boats,  unfortunately,  could 
not  be  pushed  forward  before  the  war  to  an  extent 
commensurate  with  my  desires.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  was  necessary  not  to  overburden  the  naval  budget 
during  the  carrying  out  of  the  Naval  law;  more- 
over, most  important  of  all,  it  was  necessary  to  col- 
lect further  data  from  experiments. 

Tirpitz  believed  that  the  types  with  which  other 
nations  were  experimenting  were  too  small  and  fit 
only  for  coast  defense;  that  Germany  must  build 
"seagoing"  submarines  capable  of  navigating  in 
the  open  sea ;  that  this  necessitated  a  larger  type — 
which,  however,  must  first  be  systematically  de- 
veloped. This  took  a  long  time  and  required  care- 
ful experiments  with  models. 

The  result  was  that,  at  first,  in  1914,  there  were 
only  a  small  number  of  seaworthy  submarines  in 
readiness.  Even  then  more  pressure  might  have 
been  brought  to  bear  upon  England  with  the  avail- 
able submarines  had  not  the  Chancellor  been  so 
concerned  lest  England  be  provoked  thereby. 

242 


V 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 


The  number  and  efficiency  of  the  submarines 
rose  rapidly  in  the  course  of  the  war;  in  consider- 
ing numbers,  however,  one  must  always  remember 
that  in  wartime,  U-boats  are  to  be  reckoned  as 
follows:  One  third  of  the  total  in  active  service, 
one  third  on  the  outward  or  return  journey,  one 
third  undergoing  repairs.  iThe  achievements  of 
the  U-boats  aroused  the  admiratioji  of  the  entire 
world  and  won  the  ardent  gratitude  of  the 
fatherland.! 

Admiral  von  Tirpitz's  tremendous  success  in 
creating  the  commercial  colony  of  Tsing-tao  must 
never  be  forgotten.  Here  he  gave  proof  once  more 
of  his  brilliant  talent  for  administration  and 
organization  in  all  directions.  Those  talents  of 
his  created,  out  of  a  place  that  was  previously 
almost  unknown  and  entirely  without  importance, 
a  commercial  center  which,  within  a  few  years, 
showed  a  turnover  of  between  fifty  and  sixty 
millions. 

The  dealings  with  Reichstag  members,  the 
press,  and  big  industrial  and  world-commercial  ele- 
ments gradually  increased  the  Admiral's  interest 
in  political  matters,  particularly  in  foreign  affairs, 
which  were  always  bound  up  with  the  utilization 
of  ships.  The  clear  world-vision  acquired  by  him 
as  a  traveled  sailor,  well  acquainted  with  foreign 
parts,  qualified  Tirpitz  to  make  quick  decisions, 
which  his  fiery  temperament  wished  to  see  trans- 
lated promptly  into  action. 

The  opposition  and  slowness  of  officialdom  irri- 
tated him  greatly.  A  certain  tendency  to  distrust, 
17  243 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

perhaps  strengthened  by  many  an  experience,  often 
misled  him  to  harbor  suspicion — sometimes  jus- 
tified, sometimes  not — against  individuals.  This 
caused  a  strong  tinge  of  reserve  in  Tirpitz's  char- 
acter and  "hampered  the  joyful  workings  of  the 
heart"  in  others.  He  was  also  capable  of  bringing 
to  bear  new  views  on  a  matter  with  great  decision, 
when,  after  renewed  reflection  or  study  of  new 
facts,  he  had  altered  his  previous  view.  This  made 
working  with  him  not  always  exactly  agreeable  or 
easy.  The  tremendous  results  of  his  achieve- 
ments, of  which  he  was  justly  proud,  gave  him 
a  consciousness  of  the  power  of  his  personality, 
which  sometimes  made  itself  apparent  even  to 
his  friends. 

During  the  war  Tirpitz's  tendency  to  mix  in 
politics  got  the  upper  hand  with  him  so  much  that 
it  eventually  led  to  differences  of  opinion  which 
finally  caused  his  retirement,  since  von  Bethmann, 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  demanded  the  dismissal 
of  the  Admiral-in-chief  with  the  observation  that 
the  Imperial  Secretaries  of  State  were  his  subordi- 
nates and  that  the  political  policy  must  be  con- 
ducted by  himself  alone. 

It  was  with  a  heavy  heart  that  I  acquiesced  in 
the  departure  of  this  energetic,  strong-willed  man, 
who  had  carried  out  my  plans  with  genius  and 
who  was  indefatigable  as  a  co-worker.  Tirpitz 
may  always  rest  assured  of  my  Imperial  gratitude. 
If  only  this  source  of  strength  might  stand  soon 
again  by  the  side  of  the  unfortunate  German 
fatherland  in  its  misery  and  distress!   Tirpitz  can 

244  r 


ARMY  AND  NAVY 

do  and  dares  to  do  what  many  others  do  not  dare. 
The  saying  of  the  poet  most  certainly  applies  to 
Admiral  von  Tirpitz:  "The  greatest  blessing  to 
the  children  of  earth  is,  after  all,  personality!" 

The  criticisms  which  the  Admiral  felt  con- 
strained to  make  of  me,  in  his  book — ^which  is  well 
worth  reading — cannot  change,  in  the  slightest,  my 
opinion  of  him. 


CHAPTER  X 


The  Outbreak  of  War 
FTER  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the  assassina- 


^^"Y,  tion  of  my  friend,  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand,  I  gave  up  going  to  Kiel  for  the  re- 
gatta week  and  went  back  home,  since  I  intended 
to  go  to  Vienna  for  his  funeral.  But  I  was  asked 
from  there  to  give  up  this  plan.  Later  I  heard 
that  one  of  the  reasons  for  this  was  consideration 
for  my  personal  safety;  to  this  I  naturally  would 
have  paid  no  attention. 

Greatly  worried  on  account  of  the  turn  which 
matters  might  now  take,  I  decided  to  give  up  my 
intended  journey  to  Norway  and  remain  at  home. 
The  Imperial  Chancellor  and  the  Foreign  OfRce 
held  a  view  contrary  to  mine  and  wished  me  to 
undertake  the  journey,  as  they  considered  that  it 
would  have  a  quieting  effect  on  all  Europe.  For 
a  long  time  I  argued  against  going  away  from  my 
country  at  a  time  when  the  future  was  so  unsettled, 
but  Imperial  Chancellor  von  Bethmann  told  me, 
in  short  and  concise  terms,  that  if  I  were  now  to 
give  up  my  travel  plans,  which  were  already 
widely  known,  this  would  make  the  situation  ap- 
pear more  serious  than  it  had  beea  up  to  that 


246 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 

moment  and  possibly  lead  to  the  outbreak  of  war, 
for  which  I  might  be  held  responsible;  that  the 
whole  world  was  merely  waiting  to  be  put  out  of 
suspense  by  the  news  that  I,  in  spite  of  the  situa- 
tion, had  quietly  gone  on  my  trip. 

Thereupon  I  consulted  the  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  and,  when  he  also  proved  to  be  calm  and 
unworried  regarding  the  state  of  affairs  and  him- 
self asked  for  a  summer  leave  of  absence  to  go  to 
Carlsbad,  I  decided,  though  with  a  heavy  heart, 
upon  my  departure. 

The  much-discussed  so-called  Potsdam  Crown 
Council  of  July  5th  in  reality  never  took  place. 
It  is  an  invention  of  malevolent  persons.  Natur- 
ally, before  my  departure,  I  received,  as  was  my 
custom,  some  of  the  Ministers  individually,  in 
\  order  to  hear  from  them  reports  concerning  their 
departments.  Neither  was  there  any  council  of 
Ministers  and  there  was  no  talk  about  war  prepara- 
tions at  a  single  one  of  the  conferences. 

My  fleet  was  cruising  in  the  Norwegian  fjords, 
as  usual,  while  I  was  on  my  summer  vacation  trip. 
During  my  stay  at  Balholm  I  received  only  meager 
news  from  the  Foreign  Office  and  was  obliged  to 
rely  principally  on  the  Norwegian  newspapers, 
from  which  I  got  the  impression  that  the  situation 
was  growing  worse.  I  telegraphed  repeatedly  to 
the  Chancellor  and  the  Foreign  Office  that  I  con- 
sidered it  advisable  to  return  home,  but  was  asked 
each  time  not  to  interrupt  my  journey. 

When  I  learned  that  the  English  fleet  had  not 
dispersed  after  the  review  at  Spithead,  but  had 

247 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

remained  concentrated,  I  telegraphed  again  to  Ber- 
lin that  I  considered  my  return  necessary.  My 
opinion  was  not  shared  there. 

But  when,  after  that,  I  learned  from  the  Nor- 
wegian newspapers — not  from  Berlin — about  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  and,  immediately 
thereafter,  about  the  Serbian  note  to  Austria,  I 
started  without  further  ado  upon  my  return  jour- 
ney and  commanded  the  fleet  to  repair  to  Wilhelms- 
haven.  Upon  my  departure  I  learned  from  a 
Norwegian  source  that  it  was  said  that  a  part  of 
the  English  fleet  had  left  secretly  for  Norway  in 
order  to  capture  me  (though  peace  still  reigned!). 
It  is  significant  that  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  Eng- 
lish ambassador,  was  informed  on  July  26th  at  the 
Foreign  Office  that  my  return  journey,  undertaken 
on  my  own  initiative,  was  to  be  regretted,  since 
agitating  rumors  might  be  caused  by  it. 

SAYS  WAR  WAS  NOT  FORESEEN 

Upon  my  arrival  at  Potsdam  I  found  the  Chan- 
cellor and  the  Foreign  Office  in  conflict  with  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Stafif,  since  General  von 
Moltke  was  of  the  opinion  that  war  was  sure  to 
break  out,  whereas  the  other  two  stuck  firmly  to 
their  view  that  things  would  not  get  to  such  a  bad 
pass,  that  there  would  be  some  way  of  avoiding 
war,  provided  I  did  not  order  mobilization.  This 
dispute  kept  up  steadily.  Not  until  General  von 
Moltke  announced  that  the  Russians  had  set  fire 
to  their  frontier  posts,  torn  up  the  frontier  railway 
tracks,  and  posted  red  mobilization  notices  did  a 

248 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 

light  break  upon  the  diplomats  in  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  and  bring  about  both  their  own  collapse  and 
that  of  their  powers  of  resistance.  They  had  not 
wished  to  believe  in  the  war. 

This  shows  plainly  how  little  we  had  expected — 
much  less  prepared  for — war  in  July,  1914.  When, 
in  the  spring  of  191 4,  Tsar  Nicholas  II  was  ques- 
tioned by  his  Court  Marshal  as  to  his  spring  and 
summer  plans,  he  replied:  "Je  resterai  chez  moi 
cette  annee  parceque  nous  aurons  la  guerre''  ("I 
shall  stay  at  home  this  year  because  we  shall  have 
war").  (This  fact,  it  is  said,  was  reported  to  Im- 
perial Chancellor  von  Bethmann;  I  heard  noth- 
ing about  it  then  and  learned  about  it  for  the  first 
time  in  November,  191 8.)  This  was  the  same 
Tsar  who  gave  me,  on  two  separate  occasions — at 
Bjorko  and  Baltisch-Port — entirely  without  being 
pressed  by  me  and  in  a  way  that  surprised  me,  his 
word  of  honor  as  a  sovereign,  to  which  he  added 
weight  by  a  clasp  of  the  hand  and  an  embrace,  that 
he  would  never  draw  his  sword  against  the  Ger- 
man Emperor — least  of  all  as  an  ally  of  England — ■ 
in  case  a  war  should  break  out  in  Europe,  owing 
to  his  gratitude  to  the  German  Emperor  for  his 
attitude  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  in  which 
England  alone  had  involved  Russia,  adding  that 
he  hated  England,  since  she  had  done  him  and 
Russia  a  great  wrong  by  inciting  Japan  against 
them. 

At  the  very  time  that  the  Tsar  was  announcing 
his  summer  war  program  I  was  busy  at  Corfu  ex- 
cavating antiquities;  then  I  went  to  Wiesbaden, 

249 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

and,  finally,  to  Norway.  A  monarch  who  wishes 
war  and  prepares  it  in  such  a  way  that  he  can  sud- 
denly fall  upon  his  neighbors — a  task  requiring 
long  secret  mobilization  preparations  and  concen- 
tration of  troops — does  not  spend  months  outside 
his  own  country  and  does  not  allow  his  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  to  go  to  Carlsbad  on  leave  of 
absence.  My  enemies,  in  the  meantime,  planned 
their  preparations  for  an  attack. 

Our  entire  diplomatic  machine  failed.  The 
menace  of  war  was  not  seen  because  the  Foreign 
Office  was  so  hypnotized  with  its  idea  of  "surtout 
pas  d'histoires"  (^^above  all,  no  stories"),  its  belief 
in  peace  at  any  cost,  that  it  had  completely  elimi- 
nated war  as  a  possible  instrument  of  Entente 
statesmanship  from  its  calculations,  and,  therefore, 
did  not  rightly  estimate  the  importance  of  the  signs 
of  war. 

Herein  also  is  proof  of  Germany's  peaceful  in- 
clinations. The  above-mentioned  standpoint  of 
the  Foreign  Office  brought  it  to  a  certain  extent 
into  conflict  with  the  General  Staff  and  the  Ad- 
miralty Staff,  who  uttered  warnings,  as  was  their 
duty,  and  wished  to  make  preparations  for  defense. 
This  conflict  in  views  showed  its  effect  for  a  long 
time;  the  army  could  not  forget  that,  by  the  fault 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  it  had  been  taken  by  sur- 
prise, and  the  diplomats  were  piqued  because,  in 
spite  of  their  stratagems,  war  had  ensued,  after  all. 

Innumerable  are  the  pieces  of  evidence  that  as 
early  as  the  spring  and  summer  of  1914,  when 
nobody  in  Germany  believed  as  yet  in  the  En- 

250 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 


tente's  attack,  war  had  been  prepared  for  in  Rus- 
sia, France,  Belgium,  and  England. 

I  included  the  most  important  proofs  of  this,  in 
so  far  as  they  are  known  to  me,  in  the  Comparative 
Historical  Tables  compiled  by  me.  On  account 
of  their  great  number,  I  shall  cite  only  a  few  here. 
If  in  so  doing  I  do  not  mention  all  names,  this  is 
done  for  reasons  easily  understood.  Let  me  re- 
mark furthermore  that  this  whole  mass  of  material 
became  known  to  me  only  little  by  little,  partly 
during  the  war,  mostly  after  the  war. 

1.  As  far  back  as  April,  1 9 14,  the  accumulation  of 
gold  reserves  in  the  English  banks  began.  On  the 
other  hand,  Germany,  as  late  as  July,  was  still  export- 
ing gold  and  grain;  to  the  Entente  countries,  among 
others. 

2.  In  April,  19 14,  the  German  Naval  Attache  in 
Tokyo,  Captain  von  Knorr,  reported  that  he  was 
greatly  struck  by  the  certainty  with  which  everyone 
there  foresaw  a  war  of  the  Triple  Alliance  against 
Germany  in  the  near  future  .  .  .  that  there  was  a 
something  in  the  air  as  if,  so  to  speak,  people  were  ex- 
pressing their  condolences  over  a  death  sentence  not 
yet  pronounced. 

3.  At  the  end  of  March,  19 14,  General  Sherbat- 
sheff,  director  of  the  St.  Petersburg  War  Academy, 
made  an  address  to  his  officers,  wherein,  among  other 
things,  he  said :  That  war  with  the  powers  forming  the 
Triple  Alliance  had  become  unavoidable  on  account 
of  Austria's  anti- Russian  Balkan  policy;  that  there 
existed  the  strongest  sort  of  probability  that  it  would 
break  out  as  early  as  that  same  summer ;  that,  for  Rus- 
sia, it  was  a  point  cf  honor  to  assume  the  offensive 
immediately. 

4.  In  the  report  of  the  Belgian  ambassador  at 

251 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Berlin  regarding  a  Japanese  military  mission  which  had 
arrived  from  St.  Petersburg  in  April,  19 14,  it  was 
stated,  among  other  things :  At  the  regimental  messes 
the  Japanese  officers  had  heard  quite  open  talk  of  an 
imminent  war  against  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany; 
it  was  stated,  however,  that  the  army  was  ready  to  take 
the  field,  and  that  the  moment  was  as  auspicious  for  the 
Russians  as  for  their  allies,  the  French. 

5.  According  to  the  memoirs  of  the  then  French 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  M.  Paleologue,  pub- 
lished in  192 1,  in  the  Revue  des  Deux  MondeSy  the 
Grand  Duchesses  Anastasia  and  Militza  told  him  on 
July  22,  19 14,  at  Tsarskoe  Selo,  that  their  father, 
the  King  of  Montenegro,  had  informed  them,  in  a 
cipher  telegram,  that  'Ve  shall  have  war  before  the 
end  of  the  month  [that  is,  before  the  13th  of  August, 
Russian  style]  ;  .  .  .  nothing  will  be  left  of  Austria. 
.  .  .  You  will  take  back  Alsace-Lorraine.  .  .  .  Our 
armies  will  meet  in  Berlin.  .  .  .  Germany  will  be 
annihilated." 

6.  The  former  Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Ber- 
lin, Bogitshevich,  tells  in  his  book.  Causes  of  the  War, 
published  in  19 19,  of  the  following  statement  which 
Cambon,  the  then  French  ambassador  at  Berlin,  made 
to  him  on  the  26th  or  27th  of  July,  1914:  "If  Ger- 
many wishes  matters  to  come  to  a  war,  she  will  have 
England  also  against  her.  The  English  fleet  will  take 
Hamburg.  We  shall  thoroughly  beat  the  Germans." 
Bogitshevich  states  that  this  talk  made  him  sure  that 
the  war  had  been  decided  upon  at  the  time  of  the  meet- 
ing of  Poincare  with  the  Russian  Tsar  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, if  not  sooner. 

RUSSIAN  CROWN  COUNCIL 

7.  Another  Russian  of  high  rank,  a  member  of  the 
Duma  and  a  good  friend  of  Sazonoff,  told  me  later 
about  the  secret  Crown  Council  held,  with  the  Tsar 
presiding,  in  February,  19 14;  moreover,  I  obtained 

252 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 


corroboration,  from  other  Russian  sources  mentioned 
in  my  Historical  Tables,  of  the  following:  At  this 
Crown  Council  Sazonoff  made  an  address  wherein  he 
suggested  to  the  Tsar  to  seize  Constantinople,  which, 
since  the  Triple  Alliance  would  not  acquiesce  in  it, 
would  cause  a  war  against  Germany  and  Austria.  He 
added  that  Italy  would  break  away  from  these  two, 
in  the  natural  course  of  events;  that  France  was  to  be 
trusted  absolutely  and  England  probably. 

The  Tsar  had  agreed,  it  was  said,  and  given  orders 
to  take  the  necessary  preliminary  steps.  The  Russian 
Finance  Minister,  Count  Kokovzeff ,  wrote  to  the  Tsar 
advising  against  this  course — I  was  informed  of  this 
by  Count  Mirbach  after  the  peace  of  Brest-Litovsk — 
recommending  a  firm  union  with  Germany  and  warn- 
ing against  war,  which,  he  said,  would  be  unfavorable 
to  Russia  and  lead  to  revolution  and  the  fall  of  the 
dynasty.  The  Tsar  did  not  follow  this  advice,  but 
pushed  on  toward  war. 

The  same  gentleman  told  me  this :  Two  days  after 
the  outbreak  of  war  he  had  been  invited  by  Sazonoff 
to  breakfast.  The  latter  came  up  to  him,  beaming 
with  joy,  and,  rubbing  his  hands  together,  asked: 
''Come  now,  my  dear  Baron,  you  must  admit  that  I 
have  chosen  the  moment  for  war  excellently,  haven't 
I?"  When  the  Baron,  rather  worried,  asked  him  what 
stand  England  would  take,  the  Minister  smote  his 
pocket,  and,  with  a  sly  wink,  whispered:  ''I  have  some- 
thing in  my  pocket  which,  within  the  next  few  weeks, 
will  bring  joy  to  all  Russia  and  astound  the  entire 
world;  I  have  received  the  English  promise  that  Eng- 
land will  go  with  Russia  against  Germany!" 

9.  Russian  prisoners  belonging  to  the  Siberian 
Corps,  who  were  taken  in  East  Prussia,  said  that  they 
had  been  transported  by  rail  in  the  summer  of  19 13,  to 
the  vicinity  of  Moscow,  since  maneuvers  were  to  be 
held  there  by  the  Tsar.  The  maneuvers  did  not  take 
place,  but  the  troops  were  not  taken  back.   They  were 

253 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

stationed  for  the  winter  in  the  vicinity  of  Moscow.  In 
the  summer  of  19 14  they  were  brought  forward  to 
the  vicinity  of  Vilna,  since  big  maneuvers  were  to  be 
held  there  by  the  Tsar;  at  and  near  Vilna  they  were 
deployed  and  then,  suddenly,  the  sharp  cartridges  (war 
ammunition)  were  distributed  and  they  were  informed 
that  there  was  a  war  against  Germany;  they  were  un- 
able to  say  why  and  wherefore. 

10.  In  a  report,  made  public  in  the  press,  during 
the  winter  of  19 14-15;  by  an  American,  concerning 
his  trip  through  the  Caucasus  in  the  spring  of  19 14, 
the  following  was  stated:  When  he  arrived  in  the 
Caucasus,  at  the  beginning  of  May,  19 14,  he  met, 
while  on  hi$  way  to  Tiflis,  long  columns  of  troops  of 
all  arms,  in  war  equipment.  He  had  feared  that  a 
revolt  had  broken  out  in  the  Caucasus.  When  he 
made  inquiries  of  the  authorities  at  Tiflis,  while  hav- 
ing his  passport  inspected,  he  received  the  quieting 
news  that  the  Caucasus  was  quite  peaceful,  that  he 
might  travel  wheresoever  he  wished,  that  what  he  had 
seen  had  to  do  only  with  practice  marching  and 
maneuvers. 

At  the  close  of  his  trip  at  the  end  of  May,  19 14, 
he  wished  to  embark  at  a  Caucasian  port,  but  all  the 
vessels  there  were  so  filled  with  troops  that  only  after 
much  trouble  could  he  manage  to  get  a  cabin  for  him- 
self and  his  wife.  The  Russian  officers  told  him  that 
they  were  to  land  at  Odessa  and  march  from  there  to 
take  part  in  some  great  maneuvers. 

THE  COSSACK'S  TESTIMONY 

11.  Prince  Tundutoff,  Hetman  of  the  Calmuck 
Cossacks  living  between  Tsaritsin  and  Astrakhan,  who 
was,  before  and  during  the  war,  personal  aid  of  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nicholaievitch,  came  to  General 
Headquarters  at  Bosmont  in  19 18,  seeking  to  establish 
connection  with  Germany,  since  the  Cossacks  were  not 
Slavs  at  all  and  thoroughly  hostile  to  the  Bolsheviki. 

254 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 


He  stated  that  he  had  been  sent  by  Nicholas 
Nicholaievitch,  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  to  the 
General  Staff,  in  order  to  keep  the  Grand  Duke  posted 
on  happenings  there  and  that  he  had  been  a  wit- 
ness of  the  notorious  telephone  talks  between  the 
Tsar  and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General 
Januskevitch ;  that  the  Tsar,  deeply  impressed  by  the 
earnest  telegram  of  the  German  Emperor,  had  re- 
solved to  forbid  mobilization  and  had  ordered  Janus- 
kevitch by  telephone  not  to  carry  out  mobilization, 
i,  e.,  to  break  it  off  ;  that  the  latter  had  not  obeyed 
the  unmistakable  order,  but  had  inquired  by  telephone 
of  Sazonoff,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs — with  whom, 
for  weeks,  he  had  kept  in  touch,  intrigued  and  incited 
to  war — what  he  was  to  do  now;  that  Sazonoff  had 
answered  that  the  Tsar's  order  was  nonsense,  that  all 
the  General  need  do  was  to  carry  out  mobilization, 
that  he  [Sazonoff]  would  bring  the  Tsar  around  again 
next  day  and  talk  him  out  of  heeding  the  stupid  tele- 
gram from  the  German  Emperor;  that,  thereupon,  Jan- 
uskevitch had  informed  the  Tsar  that  mobilization  was 
already  under  way  and  could  no  longer  be  broken  off. 

Prince  Tundutoff  added:  "This  was  a  lie,  for  I 
myself  saw  the  mobilization  order  lying  beside  Janus- 
kevitch on  his  writing  table,  which  shows  that  it  had 
not  as  yet  been  given  out  at  all.'' 

The  psychologically  interesting  point  about  the 
above  is  that  Tsar  Nicholas,  who  helped  prepare  the 
World  War  and  had  already  ordered  mobilization, 
wished  to  recede  at  the  last  moment.  My  earnest, 
warning  telegram,  it  seems,  made  him  realize  clearly 
for  the  first  time  the  colossal  responsibility  which  he 
was  bringing  upon  himself  by  his  warlike  preparations. 
Therefore,  he  wished  to  stop  the  war  machine,  the 
murderer  of  entire  peoples,  which  he  had  just  set  in 
motion.  This  would  have  been  possible  and  peace 
might  have  been  preserved  if  Sazonoff  had  not  frus- 
trated his  wish. 


255 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


When  I  asked  whether  the  Grand  Duke,  who  was 
known  as  a  German-hater,  had  incited  much  to  war, 
the  Cossack  chief  replied  that  the  Grand  Duke  had 
certainly  worked  zealously  for  war,  but  that  incite-  ' 
ment  on  his  part  would  have  been  superfluous,  since 
there  was  already  a  strong  sentiment  against  Germany 
all  through  the  Russian  officer  corps;  that  this  spirit 
was  transmitted,  principally,  from  the  French  army 
to  the  Russian  officers;  that  there  had  been  a  desire, 
in  fact,  to  go  to  war  in  1908-09  (Bosnian  Question), 
but  France  was  not  then  ready;  that,  in  19 14,  Russia, 
likewise,  was  not  quite  ready;  that  Januskevitch  and 
Sukhomlinoff  had  really  planned  the  war  for  19 17,  but 
Sazonoff  and  Isvolsky,  as  well  as  the  French,  could  not 
be  restrained  any  longer;  that  the  former  two  were 
afraid  of  revolution  in  Russia  and  of  the  influence  of 
the  German  Emperor  on  the  Tsar,  which  might  dis- 
suade the  Tsar  from  the  idea  of  waging  war;  and 
that  the  French,  who  were  sure,  for  the  time  being, 
of  England's  help,  were  afraid  that  England  might 
come  to  an  understanding  later  on  with  Germany  at 
the  expense  of  France. 

When  I  asked  whether  the  Tsar  had  been  aware  of 
the  warlike  spirit  in  Russia  and  had  tolerated  it,  the 
Cossack  Prince  answered  that  it  was  worthy  of  note 
that  the  Tsar  had  forbidden  once  for  all,  as  a  matter 
of  precaution,  the  inviting  of  German  diplomats  or 
military  attaches  to  luncheons  or  evening  meals  given 
by  Russian  officers  at  which  he  himself  was  to  be 
present. 

STORES  OF  ENGLISH  COATS 

(12)  When  our  troops  advanced  in  19 14  they 
found,  in  northern  France  and  along  the  Belgian 
frontier,  great  stores  of  English  soldiers'  greatcoats. 
According  to  statements  by  the  inhabitants,  these  were 
placed  there  during  the  last  years  of  peace.  Most  of 
the  English  infantrymen  who  were  made  prisoners  by 

256 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 


us  in  the  summer  of  19 14  had  no  greatcoats;  when  y 
asked  why,  they  answered,  quite  naively:  "We  are  to 
find  our  greatcoats  in  the  stores  at  Maubeuge,  Le 
Quesnoy,  etc.,  in  the  north  of  France  and  in  Belgium." 

It  was  the  same  regarding  maps.  In  Maubeuge 
great  quantities  of  English  military  maps  of  northern 
France  and  Belgium  were  found  by  our  men;  copies  of 
these  have  been  shown  to  me.  The  names  of  places 
were  printed  in  French  and  English,  and  all  sorts  of 
words  were  translated  in  the  margin  for  the  conven- 
ience of  soldiers;  for  instance:  moulin=mill,  pont= 
bridge,  maison=house,  ville=town,  bois=wood,  etc. 
These  maps  date  from  191 1  and  were  engraved  at 
Southampton. 

The  stores  were  established  by  England,  with  the 
permission  of  the  French  and  Belgian  Governments, 
before  the  war,  in  the  midst  of  peace.  What  a  tempest 
of  horror  would  have  broken  out  in  Belgium,  the  "neu- 
tral country,"  and  what  a  rumpus  England  and  France 
would  have  kicked  up,  if  we  had  wished  to  establish 
stores  of  German  soldiers^  greatcoats  and  maps  in 
Spa,  Liege,  and  Namur  I 

Among  the  statesmen  who,  besides  Poincare,  par- 
ticularly helped  unleash  the  World  War,  the  Sazonoff- 
Isvolsky  group  probably  should  take  first  rank.  Isvol- 
sky,  it  is  said,  when  at  Paris,  proudly  placed  his  hand 
upon  his  breast  and  declared:  "I  made  the  war.  Je 
suis  le  pere  de  cette  guerre"  ("I  am  the  father  of  this 
war"). 

Delcasse  also  has  a  large  share  in  the  guilt  for 
the  World  War,  and  Grey  an  even  larger  share,  since 
he  was  the  spiritual  leader  of  the  "encirclement  policy," 
which  he  faithfully  pushed  forward  and  brought  to 
completion,  as  the  "legacy"  of  his  dead  sovereign. 

I  have  been  informed  that  an  important  role 
was  played  in  the  preparation  of  the  World  War 
directed  against  the  monarchical  Central  Powers 

257 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

by  the  policy  of  the  international  "Great  Orient 
Lodge" ;  a  policy  extending  over  many  years  and 
always  envisaging  the  goal  at  which  it  aimed.  But 
the  German  Great  Lodges,  I  was  furthermore  told 
— with  two  exceptions  wherein  non-German  finan- 
cial interests  are  paramount  and  which  maintain 
secret  connection  with  the  "Great  Orient"  in  Paris 
— had  no  relationship  to  the  "Great  Orient."  They 
were  entirely  loyal  and  faithful,  according  to  the 
assurance  given  me  by  the  distinguished  German 
Freemason  who  explained  to  me  this  whole  inter- 
relationship, which  had,  until  then,  been  unknown 
to  me.  He  said  that  in  1917  an  international  meet- 
ing of  the  lodges  of  the  "Great  Orient"  was  held, 
after  which  there  was  a  subsequent  conference  in 
Switzerland;  at  this  the  following  program  was 
adopted:  Dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary, 
democratization  of  Germany,  elimination  of  the 
House  of  Hapsburg,  abdication  of  the  German 
Emperor,  restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France, 
union  of  Galicia  with  Poland,  elimination  of  the 
Pope  and  the  Catholic  Church,  elimination  of 
every  state  Church  in  Europe. 

I  am  not  now  in  a  position  to  investigate  the  very 
damaging  information  which  has  been  transmitted 
to  me,  in  the  best  of  faith,  concerning  the  organi- 
zation and  activities  of  the  Great  Orient  Lodges. 
Secret  and  public  political  organizations  have 
played  important  parts  in  the  life  of  peoples  and 
states,  ever  since  history  has  existed.  Some  of  them 
have  been  beneficial:  most  of  them  have  been  de- 
structive, if  they  had  to  have  secret  passwords 

258 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 

which  shunned  the  light  of  day.  The  most  dan- 
gerous of  these  organizations  hide  under  the  cloak 
of  some  ideal  object  or  other — such  as  active  love 
of  their  neighbors,  readiness  to  help  the  weak,  and 
poor,  and  so  forth — in  order  that,  with  such 
pretexts  as  a  blind,  they  may  work  for  their  real 
secret  ends.  It  is  certainly  advisable  to  study  the 
activities  of  the  Great  Orient  Lodges,  since  one 
cannot  adopt  a  final  attitude  toward  this  world- 
wide organization  until  it  has  been  thoroughly 
investigated. 

I  shall  not  take  up  the  war  operations  in  this 
work.  I  shall  leave  this  task  all  the  more  read- 
ily to  my  officers  and  to  the  historians,  since  I, 
writing  as  I  am  without  a  single  document,  would 
be  able  to  describe  events  only  in  very  broad 
outline. 

When  I  look  back  upon  the  four  arduous  war 
years,  with  their  hopes  and  fears,  their  brilliant 
victories  and  losses  in  precious  blood,  what  is  up- 
permost in  my  mind  is  the  feeling  of  ardent  grati- 
tude and  undying  admiration  for  the  unequaled 
achievements  of  the  German  Nation  in  arms. 

PROUD  OF  GERMAN  ARMY 

Just  as  no  sacrifice  in  endurance  and  privation 
was  too  great  for  those  staying  at  home,  so  also  the 
army,  in  defending  itself  during  the  war  criminally 
forced  upon  us,  did  not  merely  overcome  the 
crushing  superiority  of  twenty-eight  hostile  na- 
tions, but  likewise,  on  land  and  water  and  in  the 
air,  won  victories  whose  glory  may  have  paled  a 
18  259 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

bit  in  the  mists  of  the  present  day,  but,  for  that 
very  reason,  will  shine  forth  all  the  more  brightly 
in  the  light  of  history.  Nor  is  that  all.  Wherever 
there  v^as  distress  among  our  allies,  German  inter- 
vention, often  with  weak  forces,  always  restored 
the  situation  and  often  won  noteworthy  successes. 
Germans  fought  on  all  the  battlefields  of  the  far- 
flung  World  War. 

Surely  the  heroic  bravery  of  the  German  nation 
deserved  a  better  fate  than  to  fall  a  victim  to  the 
dagger  that  treacherously  stabbed  it  from  behind; 
it  seems  to  be  the  German  destiny  that  Germans 
shall  always  be  defeated  by  Germans.  Recently  I 
read  the  unfortunately  not  entirely  unjustified 
words:  "In  Germany  every  Siegfried  has  his 
Hodur  behind  him." 

Finally,  let  me  say  a  word  concerning  the  Ger- 
man "atrocities"  and  give  two  instances  thereof! 

After  our  advance  into  northern  France  I  im- 
mediately ordered  that  art  treasures  be  protected. 
Art  historians  and  professors  were  assigned  to  each 
army,  who  traveled  about  inspecting,  photograph- 
ing, and  describing  churches,  chateaux,  and  castles. 
Among  them  Professor  Clemen,  Curator  of  the 
Rhine  Province,  especially  distinguishel  himself 
and  reported  to  me,  when  I  was  at  the  front,  on  the 
protection  of  art  treasures. 

All  the  collections  in  towns,  museums,  and  cas- 
tles were  catalogued  and  numbered;  whenever 
they  seemed  to  be  imperiled  by  the  fighting  they 
were  taken  away  and  assembled,  at  Valenciennes 
and  Maubeuge,  in  two  splendid  museums.  There 

260 


THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 

they  were  carefully  preserved  and  the  name  of  the 
owner  marked  on  each  article. 

The  old  windows  of  the  cathedral  of  St.  Qucn- 
tin  were  removed  by  German  soldiers,  at  the  risk 
of  their  lives,  under  English  shell-fire.  The  story 
of  the  destruction  of  the  church  by  the  English 
was  told  by  a  German  Catholic  priest,  who  pub- 
lished it  with  photographs,  and  it  was  sent,  by  my 
orders,  to  the  Pope. 

At  the  chateau  of  Pinon,  which  belongs  to  the 
Princess  of  Poix,  who  had  been  a  guest  of  mine 
and  the  Empress,  the  headquarters  of  the  general 
commanding  the  Third  Army  Corps  was  located. 
I  visited  the  chateau  and  lived  there.  Previously 
the  English  had  been  quartered  there  and  had  rav- 
aged the  place  terribly.  The  commanding  gen- 
eral, von  Lochow,  and  his  staff  had  a  great  deal  of 
trouble  getting  it  into  some  sort  of  shape  again 
after  the  devastation  wrought  by  the  English. 

Accompanied  by  the  general,  I  visited  the  pri- 
vate apartments  of  the  Princess,  which,  up  to  then, 
our  soldiers  had  been  forbidden  to  enter.  I  found 
that  her  entire  wardrobe  had  been  thrown  out  of 
the  clothes  presses  by  the  English  soldiers  and,  to- 
gether with  her  hats,  was  lying  about  on  the  floor. 
I  had  every  garment  carefully  cleaned,  hung  in 
the  presses,  and  locked  up.  The  writing  desk  had 
also  been  broken  into  and  the  Princess's  corre- 
spondence was  scattered  about.  At  my  command, 
all  the  letters  were  gathered  together,  sealed  in  a 
package,  placed  in  the  writing  desk,  and  locked  up. 
'    Afterward,  all  the  silverware  was  found  buried 

261 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

in  the  garden.  According  to  the  villagers  this  had 
been  ordered  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  July,  so 
the  Princess  had  known  about  the  war  long  before 
its  outbreak!  I  at  once  ordered  that  the  silver  be 
inventoried,  deposited  in  the  bank  at  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle,  and  returned  to  the  Princess  after  the  war. 
Through  neutral  channels  I  caused  news  to  be 
transmitted  to  the  Princess  in  Switzerland,  by  my 
Court  Marshal,  Freiherr  von  Reischach,  concern- 
ing Pinon,  her  silverware,  and  my  care  for  her 
property.  No  answer  was  received.  Instead,  the 
Princess  had  published  in  the  French  press  a  letter 
to  the  effect  that  General  von  Kluck  had  stolen  all 
her  silver. 

On  account  of  my  care  and  the  self-sacrificing 
work  of  German  art  experts  and  soldiers — partly 
at  the  risk  of  their  lives — art  treasures  worth  bil- 
lions were  preserved  for  their  French  owners  and 
for  French  towns.  This  was  done  by  the  Huns, 
the  bochesl 


CHAPTER  XI 


The  Pope  and  Peace 

IN  the  summer  of  1917  I  received  at  Krueznach 
a  visit  from  the  Papal  Nuncio,  Pacelli,  who  was 
accompanied  by  a  chaplain.  Pacelli  is  a  distin- 
guished, likable  man,  of  high  intelligence  and 
excellent  manners,  the  perfect  pattern  of  an  emi- 
nent prelate  of  the  Catholic  Church.  He  knows 
German  well  enough  to  understand  it  easily  when 
he  hears  it,  but  not  sufficiently  to  speak  it  with 
fluency. 

Our  conversation  was  conducted  in  French,  but 
the  Nuncio  now  and  then  employed  German  ex- 
pressions of  speech.  The  chaplain  spoke  German 
fluently  and  took  part — even  when  not  asked — in 
the  conversation,  whenever  he  feared  that  the  Nun- 
cio was  becoming  too  much  influenced  by  what  I 
said. 

Very  soon  the  conversation  turned  on  the  possi- 
bility of  peace  mediation  and  the  bringing  about 
of  peace,  in  which  connection  all  sorts  of  projects 
and  possibilities  were  touched  upon,  discussed,  and 
dismissed. 

Finally,  I  suggested  that  the  Pope  should  make 
an  effort,  seeing  that  my  peace  offer  of  December 

263 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

12,  1 916,  had  been  rejected  in  such  an  unprece- 
dented manner.  The  Nuncio  remarked  that  he 
thought  such  a  step  would  be  attended  with  great 
difficulties;  that  the  Pope  had  already  been  re- 
buffed when  he  had  made  certain  advances  in  this 
direction ;  that,  aside  from  this,  the  Pope  was  ab- 
solutely in  despair  on  account  of  the  slaughter  and 
wondered  ceaselessly  how  he  might  help  toward 
freeing  the  world  and  European  culture  from  the 
scourge  of  war.  Any  suggestion  as  to  this,  he 
added,  would  be  most  valuable  to  the  Vatican. 

I  stated  that  the  Pope,  as  the  highest  in  rank 
among  ail  the  priests  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Chris- 
tians and  Church,  should,  first  of  all,  seek  to  issue 
instructions  to  his  priests  in  all  countries  to  banish 
hate,  once  for  all,  from  their  minds,  since  hate  was 
the  greatest  obstacle  in  the  path  of  the  peace  idea; 
that  it  was,  unfortunately,  true  that  the  clergy  in 
the  Entente  countries  were,  to  a  positively  fright- 
ful extent,  the  standard-bearers  and  instigators  of 
hate  and  fighting. 

I  called  attention  to  the  numerous  reports  from 
soldiers  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  concerning 
abbes  and  parish  priests  captured  with  arms  in 
their  hands;  to  the  machinations  of  Cardinal  Mer- 
cier  and  the  Belgian  clergy,  members  of  which 
often  worked  as  spies ;  to  the  sermon  of  the  Pro- 
testant Bishop  of  London,  who,  from  the  pulpit, 
glorified  the  "Baralong"  murderers;  and  to  other 
similar  cases.  I  added  that  it  would  be,  therefore, 
a  great  achievement  if  the  Pope  should  succeed  in 
having  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  in  all  the  coun- 

264 


THE  POPE  AND  PEACE 

tries  at  war  condemn  hatred  and  recommend  peace, 
as  was  already  being  done  by  the  German  clergy, 
be  it  from  the  pulpit  or  by  means  of  pastoral 
letters. 

URGES  PAPAL  INTERCESSION 

Pacelli  found  this  idea  excellent  and  worthy  of 
attention,  but  he  remarked  that  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  enlist  the  efiforts  of  the  various  prelates  in 
its  support.  I  replied  that,  in  view  of  the  severe 
discipline  of  the  hierarchy  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church,  I  could  not  imagine  that,  if  the  Pope 
should  solemnly  call  upon  the  prelates  of  the 
Church  to  preach  reconciliation  and  consideration 
for  the  foe,  those  of  any  country  whatsoever  should 
refuse  obedience;  that  the  prelates,  on  account  of 
their  eminent  rank,  were  above  all  parties,  and, 
since  reconciliation  and  love  of  our  neighbor  were 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Christian  religion, 
they  were  absolutely  in  duty  bound  to  work  toward 
making  people  observe  these  principles. 

Pacelli  agreed  to  this  and  promised  to  give  the 
idea  his  earnest  attention  and  report  upon  it  to  the 
Vatican.  In  the  further  course  of  the  conversation, 
the  Nuncio  asked  what  form — beyond  the  purely 
ecclesiastical  step  suggested  by  me — the  bringing 
about  of  peace  possibilities  through  the  interven- 
tion of  the  Pope  might  take.  I  pointed  out  that 
Italy  and  Austria  were  two  Roman  Catholic  states, 
upon  which  the  Pope  could  bring  influence  to  bear 
easily  and  effectively;  that  one  of  these  lands  was 
his  native  country  and  place  of  residence,  in  which 

265 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

he  was  greatly  revered  by  the  people  and  exerted 
direct  influence  upon  his  fellow  countrymen;  that 
Austria  was  ruled  by  a  sovereign  who  actually  bore 
the  title  ^^apostolic" ;  who,  with  all  his  family,  had 
direct  relations  with  the  Vatican  and  was  among 
the  most  faithful  adherents  of  the  Catholic 
Church ;  that  I  was,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that 
it  would  not  be  difficult  for  the  Pope  to  try  at  least 
to  make  a  beginning  with  these  two  countries  and 
cause  them  to  talk  peace. 

I  added  that  the  diplomatic  skill  and  wide  vision 
of  the  Vatican  were  known  the  world  over;  that, 
if  once  a  beginning  were  made  in  this  way — and 
it  had  a  good  chance  of  success — the  other  Powers 
could  scarcely  refuse  an  invitation  from  the  Vati- 
can later  on  to  an  exchange  of  views,  which  should 
be,  at  first,  not  binding  upon  them. 

The  Nuncio  remarked  that  it  would  be  difficult 
for  the  Vatican  to  make  the  Italian  Government 
agree  to  such  a  thing,  since  it  had  no  direct  rela- 
tion with  the  said  Government  and  no  influence 
upon  its  members;  that  the  Italian  Government 
would  never  look  with  favor  upon  an  invitation, 
even  to  mere  conferences. 

Here  the  chaplain  interposed  that  such  a  step 
by  the  Pope  was  absolutely  out  of  the  question, 
since  it  would  entail  consequences  which  might  be 
actually  dangerous  to  the  Vatican;  the  Govern- 
ment would  at  once  mobilize  the  "piazza"  ("man 
in  the  street")  against  the  Vatican,  and  the  Vatican 
certainly  could  not  expose  itself  to  that.  When  I 
refused  to  attach  importance  to  this  objection,  the 

266 


THE  POPE  AND  PEACE 

chaplain  grew  more  and  more  excited.  He  said 
that  I  did  not  know  the  Romans ;  that,  when  they 
were  incited  they  were  simply  terrible;  that  just 
as  soon  as  the  ^^piazza"  got  into  action  things  would 
get  disagreeable;  that,  if  it  did,  there  was  even  a 
possibility  of  an  attack  on  the  Vatican,  which 
might  actually  imperil  the  life  of  the  Pope 
himself. 

SCOUTS  DANGER  FROM  "PIAZZA" 

I  replied  that  I,  too,  was  well  acquainted  with 
the  Vatican;  that  no  rabble  or  "piazza"  could 
storm  it;  that,  in  addition,  the  Pope  had  a  strong 
party  of  adherents  in  society  circles  and  among  the 
people,  which  would  at  once  be  ready  to  defend 
him.  The  Nuncio  agreed  with  me,  but  the  chap- 
lain continued  unabashed  to  expatiate  upon  the 
terrors  of  the  "piazza"  and  paint  the  risks  run  by 
the  Pope  in  the  blackest  of  colors. 

I  then  remarked  that  anyone  wishing  to  capture 
the  Vatican  must  first  get  a  battery  of  heavy  mor- 
tars and  howitzers,  as  well  as  pioneers  and  storm 
troops,  and  institute  a  regular  siege;  that  all  this 
was  scarcely  possible  for  the  "piazza" ;  that,  there- 
fore, it  was  highly  improbable  that  the  latter  would 
undertake  anything.  Moreover,  I  mentioned  hav- 
ing heard  that  measures  had  already  been  taken  in 
the  Vatican  to  guard  against  such  an  emergency. 
At  this  the  priest  was  silent. 

The  Nuncio  then  remarked  that  it  was  difficult 
for  the  Pope  to  do  anything  really  practical  toward 
peace  without  giving  ofifense  and  arousing  opposi- 

267 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

tion  in  lay  Italy,  which  would  place  him  in  danger ; 
that  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  he  was,  unfor- 
tunately, not  free;  that  had  the  Pope  a  country, 
or  at  least  a  district  of  his  own  where  he  could 
govern  autonomously  and  do  as  he  pleased,  the 
situation  would  be  quite  different;  that,  as  mat- 
ters stood,  he  was  too  dependent  upon  lay  Rome 
and  not  able  to  act  according  to  his  own  free  will. 

I  remarked  that  the  aim  of  bringing  peace  to 
the  world  was  so  holy  and  great  that  it  was  impos- 
sible for  the  Pope  to  be  frightened  away,  by  purely 
wordly  considerations,  from  accomplishing  such 
a  task,  which  seemed  created  especially  for  him; 
that,  should  he  succeed  in  it,  the  grateful  world 
would  assuredly  bring  influence  to  bear  upon  the 
Italian  Government  in  support  of  his  wishes  and 
of  his  independence. 

This  made  an  impression  on  the  Nuncio;  he 
remarked  that  I  was  right,  after  all;  that  the 
Pope  must  do  something  in  the  matter. 

Then  I  called  the  attention  of  the  Nuncio  to  the 
following  point:  He  must  have  noticed,  I  said, 
how  the  Socialists  of  all  countries  were  zealously 
working  in  favor  of  peace  efforts.  I  told  him  that 
we  had  always  allowed  the  German  Socialists  to 
travel  to  foreign  parts  in  order  to  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  making  peace  at  conferences,  because  I 
believed  them  to  be  acquainted  with  the  desires 
and  views  of  the  lower  classes ;  that  we  placed  no 
obstacles  in  the  path  of  anybody  desiring  to  work 
honestly  and  without  veiled  purpose  in  the  inter- 
ests of  peace;  that  the  same  desires  for  peace  also 

268 


THE  POPE  AND  PEACE 

existed  among  the  Entente  nations  and  among 
their  Socialists,  but  that  the  latter  were  prevented 
by  refusal  of  passports  from  attending  congresses 
in  neutral  lands;  that  the  desire  for  peace  was 
gaining  strength  in  the  world,  nations  were  ac- 
quiring it  more  and  more,  and  if  nobody  in  any 
Government  should  be  found  willing  to  work 
for  peace — I,  unfortunately,  had  failed  in  my 
attempt — the  peoples  would  finally  take  the 
matter  into  their  own  hands.  I  added  that  this 
would  not  occur  without  serious  shocks  and 
revolutions,  as  history  proved,  through  which  the 
Roman  Church  and  the  Pope  would  not  come 
unscathed. 

WINS  PROMISE  OF  ACTION 

What  must  a  Catholic  soldier  think,  I  asked, 
when  he  reads  always  of  efforts  by  Socialists  only, 
never  of  an  effort  by  the  Pope,  to  free  him  from 
the  horrors  of  war?  If  the  Pope  did  nothing,  I  < 
continued,  there  was  danger  of  peace  being  forced 
upon  the  world  by  the  Socialists,  which  would 
mean  the  end  of  the  power  of  the  Pope  and  the 
Roman  Church,  even  among  Catholics! 

This  argument  struck  home  to  the  Nuncio.  He 
stated  that  he  would  at  once  report  it  to  the  Vatican 
and  give  it  his  support;  that  the  Pope  would  have 
to  act. 

Greatly  worried,  the  chaplain  again  interposed, 
remarking  that  the  Pope  would  endanger  himself 
by  such  a  course ;  that  the  "piazza"  would  attack 
him. 

269 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

To  this  I  replied  that  I  was  a  Protestant,  and, 
hence,  a  heretic  in  the  chaplain's  eyes,  notwith- 
standing which  I  was  obliged  to  point  out  that 
the  Pope  was  designated  the  "Viceroy  of  Christ 
upon  earth"  by  the  Catholic  Church  and  world; 
that  I  had,  in  studying  the  Holy  Scriptures,  occu- 
pied myself  earnestly  and  carefully  with  the  per- 
son of  the  Saviour  and  sought  to  immerse  myself 
profoundly  therein;  that  the  Lord  had  never 
feared  the  "piazza,"  although  no  fortresslike 
building,  with  guards  and  weapons,  was  at  His 
disposal;  that  the  Lord  had  always  walked  into 
the  midst  of  the  "piazza,"  spoken  to  it,  and  finally 
gone  to  His  death  on  the  Cross  for  the  sake  of  this 
hostile  "piazza." 

Was  I  now  to  believe,  I  asked,  that  His  "Vice- 
roy upon  earth"  was  afraid  of  the  possibility  of 
becoming  a  martyr,  like  his  Lord,  in  order  to  bring 
peace  to  the  bleeding  world,  all  on  account  of 
the  ragged  Roman  "piazza"?  I,  the  Protes- 
tant, thought  far  too  highly  of  a  Roman  priest, 
particularly  of  the  Pope,  to  believe  such  a 
thing.  Nothing  could  be  more  glorious  for  him, 
I  went  on,  than  to  devote  himself  unreservedly, 
body  and  soul,  to  the  great  cause  of  peace,  even 
despite  the  remote  danger  of  thus  becoming  a 
martyr! 

With  shining  eyes,  the  Nuncio  grasped  my  hand 
and  said,  deeply  moved :  "Vous  avez  parf aitement 
raison!  C'est  le  devoir  du  Pape;  il  faut  qu'il 
agisse ;  c'est  par  lui  que  le  monde  doit  etre  regagne 
a  la  paix.  Je  transmettrai  vos  paroles  a  Sa  Sain- 

270 


THE  POPE  AND  PEACE 

tete''  ("You  are  absolutely  right!  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  Pope ;  he  must  act ;  it  is  through  him  that 
the  world  must  be  won  back  to  peace.  I  shall 
transmit  your  words  to  His  Holiness"). 

The  chaplain  turned  away,  shaking  his  head, 
and  murmured  to  himself:  "Ah,  la  piazza,  la 
piazza!" 


i 


CHAPTER  XII 


End  of  the  War  and  My  Abdication 
FEW  days  after  August  8,  1918,  I  sum- 


moned  a  Crown  Council,  in  order  to  get  a 
clear  conception  of  the  situation  and  to  draw 
therefrom  the  necessary  conclusions  upon  which 
to  base  the  policy  to  be  followed  by  Count  Hert- 
ling.  The  Chief  Military  Command  approved 
the  idea  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  should  keep 
in  sight  the  possibility  of  getting  into  closer  touch 
with  the  enemy,  but  laid  stress  on  the  necessity 
of  first  occupying  the  Siegfried  line  and  there 
thoroughly  beating  off  the  foe,  and  on  the  fact 
that  negotiations  must  not  begin  before  this  oc- 
curred. Thereupon  I  directed  that  the  Chancellor 
get  into  communication  with  a  neutral  power — the 
Netherlands — in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  was 
ready  to  undertake  such  a  step  toward  mediation. 

What  rendered  the  contemplated  action  through 
Dutch  channels  very  difficult  was  that  Austria 
could  not  be  brought  to  a  definite  agreement,  but 
continually  postponed  the  declaration  which  had 
been  requested  of  her.  Even  a  verbal  agreement 
given  to  me  by  the  Emperor  Charles  was  afterward 
broken  by  him  under  Burian's  influence. 


272 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 

The  Dutch  government  had  already  been  in- 
formed by  me  and  had  signified  its  readiness  to 
act.  Meanwhile,  Austria,  without  notifying  us, 
made  her  first  separate  peace  offer,  which  set  the 
ball  rolling.  The  Emperor  Charles  had  indeed 
got  into  touch  secretly  with  the  Entente  and  had 
long  since  resolved  to  abandon  us.  He  acted  ac- 
cording to  the  plan  which  he  had  explained  thus 
to  his  entourage:  "When  I  go  to  the  Germans,  I 
agree  to  everything  they  say,  and  when  I  return 
home,  I  do  whatever  I  please." 

Thus  it  happened  that  my  government  and  I 
were  constantly  deceived  by  actions  in  Vienna, 
without  being  able  to  do  anything  against  it,  since 
from  there  we  constantly  received  the  hint:  "If 
you  make  things  hard  for  us,  we  shall  leave  you 
in  the  lurch;  in  other  words,  our  army  will  no 
longer  fight  by  your  side."  In  view  of  our  situ- 
ation, such  action  on  Austria's  part  had  to  be 
avoided  in  any  way  possible,  both  on  military  and 
political  grounds. 

The  defection  of  Hungary  and  Austria  brought 
a  crisis  upon  us.  Had  Emperor  Charles  kept  con- 
trol of  his  nerves  for  three  weeks  longer,  many 
things  would  have  turned  out  differently.  But 
Andrassy — as  he  himself  admitted — had  been  ne- 
gotiating for  a  long  time  in  Switzerland,  behind 
our  backs,  with  the  Entente.  Thus  Emperor 
Charles  believed  that  he  would  assure  himself  of 
good  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Entente. 

After  our  failure  of  August  8th,  General  Luden- 
dorff  had  declared  that  he  could  no  longer  guar- 

273 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

antee  a  military  victory.  Therefore,  the  prepara- 
tion of  peace  negotiations  was  necessary.  Since 
diplomacy  had  not  succeeded  in  initiating  any 
promising  negotiations  and  the  military  situation 
had  become  even  worse  in  the  meantime,  on  ac- 
count of  revolutionary  agitation,  Ludendorff,  on 
the  29th  of  September,  demanded  that  preparations 
be  made  for  an  armistice  instead  of  for  peace 
negotiations. 

MOVEMENT  FOR  ABDICATION 

At  this  critical  time  a  strong  movement  began 
at  home  in  favor  of  setting  up  a  new  government 
for  the  now  necessary  termination  of  the  war.  I 
could  not  ignore  this  movement,  since  the  old  gov- 
ernment, during  the  seven  weeks  from  August  8th 
to  the  end  of  September,  had  not  managed  to 
initiate  peace  negotiations  offering  any  hope  of 
success. 

Meanwhile,  General  von  Gallwitz  and  General 
von  Mudra,  summoned  from  the  front,  appeared 
before  me.  They  gave  a  picture  of  the  inner  situ- 
ation of  the  army,  laying  due  emphasis  upon  the 
great  number  of  shirkers  behind  the  front,  the  fre- 
quency of  insubordination,  the  displaying  of  the 
red  flag  upon  trains  filled  with  soldiers  return- 
ing from  furloughs  at  home  and  other  similar 
phenomena. 

The  two  generals  considered  that  the  principal 
cause  of  the  bad  conditions  was  to  be  sought  in  the 
unfavorble  influence  exerted  upon  the  soldiers  by 
the  spirit  predominating  behind  the  front  and  in 

274 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 


the  general  desire  for  ending  the  fighting  and  get- 
ting peace,  which  was  spreading  from  the  home- 
land along  the  lines  of  communication  behind  the 
front  and  was  already  becoming  noticeable  even 
among  some  of  the  troops  at  the  front  itself.  The 
generals  advanced  the  opinion  that,  owing  to  these 
reasons,  the  army  must  immediately  be  withdrawn 
behind  the  Antwerp-Meuse  line. 

On  that  same  day  I  commanded  Field  Marshal 
von  Hindenburg  by  telephone  to  effect  as  soon  as 
possible  the  retreat  to  the  Antwerp-Meuse  line. 
The  falling  back  of  the  tired,  but  nowhere  deci- 
sively beaten,  army  to  this  position  merely  signi- 
fied occupying  an  essentially  shorter  line,  possess- 
ing far  greater  natural  advantages.  It  was  not 
yet  completed,  to  be  sure,  but  the  fact  was  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  we  had  engaged  in  battle  on 
the  Somme  while  occupying  positions  composed 
largely  of  shell  craters.  What  we  had  to  do  was 
to  regain  operative  freedom,  which,  to  my  way  of 
thinking,  was  by  no  means  impossible;  in  the 
course  of  the  war,  had  we  not  often  retreated  in 
order  to  put  ourselves  in  a  situation  that  was  more 
advantageous  from  the  military  point  of  view? 

The  army,  to  be  sure,  was  no  longer  the  old 
army.  The  new  1918  troops  particularly  were 
badly  tainted  with  revolutionary  propaganda  and 
often  took  advantage  of  the  darkness  at  night  to 
sneak  away  from  the  firing  and  vanish  to  the 
rear. 

But  the  majority  of  my  divisions  fought  flaw= 
lessly  to  the  very  end  and  preserved  their  disci- 
19  275 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

pline  and  military  spirit.  To  the  very  end  they 
were  always  a  match  for  the  foe  in  morale ;  despite 
superiority  in  numbers,  cannon,  munitions,  tanks, 
and  airplanes,  the  foe  invariably  succumbed  when 
he  ran  up  against  serious  resistance.  Therefore, 
the  associations  of  our  ex-fighters  at  the  front  are 
right  in  bearing  upon  their  banners  the  motto: 
"Unbeaten  on  land  and  sea!" 

SAYS  ARMY  WAS  STILL  STRONG 

The  achievements  of  the  German  fighters  at  the 
front  and  of  the  German  Nation  in  arms,  during 
four  and  a  half  years  of  war,  are  beyond  all  praise. 
One  does  not  know  what  to  admire  most:  the  en- 
thusiasm with  which  the  magnificent  youth  of 
1914,  without  waiting  for  our  artillery  fire  to  take 
effect,  joyfully  charged  on  the  enemy,  or  the  self- 
sacrificing  fidelity  to  duty  and  tenacity  with  which 
our  men  in  field  gray,  sparingly  fed  and  seldom 
relieved,  year  in,  year  out,  digging  by  night,  liv- 
ing in  dugouts  and  earthholes  by  day,  or  crouching 
in  shell  holes,  defied  the  hail  of  steel  from  the 
enemy  artillery,  flyers,  and  tanks.  And  this  army, 
which  one  might  have  expected  was  to  be  rated  as 
utterly  fought  to  a  finish,  was  able,  after  nearly 
four  years  of  war,  to  carry  out  successful  offensive 
operations  such  as  our  foes  could  nowhere  boast 
of,  despite  their  colossal  superiority. 

In  spite  of  all  this,  it  was  not  right  to  believe 
the  German  army  capable  of  accomplishing  the 
superhuman ;  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  fall  back, 
in  order  to  get  breath. 

276 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 

The  Field  Marshal  balked  at  the  order  to  re- 
treat; the  army,  he  thought,  should  stay  were  it 
was,  for  political  reasons  (peace  negotiations  and 
so  on) ;  he  also  pointed  out,  among  other  things, 
that  it  was  necessary,  first,  to  arrange  for  the  with- 
drawal to  the  rear  of  war  materials,  etc. 

I  now  resolved  to  go  to  the  front,  acquiescing 
in  the  desire  expressed  to  me  by  the  army  that 
I  might  be  with  my  hard-fighting  troops  and 
convince  myself  personally  of  their  spirit  and 
condition. 

I  could  carry  out  this  resolve  all  the  sooner  in 
view  of  the  fact  that,  ever  since  the  new  Govern- 
ment had  been  set  up,  no  further  claims  were  made 
upon  my  time  either  by  it  or  by  the  Imperial 
Chancellor,  which  made  my  staying  at  home  seem 
useless. 

The  notes  to  Wilson  were  discussed  and  writ- 
ten by  Solf,  the  War  Cabinet,  and  the  Reichstag, 
after  sessions  lasting  hours,  without  my  being  in- 
formed thereof;  until,  finally,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  last  note  to  Wilson,  I  caused  Solf  to  be  given 
to  understand  very  plainly,  through  my  chief  of 
Cabinet,  that  I  demanded  to  know  about  the  note 
before  it  was  sent. 

Solf  appeared  and  showed  the  note;  he  was 
proud  of  his  antithesis  between  laying  down  of 
arms  ("Waffenstreckung"),  which  was  demanded 
by  Wilson,  and  armistice  ("Waffenstillstand") , 
which  was  proposed.  When  I  spoke  about  the 
rumors  of  abdication  and  demanded  that  the  For- 
eign Office  adopt  an  attitude,  through  the  press, 

277 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

against  what  was  unworthy  in  the  newspaper 
polemics,  Solf  replied  that  already  everybody  on 
every  street  corner  was  talking  about  abdication 
and  that,  even  in  the  best  circles,  people  were  dis- 
cussing it  quite  unreservedly. 

When  I  expressed  my  indignation  at  this,  Solf 
sought  to  console  me  by  observing  that,  should  His 
Majesty  go,  he  also  would,  since  he  could  serve  no 
longer  under  such  conditions.  I  went,  or — to  put 
it  much  more  correctly — I  was  overthrown  by  my 
own  Government,  and — Herr  Solf  remained. 

When  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Prince  Max, 
heard  of  my  resolve  to  go  to  the  front,  he  did  all 
he  could  to  prevent  it.  He  asked  why  I  wished  to 
go  and  received  the  answer  that  I  considered  it  my 
duty,  as  Supreme  Commander,  to  return  to  the 
front,  since  I  had  been  separated  for  almost  a 
month  from  the  hard-fighting  army.  When  the 
Chancellor  objected  that  I  was  indispensable  at 
home,  I  retorted  that  we  were  at  war,  that  the 
Emperor  belonged  to  his  soldiers.  Finally.,  I  de- 
clared, once  for  all,  that  I  would  go ;  that  in  case 
Wilson's  armistice  note  arrived,  it  would  have  to 
be  discussed,  anyhow,  at  the  General  Headquar- 
ters of  the  army,  for  which  purpose  the  Chancellor 
and  other  members  of  the  Government  would  be 
obliged  to  go  to  Spa  for  the  conferences. 

*70YFULLY  RECEIVED"  BY  ARMY 

I  went  to  the  army  in  Flanders,  after  having 
once  more  given  the  General  Staff  at  Spa  definite 
orders  to  fall  back  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the 

278 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 


Antwerp-Meuse  line,  in  order  that  the  troops 
might  finally  be  taken  out  of  the  fighting  and 
given  a  rest.  Despite  objections  that  this  would 
demand  time,  that  the  position  was  not  yet  ready, 
that  the  war  material  must  first  be  taken  back,  and 
so  forth,  I  stood  by  the  order.  The  retreat  was 
begun. 

In  Flanders  I  saw  delegations  from  the  different 
divisions,  spoke  with  the  soldiers,  distributed  dec- 
orations, and  was  everywhere  joyfully  received  by 
officers  and  men.  Particularly  ardent  enthusiasm 
reigned  among  the  soldiers  of  a  royal  Saxon  recruit 
depot,  who  greeted  me  with  wild  cheers  at  the 
railway  station  when  I  was  returning  to  my  train. 
While  I  was  giving  out  decorations  to  members 
of  the  Reserve  Guard  Division,  an  enemy  bomb- 
ing squadron,  followed  by  heavy  fire  from  anti- 
aircraft guns  and  machine  guns,  flew  directly  over 
us  and  dropped  bombs  near  the  special  train. 

The  commanders  of  the  army  were  unanimous 
in  declaring  that  the  spirit  of  the  troops  at  the 
front  was  good  and  reliable;  that,  further  to  the 
rear,  among  the  supply  columns,  it  was  not  so 
good ;  that  the  worst  of  all  were  the  soldiers  back 
from  leave,  who,  it  was  plain  to  be  seen,  had  been 
worked  upon  and  infected  at  home,  whence  they 
had  brought  back  a  poor  spirit.  The  young  re- 
cruits at  the  depots,  it  was  stated,  furthermore,  were 
good. 

At  Spa,  whither  I  now  went,  news  came  con- 
stantly from  home  about  the  ever  more  violent 
agitation  and  hostile  attitude  against  the  Emperor 

279 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

and  the  growing  slackness  and  helplessness  of  the 
Government,  which,  without  initiative  or  strength, 
was  letting  itself  be  pushed  around  at  will.  It 
was  alluded  to  contemptuously  in  the  newspapers 
as  the  "debating  society"  and  Prince  Max  was 
called  by  leading  newspapers  the  "Revolution 
Chancellor."  As  I  learned  afterward,  he  lay  in 
bed  for  ten  days,  suffering  from  grippe  and  in- 
capable of  really  directing  affairs.  His  Excel- 
lency von  Payer  and  Solf ,  with  the  so-called  War 
Cabinet,  which  was  in  permanent  session,  governed 
the  German  Empire. 

At  such  a  critical  time,  to  my  way  of  thinking, 
the  imperiled  ship  of  state  should  not  be  steered 
by  representatives  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
since  they  certainly  cannot  have  the  authority 
possessed  by  the  responsible  head  of  the  Govern- 
ment. What  was  particularly  needed  at  this  junc- 
ture was  authority;  yet,  so  far  as  I  know,  no  wide 
powers  to  act  had  been  conferred  upon  the  Vice 
Chancellor. 

The  right  solution — /.  e.,  the  one  that  those  con- 
cerned were  in  duty  bound  to  adopt — would  have 
been  to  remove  Prince  Max  actually  from  the 
post  of  Chancellor  and  summon  in  his  place  some 
man  of  strong  personality.  Since  we  had  the  par- 
liamentary form  of  government  it  devolved  upon 
the  political  parties  to  bring  about  the  change  in 
the  Chancellorship  and  present  me  with  a  succes- 
sor to  Prince  Max.   This  did  not  take  place. 

Now  the  efforts  of  the  Government  and  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  to  induce  me  to  abdicate  be- 

280 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 

gan.  Drews,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  came  to 
me  at  the  behest  of  the  Chancellor,  in  order  to 
supply  me  with  information  concerning  the  spirit 
in  the  country.  He  described  the  well-known  hap- 
penings in  press,  high  finance,  and  public,  and  laid 
emphasis  on  the  fact  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
himself  adopted  no  attitude  toward  the  question 
of  my  abdication,  but,  nevertheless,  had  sent  him 
to  me.  Drews,  in  short,  was  to  suggest  to  me  that 
I  myself  should  decide  to  abdicate,  in  order  that  it 
might  not  appear  that  the  Government  had  exerted 
pressure  upon  me. 

I  spoke  to  the  Minister  about  the  fateful  con- 
sequences of  my  abdication  and  asked  how  he,  as 
a  Prussian  official,  could  reconcile  such  a  supposi- 
tion with  his  oath  as  an  official  to  his  King.  The 
Minister  grew  embarrassed  and  excused  himself 
by  reference  to  the  command  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellor,  who  had  been  unable  to  find  any  other 
man  for  the  task.  I  was  informed  later  that  Drews 
was  one  of  the  first  officials  who  spoke  of  the  abdi- 
cation of  his  master  and  King. 

I  refused  to  abdicate  and  declared  that  I  would 
gather  troops  together  and  return  with  them  in 
order  to  help  the  Government  to  maintain  order 
in  the  land. 

After  that,  Drews  was  received,  in  my  presence, 
by  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg  and  General 
Groner,  whom  he  informed  of  the  mission  intrusted 
to  him  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  by  both 
of  whom  he  was  very  sharply  rebuked  in  the  name 
of  the  army.   Groner's  characterization  of  Prince 

281 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Max,  in  particular,  was  expressed  in  such  plain 
terms  that  I  had  to  appease  and  comfort  the 
Minister. 

The  Field  Marshal  also  called  Drews's  attention 
to  the  fact  that,  in  the  event  of  my  abdication,  the 
army  would  not  go  on  fighting,  but  would  dis- 
perse, and  that  the  majority  of  the  officers,  in  par- 
ticular, would  probably  resign  and  thus  leave  the 
army  without  leaders. 

Soon  after  that  I  learned  from  one  of  my  sons 
that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  had  tried  to  ascer- 
tain whether  he  was  prepared  to  undertake  the 
mission  which  subsequently  was  undertaken  by 
Drews.  My  son  indignantly  declined  to  suggest 
abdication  to  his  father. 

In  the  meantime  I  had  sent  the  chief  of  Cabinet, 
von  Delbriick,  to  Berlin,  in  order  to  lay  before 
the  Chancellor  a  general  address,  also  intended 
for  publication,  which  should  take  the  place  of 
my  address  to  the  Ministry  (not  published  by  the 
Chancellor),  deal  more  broadly  with  the  matters 
taken  up  therein,  and  make  clear  my  attitude  to- 
ward the  Government  and  toward  the  new  direc- 
tion taken  by  public  opinion.  At  first  the  Chan- 
cellor failed  to  publish  this.  Not  until  several 
days  later  did  he  find  himself  forced  to  permit 
publication,  owing  to  a  letter  written  to  him,  as  I 
learned  afterward,  by  the  Empress. 

Thereupon  Herr  von  Delbriick  informed  me 
that  the  address  had  made  a  good  impression  in 
Berlin  and  in  the  press,  relieved  the  situation,  and 
tended  to  quiet  the  people,  so  that  the  idea  of  abdi- 

282 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 


catioQ  had  begun  to  disappear  and  even  the  So- 
cialists of  the  Right  had  decided  to  postpone  action 
concerning  it. 

SOCIALIST  ACTIVITY 

During  the  next  few  days  there  were  constant 
reports  that  the  Socialists  in  Berlin  were  planning 
trouble  and  that  the  Chancellor  was  growing 
steadily  more  nervous.  The  report  given  by  Drews 
to  the  Government,  after  his  return  from  Spa,  had 
not  failed  to  cause  an  impression;  the  gentlemen 
wished  ta  get  rid  of  me,  to  be  sure,  but  for  the  time 
being  they  were  afraid  of  the  consequences. 

Their  point  of  view  was  as  obscure  as  their  con- 
duct. They  acted  as  if  they  did  not  want  a  re- 
public, yet  failed  completely  to  realize  that  their 
course  was  bound  to  lead  straight  to  a  republic. 
Many,  in  fact,  explained  the  actions  of  the  Gov- 
ernment by  maintaining  that  the  creation  of  a  re- 
public was  the  very  end  that  its  members  had  in 
view ;  plenty  of  people  drew  the  conclusion,  from 
the  puzzling  conduct  of  the  Chancellor  toward 
me,  that  he  was  working  to  eliminate  me  in  order 
to  become  himself  President  of  the  German  Re- 
public, after  being,  in  the  interim,  the  adminis- 
trator of  the  Empire. 

To  believe  this  is  undoubtedly  to  do  the  Prince 
an  injustice;  such  a  train  of  thought  is  impos- 
sible in  a  man  belonging  to  an  old  German  princely 
family. 

General  Groner,  who  had  gone  to  Berlin  to 
study  the  situation,  reported  on  his  return  that  he; 

283 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


had  received  very  bad  impressions  regarding  the 
Government  and  the  sentiment  prevailing  in  the 
country;  that  things  were  approaching  revolu- 
tion; that  the  Government  was  merely  tearing 
down  without  setting  up  anything  positive;  that 
the  people  wanted  peace  at  last,  at  any  cost,  no 
matter  what  kind  of  peace ;  that  the  authority  of 
the  Government  was  equal  to  zero,  the  agitation 
against  the  Emperor  in  full  swing,  my  abdication 
hardly  to  be  avoided  longer. 

He  added  that  the  troops  at  home  were  unre- 
liable and  disagreeable  surprises  might  come  in 
case  of  a  revolt ;  that  the  courier  chests  of  the  Rus- 
sian Bolshevist  ambassador,  seized  by  the  criminal 
police,  had  disclosed  some  very  damaging  evi- 
dence that  the  Russian  Embassy,  in  conjunction 
with  the  Spartacus  group,  had  long  since  thor- 
oughly prepared,  without  being  disturbed,  a  Bol- 
shevist revolution  on  the  Russian  model.  (This 
had  gone  on  with  the  knowledge  of  the  Foreign 
Office — which  had  received  constant  warning, 
but  had  either  laughed  at  them  all  or  dismissed 
them  with  the  remark  that  the  Bolsheviki  must 
not  be  angered — likewise  under  the  very  eyes  of 
the  police,  which  was  continually  at  loggerheads 
with  the  Foreign  Office.)  The  men  back  from 
leave,  he  went  on,  infected  by  propaganda,  had 
already  carried  the  poison  to  the  army,  which  was 
already  partly  affected  and  would,  as  soon  as  it 
had  been  made  free  by  an  armistice,  refuse  to  fight 
against  the  rebels  upon  its  return  home. 

Therefore,  he  declared,  it  was  necessary  to  ac- 

284 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 


cept,  immediately  and  unconditionally,  any  sort  of 
armistice,  no  matter  how  hard  its  conditions  might 
be;  the  army  was  no  longer  to  be  trusted  and 
revolution  was  imminent  behind  the  front. 

PRINCE  MAX  INSISTENT 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  November,^  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden, 
caused  me  to  be  informed  again — as  he  had  already 
done  on  the  7th — that  the  Social  Democrats,  and 
also  the  Social  Democratic  Secretaries  of  State, 
demanded  my  abdication;  that  the  rest  of  the 
members  of  the  Government,  who  had  stood  out  so 
far  against  it,  were  now  in  favor  of  it,  and  that 
the  same  was  true  of  the  majority  parties  in  the 
Reichstag.  For  these  reasons,  he  continued,  he 
requested  me  to  abdicate  immediately,  since,  other- 
wise, extensive  street  fighting  attended  by  blood- 
shed would  take  place  in  Berlin;  it  had  already 
started  on  a  small  scale. 

I  immediately  summoned  Field  Marshal  von 
Hindenburg  and  the  Quartermaster  General,  Gen- 
eral Groner.  General  Groner  again  announced 
that  the  army  could  fight  no  longer  and  wished 
rest  above  all  else,  and  that,  therefore,  any  sort 
of  armistice  must  be  unconditionally  accepted; 
that  the  armistice  must  be  concluded  as  soon  as 
possible,  since  the  army  had  supplies  for  only  six 

^  Concerning  the  course  of  events  up  to  the  fateful  9th  of  November 
and  this  day  itself  there  are  authentic  statements  by  an  eyewitness 
in  the  book  (well  worth  reading)  of  Major  Niemann,  who  was  sent 
by  the  Chief  Army  Command  to  me,  entitled  War  and  Revolution 
{Krieg  und  Revolution) ^  Berlin,  1922. 

285 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

to  eight  days  more  and  was  cut  off  from  all  further 
supplies  by  the  rebels,  who  had  occupied  all  the 
supply  storehouses  and  Rhine  bridges;  that,  for 
some  unexplained  reason,  the  armistice  commis- 
sion sent  to  France — consisting  of  Erzberger,  Am- 
bassador Count  Oberndorff,  and  General  von 
Winterfeldt — which  had  crossed  the  French  lines 
two  evenings  before,  had  sent  no  report  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  conditions. 

The  Crown  Prince  also  appeared,  with  his  Chief 
of  Staff,  Count  Schulenburg,  and  took  part  in  the 
conference.  During  our  conversation  several  tele- 
phone inquiries  came  from  the  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, which,  pointing  out  that  the  Social  Demo- 
crats had  left  the  Government  and  that  delay  was 
dangerous,  became  most  insistent.  The  Minister 
of  War  reported  uncertainty  among  part  of  the 
troops  in  Berlin — 4th  Jagers,  Second  Company 
of  Alexander  Regiment,  Second  Battery,  Jiiterbog, 
gone  over  to  the  rebels — no  street  fighting. 

I  wished  to  spare  my  people  civil  war.  If  my 
abdication  was  indeed  the  only  way  to  prevent 
bloodshed,  I  was  willing  to  renounce  the  Imperial 
throne,  but  not  to  abdicate  as  King  of  Prussia;  I 
would  remain,  as  such,  with  my  troops,  since  the 
military  leaders  had  declared  that  the  officers 
would  leave  in  crowds  if  I  abdicated  entirely,  and 
the  army  would  then  pour  back,  without  leaders, 
into  the  fatherland,  damage  it,  and  place  it  in 
peril. 

A  reply  had  been  sent  to  the  Imperial  Chancel- 
lor to  the  effect  that  my  decision  must  first  be  care- 

286 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 

fully  weighed  and  formulated,  after  which  it 
would  be  transmitted  to  the  Chancellor.  When, 
a  little  later,  this  was  done,  there  came  the  surpris- 
ing answer  that  my  decision  had  arrived  late! 
The  Imperial  Chancellor,  on  his  own  initiative, 
had  summarily  announced  my  abdication — which 
had  not  occurred  yet  at  all! — as  well  as  renun- 
ciation of  the  throne  by  the  Crown  Prince,  who 
had  not  even  been  questioned.  He  had  turned  over 
the  Government  to  the  Social  Democrats  and  sum- 
moned Herr  Ebert  as  Imperial  Chancellor.  All 
this  had  been  spread  simultaneously  by  wireless, 
so  the  entire  army  could  read  it. 

DENIES  HE  FORSOOK  FOLLOWERS 

Thus  the  decision  as  to  my  going  or  staying,  as 
to  my  renunciation  of  the  Imperial  Crown  and 
retention  of  the  Royal  Crown  of  Prussia,  was 
summarily  snatched  from  me.  The  army  was 
shaken  to  the  core  by  the  erroneous  belief  that  its 
King  had  abandoned  it  at  the  most  critical  moment 
of  all. 

If  the  conduct  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
Prince  Max  of  Baden,  is  considered  as  a  whole, 
it  appears  as  follows:  first,  solemn  declaration 
that  he  will  place  himself,  together  with  the  new 
Government,  before  the  Emperor's  throne,  to  pro- 
tect it;  then,  suppression  of  the  address,  which 
might  have  impressed  public  opinion  favorably, 
elimination  of  the  Emperor  from  all  co-operation 
in  the  Government,  sacrifice  of  the  respect  due  the 
Emperor  by  suppression  of  the  censorship,  failure 

287 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


to  come  to  the  support  of  the  monarchy  in  the  mat- 
ter of  abdication;  then,  attempts  to  persuade  the 
Emperor  to  abdicate  voluntarily;  and,  finally, 
announcement  of  my  abdication  by  wireless,  in 
which  the  Chancellor  went  over  my  head. 

This  sequence  of  events  shows  the  course — a 
perilous  one  to  the  nation — adopted  by  Scheide- 
mann,  who  held  the  Chancellor  in  the  hollow  of 
his  hand.  Scheidemann  left  the  Ministers,  his 
colleagues,  in  the  dark  as  to  his  real  purposes, 
drove  the  Prince  from  one  step  to  another,  and 
finally  summoned  Ebert,  declaring  that  the  leaders 
no  longer  had  the  masses  under  control.  Thus  he 
caused  the  Prince  to  sacrifice  the  Emperor,  the 
princes,  and  the  Empire,  and  made  him  the  de- 
stroyer of  the  Empire.  After  that,  Scheidemann 
overthrew  the  weak  princely  "statesman." 

Following  the  arrival  of  the  wireless  message, 
the  situation  was  diflScult.  To  be  sure,  troops  were 
being  transported  to  Spa  for  the  purpose  of  going 
on  undisturbed  with  the  work  at  Great  General 
Headquarters,  but  the  Field  Marshal  now  thought 
it  no  longer  possible  to  reckon  absolutely  on  their 
reliability  in  case  rebellious  forces  should  advance 
from  Aix-le-Chapelle  and  Cologne  and  confront 
our  troops  .with  the  dilemma  of  whether  or  not 
to  fight  against  their  own  comrades.  In  view  of 
this,  he  advised  me  to  leave  the  army  and  go  to 
some  neutral  country,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding 
such  a  "civil  war." 

I  went  through  a  fearful  internal  struggle.  On 
the  one  hand,  I,  as  a  soldier,  was  outraged  at  the 

288 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 

idea  of  abandoning  my  still  faithful,  brave  troops. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  was  the  declaration  of 
our  foes  that  they  were  unwilling  to  conclude  with 
me  any  peace  endurable  to  Germany,  as  well  as 
the  statement  of  my  own  Government  that  only  by 
my  departure  for  foreign  parts  was  civil  war  to 
be  prevented. 

In  this  struggle  I  set  aside  all  that  was  personal. 
I  consciously  sacrificed  myself  and  my  throne  in 
the  belief  that,  by  so  doing,  I  was  best  serving  the 
interests  of  my  beloved  fatherland.  The  sacrifice 
was  in  vain.  My  departure  brought  us  neither 
better  armistice  conditions  nor  better  peace  terms ; 
nor  did  it  prevent  civil  war — on  the  contrary,  it 
hastened  and  intensified,  in  the  most  pernicious 
manner,  the  disintegration  in  the  army  and  the 
nation. 

PROUD  OF  THE  ARMY 

For  thirty  years  the  army  was  my  pride.  For 
it  I  lived,  upon  it  I  labored.  And  now,  after  four 
and  a  half  brilliant  years  of  war  with  unprece- 
dented victories,  it  was  forced  to  collapse  by  the 
stab  in  the  back  from  the  dagger  of  the  revolu- 
tionists, at  the  very  moment  when  peace  was  within 
reach ! 

And  the  fact  that  it  was  in  my  proud  navy,  my 
creation,  that  there  was  first  open  rebellion,  cut 
me  most  deeply  to  the  heart. 

There  has  been  much  talk  about  my  having 
abandoned  the  army  and  gone  to  neutral  foreign 
parts. 

289 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Some  say  the  Emperor  should  have  gone  to 
some  regiment  at  the  front,  hurled  himself  with  it 
upon  the  enemy,  and  sought  death  in  one  last  at- 
tack. That,  however,  would  not  only  have  ren- 
dered impossible  the  armistice,  ardently  desired 
by  the  nation,  concerning  which  the  commission 
sent  from  Berlin  to  General  Foch  was  already 
negotiating,  but  would  also  have  meant  the  useless 
sacrifice  of  the  lives  of  many  soldiers — of  some  of 
the  very  best  and  most  faithful,  in  fact. 

Others  say  the  Emperor  should  have  returned 
home  at  the  head  of  the  army.  But  a  peaceful  re- 
turn was  no  longer  possible ;  the  rebels  had  already 
seized  the  Rhine  bridges  and  other  important 
points  in  the  rear  of  the  army.  I  could,  to  be 
sure,  have  forced  my  way  back  at  the  head  of 
loyal  troops  taken  from  the  fighting  front;  but, 
by  so  doing,  I  should  have  put  the  finishing  touch 
to  Germany's  collapse,  since,  in  addition  to  the 
struggle  with  the  enemy,  who  would  certainly 
have  pressed  forward  in  pursuit,  civil  war  would 
also  have  ensued. 

Still  others  say  the  Emperor  should  have  killed 
himself.  That  was  made  impossible  by  my  firm 
Christian  beliefs.  And  would  not  people  have 
exclaimed : 

"How  cowardly!  Now  he  shirks  all  responsibil- 
ity by  committing  suicide  1"  This  alternative  was 
also  eliminated  because  I  had  to  consider  how  to 
be  of  help  and  use  to  my  people  and  my  country 
in  the  evil  time  that  was  to  be  foreseen. 

I  knew  also  that  I  was  particularly  called  upon 

290 


END  OF  WAR  AND  MY  ABDICATION 


to  champion  the  cause  of  my  people  in  the  clearing 
up  of  the  question  of  war  guilt — which  was  dis- 
closing itself  more  and  more  as  the  pivotal  point 
in  our  future  destiny — since  I  better  than  anyone 
else  could  bear  witness  to  Germany's  desire  for 
peace  and  to  our  clean  conscience. 

After  unspeakably  arduous  soul  struggles,  and 
following  the  most  urgent  advice  of  my  counselors 
of  the  highest  rank  who  were  present  at  the  mo- 
ment, I  decided  to  leave  the  country,  since,  in  view 
of  the  reports  made  to  me,  I  must  needs  believe 
that,  by  so  doing,  I  should  most  faithfully  serve 
Germany,  make  possible  better  armistice  and  peace 
terms  for  her,  and  spare  her  further  loss  of  human 
lives,  distress,  and  misery. 

20 


CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Enemy  Tribunal  and  the  Neutral  Tribunal 

WHEN  the  Entente's  demand  that  I  and  the 
German  army  leaders  should  be  surren- 
dered for  trial  before  Entente  tribunals  became 
known,  I  immediately  asked  myself  whether  I 
could  be  of  use  to  my  fatherland  by  giving  myself 
up  before  the  German  people  and  the  German 
Government  had  expressed  themselves  regarding 
this  demand.  It  was  clear  to  me  that,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Entente,  such  a  surrender  would  so 
seriously  shake  the  prestige  of  Germany,  as  a  state 
and  people,  for  all  time,  that  we  could  never  again 
take  our  place,  with  equal  rights,  equal  dignity, 
and  equal  title  to  alliances,  in  the  first  rank  of 
nations,  where  we  belonged. 

I  recognized  it  as  my  duty  not  to  sacrifice  the 
honor  and  dignity  of  Germany.  The  question  re- 
solved itself  into  deciding  whether  there  was 
any  way  to  give  myself  up  which  might  benefit 
the  German  nation  and  not  subject  it  to  the 
above-mentioned  disadvantages.  Were  there 
such  a  way  I  should  have  been  ready  without 
hesitation  to  add  another  sacrifice  to  those  already 
made. 

292 


THE  TRIBUNALS 

The  question  of  my  giving  myself  up  has  also 
been  debated — as  I  know — in  well-meaning  and 
earnest  German  circles.  Wherever  this  was 
due  to  psychological  depression  or  failure  to 
realize  the  impression  which  self-chastisement, 
self-debasement,  and  fruitless  martyrdom  in 
the  face  of  the  Entente  must  arouse,  all  that 
was  needed  was  to  recall  the  materially  political 
origin  of  the  Entente's  demand,  cursorily 
mentioned  above,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  clean- 
cut  decision — in  other  words,  at  an  emphatic 
refusal. 

It  was  otherwise  with  the  considerations  based 
upon  the  assumption  that  I  might,  by  taking  upon 
myself,  before  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world,  the 
responsibility  for  all  important  decisions  and  acts 
of  my  Government  connected  with  the  war,  con- 
tribute toward  making  the  fate  of  the  German 
nation  easier.  Here  was  not  an  act  of  unpolitical 
sentimentality,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  deed  which, 
in  my  eyes,  had  much  to  commend  it.  The  thought 
that,  according  to  the  Constitution  of  the  Empire 
then  in  force,  not  I,  but  the  Chancellor  alone  as 
was  well  known — bore  the  responsibility,  would 
naturally  not  have  bothered  me  with  regard  to 
this. 

Had  there  been  even  the  slightest  prospect  of 
bettering  Germany's  situation  by  taking  such  a 
step,  there  would  have  been  no  possible  doubt  for 
me  personally  as  to  what  I  should  do.  Already  I 
had  shown  my  personal  willingness  to  sacrifice 
myself  when  I  left  the  country  and  gave  up  the 

293 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

throne  of  my  fathers,  because  I  had  been  erroneously 
and  deceivingly  assured  that  I  could,  by  so  doing, 
make  possible  better  peace  terms  for  my  people 
and  prevent  civil  war.  I  should  likewise  have 
made  this  further  attempt  to  help  my  people,  de- 
spite the  fact  that,  in  the  meantime,  one  of  the 
considerations  in  favor  of  it  which  have  been  urged 
upon  me — viz.j  the  prevention  of  civil  war — had 
already  turned  out  to  be  false. 

RECALLS  PLIGHT  OF  VERCINGETORIX 

There  was,  however,  no  possibility  of  helping 
the  German  people  by  such  an  act.  Surrender  of 
my  person  would  have  had  no  result  beyond  our 
obedience  to  the  demand  from  the  Entente  that  I 
be  given  up.  For  no  tribunal  in  the  world  can 
pronounce  a  just  sentence  before  the  state  archives 
of  all  the  nations  participating  in  the  war  are 
thrown  open,  as  has  been  done,  and  is  still  being 
done,  by  Germany. 

Who,  after  the  unprecedented  judgment  of 
Versailles,  could  still  summon  up  optimism  enough 
to  believe  that  the  Entente  nations  would  place 
their  secret  documents  at  the  disposal  of  such  a 
tribunal?  Therefore,  after  careful  reflection  on 
my  part,  I  gave  the  decisive  importance  that  was 
their  due  to  the  above-mentioned  weighty  consid- 
erations of  personal  and  national  dignity  and 
honor,  and  rejected  the  idea  of  giving  myself  up. 
It  was  not  for  me  to  play  the  role  of  Vercingetorix, 
who,  as  is  well  known,  relying  upon  the  magna- 
nimity of  his  foes,  surrendered  himself  to  them  in 

294 


THE  TRIBUNALS 

order  to  obtain  a  better  fate  for  his  people.  In 
view  of  the  conduct  of  our  enemies  during  the 
war  and  in  the  peace  negotiations,  it  was  surely 
not  to  be  assumed  that  the  Entente  would 
show  any  greater  magnanimity  than  did  Caesar 
when  he  threw  the  noble  Gaul  into  chains,  sub- 
sequently had  him  executed,  and,  in  spite  of  what 
Vercingetorix  had  done,  enslaved  his  people  just 
the  same. 

I  wish  to  remark  in  a  general  way  that  it  has 
always  proved  wrong  to  follow  the  suggestions  of 
the  enemy  or  to  heed  them  to  any  extent.  The 
well-meant  suggestions  regarding  my  giving  my- 
self up,  emanating  from  Germans,  also  grew  from 
the  soil  of  the  enemy  demands,  though  perhaps 
partly  unknown  to  those  making  them.  For  that 
very  reason  it  was  necessary  to  refuse  to  heed  them. 

Thus  the  only  solution  remaining  is  an  interna- 
tional, nonpartisan  court,  which,  instead  of  trying 
individuals,  shall  examine  and  pronounce  judg- 
ment upon  all  the  happenings  leading  to  the  World 
War,  in  all  the  countries  taking  part  therein,  after  ^ 
all  the  national  archives,  not  merely  those  of 
Germany,  have  been  opened  up.  Germany 
can  well  agree  to  this  mode  of  procedure.  Who- 
soever opposes  it  pronounces  judgment  upon 
himself ! 

My  standpoint  on  the  subject  here  discussed  is 
expressed  in  the  letter  reproduced  below,  which  I 
addressed,  under  date  of  April  5,  1921,  to  Field 
Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  and  which  the  latter 
has  made  public  in  the  meantime.  To  make  mat- 

295 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


tcrs  clearer,  the  letter  which  preceded  it,  from  the 
Marshal,  is  also  given/ 

HINDENBURG'S  LETTER 

Hanover,  March  50,  iq2i. 

Your  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesty: 

I  beg  to  thank  Your  Majesty  most  respectfully  for 
his  gracious  interest  in  the  illness  of  my  wife.  She  is 
not  yet  out  of  danger. 

I  have  httle  that  is  pleasant  to  report  from  our 
country.  The  troubles  in  Central  Germany  are  more 
serious  than  they  are  represented  to  be  by  the  Prussian 
Government.   I  hope  that  they  will  soon  be  suppressed. 

The  effects  of  the  Versailles  peace  decree  lie  ever 
more  crushingly  upon  the  German  people,  and  the  ob- 
ject of  this  peace — the  policy  of  annihilation  of  our 
enemies — comes  more  plainly  to  the  fore  every  day. 
For  the  purpose  of  justifying  this  policy  of  force  the 
fairy  tale  of  German  war  guilt  must  be  adhered  to. 

The  spokesman  of  the  enemy  alliance,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  is  little  disturbed  by  the  fact  that,  on  Decem- 
ber 20th  of  last  year,  he  declared  that  no  statesman 
wished  war  in  the  summer  of  19 14,  that  all  the  nations 
had  slipped  or  stumbled  into  it.  In  his  speech  at  the 
London  conference  on  March  3d  he  calmly  remarked 
that  Germany's  responsibility  for  the  war  was  funda- 
mental, that  it  was  the  basis  on  which  the  Peace  of 
Versailles  was  erected,  and  that,  if  the  admission  of 
this  guilt  should  be  refused  or  given  up,  the  treaty 
would  become  untenable. 

Now  as  before,  the  question  of  war  guilt  is  the 
cardinal  point  in  the  future  of  the  German  nation.  The 
admission  of  our  alleged  "guilt"  regarding  the  war, 
forced  from  the  German  representatives  at  Versailles 

^This  letter  and  the  letter  from  the  Field  Marshal  which  preceded 
it  are  reprinted  herewith.  The  parts  which  are  most  important  in 
relation  to  the  matter  in  question  are  underscored  in  the  text. 

296 


THE  TRIBUNALS 


against  their  judgment,  is  wreaking  frightful  venge- 
ance; equally  so  the  untrue  acknowledgment  of  Ger- 
many's "complicity"  which  Minister  Simons  gave  at 
the  London  conference. 

I  agree  with  Your  Majesty  to  the  uttermost  depths 
of  my  soul — in  my  long  term  of  military  service  I 
have  had  the  good  fortune  and  honor  to  enter  into 
close  personal  relations  with  Your  Majesty.  I  know 
that  all  the  efforts  of  Your  Majesty  throughout  your 
reign  were  bent  toward  maintaining  peace.  I  can 
realize  how  immeasurably  hard  it  is  for  Your  Majesty 
to  be  eliminated  frorn  positive  co-operation  for  the 
fatherland. 

The  Comparative  Historical  Tables  compiled  by 
Your  Majesty,  a  printed  copy  of  which  Your  Majesty 
sent  me  recently,  are  a  good  contribution  to  the  history 
of  the  origin  of  the  war  and  are  calculated  to  remove 
many  an  incorrect  conception.  I  have  regretted  that 
Your  Majesty  did  not  make  the  tables  public,  but 
limited  them  instead  to  a  small  circle.  Now  that  the 
tables,  owing  to  indiscretions,  have  been  published  in 
the  foreign  press,  partly  in  the  form  of  incomplete  ex- 
cerpts, it  seems  to  me  advisable  to  have  them  published 
in  full  in  the  German  press. 

To  my  great  joy  I  have  heard  that  there  has  been 
an  improvement  recently  in  the  health  of  Her  Majesty.  \ 
May  God  help  further! 

With  the  deepest  respect,  unlimited  fidelity  and  grati- 
tude, I  am  Your  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesty's  most 
humble  servant, 

(Signed)  VoN  Hindenburg, 

Field  Marshal. 

THE  KAISER'S  LETTER 

House  Doorn,  April  5,  ig2i. 
My  Dear  Field  Marshal: 

Accept  my  warmest  thanks  for  your  letter  of  March 
30th,  ult.    You  are  right.    The  hardest  thing  of  all 

297 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


for  me  is  to  be  obliged  to  live  in  foreign  parts,  to  fol- 
low, with  burning  anguish  in  my  soul,  the  awful  fate 
of  our  dear  fatherland,  to  whi'ch  I  have  devoted  the 
labors  of  my  entire  life,  and  to  be  barred  from  co- 
operation. 

You  stood  beside  me  during  the  dark,  fatal  days  of 
November,  191 8.  As  you  know,  I  forced  myself  to 
the  difficult,  terrible  decision  to  leave  the  country  only 
upon  the  urgent  declaration  of  yourself  and  the  rest 
of  my  counselors  who  had  been  summoned  that  only 
by  my  so  doing  would  it  be  possible  to  obtain  more 
favorable  armistice  terms  for  our  people  and  spare  it  a 
bloody  civil  war. 

The  sacrifice  was  in  vain.  Now,  as  well  as  before, 
the  enemy  wishes  to  make  the  German  people  expiate 
the  alleged  guilt  of  "Imperial  Germany." 

SILENT  UNDER  ATTACKS 

In  my  endeavor  to  subordinate  all  personal  con- 
siderations to  the  welfare  of  Germany,  I  keep  myself 
completely  in  the  background.  I  am  silent  in  the  face 
of  all  the  lies  and  slanders  which  are  spread  abroad 
concerning  me.  I  consider  it  beneath  my  dignity  to 
defend  myself  against  attacks  and  abuse. 

In  accordance  with  this  policy  of  restraint  I  have 
also  kept  the  Historical  Tables  mentioned  by  you 
strictly  objective  and  made  them  accessible  only  to  a 
narrow  circle  of  acquaintances.  I  am  utterly  at  a  loss 
to  understand  how  they  have  now  become  public 
through  some  sort  of  indiscretion  or  theft  (?).  The 
purpose  inspiring  me  when  I  prepared  the  historical 
tables  was  this:  To  bring  together  strictly  historical 
material  by  a  systematic  enumeration  of  sober  facts, 
such  as  might  enable  the  reader  to  form  his  own  judg- 
ment of  the  historical  happenings  preceding  the  war. 
I  found  my  most  convincing  sources,  be  it  remarked, 
in  the  literature  which  has  sprung  up  after  the  war, 
particularly  in  the  works  of  natives  of  the  enemy  coun- 

298 


THE  TRIBUNALS 


tries.  Therefore  I  am  glad  that  you  find  my  modest 
contribution  to  history  useful. 

As  to  your  suggestiofi  to  make  the  tables,  which  have 
been  completed  in  the  meantime,  accessible  to  the  Ger- 
man press,  I  thank  you,  and  will  follow  it.^ 

Truth  will  hew  a  way  for  itself — mightily,  irresis- 
tibly, like  an  avalanche.  Whoever  does  not  close  his 
ears  to  it  against  his  better  judgment  must  admit  that, 
during  my  twenty-six-year  reign  previous  to  the  war, 
German's  foreign  policy  was  directed  solely  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  Its  one  and  only  aim  was  to 
protect  our  sacred  native  soil,  threatened  from  the 
west  and  the  east,  and  the  peaceful  development  of 
our  commerce  and  political  economy. 

Had  we  ever  had  warlike  intentions  we  should  have 
struck  the  blow  in  1900,  when  England's  hands  were 
tied  by  the  Boer  War,  Russia's  by  the  Japanese  War, 
at  which  time  almost  certain  victory  beckoned  us.  In 
any  event,  we  assuredly  would  not  have  singled  out 
the  year  19 14,  when  we  were  confronted  by  a  com- 
pact, overwhelmingly  superior  foe.  Also,  every  im- 
partial man  must  acknowledge  to  himself  that  Ger- 
many could  expect  nothing  from  the  war,  whereas  our 
enemies  hoped  to  obtain  from  it  the  complete  realiza- 
tion of  the  aims  which  they  had  based,  long  since,  upon 
our  annihilation. 

The  fact  that  my  zealous  efforts  and  those  of  my 
Government  were  concentrated,  during  the  critical  July 
and  August  days  of  1 9 1 4,  upon  maintaining  world  peace 
is  being  proved  more  and  more  conclusively  by  the 
most  recent  literary  and  documentary  publications  in 
Germany,  and,  most  especially,  in  the  enemy  countries. 
The  most  effective  proof  thereof  is  Sazonoff's  state- 
ment: "The  German  Emperor's  love  of  peace  is  a 
guarantee  to  us  that  we  ourselves  can  decide  upon  the 

iThis  has  meanwhile  been  done.  The  Comparative  Historical 
Tables  from  1878  to  the  Outbreak  of  the  War  in  IQJ4  were  published 
in  December,  1921,  by  K.  F.  Koehler,  Leipsic 

299 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


moment  of  war."  What  further  proof  of  our  inno- 
cence is  needed?  The  above  means  that  the  intention 
existed  to  make  an  attack  upon  one  who  was  absolutely 
unsuspecting. 

CALLS  ACCUSATION  FUTILE 

God  is  my  witness  that  I,  in  order  to  avoid  war,  went 
to  the  uttermost  limit  compatible  with  responsibility 
for  the  security  and  inviolability  of  my  dear  fatherland. 

It  is  futile  to  accuse  Germany  of  war  guilt.  To-day 
there  is  no  longer  any  doubt  that  not  Germany,  but  the 
alliance  of  her  foes,  prepared  the  war  according  to  a 
definite  plan,  and  intentionally  caused  it. 

For  the  purpose  of  concealing  this,  the  allied  enemies 
extorted  the  false  ''admission  of  guilt"  from  Germany 
in  the  shameful  Peace  Treaty  and  demanded  that  I  he 
produced  before  a  hostile  tribunal.  You,  my  dear  Field 
Marshal,  know  me  too  well  not  to  be  aware  that  no 
sacrifice  for  my  beloved  fatherland  is  too  great  for 
me.  Nevertheless,  a  tribunal  in  which  the  enemy 
alliance  would  be  at  once  plaintiff  and  judge  would  be 
not  an  organ  of  justice,  but  an  instrument  of  political 
arbitrariness,  and  would  serve  only,  through  the  sen- 
tence which  would  inevitably  be  passed  upon  me,  to  jus- 
tify subsequently  the  unprecedented  peace  conditions 
imposed  upon  us.  Therefore,  the  enemy's  demand 
naturally  had  to  be  rejected  by  me. 

But,  in  addition,  the  idea  of  my  being  produced 
before  a  neutral  tribunal,  no  matter  how  constituted, 
cannot  be  entertained  by  me.  /  do  not  recognize  the 
validity  of  any  sentence  pronounced  by  any  mortal  judge 
whatsoever,  be  he  never  so  exalted  in  rank,  upon  the 
measures  taken  by  me  most  conscientiously  as  Ew.peror 
and  King — in  other  words,  as  the  constitutional,  not 
responsible,  representative  of  the  German  nation — 
since,  were  I  to  do  so,  I  should  thereby  be  sacrificing 
the  honor  and  dignity  of  the  German  nation  repre- 
sented by  me. 

300 


THE  TRIBUNALS 


Legal  proceedings  having  to  do  with  guilt  and 
punishment,  instituted  solely  against  the  head  of  one  of 
the  nations  which  took  part  in  the  war,  deprive  that 
one  nation  of  every  vestige  of  equality  of  rights  with 
the  other  nations,  and  thereby  of  its  prestige  in  the 
community  of  nations.  Moreover,  this  would  cause, 
as  a  consequence,  the  impression  desired  by  the  enemy 
that  the  entire  question  of  guilf*  concerns  only  this  one 
head  of  a  nation  and  the  one  nation  represented  by 
him.  It  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  moreover, 
that  a  nonpartisan  judgment  of  the  **question  of  guilt" 
is  impossible,  if  the  legal  proceedings  are  not  made  to 
include  the  heads  and  leading  statesmen  of  the  enemy 
powers,  and  if  their  conduct  is  not  subjected  to  the  same 
investigation,  since  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  con- 
duct of  the  aforesaid  one  nation  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  can  be  judged  correctly  only  if  there  is  simul- 
taneous consideration  of  the  actions  of  its  opponents. 

A  real  clearing  up  of  the  **question  of  guilt,"  in 
which  surely  Germany  would  have  no  less  interest  than 
her  foes,  could  be  accomplished  only  if  an  international, 
nonpartisan  tribunal,  instead  of  trying  individuals  as 
criminals,  should  establish  all  the  events  which  led  to 
the  World  War,  as  well  as  all  other  offenses  against 
international  law,  in  order  thereafter  to  measure  cor- 
rectly the  guilt  of  individuals  implicated  in  every  one 
of  the  nations  participating  in  the  war. 

Such  an  honest  suggestion  was  officially  made  in  Ger- 
many after  the  end  of  the  war,  but,  so  far  as  I  know, 
it  was  partly  refused,  partly  found  unworthy  of  any 
answer  at  all.  Furthermore,  Germany,  immediately 
after  the  war,  unreservedly  threw  open  her  archives, 
whereas  the  enemy  alliance  has  taken  good  care  so  far 
not  to  follow  such  an  example.  The  secret  documents 
from  the  Russian  archives,  now  being  made  public  in 
America,  are  but  the  beginning. 

This  method  of  procedure  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
alliance  in  itself,  combined  with  overwhelming  damage 

301 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

ing  evidence  coming  to  hand,  shows  where  the  "war 
guilt"  is  really  to  be  sought!  This  makes  it  all  the 
more  a  solemn  duty  for  Germany  to  collect,  sift,  and 
make  public,  by  every  possible  means,  every  bit  of  ma- 
terial bearing  on  the  "question  of  guilt,"  ill  order,  by 
so  doing,  to  unmask  the  real  originators  of  the  war. 

Unfortunately,  the  condition  of  Her  Majesty  has 
become  worse.  My  heart  is  filled  with  the  most 
grievous  worry. 

God  with  us  I 

Your  grateful 

(Signed)  Wilhelm. 


I 


CHAPTER  XIV 
The  Question  of  Guilt 

HISTORY  can  show  nothing  to  compare  with 
the  World  War  of  19 14-18.  It  also  can 
show  nothing  like  the  perplexity  which  has  arisen 
as  to  the  causes  leading  up  to  the  World  War. 

This  is  all  the  more  astounding  in  that  the  Great 
War  befell  a  highly  cultivated,  enlightened,  polit- 
ically trained  race  of  men,  and  the  causes  leading 
up  to  it  were  plainly  to  be  seen. 

The  apparent  complicity  in  the  crisis  of  July, 
1 9 14,  should  deceive  nobody.  The  telegrams  ex- 
changed at  that  time  between  the  Cabinets  of  the 
great  powers  and  their  rulers,  the  activities  of  the 
statesmen  and  leading  private  individuals  in  ver- 
bal negotiations  with  important  personages  of  the 
Entente,  were  certainly  of  the  greatest  importance 
on  account  of  the  decisive  significance  assumed 
by  almost  every  word  when  it  came  from  respon- 
sible lips,  by  every  line  that  was  written  or  tele- 
graphed. The  essential  basis  of  the  causes  of 
the  war,  however,  is  not  altered  by  such  things; 
it  is  firmly  established,  and  people  must  never 
hesitate  from  freeing  it,  calmly  and  with  an  eye 
to    realities,    from    the    bewildering  outcrop- 

303 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

pings  from  the  events  accompanying  the  outbreak 
of  war. 

The  general  situation  of  the  German  Empire 
in  the  period  before  the  war  had  become  continu- 
ally more  brilliant,  and  for  that  very  reason  con- 
tinually more  difficult  from  the.  point  of  view  of 
foreign  politics.  Unprecedented  progress  in  in- 
dustry, commerce,  and  world  traffic  had  made 
Germany  prosperous.  The  curve  of  our  develop- 
ment tended  steadily  upward. 

The  concomitant  of  this  peaceful  penetration 
of  a  considerable  part  of  the  world's  markets,  to 
which  German  diligence  and  our  achievements 
justly  entitled  us,  was  bound  to  be  disagreeable 
to  older  nations  of  the  world,  particularly  to 
England.  This  is  quite  a  natural  phenomenon, 
having  nothing  remarkable  about  it.  Nobody 
is  pleased  when  a  competitor  suddenly  appears 
and  obliges  one  to  look  on  while  the  old  cus- 
tomers desert  to  him.  For  this  reason  I  cannot 
reproach  the  British  Empire  because  of  English 
ill  humor  at  Germany's  progress  in  the  world's 
markets. 

Had  England  been  able,  by  introducing  better 
commercial  methods,  to  overcome  or  restrict  Ger- 
man competition,  she  would  have  been  quite  within 
her  rights  in  doing  so  and  no  objections  could  have 
been  made.  It  simply  would  have  been  a  case  of 
the  better  man  winning.  In  the  life  of  nations 
nobody  can  find  it  objectionable  if  two  nations 
contend  against  each  other  peacefully  by  the  same 
methods — i,  e.,  peaceful  methods — yet  with  all 

304 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

their  energy,  daring,  and  organizing  ability,  each 
striving  to  benefit  itself. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  another  matter  if 
one  of  these  nations  sees  its  assets  on  the  world^s 
balance  sheet  threatened  by  the  industry,  achieve- 
ments, and  super  business  methods  of  the  other, 
and  hence,  not  being  able  to  apply  ability  like  that 
of  its  young  competitor,  resorts  to  force — e.,  to 
methods  that  are  not  those  of  peace,  but  of  war — 
in  order  to  call  a  halt  upon  the  other  nation  in  its 
peaceful  campaign  of  competition,  or  to  anni- 
hilate it. 

NAVY  MERELY  PROTECTIVE 

Our  situation  became  more  serious  since  v^e  were 
obliged  to  build  a  navy  for  the  protection  of  our 
welfare,  which,  in  the  last  analysis,  was  not  based 
on  the  nineteen  billions  yearly  to  which  German 
exports  and  imports  amounted.  The  supposition 
that  we  built  this  navy  for  the  purpose  of  attack- 
ing and  destroying  the  far  stronger  English  fleet 
is  absurd,  since  it  would  have  been  impossible 
for  us  to  win  a  victory  on  the  water,  because  of 
the  discrepancy  between  the  two  navies.  More- 
over, we  were  striding  forward  in  the  world 
market  in  accordance  with  our  desires  and  had 
no  cause  for  complaint.  Why,  then,  should  we 
wish  to  jeopardize  the  results  of  our  peaceful 
labors? 

In  France  the  idea  of  revenge  had  been  sedu- 
lously cultivated  ever  since  1870-71 ;  it  was  fos- 
tered, with  every  possible  variation,  in  literary, 

305 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

political,  and  military  writings,  in  the  officer  corps, 
in  schools,  associations,  political  circles. 

I  can  well  understand  this  spirit.  Looked  at 
from  the  healthy  national  standpoint,  it  is,  after 
all,  more  honorable  for  a  nation  to  desire  revenge 
for  a  blow  received  than  to  endure  it  without 
complaint. 

But  Alsace-Lorraine  had  been  German  soil  for 
many  centuries ;  it  was  stolen  by  France  and  taken 
back  by  us  in  1871  as  our  property.  Hence,  a  war 
of  revenge  which  had  as  its  aim  the  conquest  of 
thoroughly  German  territory  was  unjust  and  im- 
moral. For  us  to  have  yielded  on  this  point  would 
have  been  a  slap  in  the  face  to  our  sentiments  of 
nationality  and  justice.  Since  Germany  could 
never  voluntarily  return  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France, 
the  French  dream  could  be  realized  only  by  means 
of  a  victorious  war  which  should  push  forward 
the  French  boundary  posts  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine. 

Germany,  on  the  contrary,  had  no  reason  for 
staking  what  she  had  won  in  1870-71,  so  the  course 
for  her  to  pursue  was  to  maintain  peace  with 
France,  all  the  more  so  because  of  the  fact  that 
the  combination  of  the  powers  against  the  German- 
Austrian  Dual  Alliance  was  continually  becom- 
ing more  apparent. 

As  to  Russia,  the  mighty  empire  of  the  Tsars 
was  clamoring  for  an  outlet  on  the  sea  to  the  south- 
ward. This  was  a  natural  ambition  and  not  to  be 
harshly  judged.  In  addition,  there  was  the  Rus- 
sian-Austrian conflict  of  influence,  especially  in 

306 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

Serbia,  which  also  concerned  Germany  in  so  far 
as  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  allies. 

The  Russia  of  the  Tsars,  moreover,  was  in  a 
state  of  continual  internal  ferment  and  every  Tsar- 
istic  Government  had  to  keep  the  possibility  for 
a  foreign  conflict  ever  in  readiness,  in  order  always 
to  be  able  to  deflect  attention  from  inner  troubles 
to  foreign  difficulties ;  to  have  a  safety  valve  as  an 
outlet  for  the  passions  that  might  lead  to  trouble 
at  home. 

Another  point  was  that  Russia's  enormous  de- 
mand for  loans  was  met  almost  exclusively  by 
France ;  more  than  twenty  billions  of  French  gold 
francs  found  their  way  to  Russia,  and  France  had 
a  voice,  to  some  extent,  in  determining  how  they 
should  be  expended.  As  a  result,  it  became  en- 
tirely a  matter  of  expenditure  on  strategic  meas- 
ures and  preparations  for  war.  The  golden  chain 
of  the  French  billions  not  only  bound  Russia  to 
France  financially,  but  made  Russia  serve  the 
French  idea  of  revenge. 

PURPOSE  OF  "ENCIRCLEMENT" 

Thus  England,  France,  and  Russia  had,  though 
for  different  reasons,  an  aim  in  common — viz.,  to 
overthrow  Germany.  England  wished  to  do  so 
for  commercial-political  reasons,  France  on  ac- 
count of  her  policy  of  revenge,  Russia  because  she 
was  a  satellite  of  France  and  also  for  reasons  of 
internal  politics  and  because  she  wished  to  reach 
the  southern  sea.  These  three  great  nations,  there- 
fore, were  bound  to  act  together.  The  union  of 
21  307 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


these  ambitions  in  a  common  course  of  action, 
duly  planned,  is  what  we  call  the  ^^policy  of 
encirclement." 

Added  to  all  this  there  was  also  the  Gentlemen's 
Agreement  which  has  only  recently  come  to  light 
and  has  already  been  thoroughly  discussed  in  the 
^'Hohenlohe"  chapter;  concerning  this  agreement 
I  knew  absolutely  nothing  during  my  reign,  and 
the  German  Foreign  OfBce  was  only  superficially 
and  unreliably  informed. 

When  I  learned  of  it,  I  immediately  sought  in- 
formation about  it  from  Herr  von  Bethmann.  He 
wrote  me  a  rather  puzzling  letter  to  the  efiPect  that 
there  was  surely  something  about  it  among  the 
documents  of  the  Foreign  OfEce ;  that  the  German 
ambassador  at  that  time  in  Washington,  von  Hol- 
leben,  had  made  some  confidential  report  on  it,  to 
be  sure,  but  had  not  given  his  source  of  informa- 
tion, wherefore  the  Foreign  OfEce  had  not  attached 
any  importance  to  the  matter  and  had  not  reported 
further  on  it  to  me.  Hence  the  said  agreement 
had  actually  no  influence  upon  Germany's  policy, 
but  it  constitutes  supplementary  proof  that  the 
Anglo-Saxon  world  as  far  back  as  1897  had  com- 
bined against  us,  and  thereby  explains  a  number 
of  obstacles  encountered  by  Germany  in  her  for- 
eign policy.  It  also  explains  America's  attitude 
in  the  war. 

We  were  quite  well  acquainted,  on  the  other 
hand,  with  the  Entente  Cordiale,  its  foundations 
and  purposes,  and  it  decisively  influenced  the 
course  of  our  policy. 

308 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

In  view  of  the  grouping  of  England,  France, 
and  Russia — three  very  strong  powers — only  one 
political  course  lay  open  to  Germany,  the  threat 
of  deciding  Germany's  future  by  force  of  arms 
must  be  avoided  until  we  had  secured  for  our- 
selves such  an  economic,  military,  naval,  and  na- 
tional-political position  in  the  world  as  to  make  it 
seem  advisable  to  our  opponents  to  refrain  from 
risking  a  decision  by  arms  and  to  yield  us  the  share 
in  the  apportionment  and  management  of  the 
world  to  which  our  ability  entitled  us.  We  neither 
desired  nor  were  we  entitled  to  jeopardize  our 
hard-won  welfare. 

The  aims  of  the  Entente  could  be  attained  only 
through  a  war,  those  of  Germany  only  without  a 
war.  It  is  necessary  to  hold  fast  to  this  basic  idea ; 
it  is  of  more  decisive  value  than  all  accessory  mat- 
ters. Hence  I  shall  not  go  into  detail  here,  nor 
take  up  Belgian  or  other  reports,  nor  the  tele- 
grams sent  just  before  the  outbreak  of  war.  The 
thorough  treatment  of  these  details  lies  in  the  do- 
main of  research. 

In  Germany  our  situation  was  correctly  under- 
stood, and  we  acted  accordingly. 

SOUGHT  ENGLAND'S  FRIENDSHIP 

Taking  up  once  more  our  relations  with  Eng- 
land, we  did  everything  in  our  power  to  bring 
about  a  rapprochement;  we  consented  to  the  de- 
mand for  limitation  of  naval  construction,  as  I 
have  shown  in  my  report  of  Haldane's  visit  to 
Berlin.  I  went  so  far  as  to  try  to  utilize  my  family 

309 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

connections.  But  in  vain.  The  actions  of  King 
Edward  VII  are  explained  by  the  simple  fact  that 
he  was  an  Englishman  and  was  trying  to  bring  to 
realization  the  plans  of  his  Government  Maybe 
the  political  ambitions  of  the  King,  who  did  not 
begin  to  reign  until  well  along  in  years,  contrib- 
uted to  this. 

We  certainly  did  all  that  was  possible  to  meet 
England  halfway,  but  it  was  useless,  because  the 
German  export  figures  showed  an  increase;  natur- 
ally we  could  not  limit  our  world  commerce  in 
order  to  satisfy  England.  That  would  have  been 
asking  too  much. 

As  regards  our  policy  toward  England,  we  have 
been  much  blamed  for  having  refused  the  offer  of 
an  alliance  made  us  by  Chamberlain,  the  English 
Colonial  Minister,  toward  the  close  of  the  'nine- 
ties. This  matter,  however,  was  far  different  in 
character,  on  closer  inspection,  from  what  it  was 
represented  as  being. 

First,  Chamberlain  brought  a  letter  with  him 
from  the  English  Premier,  Salisbury,  to  Biilow, 
in  which  the  English  Prime  Minister  declared 
that  Chamberlain  was  dealing  on  his  own  account 
only,  that  the  English  Cabinet  was  not  behind  him. 
This,  to  be  sure,  might  have  meant  the  adoption 
of  a  course  that  was  diplomatically  permissible, 
giving  the  English  Cabinet,  which  was  respon- 
sible to  Parliament,  a  free  hand;  but  it  turned 
out  later,  be  it  remarked,  that  the  Liberal  group 
in  England  was  at  that  time  hostile  to  a  German- 
English  alliance. 

310 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

Nevei-theless,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  there  was 
a  possibility  that  the  course  adopted  was  a  mere 
diplomatic  formality — that  Chamberlain  might 
have  been  sent  on  ahead  and  complete  freedom  of 
action  retained  for  the  English  Cabinet,  which  is 
a  favorite  method  in  London — Prince  Biilow,  with 
my  consent,  went  thoroughly  into  the  matter  with 
Chamberlain. 

It  transpired  then  that  the  English-German  al- 
liance was  aimed  unquestionably  against  Russia. 
Chamberlain  spoke  directly  about  a  war  to  be 
waged  later  by  England  and  Germany  against 
Russia.  Prince  Biilow,  in  full  agreenient  with  me, 
declined  politely  but  emphatically  thus  to  disturb 
the  peace  of  Europe.  In  so  doing  he  was  but  fol- 
lowing the  example  of  the  great  Chancellor,  for 
Prince  Bismarck  coined  the  phrase — I  myself 
have  heard  it  repeatedly  in  the  Bismarck  family 
circle:  "Germany  must  never  become  England's 
dagger  on  the  European  continent." 

So  we  did  nothing  further  at  that  time  than  to 
go  straight  ahead  with  our  policy — viz.,  we  refused 
all  agreements  which  might  lead  to  a  war  which 
was  not  based  directly  on  the  defense  of  our  native 
soil.  The  refusal  of  the  Chamberlain  offer  is  a 
proof  of  the  German  love  of  peace. 

As  to  France,  we  sought  to  bring  about  an  en- 
durable state  of  affairs.  This  was  difficult,  for,  in 
French  eyes,  we  were  the  archenemy  and  it  was 
impossible  for  us  to  acquiesce  in  the  demands  in- 
spired by  the  policy  of  revenge.  We  settled  the 
Morocco  quarrel  peacefully;  no  man  of  standing 

311 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


in  Germany  entertained  the  idea  of  war  on  account 
of  Morocco.  For  the  sake  of  peace  we  allowed 
France  at  that  time  to  encroach  upon  the  essen- 
tially legitimate  interests  of  Germany  in  Morocco, 
strengthened  as  the  French  were  by  the  agreement 
concluded  secretly  with  England  as  to  mutual  com- 
pensation in  Egypt  and  Morocco. 

In  the  Algeciras  Conference  the  outline  of  the 
Great  War  was  already  visible.  It  is  assuredly  not 
pleasant  to  be  forced  to  retreat  politically,  as  we 
did  in  the  Morocco  matter,  but  Germany's  policy 
subordinated  everything  to  the  great  cause  of  pre- 
serving the  peace  of  the  world. 

We  tried  to  attain  this  end  by  courtesy,  which 
was  partially  resented.  I  recall  the  journey  of 
my  mother,  the  Empress  Frederick,  to  Paris.  We 
expected  a  tolerably  good  reception,  since  she  was 
an  English  Princess  and  went,  as  an  artist,  to  be 
the  guest  of  French  art.  Twice  I  visited  the  Em- 
press Eugenie — once  from  Aldershot  at  her  castle 
of  Fernborough,  the  Other  time  aboard  her  yacht, 
in  Norwegian  waters,  near  Bergen.  This  was  a 
piece  of  politeness  that  seemed  to  me  perfectly 
natural,  seeing  that  I  happened  to  be  very  near 
her.  When  the  French  General  Bonnal  was  in 
Berlin  with  several  officers,  these  gentlemen  dined 
with  the  Second  Infantry  Regiment.  I  was  pres- 
ent and  toasted  the  French  army — something  that 
was  still  out  of  the  ordinary,  but  was  done 
with  the  best  intentions.  I  brought  French 
female  and  male  artists  to  Germany.  All  this 
sort  of  thing,  of  course,  was  a  trifle  in  the  great 

312 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

game  of  politics,  but  it  at  least  showed  our 
good  will. 

With  regard  to  Russia,  I  went  to  the  utmost 
trouble.  My  letters,  published  in  the  meantime, 
were  naturally  never  sent  without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellors,  but  always  in  agree- 
ment with  them  and  largely  at  their  desire.  Russia 
would  doubtless  never  have  got  into  a  war  with 
Germany  under  Alexander  III,  for  he  was  reli- 
ably. Tsar  Nicholas  was  weak  and  vacillating; 
whoever  had  last  been  with  him  was  right;  and, 
naturally,  it  was  impossible  for  me  always  to  be 
that  individual. 

I  made  every  effort  with  this  Tsar,  also,  to 
restore  the  traditional  friendship  between  Ger- 
many and  Russia.  I  was  moved  to  do  so  not 
only  by  political  reasons,  but  by  the  promise 
which  I  had  made  to  my  grandfather  on  his 
deathbed. 

I  most  urgently  advised  Tsar  Nicholas,  repeat- 
edly, to  introduce  liberal  reforms  within  his  coun- 
try, to  summon  the  so-called  Great  Duma,  which 
existed  and  functioned  even  as  far  back  as  the  reign 
of  Ivan  the  Terrible.  In  doing  so  it  was  not  my 
intention  to  interfere  in  Russian  internal  affairs; 
what  I  wanted  was  to  eliminate,  in  the  interests  of 
Germany,  the  ferment  going  on  in  Russia,  which 
had  often  enough  been  deflected  before  to  foreign 
conflicts,  as  I  have  already  described.  I  wished 
to  help  toward  eliminating  at  least  this  one  phase 
of  the  internal  situation  in  Russia,  which  threat- 
ened to  cause  war,  and  I  was  all  the  more  willing 

313 


/ 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


to  make  the  effort  since  I  might  thereby  serve  both 
the  Tsar  and  Russia. 

The  Tsar  paid  no  heed  to  my  advice,  but  created 
a  new  Duma  instead,  which  was  quite  inadequate 
for  coping  with  the  situation.  Had  he  summoned 
the  old  Duma  he  might  have  dealt  and  talked  per- 
sonally with  all  the  representatives  of  his  huge 
realm  and  won  their  confidence. 

When  the  Tsar  resolved  upon  war  against 
Japan,  I  told  him  that  I  would  assure  him  security 
in  the  rear  and  cause  him  no  annoyances.  Ger- 
many kept  this  promise. 

GRAND  DUKE'S  VISIT 

When  the  course  taken  by  the  war  did  not  fulfill 
the  Tsar's  expectations,  and  the  Russian  and  Jap- 
anese armies  finally  lay  before  each  other  for 
weeks  without  serious  fighting,  the  young  brother 
of  the  Tsar,  Grand  Duke  Michael,  arrived  at 
Berlin  for  a  visit.  We  could  not  quite  make  out 
what  he  wanted.  Prince  Biilow,  who  was  then 
Chancellor,  requested  me  to  ask  the  Grand  Duke 
sometime  how  matters  really  stood  with  Russia; 
he  said  that  he,  the  Prince,  had  received  bad  news 
and  thought  it  was  high  time  for  Russia  to  bring 
the  war  to  an  end. 

I  undertook  this  mission.  The  Grand  Duke 
was  visibly  relieved  when  I  spoke  to  him  frankly ; 
he  declared  that  things  looked  bad  for  Russia.  I 
told  him  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  Tsar  ought 
to  make  peace  soon,  since  what  the  Grand  Duke 
had  told  me  about  the  unreliability  of  troops  and 

314 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

officers  appeared  to  me  quite  as  serious  as  the  re- 
newed internal  agitation. 

Grand  Duke  Michael  was  grateful  for  my  hav- 
ing given  him  an  opportunity  to  talk.  He  said  that 
the  Tsar  was  vascillating,  as  always,  but  he  must 
make  peace  and  would  make  it  if  I  advised  him  to 
do  so.  He  asked  me  to  write  a  few  lines  to  the  Tsar 
to  that  effect,  for  him  to  deliver. 

I  drafted  a  letter  in  English  to  Tsar  Nicholas, 
went  to  Biilow,  told  him  what  the  Grand  Duke 
had  told  me,  and  showed  him  the  draft  of  my  let- 
ter. The  Prince  thanked  me  and  found  the  letter 
suitable.  The  Grand  Duke  informed  the  Russian 
ambassador  in  Berlin,  Count  Osten-Sacken,  and, 
after  he  had  repeatedly  expressed  his  thanks,  went 
direct  to  the  Tsar,  who  then  had  peace  negotia- 
tions begun. 

Count  Osten-Sacken  told  me,  when  next  we  met, 
that  I  had  done  Russia  a  great  service.  I  was  glad 
this  was  recognized,  and  felt  justified  in  hoping, 
on  account  of  this,  that  my  conduct  would  con- 
tribute toward  bringing  about  friendly  relations 
with  Russia.  In  acting  as  I  did  I  also  worked 
toward  preventing  the  possible  spread  of  a  Rus- 
sian revolution,  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
across  the  frontiers  of  Germany.  Germany  earned 
no  thanks  thereby;  however,  our  conduct  during 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  is  another  proof  of  our 
love  of  peace. 

The  same  purpose  underlay  my  suggestion  which 
led  to  the  Bjorko  agreement  (July,  1905).  It 
contemplated  an  alliance  between  Germany  and 

315 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

Russia,  which  both  the  Allies  as  well  as  other 
nations  should  be  at  liberty  to  join.  Ratification 
of  this  agreement  failed  through  the  opposition 
of  the  Russian  Government  (Isvolsky). 

It  remains  to  say  a  few  words  about  America. 
Aside  from  the  Gentlemen's  Agreement  already 
mentioned,  which  assured  America's  standing  be- 
side England  and  France  in  a  World  War^  Amer- 
ica did  not  belong  to  the  Entente  Cordiale  created 
by  King  Edward  VII  at  the  behest  of  his  Gov- 
ernment, and,  most  important  of  all,  America,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  possible  at  present  to  judge  events, 
did  not  contribute  toward  bringing  on  the  World 
War.  Perhaps  the  unfriendly  answer  given  by 
President  Wilson  to  the  German  Government  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  may  have  had  some  con- 
nection with  the  Gentlemen's  Agreement. 

AMERICAN  FACTORS  IN  DEFEAT 

But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  America's  entry 
into  the  war,  and  the  enormous  supplies  of  am- 
munition, and  especially  of  war  materials,  which 
preceded  her  entry,  seriously  hurt  the  chance  of 
the  Central  Powers  to  bring  the  war  to  a  success- 
ful termination  by  force  of  arms. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  avoid  all  emotional 
criticism  of  America  also,  since,  in  the  great  game 
of  politics,  real  factors  only  can  be  considered. 
America  was  at  liberty  (despite  the  Gentlemen's 
Agreement)  to  remain  neutral  or  to  enter  the  war 
on  the  other  side.  One  cannot  reproach  a  nation 
for  a  decision  as  to  war  or  peace  made  in  accord- 

316 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

ance  with  its  sovereign  rights  so  long  as  the  deci- 
sion is  not  in  violation  of  definite  agreements. 
Such  is  not  the  case  here. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  noted  that  John  Ken- 
neth Turner,  in  his  already  mentioned  book.  Shall 
It  Be  Again?  shows,  on  the  basis  of  extensive 
proofs,  that  all  Wilson's  reasons  for  America's 
entry  into  the  war  were  fictitious,  that  it  was  far 
more  a  case  of  acting  solely  in  the  interest  of  Wall 
Street  high  finance. 

The  great  profit  derived  by  America  from  the 
World  War  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  was  able  to  attract  to  itself  nearly  fifty  per 
cent  of  all  the  gold  in  the  world,  so  that  now  the 
dollar,  instead  of  the  English  pound,  determines 
the  world's  exchange  rate.  But  here  also  no  re- 
proach is  at  all  justified,  since  any  other  nation 
in  a  position  to  do  so  would  have  rejoiced  in  at- 
tracting to  itself  this  increase  of  gold  and  of 
prestige  in  the  world's  money  market.  It  was 
certainly  regrettable  for  us  that  America  did 
not  do  this  stroke  of  business  on  the  side  of  the 
Central  Powers. 

But  just  as  Germany  objects  with  perfect  justi- 
fication to  having  had  her  peaceful  labors  com- 
bated by  the  Entente,  not  with  peaceful,  but  with 
warlike  means,  so  also  she  can  and  must  enter  con- 
stant protest — as  she  is  already  trying  to  do  by 
means  of  published  material — against  America's 
violation  of  the  right  at  the  close  of  the  World  War. 

Personally  I  do  not  believe  that  the  American 
people  would  have  consented  to  this;  American 

317 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

women  particularly  would  not  have  participated 
in  tfie  denial  of>  President  Wilson's  Fourteen 
Points,  if  they  could  have  been  enlightened  at  that 
time  as  to  the  facts.  America,  more  than  other 
countries,  had  been  misled  by  English  propa- 
ganda, and  therefore  allowed  President  Wilson, 
who  had  been  provided  with  unprecedented 
powers,  to  act  on  his  own  initiative  at  Paris — in 
other  words,  to  be  beaten  down  on  his  Fourteen 
Points.  Just  as  Mr.  Wilson  omitted  mention, 
later  on,  of  the  English  blockade,  against  which 
he  had  protested  previously,  so  also  he  acted  with 
regard  to  his  Fourteen  Points. 

The  German  Government  had  accepted  Wil- 
son's Fourteen  Points,  although  they  were  severe 
enough.  The  Allies  likewise  had  accepted  the 
Fourteen  Points,  with  the  exception  of  those  on 
reparations  and  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  Wilson 
had  guaranteed  the  Fourteen  Points. 

FOURTEEN  POINTS  ABANDONED 

I  fail  to  find  the  most  important  of  them  in  the 
Versailles  instrument,  but  only  those  expressing 
the  Entente's  policy  of  violence,  and  even  part 
of  these  in  a  greatly  falsified  form.  Relying  on 
Wilson's  guaranty,  Germany  evacuated  the  enemy 
territory  occupied  by  her  and  surrendered  her 
weapons — in  other  words,  made  herself  defense- 
less. In  this  blind  confidence  and  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  Fourteen  Points  on  the  one  side,  and 
in  the  outbreak  of  the  German  revolution  on  the 
other,  lies  the  key  to  our  present  condition. 

318 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

According  to  Turner,  the  Fourteen  Points,  as 
far  back  as  the  drawing  up  of  the  armistice  terms, 
were,  to  Wilson,  no  more  than  a  means  of  making 
Germany  lay  down  her  arms ;  as  soon  as  this  end 
was  achieved  he  dropped  them. 

Already  a  very  large  part  of  the  American  peo- 
ple has  arrayed  itself  against  Mr.  Wilson  and  is 
unwilling  to  be  discredited  along  with  him.  I 
am  not  dreaming  of  spontaneous  American  help 
for  Germany;  all  I  count  upon  is  the  sober  ac- 
knowledgment by  the  American  people  that  it 
has  to  make  good  the  gigantic  wrong  done  Ger- 
,  many  by  its  former  President.  For  the  atmos- 
phere of  a  victory  does  not  last  forever,  and  later 
on,  not  only  in  Germany,  but  elsewhere,  people 
will  remember  the  unreliability  of  the  American 
President  and  look  upon  it  as  American 
unreliability. 

That  is  not  a  good  thing,  however,  for  the 
American  people.  To  have  the  policy  of  a  na- 
tion branded  with  the  stigma  of  unreliability  is 
not  advantageous.  When  judgment  is  passed 
hereafter  on  American  policy,  people  will  for- 
get that  Mr.  Wilson,  unversed  in  the  ways  of 
the  world,  was  trapped  by  Lloyd  George  and 
Clemenceau. 

I  have  met — particularly  at  the  Kiel  regattas — 
many  American  men  and  women  whose  political 
judgment  and  caution  would  make  it  impossible 
for  them  to  approve  such  a  flagrant' breach  of 
faith  as  was  committed  by  Mr.  Wilson,  because 
of  its  effect  on  America's  political  prestige.   It  is 

319 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

upon  such  considerations  of  national  egotism,  not 
upon  any  sort  of  sentimental  considerations,  that 
I  base  my  hope  that  Germany's  burden  will  be 
lightened  from  across  the  ocean. 

Besides  the  injustice  in  the  abandonment  of  the 
Fourteen  Points,  it  must  also  be  remembered  that 
Mr.  Wilson  was  the  first  to  demand  of  the  Ger- 
man reigning  dynasty  that  it  withdraw,  in  doing 
which  he  hinted  that,  were  such  action  taken,  the 
German  people  would  be  granted  a  better  peace. 
Before  the  Government  of  Prince  Max  joined  in 
the  demand  for  my  abdication  of  the  throne, 
which  it  based  on  the  same  grounds  as  Mr.  Wil- 
son— that  Germany  would  thereby  get  better 
terms — (prevention  of  civil  war  was  used  as  a 
second  means  of  bringing  pressure  on  me) — it 
was  in  duty  bound  to  get  some  sort  of  a  binding 
guaranty  from  Mr.  Wilson.  In  any  event,  the 
statements  made,  which  became  continually  more 
urgent  and  pressing,  contributed  toward  making 
me  resolve  to  quit  the  country,  since  I  was  con- 
strained to  believe  that  I  could  render  my  country 
a  great  service  by  so  doing. 

ACCEPTED  "SIGHT  UNSEEN" 

I  subordinated  my  own  interests  and  those  of 
my  dynasty,  which  certainly  were  not  unimpor- 
tant, and  forced  myself,  after  the  severest  inward 
struggles,  to  acquiesce  in  the  wish  of  the  German 
authorities.  Later  it  transpired  that  the  German 
Government  had  obtained  no  real  guaranties. 
But,  in  the  tumultuous  sequence  of  events  during 

320 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

those  days,  it  was  necessary  for  me  to  consider  the 
unequivocal  and  definite  announcement  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  as  authoritative.  For  this 
reason  I  did  not  investigate  it. 

Why  the  Entente  demanded,  through  Mr.  Wil- 
son, that  I  should  abdicate  is  now  obvious.  It 
felt  perfectly  sure  that,  following  my  being  dis- 
possessed of  the  throne,  military  and  political  in- 
stability would  necessarily  ensue  in  Germany  and 
enable  it  to  force  upon  Germany  not  easier  but 
harder  terms.  At  that  time  the  revolution  had 
not  yet  appeared  as  an  aid  to  the  Entente. 

For  me  to  have  remained  on  the  throne  would 
have  seemed  to  the  Entente  more  advantageous 
to  Germany  than  my  abdication.  I  myself  agree 
with  this  view  of  the  Entente,  now  that  it  has 
turned  out  that  the  Max  of  Baden  Government 
had  no  substantial  foundation  for  its  declaration 
that  my  abdication  would  bring  better  terms  to 
my  fatherland. 

I  go  even  further  and  declare  that  the  Entente 
would  never  have  dared  to  offer  such  terms  to  an 
intact  German  Empire.  It  would  not  have  dared 
to  offer  them  to  an  imperial  realm  upon  which  the 
parliamentary  system  had  not  yet  been  forced, 
with  the  help  of  German  Utopians,  at  the  very 
moment  of  its  final  fight  for  existence ;  to  a  realm 
whose  monarchical  Government  had  not  been  de- 
prived of  the  power  to  command  its  army  and 
navy. 

In  view  of  all  this,  heavy  guilt  also  lies  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  American  ex-President  as  a  re- 

321 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

suit  of  his  having  demanded  my  abdication  under 
the  pretense  that  it  would  bring  Germany  better 
terms.  Here  also  we  certainly  have  a  point  of 
support  for  the  powerful  lever  which  is  destined 
to  drag  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  from  where  it  lies 
behind  lock  and  key.  In  Germany,  however,  Mr. 
Wilson  should  never  be  confused  with  the  Ameri- 
can people. 

In  setting  forth  my  political  principles  in  what 
follows  I  am  actuated  solely  by  a  desire  to  con- 
tribute toward  proving  Germany's  innocence  of 
having  brought  on  the  World  War. 

From  the  outset  of  my  reign  German  policy 
was  based  upon  compromise  of  the  differences 
which  it  found  existing  between  nations.  In  its 
entirety,  therefore,  my  policy  was  eminently 
peaceful.  This  policy  of  peaceful  compromise 
became  apparent  in  internal  politics,  at  the  very 
beginning  of  my  reign,  in  the  legislation  desired 
by  me  for  the  protection  of  the  workers.  The  de- 
velopment of  social  legislation,  which  placed 
Germany  at  the  head  of  civilized  nations  in  the 
domain  of  governmental  protection,  was  based  on 
a  like  foundation. 

The  fundamental  idea  of  a  policy  of  compro- 
mise went  so  far  within  Germany  that  the  strength 
of  the  army  would  have  remained  far  less  than 
universal  compulsory  military  service  and  the  size 
of  the  population  made  possible. ,  Here,  as  well  as 
in  the  matter  of  naval  construction,  the  curtail- 
ments demanded  by  the  Reichstag  were  put  up 
with  by  the  Crown  and  the  Government.  Al- 

322 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

ready  at  that  time  the  question  of  Germany's 
capabilities  of  defense  was  left  to  the  decision  of 
the  people's  representatives.  A  nation  that 
wished  and  prepared  war  would  have  adopted 
quite  dififerent  tactics. 

INADEQUATE  PREPAREDNESS 

The  more  apparent  the  Entente's  "policy  of  en- 
circlement" and  attack  became,  the  more  the  means 
of  protecting  our  welfare  should  have  been 
strengthened  for  defensive  reasons.  This  idea  of 
natural  and  justified  self-protection,  by  means  of 
defensive  measures  against  a  possible  hostile  at- 
tack was  carried  out  in  a  wretchedly  inadequate 
manner. 

Germany's  desire  for  peace,  in  fact,  was  unable 
to  develop  this  protection  by  land  and  sea  in  a 
manner  compatible  with  her  financial  and  na- 
tional strength  and  with  the  risk  which  our 
welfare  was  bound  to  run  in  case  of  a  war. 
Therefore,  we  are  now  suffering  not  from  the 
consequences  of  the  tendency  toward  aggression 
falsely  imputed  to  us,  but  actually  from  the  conse- 
quences of  a  well-nigh  incredible  love  of  peace  and 
of  blind  confidence. 

The  entirely  dififerent  political  principles  of 
the  Entente  have  already  been  described  by  me, 
also  our  continuous  efiforts  to  get  upon  friendly 
terms  with  the  individual  Entente  nations. 

I  do  not  wish  to  ignore  completely  the  less 
important  work  done  by  Germany,  also  included 
within  the  framework  of  politics  on  a  large  scale, 
22  323 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

which  was  always  inspired  by  the  same  purpose: 
to  effect  compromise  of  existing  points  of  con- 
flict. The  Kiel  regatta  brought  us  guests  from 
all  the  leading  nations.  We  sought  compromise 
with  the  same  zeal  on  the  neutral  territory  of 
sport  as  in  the  domain  of  science  by  means  of  ex- 
change professors,  and  foreign  officers  were  most 
willingly  allowed  to  inspect  our  army  system. 
This  latter  might  be  adjudged  a  mistake,  now  that 
we  can  look  back,  but,  in  any  event,  all  these 
points  are  certain  proofs  of  our  honest  desire  to 
live  at  peace  with  all. 

Moreover,  Germany  did  not  take  advantage  of 
a  single  one  of  the  opportunities  that  arose  for 
waging  war  with  a  sure  prospect  of  success. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  the  benevolent  neu- 
trality of  Germany  toward  Russia  at  the  time  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  War. 

At  the  time  when  England  was  deeply  in- 
volved in  the  Boer  War  we  might  have  fought 
against  England  or  against  France,  which,  at  that 
time,  would  have  been  obliged  to  forego  help 
from  England.  But  we  did  not  do  so.  Also,  while 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  in  progress,  we 
might  have  fought  not  only  against  Russia,  but 
also  against  France.   But  we  did  not  do  so. 

In  addition  to  the  Morocco  crisis  already 
touched  upon,  in  connection  with  which  we  set 
aside  the  idea  of  going  to  war,  we  also  gave  evi- 
dence of  our  desire  for  peace  by  overcoming  the 
Bosnian  crisis  by  diplomatic  means. 

When  one  considers  these  plainly  visible  politi- 

324 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

cal  events  as  a  whole  and  adduces  the  declarations 
of  Entente  statesmen  such  as  Poincare,  Clemen- 
ceau,  Isvolsky,  Tardieu,  and  others,  one  is  bound 
to  ask  one's  self,  in  amazement,  how  a  peace  treaty, 
founded  upon  Germany's  guilt  in  having  brought 
on  the  World  War,  could  have  been  drafted  and 
put  through.  This  miscarriage  of  justice  will  not 
stand  before  the  bar  of  world  history. 

BLAMES  FRANCE  FOR  1870 

A  Frenchman,  Louis  Guetant,  delegate  from 
Lyon  to  the  Society  for  the  Rights  of  Man,  re- 
cently made  this  statement: 

"If  we  once  look  upon  events  without  preju- 
dice, with  complete  independence  and  frankness, 
without  bothering  about  which  camp  chance 
placed  us  in  at  birth,  the  following  is  forced  upon 
our  attention  first  of  all:  The  War  of  1914  is  a 
consequence  of  the  War  of  1870.  For,  ever  since 
that  earlier  date,  the  idea  of  revenge,  more  or  less 
veiled,  has  never  left  us. 

"The  War  of  1870,  however,  was  prepared  and 
declared  by  the  French  Government.  The  French 
Empire,  indeed,  needed  it  very  badly  in  order  to 
contend  against  interior  troubles  and  its  steadily 
growing  unpopularity  with  the  public.  Even 
Gambetta,  the  wild  tribune  of  the  opposition, 
exclaimed:  ^If  the  Empire  brings  us  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  I  shall  become  reconciled 
with  it!'  Thus,  it  was  a  war  of  conquest;  nobody 
bothered  about  what  the  conquered  populations 
might  have  to  say  about  it.   We  shall  bend  their 

325 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

will  to  ours!'  Thus  it  is  written  in  the  law  of  the 
victor ! 

"And  now,  suddenly,  the  opportunity  for  doing 
this  was  to  escape  France.  In  view  of  the  political 
difficulties  and  dangers  of  war  caused  by  his  can- 
didacy. Prince  Leopold  declared  himself  ready  to 
withdraw.  That  is  bad!  Without  a  pretext  there 
can  be  no  war! 

"It  was  the  same  with  France  as  with  the  milk- 
maid and  the  broken  pitcher  in  the  fable,  only  in- 
stead of,  Tarewell,  calf,  cow,  pig,  hens,'  it  was^; 
Tarewell,  bloody  profits,  glory,  victory,  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  even  Belgium!' — for  the  latter,  too, 
lay  on  that  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  which  France 
coveted.  No,  that  would  have  been  too  hard,  the 
disillusionment  would  have  been  too  great,  the  op- 
portunity must  be  created  anew.  The  entire  chau- 
vinistic press,  the  entire  clan  of  boasters,  set  to  work 
and  soon  found  a  way.  Gramont,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  sent  Ambassador  Benedetti  to 
visit  Emperor  William,  who  was  taking  the  cure 
at  Ems,  and  demand  from  him  a  written  promise 
that,  in  case  Prince  Leopold  should  change  his 
mind  about  his  withdrawal,  he,  William,  as  head 
of  the  family,  would  take  issue  against  this. 

"The  withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold  was  an- 
nounced to  France  in  a  valid  manner  and  officially 
accepted  by  the  Spanish  Government.  There 
could  be  no  doubt  as  to  its  genuineness.  Never- 
theless the  Paris  newspapers,  almost  without  ex- 
ception, clamored  for  war.  Whoever,  like  Robert 
Michell  in  the  Constitutionel,  expressed  his  pleas- 

326 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

ure  at  the  prospects  for  peace  and  declared  himself 
satisfied,  was  insulted  on  the  street.  Gambetta 
shouted  at  him :  *You  are  satisfied !  What  a  base 
expression  V  Copies  of  his  newspapers  were  stolen 
from  the  news  stands,  thrown  into  the  river,  hurled 
in  his  face!  Emilie  de  Girandin  wrote  to  him: 
*The  opportunity  is  unique,  unhoped-for;  if  the 
Empire  mi3ses  it  the  Empire  is  lostT  Then  it  was 
that  preparation  for  the  War  of  1914  was  begun." 

Voices  like  this  also,  which  are  not  unique  either 
in  France  or  England,  must  always  be  adduced  as 
proof  that  the  guilt  is  not  ours, 

"MISTAKEN,  BUT  NOT  GUILTY" 

Our  political  and  diplomatic  operations  in  the 
course  of  decades  were  not,  it  must  be  admitted, 
faultlessly  conceived  or  executed.  But  where  we 
made  mistakes  they  were  caused  invariably  by  the 
too  great  desire  to  maintain  world  peace.  Such 
mistakes  do  not  constitute  guilt. 

As  I  mentioned  elsewhere,  I  even  consider  the 
Congress  of  Berlin  a  mistake,  for  it  made  our  rela- 
tions with  Russia  worse.  The  congress  was  a  vic- 
tory for  Disraeli,  an  Anglo-Austrian  victory  over 
Russia,  which  turned  Russian  anger  upon  Ger- 
many. Yet — think  of  all  that  has  been  done  since 
then  to  make  up  with  Russia!  I  have  partly  enu- 
merated these  acts.  And  Bismarck's  sole  intention 
in  bringing  about  the  Congress  of  Berlin  was,  as  I 
have  pointed  out,  the  prevention  of  a  great  general 
war. 

Chancellor  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  also,  who 

327 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

had  strict  orders  from  me  to  maintain  peace  if  it 
was  at  all  possible,  made  mistakes  in  1914;  as  a 
statesman  he  was  not  at  all  adequate  to  the  world 
crisis.  But  the  blame  for  the  war  cannot  be  put 
upon  us  simply  because  our  opponents  profited  by 
our  mistakes.  Bethmann  Hollweg  wished  to  avoid 
the  war,  like  all  of  us — sufficient  proof  of  this  is 
to  be  found  in  the  one  fact  alone  that  he  persisted, 
until  the  4th  of  August,  in  his  political  inertia, 
negotiating  with  England  in  the  erroneous  belief 
that  he  could  keep  England  out  of  the  Entente. 

While  on  this  subject  I  wish  also  to  call  attention 
to  the  delusion  under  which  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
the  German  ambassador  in  London,  was  laboring. 
Soon  after  he  had  become  ambassador,  King 
George  came  to  the  Embassy  to  dinner.  The 
King's  example  was  followed  automatically  by  the 
best  society  people  in  London. 

The  Prince  and  Princess  were  singled  out  for 
marked  attentions  and  exceedingly  well  treated 
socially.  From  this  the  German  ambassador  drew 
the  conclusion  that  our  relations  with  England  had 
improved,  until,  shortly  before  the  war,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  coolly  informed  him  that  he  must  draw 
no  political  conclusions  from  social  favors  and 
good  treatment  accorded  to  him  personally. 

Nothing  could  give  a  better  insight  into  the  dif- 
ference between  the  English  and  German  men- 
tality than  this.  The  German  assumed  social 
friendliness  to  be  the  expression  of  political 
friendliness,  since  the  German  is  accustomed  to  ex- 
press aversion  and  approval  by  means  of  social 

328 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 


forms  as  well  as  otherwise.  He  is  very  outspoken 
about  what  he  has  on  his  mind. 

CHARGES  ENGLISH  INSINCERITY 

The  Englishman,  however,  makes  a  distinction ; 
in  fact,  he  is  rather  pleased  if  the  man  to  whom  he 
is  speaking  confuses  form  with  substance,  or,  in 
other  words,  if  he  takes  the  form  to  be  the  expres- 
sion of  actual  sentiments  and  political  views. 
Judged  from  the  English  standpoint,  the  above- 
mentioned  words  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  were  a  per- 
fectly frank  statement. 

The  much-discussed  nonrenewal  of  the  reinsur- 
ance treaty  with  Russia,  already  touched  upon  by 
me,  is  not  to  be  considered  so  decisive  as  to  have 
influenced  the  question  of  whether  there  was  to  be 
war  or  peace.  The  reinsurance  treaty,  in  my  opin- 
ion, would  not  have  prevented  the  Russia  of  Nich- 
olas II  from  taking  the  road  to  the  Entente;  under 
Alexander  III  it  would  have  been  superfluous. 

Prince  Bismarck's  view  that  the  Russian  am- 
bassador. Prince  Shuvaloff,  would  have  renewed 
the  reinsurance  treaty  with  him  but  not  with  his 
successor,  is  naturally  the  honest,  subjective  way 
of  looking  at  the  matter — judged  in  the  light  of 
fact,  however,  it  does  not  hold  water,  in  view  of 
what  the  two  parties  concerned  had  to  consider  at 
that  time.  For  instance,  the  Under  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  Prince,  Count  Berchem,  stated  offi- 
cially in  a  report  to  the  Prince  that  the  treaty  could 
not  be  renewed,  which  meant  that  it  could  not  be 
renewed  through  Shuvaloff,  either. 

329 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

I  thought  that  not  the  old  treaty,  but  only  a  new 
and  different  kind  of  treaty,  was  possible,  in  the 
drawing  up  of  which  Austria  must  participate,  as 
in  the  old  Three-Emperor-Relationship. 

But,  as  I  said,  treaties  with  Nicholas  II  would 
not  have  seemed  absolutely  durable  to  me,  par- 
ticularly after  the  sentiment  of  the  very  influential 
Russian  general  public  had  also  turned  against 
Germany. 

Our  acts  were  founded  upon  the  clear  percep- 
tion that  Germany  could  reach  the  important  posi- 
tion in  the  world  and  obtain  the  influence  in  world 
affairs  necessary  to  her  solely  by  maintaining  world 
peace.  This  attitude  was  strengthened,  moreover, 
by  personal  considerations. 

Never  have  I  had  warlike  ambitions.  In  my 
youth  my  father  had  given  me  terrible  descriptions 
of  the  battlefields  of  1870  and  1871,  and  I  felt  no 
inclination  to  bring  such  misery,  on  a  colossally 
larger  scale,  upon  the  German  people  and  the 
whole  of  civilized  mankind.  Old  Field  Marshal 
Moltke,  whom  I  respected  greatly,  had  left  behind 
him  the  prophetic  warning:  Woe  to  him  who  hurls 
the  firebrand  of  war  upon  Europe!  And  I  con- 
sidered as  a  political  legacy  from  the  great  Chan- 
cellor the  fact  that  Prince  Bismarck  had  said  that 
Germany  must  never  wage  a  preventive  war;  that 
German  resistance  would  be  neutralized  if  she  did. 

Thus  the  trend  of  the  German  policy  of  main- 
taining the  peace  was  determined  by  political  in- 
sight, personal  inclination,  the  legacies  of  two 
great  men,  Bismarck  and  Moltke,  and  the  desire  of 

330 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

the  German  people  to  devote  itself  to  peaceful 
labors  and  not  to  plunge  into  adventures. 

Whatever  has  been  said  in  malevolent  circles 
about  the  existence  of  a  German  party  favoring 
war  is  a  conscious  or  unconscious  untruth.  In 
every  land  there  are  elements  which,  in  serious 
situations,  either  from  honest  conviction  or  less 
lofty  motives,  favor  the  appeal  to  the  sword,  but 
never  have  such  elements  influenced  the  course  of 
German  policy. 

The  accusations,  especially  those  which  have 
been  made  against  the  General  Staff  to  the  effect 
that  it  worked  for  war,  are  pretty  untenable.  The 
Prussian  General  Staff  served  its  King  and  father- 
land by  hard,  faithful  work,  and  maintained  Ger- 
many's ability  to  defend  herself  by  labors  extend- 
ing over  many  years  of  peace,  as  was  its  duty,  but 
it  exerted  absolutely  no  political  influence  what- 
soever. Interest  in  politics,  as  is  well  known,  was 
never  particularly  strong  in  the  Prussian-German 
army.  Looking  backward,  one  might  almost  say, 
in  fact,  that  it  would  have  been  better  for  us  if 
those  in  leading  military  circles  had  concerned 
themselves  a  bit  more  with  foreign  policy. 

Therefore,  how  the  Peace  of  Versailles,  in  view 
of  this  perfectly  clear  state  of  affairs,  could  have 
been  founded  upon  Germany's  guilt  in  having 
caused  the  World  War,  would  seem  an  insoluble 
riddle  if  it  were  not  possible  to  trace  the  tremen- 
dous effect  of  a  new  war  weapon — viz.,  the  politi- 
cal propaganda  of  England  against  Germany — 
planned  on  a  large  scale  and  applied  with  audacity 

331 


/ 


THE  KAISER^S  MEMOIRS 

and  unscrupulousness.  I  cannot  bring  myself  to 
dismiss  this  propaganda  by  branding  it  with  catch- 
words such  as  "a  piece  of  rascality,"  etc.,  since  it 
constitutes  an  achievement  which,  in  spite  of  its 
repugnant  nature,  cannot  be  ignored;  it  did  us 
more  harm  than  the  arms  in  the  hands  of  our 
opponents. 

To  us  Germans,  such  an  instrument  of  insincer- 
ity, distortion,  and  hypocrisy  is  not  pleasing;  it  is 
something  that  is  incompatible  with  the  German 
character;  we  try  to  convince  our  opponents  with 
the  weapon  of  truth  as  well  as  with  other  weapons. 
But  war  is  a  cruel  thing  and  what  matters  in  it  is 
to  win ;  after  all,  to  fire  heavy  guns  at  civilized  be- 
ings is  not  a  pleasant  matter,  nor  to  bombard  beau- 
tiful old  towns,  yet  this  had  to  be  done  by  both 
sides  in  the  war. 

Moreover,  we  could  not  have  developed  a 
propaganda  on  a  large  scale  like  that  of  our 
enemies  during  the  war  for  the  very  reason  that 
they  had  no  foes  in  their  rear,  whereas  we  were 
surrounded.  In  addition,  most  Germans  have  not 
the  gift  to  fit  a  scheme  of  propaganda  to  the  dif- 
ferent nationalities  of  the  nations  upon  which  it  is 
supposed  to  work.  But,  just  as  the  English  were 
more  than  our  match  with  that  terrible  weapon 
of  theirs,  the  tank,  against  which  we  could  bring 
nothing  of  equal  efficiency,  so  also  were  they  su- 
perior to  us  with  their  very  effective  weapon  of 
propaganda. 

And  this  weapon  still  continues  its  work  and  we 
are  compelled  still  to  defend  ourselves  against  it 

332 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

over  and  over  again.  For  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  unjust  Peace  of  Versailles  could  not  have 
been  founded  upon  Germany's  war  guilt  unless 
propaganda  had  previously  accomplished  its  task 
and,  partly  with  the  support  of  German  pacifists, 
instilled  into  the  brains  of  100,000,000  human 
beings  the  belief  in  Germany's  guilt,  so  that 
the  unjust  Peace  of  Versailles  seemed  to  many 
justified. 

HOPES  FOR  VERSAILLES  REACTION 

Meanwhile,  things  have  changed,  the  barriers 
between  nations  have  fallen,  and  gradually  they 
are  awakening  to  the  realization  of  how  their  con- 
fidence was  imposed  upon.  The  reaction  will  be 
crushing  to  the  makers  of  the  Versailles  Peace,  but 
helpful  to  Germany.  It  goes  without  saying  that, 
among  the  statesmen,  politicians,  and  publicists  of 
the  Entente  who  really  know,  not  a  single  one  is 
really  convinced  of  Germany's  guilt  in  having 
caused  the  World  War.  Every  one  of  them  knows 
the  real  interrelation  of  events,  and  assuredly 
there  never  was  a  case  where  so  many  augurs  smiled 
at  each  other  over  a  secret  held  in  common  as  the 
case  of  the  responsibility  for  the  World  War,  In 
fact,  one  may  even  speak  of  a  chorus  of  such 
individuals,  since  twenty-eight  nations  took  part 
in  the  war  against  Germany.  But,  in  the  long 
run,  not  even  the  shrewdest  augurs  will  suffice 
to  make  world  history.  Truth  will  make  its 
way  forward  and  thus  Germany  will  come  into 
her  rights. 

333 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


The  various  stipulations  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty  are  in  themselves  null  and  void,  since  they 
can  be  observed  neither  by  the  Entente  nor  by 
Germany.  It  has  been  possible  for  months  to  note 
what  difficulties  are  arising  in  the  path  not  only 
of  Germany,  but  of  the  victors,  as  a  result  of  such 
an  extravagant  instrument. 

In  many  ways  the  treaty  has  been  punctured  by 
the  Entente  itself,  and  for  this  the  reason  is  easily 
found.  In  the  present  highly  developed  state  of 
the  world,  which  rests  upon  free,  systematic  ex- 
change of  material  and  intellectual  property, 
regulated  solely  by  production  itself,  it  is  quite  out 
of  the  question  for  three  men — no  matter  how 
eminent  they  may  be — ^to  sit  themselves  down 
anywhere  and  dictate  paragraphed  laws  to  the 
world.  Yet  that  is  what  the  Versailles  Treaty 
does,  not  only  for  Germany,  but  also,  indirectly, 
for  the  Entente  and  America,  since  all  economic 
questions  can  be  solved  by  mutual,  not  one-sided, 
action. 

The  life  of  nations  is  regulated  always — and 
most  particularly  in  our  day — not  by  paragraphs, 
but  simply  and  solely  by  the  needs  of  nations.  It 
is  possible,  to  be  sure,  to  do  violence  to  those  na- 
tional needs  temporarily  by  the  imposition  of  arbi- 
trary decisions,  but,  in  such  cases,  both  parties 
concerned  must  suflfer. 

The  world  is  in  such  a  stage  just  now.  Condi- 
tions like  those  at  present  cannot  last;  not  guns,  nor 
tanks,  nor  squadrons  of  airplanes,  can  perpetuate 
them.    Therefore,  their  removal  has  already  be- 

334 


THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 

gun;  for,  if  the  peace  of  Versailles  were  really  such 
a  judicious,  unimpeachable  instrument,  bringing 
blessings  upon  the  world,  there  would  not  be  con- 
stant need  of  new  conferences,  discussions,  and 
meetings  having  to  do  with  this  "marvelous"  docu- 
ment. The  constant  necessity  for  new  interpreta- 
tions is  due,  indeed,  to  the  fact  that  the  needs  of 
highly  cultivated  and  civilized  nations  were  not 
taken  into  account  when  the  peace  was  concluded. 

One  must  not  be  pharisaical,  however;  up  to  a 
certain  point  the  extravagance  of  the  terms  im- 
posed by  the  victor  after  a  life-and-death  struggle 
is  a  natural  consequence  of  the  relief  felt  at  having 
escaped  alive  from  deadly  danger. 

Nevertheless,  I  know  that  Germany,  if  we  had 
emerged  victorious  from  the  war,  would  have  im- 
posed quite  diflferent  terms — /.  e.,  terms  that  would 
have  been  just  and  endurable.  The  peace  treaties 
of  Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucharest — ^which  indeed  are 
not  at  all  comparable  with  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
— cannot  be  adduced  against  us.  They  were  con- 
cluded in  the  very  midst  of  the  war  and  had 
to  include  conditions  which  would  guarantee 
our  safety  until  the  end  of  the  war.  Had  it 
come  to  a  general  peace,  the  treaty  made  by  us 
in  the  East  would  have  had  a  far  different  aspect; 
had  we  won  the  war,  it  would  have  been  re- 
vised by  ourselves.  At  the  time  it  was  made  it 
was  necessary  to  give  preference  to  military 
requirements. 

But  enlightenment  regarding  the  unjust  Treaty 
of  Versailles  is  on  the  way  and  the  necessities  of 

335 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

life  among  present-day  nations  will  speak  in  im- 
perious tones  to  victors  and  vanquished. 

After  years  of  the  heaviest  trial  will  come  the 
liberation  from  a  yoke  imposed  unjustly  upon  a 
great,  strong,  honest  nation.  Then  every  one  of  us 
will  be  glad  and  proud  again  that  he  is  a  German. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XV 
The  Revolution  and  Germany's  Future 

I DO  not  care  what  my  foes  say  about  me.  I  do 
not  recognize  them  as  my  judges.  When  I  see 
how  the  same  people  who  exaggeratedly  spread 
incense  before  me  in  other  days  are  now  vilifying 
me,  the  most  that  I  can  feel  is  pity.  The  bitter 
things  that  I  hear  about  myself  from  home  disap- 
point me.  God  is  my  witness  that  I  have  always 
wished  what  was  best  for  my  country  and  my  peo- 
ple, and  I  believed  that  every  German  had  recog- 
nized and  appreciated  this.  I  have  always  tried 
to  keep  my  political  acts,  everything  that  I  did  as 
a  ruler  and  a  man,  in  harmony  with  God's  com- 
mandments. Much  turned  out  differently  from 
what  I  desired,  but  my  conscience  is  clean.  The 
welfare  of  my  people  and  my  Empire  was  the  goal 
of  my  actions, 

I  bear  my  personal  fate  with  resignation,  for  the 
Lord  knows  what  He  does  and  what  He  wishes. 
He  knows  why  He  subjects  me  to  this  test.  I  shall 
bear  everything  with  patience  and  await  what- 
soever God  still  holds  in  store  for  me. 

The  only  thing  that  grieves  me  is  the  fate  of  my 
country  and  my  people.   I  am  pained  at  the  hard 

337 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

period  of  trial  which  my  children  of  the  German 
land  are  undergoing,  which  I — obliged  to  live  in 
foreign  parts — cannot  suffer  with  them.  That  is 
the  sword  thrust  which  pierces  through  my  soul; 
that  is  what  is  bitter  to  me.  Here  in  solitude  I  still 
feel  and  think  solely  for  the  German  people,  still 
wonder  how  I  can  better  matters  and  help  with 
enlightenment  and  counsel. 

Nor  can  bitter  criticism  ever  lessen  my  love  for 
my  land  and  people.  I  remain  faithful  to  the 
Germans,  no  matter  how  each  individual  German 
may  now  stand  with  regard  to  me.  To  those  who 
stand  by  me  in  misfortune  as  they  stood  in  pros- 
perity, I  am  grateful — they  comfort  me  and  relieve 
my  gnawing  homesickness  for  my  beloved  Ger- 
man home.  And  I  can  respect  those  who,  im- 
pelled by  honest  convictions,  array  themselves 
against  me ;  as  for  the  rest,  let  them  look  to  justify- 
ing themselves  to  God,  their  consciences,  and 
history. 

They  will  not  succeed  in  separating  me  from 
the  Germans.  Always  I  can  look  upon  country 
and  people  solely  as  one  whole.  They  remain  to 
me  what  they  were  when  I  said  on  the  occasion  of 
the  opening  of  the  Reichstag  on  the  ist  of  August, 
1914,  in  the  Imperial  Palace:  "I  know  no  more  of 
parties;  I  know  only  Germans." 

The  revolution  broke  the  Empress's  heart.  She 
aged  visibly  from  November,  191 8,  onward,  and 
could  not  resist  her  bodily  ills  with  the  strength  of 
before.  Thus  her  decline  soon  began.  The  hard- 
est of  all  for  her  to  bear  was  her  homesickness  for 

338 


THE  REVOLUTION 


the  soil  of  Germany,  for  the  German  people.  Not- 
withstanding this,  she  still  tried  to  bring  me 
consolation. 

The  revolution  destroyed  things  of  enormous 
value.  It  was  brought  about  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  German  nation's  fight  for  existence  was 
to  have  been  ended,  and  every  effort  should  have 
been  concentrated  upon  reconstruction.  It  was  a 
crime  against  the  nation. 

WIND  AND  WHIRLWIND 

I  am  well  aware  that  many  who  rally  around 
the  Social  Democratic  banner  did  not  wish  revo- 
lution; some  of  the  individual  Social  Democratic 
leaders  likewise  did  not  wish  it  at  that  time,  and 
more  than  one  among  them  was  ready  to  co-operate 
with  me.  Yet  these  Social  Democrats  were  in- 
capable of  preventing  the  revolution,  and  therein 
lies  their  share  of  guilt  for  what  is  now  going  on, 
all  the  more  so  since  the  Socialist  leaders  stood 
closer  to  the  revolutionary  masses  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  monarchical  Government  and, 
therefore,  could  exert  more  influence  upon  them. 

But  the  leaders,  even  in  the  days  before  the  war, 
had  brought  the  idea  of  revolution  to  the  masses 
and  fostered  it,  and  the  Social  Democracy  had 
been,  from  time  immemorial,  openly  hostile  to  the 
earlier,  monarchical  form  of  government,  and  had 
worked  systematically  toward  eliminating  it.  It 
sowed  the  wind  and  reaped  the  whirlwind. 

The  time  and  nature  of  the  revolution  were  not 
to  the  liking  of  a  number  of  the  leaders,  but  it  was 
23  3  3  9 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

exactly  these  men  who,  at  the  decisive  moment, 
abandoned  leadership  to  the  most  unbridled  ele- 
ments and  failed  to  bring  their  influence  to  bear 
toward  maintaining  the  Government. 

It  was  the  duty  of  the  Government  of  Prince 
Max  to  protect  the  old  form  of  government.  It 
failed  to  fulfill  its  holy  duty  because  it  had  become 
dependent  on  the  Socialist  leaders,  the  very  men 
who  had  lost  their  influence  on  the  masses  to  the 
radical  elements. 

Therefore,  the  greatest  share  of  the  guilt  falls 
upon  the  leaders,  and  for  that  reason  history  will 
not  brand  the  German  working  classes,  but  their 
leaders,  with  the  curse  of  the  revolution,  in  so  far 
as  these  leaders  participated  in  making  the  revolu- 
tion or  failed  to  prevent  it — and  it  will  also  brand 
the  Government  of  Prince  Max  of  Baden  with  that 
curse. 

The  German  workers  fought  brilliantly  in  bat- 
tle under  my  leadership,  and  at  home,  as  well, 
labored  ceaselessly  to  provide  munitions  and  war 
material.  That  is  something  which  must  not  be 
forgotten.  It  was  only  later  that  some  of  them 
began  to  break  away,  but  the  responsibility  for  this 
lies  at  the  door  of  the  agitators  and  revolutionists, 
not  at  that  of  the  decent,  patriotic  section  of  the 
working  classes. 

The  conscienceless  agitators  are  the  men  really 
responsible  for  Germany's  total  collapse.  That 
will  be  recognized  some  day  by  the  working  classes 
themselves. 

The  present  is  a  hard  time  for  Germany.  Of 

340 


THE  REVOLUTION 

the  future  of  this  healthy,  strong  nation  I  do  not 
despair.  A  nation  which  can  achieve  such  an  un- 
precedented rise  as  that  of  Germany  between  1871 
and  1 9 14,  a  nation  which  can  maintain  itself  suc- 
cessfully for  over  four  years  in  a  defensive  war 
against  twenty-eight  nations,  cannot  be  driven 
from  the  earth.  Economically,  the  world  cannot 
do  without  us. 

But  in  order  that  we  may  regain  the  position  in 
the  world  which  is  Germany's  due,  we  must  not 
await  or  count  upon  help  from  outside.  Such  help 
will  not  come,  in  any  event;  were  it  to  come,  it 
would  but  mean  at  best  our  being  mere  Helots. 
Also,  the  help  which  the  German  Social  Demo- 
cratic party  hoped  for  from  abroad  has  not  ma- 
terialized, after  all.  The  international  part  of  the 
socialistic  program  has  proved  itself  a  frightful 
mistake. 

The  workers  of  the  Entente  lands  took  the  field 
against  the  German  people  in  order  to  destroy  it; 
nowhere  was  there  a  trace  of  international  soli- 
darity among  the  masses. 

ANOTHER  GERMAN  MISTAKE 

This  mistake,  too,  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
war  turned  out  so  badly  for  Germany.  The  Eng- 
lish and  French  working  classes  were  rightly  di- 
rected— i,  e.,  nationalistically— by  their  leaders ; 
the  German  working  classes  were  wrongly  directed 
— /.  e,,  internationally. 

The  German  people  must  rely  upon  no  other 
people,  but  solely  upon  themselves.  When  self -con- 

341 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 

scious,  national  sentiment  returns  to  all  the  Strata 
of  our  people  our  upward  march  will  begin.  All 
classes  of  the  population  must  be  united  in  na- 
tional sentiment,  no  matter  if  their  ways  lie  apart 
in  other  departments  of  the  nation's  life.  Therein 
lies  the  strength  of  England,  of  France — even  of 
the  Poles. 

If  this  comes  to  pass,  the  feeling  of  solidarity 
with  all  fellow  members  of  the  nation,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  dignity  of  our  noble  land,  the 
pride  in  being  German,  and  the  genuinely  German 
conception  of  ethics,  which  was  one  of  the  secret 
sources  of  strength  that  have  made  Germany  so 
great,  will  come  back  to  us. 

In  the  community  of  cultured  nations  Germany 
will  again  play,  as  she  did  before  the  war,  the  role 
of  the  nation  with  the  greatest  capacity  for  labor, 
and  will  once  more  march  victoriously  in  the  van 
in  peaceful  competition,  offering  not  only  to  her- 
self, but  to  all  the  nations  of  the  earth,  whatever 
is  best  in  the  domain  of  technical  achievement,  of 
science,  of  art. 

I  believe  in  the  revocation  of  the  unjust  Peace 
of  Versailles  by  the  judgment  of  the  sensible  ele- 
ments of  foreign  lands  and  by  Germany  herself.  I 
believe  in  the  German  people  and  in  the  continua- 
tion of  its  peaceful  mission  in  the  world,  which 
has  been  interrupted  by  a  terrible  war,  for  which 
Germany,  since  she  did  not  will  it,  does  not  bear 
the  guilt. 


INDEX 


Abdication    of    Kaiser  and 

Crown    Prince,  280-288, 

320,  321,  322. 
Abdul-Hamid,    Sultan,  and 

the  Albanians,    142,  164, 

165. 

Achenbach,  von,  34. 

Adlerberg,  Count,  13. 

Admiralty,  English,  154; 
Staff,  German,  240,  250. 

Agadir  affair,  145. 

Agrarian  Conservatives,  54. 

Agreement,  Anglo  -  Russian, 
116;  German-French,  Mo- 
rocco, 126,  127. 

Airplanes,  276,  334. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  262,  278. 

Albania,  142,  163-169. 

Albedyll,  von,  8. 

Aldershot,  312. 

Alexander  II,  of  Russia,  14, 
16,  17,  18,  19,  28. 

Alexander  III,  of  Russia,  313, 
329. 

Alexandra,  Queen,  of  Eng- 
land, 127,  130. 

Algeciras  Conference,  1 1 1 , 
115,  126,  144,  145,  312. 

Alliance,  Triple,  8,  251,  253; 
Double,  8,  306;  Anglo- 
Japanese,  69;  Balkan,  170; 
German-English,  310,  311. 


Alsace-Lorraine,  60,  61,  89, 

252,  258,  306. 
Althoc,  Privy  Councilor,  107. 
Althoff,  von,  183,  198. 
America.    See  United  States. 
America,  Central,  73. 
Anastasia,    Grand  Duchess, 

252. 

Andrassy,  5,  273. 
Annihilation,  policy  of,  296. 
Antwerp- Meuse    line,  275, 
279. 

Archives,  294,  295,  301. 
"Areopagus  of  the  Powers," 
165. 

Armistice,  274,  278,  284,  285, 

286,  289,  290,  298,  319. 
Armored  ship,  first  German, 

48. 

Army,  German,  52,  62,  77, 
105,  223-228,  259,  274, 
275,  276,  277,  278,  281, 
284,  285,  286,  287,  288, 
289,  290,  320,  322,  331; 
Russian,  10,  105,  227,  254; 
British,  91,  142,  162. 

"Asia  for  the  Asiatics,"  79. 

Asquith,  Herbert  Henry,  152, 
153.^ 

"Assurbanipal,"  204. 
Assyriology,  203-207. 
Astrakhan,  254. 
Austria,    alliance    with,  5; 


343 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


worked  with,  8;  threat 
against,  54;  war  begun  by 
Germany  on,  71  n. ;  if  Ger- 
many or,  should  begin  war, 
72;  ultimatum  to  Serbia, 
248;  Serbia's  answer  to, 
248 ;  anti-Russian  Balkan 
policy,  251;  "nothing  will 
be  left  of  Austria,"  252 ;  dis- 
memberment of  Austria- 
Hungary,  258;  elimination 
of  the  House  of  Hapsburg, 
258;  and  the  Pope,  265, 
266;  Emperor  Charles's  va- 
cillation, 272 ;  peace  offer  of, 
273 ;  deceives  Germany, 
273 ;  Russo- Austrian  con- 
flict of  influence  in  Serbia 
307 ;  Germany's  ally,  307. 
Automobile  Club,  Imperial 
45,  46. 

B 

"Babel  and  the  Bible,"  204, 
218. 

Baden,  285,  287,  321,  340. 
Bagdad  Railway,  89,  90. 
Balholm,  247. 

Balkans,  106,  165,  199,  200. 
Ballin,  Albert,  3,  107,  146, 

147,   148,  150,  151,  152, 

153,  154,  158. 
Baltic,  105. 

Baltisch-Port,  169-170,  249. 
"Baralong"  murderers,  264. 
Barrere,  Camille,  126. 
Battlefields  of  1 870-71,  330. 
Bavaria,  60. 

Belgian  Documents,  127. 
Belgium,  42,  43,  309,  326. 


Bender,  Herr  von,  29-30,  31. 
Benedetti,  Ambassador,  326. 
Benedictine  monks,  216. 
Bennigsen,  Rudolf  von,  30, 

31,  32. 
Berchem,  Count,  54,  329. 
Bergen,  312. 

Berlin  Treaty,  10,  11,  14; 
Congress,  2,  15,  17,  20,  327. 

Berlin,  University  of,  199; 
Palace  Chapel  at,  218. 

Bertram,  Prince-Bishop,  208. 

Beseler,  Max,  187. 

Bethmann  Hollweg,  von, 
Chancellor,  124-134;  "the 
governess,"  132;  enjoys  con- 
fidence of  foreign  countries, 
134;  dismissed,  134;  his 
diplomatic  power,  138,  246; 
mistakes  in  19 14,  328; 
wished  to  avoid  war,  328; 
tried  to  keep  England  out  of 
the  Entente,  328. 

Beuron  Congregation,  216. 

Biebrich-Mosbach,  179. 

Bismarck,  Bill,  3. 

Bismarck,  Count  Herbert,  2, 
5,  6,  12,  27,  28,  76. 

Bismarck,  Prince,  Chancellor, 
1-53,*  greatness  as  a  states- 
man, I ;  services  to  Prussia 
and  Germany,  i ;  creator  of 
the  German  Empire,  i ; 
Memoirs,  3,  4;  fight  against 
the  Kaiser,  2;  appreciation 
by  the  Prince  of  Prussia 
(later  the  Kaiser),  2;  major- 
domo  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns,  3 ;  and  the  harbor  of 
Hamburg,  4;  the  third  vol- 
ume of  his  reminiscences,  4 ; 


344 


INDEX 


continental  preparations,  7; 
his  Congress,  10;  ^'honest 
broker,"  10,  11;  "Now  I 
am  driving  Europe  four-in- 
hand,  II ;  retirement  of,  18, 
53;  and  the  Socialists,  40; 
his  labor  views,  41 ;  and  the 
Vulcan  shipyards,  48;  suc- 
ceeded by  Caprivi,  54 ;  fights 
his  successor,  55;  "mis- 
understood Bismarck,"  55, 
76 ;  reconciliation  with  Kai- 
ser, 92;  eightieth  birthday, 
93 ;  "Germany  must  never 
become  England's  dagger  on 
the  European  continent," 
311;  and  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  327. 

Bismarckian  theory,  102. 

Bjoko  agreement,  201,  249, 
315. 

Bissing,  General  von,  43. 
Black  Sea,  105,  191,  192. 
Blockade,  English,  318. 
Boches,  262. 

Bolsheviki,  181,  254,  284. 

Bonn,  214. 

Bonnal,  General,  312. 

Book  of  the  German  Fleet, 

184. 
Bosmont,  254. 
Bosnia,  324,  326. 
Botticher,  His  Excellency  von, 

3,  38. 
Brandenburg,  196. 
Brandenburg,  231. 
Breitenbach,  Paul  von,  180, 

181,  182. 
Brest-Li  to  vsk,    14,    16,  136, 

253,  335;  Treaty  of,  335- 
Brest  mission,  4. 


Bucharest,  Treaty  of,  335. 

Buckingham  Palace,  142. 

Budde,  Hermann,  178,  179. 

Billow,  Prince  von,  68 ;  Chan- 
cellor, 95-123,  192,  i94> 
195,  233>3io,3ii, 314,315. 

Burchard,  Doctor  von,  156, 

157-158,  159. 
Burian,  Stefan,  272. 
Boyd-Carpenter,  W.,  Bishop 

of  Ripon,  213. 


Cabinet,  German  War,  23, 
277,  280;  Civil,  25,  35,  134, 
136;  English,  310,  311. 

Csesar,  295. 

Calmuck  Cossacks,  254. 
Cambon,  Jules,  252. 
Cambridge,  Duke  of,  91. 
Canal,  Central,  ii2,  174,  177, 

178,  181;  Elbe-Trave,  178; 

Kaiser  Wilhelm,  163,  181, 

238-239;    Panama,  181, 

238. 
Canton,  78. 

Cape-to-Cairo  Railway  and 
Telegraph  line  deal,  87-88, 
89. 

Caprivi,  General  Leo  von,  51 ; 
Chancellor,  54-58;  opposi- 
tion of  Bismarck,  57. 

Carlsbad,  247,  250. 

Caro,  Professor,  206. 

Cassel,  Sir  Ernest,  146,  147, 
150,  152,  159. 

Cassino,  Monte,  217. 

Caucasus,  207,  254. 

Causes  of  the  World  War, 
127,  252. 

Centrists,  33,  68. 


345 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Central  Powers,  8i,  257,  316, 
317. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  68,  91, 
104,  186,  310,  311. 

Charles,  Emperor,  agreement 
with  Kaiser,  272;  secret 
dealings  with  the  Entente, 
273;  "When  I  go  to  the 
Germans,  I  agree  to  every- 
thing they  say,  and  when  I 
return  home,  I  do  whatever 
I  please,"  273. 

Charlotte,  Grand  Duchess, 
172. 

Charlottenburg,  196,  201. 
Chih-li,  Gulf  of,  67. 
China,  64,  106. 
Chinese  Empire,  78. 
Chirol,  Sir  Valentine,  85,  86. 
Church,    of    England,  213; 

St.    Mary's  (Jerusalem), 

216. 

Churchill,  Winston,  150,  152, 
153. 

"Citizens*  Book  of  Laws,"  93, 
187. 

"Civis  Germanus  sum,"  183. 
Clemenceau,    Georges,  319, 
325. 

Clemen,  Professor  Paul,  260. 
Coaling  stations,  64,  69-70, 

73,  74. 

Cologne,  180,  288. 

Colonial  acquisitions,  7,  9. 

Colonies,  German,  7,  8,  9,  11, 
12,  55,  56,  57. 

Commerce,  world,  310. 

Comparative  Historical  Tables 
from  1878  to  the  Outbreak 
of  the  War  in  1 91 4,  251, 
253,  297,  298,  299  n. 


Conference,  London,  296,  297. 

Conflict,  Russo-English,  10. 

Conflict  of  Influence,  Russian- 
Austrian,  306. 

Congress  of  Berlin,  2,  327. 

Connaught,  Duke  of,  102. 

Conrad,  Consistorial  Coun- 
cilor, 215. 

Conservatives,  31,  32,  33,  54, 
III,  112,  114,  119,  122, 
174. 

Constantine,    Crown  Prince 

(of  Greece),  28. 
Constantine  the  Great,  218. 
Constantinople,    10,    14,  15, 

16,  28,  90,  105,  106,  253. 
Constitution,  German,  2,  139- 

141,  293. 
Constitutionelj  326. 
Conversations    with  Christ, 

215. 
Costheim,  179. 
Court,  international,  295. 
Cronberg-Friedrichshof  situa- 
tion, 148. 
Crown  Council,  German,  247, 

272;  Russian,  252,  253. 
Crown  Prince,  German,  286, 

287. 
Cuniberti,  240. 
Cuxhaven,  107,  156. 


Dahn,  Professor,  206. 

Daily  Telegraph,  London, 
118,  120;  "interview,"  118. 

Dardanelles,  ofler  of,  to  Rus- 
sia, 14. 

Dar-es-Salaam,  56. 

"Debating  society,"  280. 

Deldriick,  Klemens  von,  282. 


346 


INDEX 


Delcasse,  Theophile,  io8,  257. 

Delitzsch,  Professor  Fried- 
rich,  204,  218. 

"Deutschland  iiber  alles,"  186. 

Dirschau,  177. 

Disraeli,  Benjamin,  11,  327. 

Documents,  secret,  294. 

Dollar,  American,  317. 

Donaneschingen,  119. 

"Dormition,"  216. 

Dorpat,  University  of,  200. 

Dorpfeld,  Professor  Wilhelm 
204,  205. 

Downing  Street,  70. 

Dreadnaughts,  238,  239,  240, 
241. 

Drews,  Bill,  Minister  of  In- 
terior, 281. 

Dryander,  Doctor  Ernest,  214. 

Duma,  Great,  313,  314;  new 
314. 

Durnovo,  Madame,  192,  193 
E 

*  Ebert,    Imperial  Chancellor, 
287,  288. 

Eckartsan,  119. 

Edward  VII,  of  England,  74, 
103,  162;  at  Kiel,  115;  in- 
vites Kaiser  to  Windsor, 
117;  "policy  of  encircle 
ment,"  45,  115,  126,  128, 
257;  visits  Berlin,  126; 
death  of  and  funeral,  128- 
130,  144;  actions  of  ex- 
plained, 310;  political  am- 
bitions of,  310;  and  the; 
Entente  Cordiale,  316. 

Egypt,  312. 

Eiffel  Mountains,  180. 


Einen,  General  von,  151,  161. 
Eisenach  Conference,  213. 
Emden,  181. 

Empire,  French,  325,  327. 

Empress,  German,  61,  196, 
297,  302,  338. 

Ems,  326,  329. 

England,  9,  10,  15,  16,  26, 
44;  conditions  of  English 
workmen,  44-45;  and  Ger- 
many as  to  coaling  stations, 
69;  anger  at  Germany's  oc- 
cupation of  Kiao-Chau,  70- 
71;  and  France,  71  n.,  72, 
73,  75;  and  United  States, 
71  n.,  72-74,  75;  naval  sta- 
tions, 78;  and  Japan,  78, 
82;  Kaiser  foresees  compli- 
cations with,  83;  Kruger 
telegram,  83-86 ;  Russia 
and  France's  proposal  to 
Germany  to  attack,  87,  91 ; 
Kaiser  loyal  to,  87;  the 
Kaiser's  opinion  of  English- 
men, 98;  death  of  Queen 
Victoria,  103;  Kaiser's  re- 
ception in  England,  102- 
104;  Chamberlain  suggests 
alliance  between  Germany 
and  England  against  Rus- 
sia, 104-106;  validity  of 
alliance,  106;  plan  fails, 
106;  alliance  with  Japan, 
106;  pro-French  and  anti- 
German  attitude  of,  at  Al- 
geciras  Convention,  115— 
116;  Kaiser  visits  Windsor, 
117;  Edward  VII  visits 
Berlin,  126;  death  of  Ed- 
ward VII,  128-130;  fu- 
neral,  129-130;  unveiling 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


of  Statue  to  Queen  Victoria,  ^ 
142-143;  Kaiser  at,  142- 
1 43 ;  festivities,  1 43-1 44  ; 
comparison  of  pomp  between 
democratic  England  and 
mediaeval  Germany,  144; 
in  Egypt,  145;  offer  to  re- 
main neutral  in  "unpro- 
voked" attack  on  Germany, 
146;  "verbal  note"  to  the 
Kaiser,  147;  negotiations, 
153-155  J  repudiation,  159; 
Kaiser  denounces  Haldane, 
162;  evolution  of  the  dread- 
naught,  240;  fleet,  241,  247, 
252 ;  "two-Power  standard," 
241 ;  Tsar's  hatred  for,  249 ; 
promise  of,  t6  side  with  Rus- 
sia against  Germany,  253 ; 
Germany's  progress  dis- 
agreeable to,  304;  aim  to 
overthrow  Germany,  307  ,* 
grouping  of  Russia,  France, 
and,  309;  Germany  tries  to 
bring  about  a  rapproche- 
ment with,  309;  Germany 
consents  to  limitation  of 
naval  construction,  309 ; 
political  ambitions  of  King 
Edward,  310;  Germany 
could  not  satisfy,  310;  secret 
agreement  with  France  as 
to  Morocco  and  Egypt, 
312;  propaganda  in  Amer- 
ica, 318;  blockade,  318; 
Bethmann  tries  to  keep 
England  out  of  the  Entente, 
328;  political  propaganda, 
331-333;  working  classes, 
341 ;  strength  of  England, 
342. 


Enmity,  source  of  Russian,  9. 

Entente,  72,  73,  74)  I34,  141  > 
165,  250,  251,  264,  269, 
273,  292,  293,  294,  295, 
303,  307,  309,  316,  317, 
318,  321,  323,  325,  333, 
334,  341. 

Erzberger,  Ambassador,  286. 

Essad  Pasha,  167,  169. 

Eugenie,  Empress,  312. 

Eulenburg,  Count  Augustus, 
24,  117. 

F 

"Fairyland  Wants  Its  Prince," 
166. 

Fatherland,   286,   289,  292, 

297,  298,  300,  321,  331. 
Faulhaber,  Archbishop,  208. 
Federal  Council,  157. 
Fernborough,  Castle  of,  312. 
Figaro  J  21. 

Fischer,  Cardinal,  210. 

Fisher,  Admiral,  154,  240. 

Flanders,  278,  279. 

Fleet,  English,  10,  105,  241, 
247,  248,  305. 

Foch,  General,  290. 

Foreign  Office,  German,  5,  6, 
9,  10,  II,  12,  25,  27,  29, 
48,  59,  66,  68,  75,  76,  77, 
84,  98,  99,  100,  loi,  104, 
108,  118,  119,  121,  132, 
134,  138,  139,  145,  146, 
155,  246,  247,  248,  250, 
277,  284,  308. 

Foundations  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  186. 

Fourteen  Points,  318,  319, 
320. 

France,  and  Russia,  61 ;  and 


INDEX 


Germany,  7 1  n. ;  and  United 
States,  71  n.,  72,  73,  75; 
and  England,  71  n.,  72-74; 
at  Shimonoseki,  81 ;  fortifi- 
cations, 81 ;  Russo-French 
proposal  to  Germany 
against  England,  87,  91 ; 
anger  at  Kaiser's  visit  to 
Tangier,  108;  not  yet  ready 
for  war,  109;  England's 
offer  of  100,000  men  to 
seize  Kaiser  Wilhelm 
Canal,  109;  downfall  of 
Delcasse,  109;  accession  of 
Rouvier,  109*  growing  de- 
sire for  revenge  and  enmity; 
toward  Germany,  126,  305; 
German  -  French  Morocco 
agreement,  126;  confers 
cross  of  Legion  of  Honor 
on  Radolin  and  von  Schoen, 
126;  railways,  179;  armi- 
stice commission  in,  286, 
290 ;  Kaiser  understands 
spirit,  306 ;  Alsace-Lorraine, 
306 ;  enormous  loans  to  Rus- 
sia, 307;  aim  to  overthrow 
Germany,  307 ;  grouping  of 
England,  Russia,  and,  309; 
Germany  arch  enemy  of, 
311;  secret  agreement  with 
England  as  to  Morocco  and 
Egypt,  312;  War  of  1870 
325;  working  classes,  341; 
strength  of  France,  342. 

Franchise,  Prussian,  135-138. 

Frankfort,  181. 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke 
119,  246. 

Franz  Josef,   Emperor,  14 
119. 


Frederick  II,  Emperor,  217. 
Frederick    Charles,  Prince, 
102. 

Frederick,  Crown  Prince,  134, 
180. 

Frederick,  Empress,  172,  189, 

202,  312. 
Frederick  the  Great,  28,  39, 

76,  217. 
Frederick,  William  III,  21 

22,  24,  26,  29,  172,  224. 
Free  Thinkers,  3 1 . 
Friedberg,     His  Excellency 

Heinrich,  187. 
Fried jung,  Heinrich,  128. 
Friedrichsruh,    Admiral  von 

Tirpitz  at,  4;  Kaiser  at,  93. 
Friendship,   Russo-French  to 

replace  Russo-Prussian,  11. 
Fiirstenberg,     Prince  Max 

Egon,  117,  119. 


Gambetta,  Leon,  325,  327. 

Galician-Polish  campaign,  136. 

Gallwitz,  General  von,  274. 

General  Headquarters,  Ger- 
man, 122,  254,  278,  288. 

General  Staff,  German,  6,  61, 
161,  177,  178,  180,  226, 
227,  247,  248,  250,  331; 
English,  161,  162,  175; 
Austrian,  167;  Russian,  255. 

''Gentlemen's  agreement,"  74, 
308,  316. 

George,  David  Lloyd,  296, 
320. 

George  V,  of  England,  130, 
142,  143,  144,  296,  328. 

"German  Evangelical  Church 
Union,'*  214. 


349 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Germany,  Bismarck  creator  of 
German  Empire,  i ;  consti- 
tution of,  2,  1 39-1 4 1 ;  alli- 
ance with  Austria,  5;  ani- 
mosity of  Russian  military 
circles  against,  17;  as  peace 
maker,  20;  maintenance  of, 
31;  conditions  of  laboring 
classes  in,  36-50;  first  ar- 
mored ship,  48;  merchant 
marine,  48 ;  shipbuilding  in- 
dustry, 51,  235;  corps,  naval 
officer,  51,  52,  53,  112,  230; 
reinsurance  treaty  with 
Russia,  54 ;  and  Kiao-Chau, 
64-68,  74;  coaling  stations, 
64,  69-70;  and  United 
States,  71  n.,  72-74;  diffi- 
culty of  training  up  good 
diplomats  in,  76;  English 
commercial  envy  of,  79; 
Russia  and  France's  pro- 
posal to  attack  England,  87 ; 
Cecil  Rhodes's  admiration 
for  Berlin  and  tremendous 
German  industrial  plants, 
88 ;  difference  between  Ger- 
mans and  English,  92;  re- 
form of  military  punishment 
procedure,  93 ;  Naval  law, 
93,  146,  147;  appointment 
of  Waldersee,  93 ;  Boxer 
war,  93;  Tsing-tao,  94; 
Yangtse  Treaty,  94;  rela- 
tions with  England  become 
more  complicated,  95 ; 
France,  Russia,  and,  in  the 
Far  East,  105;  validity  of 
an  alliance,  106;  failure  of 
plan,  106;  disturbed  rela- 
tions among  the  parties  in 


the  Reichstag,  1 1 1 ;  popular 
demonstration  at  defeat  of 
Social  Democrats,  114;  Ed- 
ward VII  at  Kiel,  115;  Kai- 
ser's Daily  Telegraph  inter- 
view, 118;  press  demands 
Fiirstenberg  to  "tell  the 
Emperor  the  truth  for 
once,"  119;  Conservatives' 
"Open  Letter,"  122;  retire- 
ment of  Billow,  123;  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg  appointed 
Chancellor,  124;  growing 
desire  for  revenge  and  en- 
mity of  France,  126;  Ger- 
man -  French  Morocco 
Agreement,  1 26 ;  Austro- 
Hungarian  allies,  128 ;  "Na- 
tion in  Arms,"  135,  259; 
Chancellor's  powers,  139- 
141 ;  German  French  agree- 
ment, 146 ;  "A  verbal  note!" 
147,  148;  astonishment  at, 
149;  discussion  and  reply, 
149-150;  negotiations,  153- 
155  J*  verbal  note  disavowed 
by  England,  159;  Haldane 
"cheated"  the  Germans, 
162;  blamed  on  Kaiser  and 
von  Tirpitz,  162;  the  Cen- 
tral Canal,  174;  railways, 
175-182;  schools,  183-185; 
forests,  189;  science  and  art, 
196-207;  must  become 
sword  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  211;  revolution, 
213,  218,  224;  Protestant 
Union,  214-215;  officer 
corps,  225,  226;  noncom- 
missioned officer  corps,  225, 
230;  development  of  Heli- 


INDEX 


goland,  238 ;  first  big  fight- 
ing ship,  241 ;  U-boats,  242- 
243 ;  democratization  of, 
258 ;  Germans  on  all  battle- 
fields, 260;  "Germans  al- 
ways defeated  by  Germans," 
260;  "In  Germany  every 
Siegfried  has  his  Hodur  be- 
hind him,"  260;  atrocities, 
260;  protection  of  churches, 
chateaux,  castles,  and  art 
treasures,  260;  failure  of 
August  8,  1918,  272,  273; 
movement  for  setting  up  of 
new  government,  274;  inner 
situation  of  army,  274,  279; 
revolutionary  agitation  in, 
274,  275;  general  desire 
for  ending  fighting,  275; 
achievements  of  fighters  and 
nation  in  arms,  276;  army 
of  19 1 8  cannot  compare  with 
army  of  1914,  275,  276; 
approaching  revolution,  284; 
people  want  peace  at  any 
cost,  284 ;  authority  of  Gov- 
ernment zero,  284 ;  agitation 
against  Emperor  in  full 
swing,  284;  abdication  of 
Emperor  not  to  be  avoided 
any  longer,  284 ;  evidence  of 
Russian  Bolshevist  influence 
in,  284;  relations  between 
Foreign  Office  and  police, 
284;  army  no  longer  to  be: 
trusted,  285 ;  revolution  im- 
minent behind  front,  285; 
Kaiser's  abdication  de- 
manded, 285 ;  revolt  among 
troop  begins,  286;  Kaiser 
willing  to  renounce  Imperial 

35 


throne,  but  not  to  abdicate 
as  King  of  Prussia,  286 ;  ab- 
dication of  Kaiser  and 
Crown  Prince  summarily 
announced,  287;  conduct  of 
Prince  Max,  287-288;  sac- 
rifice of  Emperor,  princes, 
and  Empire,  288;  Kaiser 
advised  to  go  to  neutral 
country,  288 ;  foes  unwilling 
to  conclude  peace  with  Kai- 
ser, 289;  the  question  of 
war  guilt,  291,  302;  desire 
for  peace  and  clean  con- 
science, 291 ;  Kaiser  decides 
to  leave  country  for  coun- 
try's good,  291,  294;  En- 
tente demands  surrender  of 
Kaiser  for  trial,  292,  300; 
state  archives  thrown  open, 
294;  demands  for  Kaiser's 
surrender  rejected,  294; 
policy  of  annihilation  of 
enemies,  296;  general  situa- 
tion before  the  war,  304; 
unprecedented  progress  in  in- 
dustry, commerce,  and  world 
traffic,  304 ;  navy  merely  pro- 
tective, 305 ;  exports  and  im- 
ports, 305 ;  Alsace-Lorraine, 
German  soil  for  centuries, 
306;  stolen  by  France,  306; 
retaken  in  187 1,  306;  and 
Serbia,  307;  aim  of  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Russia  to 
overthrow,  307 ;  obstacles 
encountered  in  foreign  pol- 
icy, 308;  only  one  political 
course,  309 ;  seeks  England's 
friendship,  309;  consents  to 
limitation   of   naval  con- 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


stniction,  309;  blamed  for 
refusing  alliance  with  Eng- 
land, 310;  "Germany  must 
never  become  England's 
dagger  on  the  European  con- 
tinent" ( Bismarck ) ,  311; 
archenemy  of  France,  311; 
traditional  friendship  be- 
tween Russia  and,  313;  pro- 
tests against  America's  vio- 
lation of  right,  317;  and 
President  Wilson's  Four- 
teen Points,  318;  evacuated 
German  territory  and  sur- 
rendered arms  on  Wilson's 
guaranty,  318;  revolution 
as  an  aid  to  Entente,  321 ; 
financial  and  national 
strength,  323 ;  War  of  1870, 
325 ;  political  and  diplomatic 
operations,  325 ;  English 
propaganda  against,  331- 
333  >  wind  and  whirlwind, 
339;  agitators  responsible 
for  collapse,  340;  English 
and  French  working  classes 
versus  Grerman  working 
classes,  341 ;  German  people 
must  rely  on  themselves, 
341 ;  upward  march  will  be- 
gin again,  342;  will  again 
march  in  the  van,  342. 

"Germany  will  be  annihi- 
lated,'* 252. 

Girandin,  Emilie  de,  327. 

Goethals,  Colonel,  238-239. 

Gorlice-Tarnow,    battle  of, 

136. 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  248. 
Grossler,  Gustav  von,  183. 
Gramont,  Herzog  Agenor,  326. 

35! 


Greatcoats,  English  soldiers', 
256. 

Greater  Germany,  184. 
"Great  Orient  Lodge,"  258. 
Greece,  28,  141,  142. 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  146,  151, 

152,  153,  257,  328,  329. 
Groner,    General  Wilhelm, 

281,  283,  285. 
Guetant,  Louis,  325. 


Hague,  The,  71. 

Hahnke,    General  Wilhelm 

von,  23. 
"Haldane  Episode,"  160. 
Haldane,  Lord,  146,  151,  152, 

153,   154,   158,  161,  162, 

188. 

Hamburg,  3,  49,  137,  252. 
Hamilton,  Sir  Ian,  234. 
Handbook  for  English  Naval 

Officers,  154. 
Hanseatic  ports,  55,  56,  57, 

156. 

Harden,  Maximilian,  102. 
Hardinge,  Sir  Charles,  149. 
Harkort,  Friedrich,  236. 
Harnack,  Professor  Adolf  von, 
199. 

Hartmann,    Cardinal  Felix 

von,  208. 
Hayashi,  Tadasu,  io6. 
Headquarters,  Great  General, 

122,  254,  278,  288. 
Heavy  artillery,  227. 
Heeringen,  Josias  von,  151. 
Helfferich,  Karl,  128. 
Heligoland,    8,    11,    55;  a 

menace  to  Hamburg  and 


INDEX 


Bremen,  55;  deal  for,  55; 
acquired  by  Germany,  56; 
Kaiser  at,  86,  117;  develop- 
ment of,  238;  Colonel 
Goethals  enthusiastic  over, 
238. 
Helots,  341. 

Henry  of  Prussia,  Prince,  68, 
237. 

Hertling,  Count  von,  89,  123, 
272. 

Highcliffe    dispatches,  117, 

119,  121. 
Hildegard,  Convent  of  Saint, 

218. 

Hindenburg,  Field  Marshal 
Paul  von,  181,  275,  277, 
281,  282,  285,  288,  295- 
302. 

Hinzpeter,  Professor  George 
Ernst,  38,  I94>  I99,  215, 
228. 

Hochst,  181. 

Hohenfinow,  124. 

Hohenlohe,  Alexander  ("the 
Crovtrn  Prince"),  93. 

Hohenlohe,  Prince,  Chancel- 
lor, 60-94;  governor  of  Al- 
sace-Lorraine, 60 ;  Bis- 
marck's opposition,  60,  82, 
92;  attitude  tovv^ard  Social- 
ists, 90,  91 ;  retires,  92,  1 11. 

HohenzoUern,  House  of,  3, 
43,  114,  175,  177. 

Holland.   See  Netherlands. 

Holleben,  Ambassador  von, 
308. 

Holstem,  Fritz  von,  5,  6,  60, 

82,  98-102. 
Hollmann,  Admiral,  66,  67, 

84,  94,  215,  218. 


Hovel,  Freiherr  Baldw^in  von, 
190, 

Homburg,  104,  180. 
Hongkong,  78,  79. 
Hubertusstock,  61. 
Hiilsen  -  Haeseler,  Count 

George  von,  119,  204. 
Hungary,  defection  of,  273. 
Huns,  262. 

I 

"Idea  of  risk,"  230,  231. 
Illustrated  Naval  AtlaSj  240. 
India,  105,  106. 
Intze,  197. 

Italy,  8,  61 ;  severs  alliance 
with  Germany,  136;  smug- 
gling of  arms  from,  to  Al- 
bania, 141 ;  plots  against 
William  of  Weid,  167; 
vi^ould  break  away  from 
Germany  and  Austria,  253 ; 
and  the  Pope,  265,  266- 
268. 

Isvolsky,  256,  257,  316,  325. 
Ivan  the  Terrible,  313. 
Ivangorod,  136. 

J 

Jagow,  Gottlieb  von.  Secre- 
tary of  State,  127. 

Jameson  raid,  83,  88. 

Januskevitch,  General  Nikolai, 
255. 

Japan,  74;  England  and,  78; 
watchwords,  79 ;  growing 
power  of,  79;  menace  to 
Russia  and  Europe,  79;  re 
proached   by  Kaiser,  81; 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


"Prussians  of  the  East,"  8i ; 
sympathies  with  England, 
82;  alliance  with  England, 
106;  war  with  Russia,  106; 
pawn  of  England,  106;  free 
hand  in  Korea  and  China, 
106;  Portsmouth  Treaty, 
200. 

Jaures,  Jean,  109. 
Jenisch,  Martin  von,  118. 
Jerusalem,  90;  Church  at,  213, 
216. 

Joachimsthal,  190. 
Jubilee,   papal,   210;  Queen 

Victoria's  golden,  238. 
Jutland,  58,  161,  231,  242. 

K 

Kaiser,  Bismarck's  fight 
against,  2;  his  regard  for 
Bismarck  while  Prince  of 
Prussia,  2 ;  his  grandfather's 
successor,  3 ;  in  the  Foreign 
Office,  5,  12;  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, 13,  16,  25,  63;  proph- 
ecy of  Russian  downfall, 
16;  conduct  of  Russian  offi- 
cers toward,  16;  relief  at 
Bismarck's   dismissal,  18; 
and  his  father,  21 ;  he  be- 
comes Emperor,  22;  and 
Queen    Victoria,    26-27  ; 
conflict  with  Bismarck  on 
Turkish  policy,  28 ;  impres- 
sions of  Greece,  28;  Con- 
stantinople impressions,  28; 
Turkish  policy,  28 ;  attitude 
of  father's  friends  toward, 
29 ;  his  attitude  toward  par- 
ties, 30-34;  conflict  with 

354 


Bismarck,  34;  attitude  of 
Bismarck   cabinet  toward, 
35 ;  handles  a  coal  strike, 
36 ;  and  the  laboring  classes, 
36,  322;  his  welfare  fund, 
45-46 ;  and  the  Vulcan  ship- 
yard, 47,  50;  presented  with 
a  laurel  wreath  by  work- 
ingmen,    50;  "orphaned" 
young  Emperor,  54;  news- 
paper criticism  of,  55,  57; 
and  Heligoland,  55-58;  and 
Prince    Lobanoff,  61-63; 
finds  seed  of  World  War, 
7 1 ;  Tsar  asks  opinion  as  to 
growing  power  of  Japan, 
79-80;  reproaches  for  Ja- 
pan,  80;   at  Shimonoseki, 
81;  sees  complications  with 
England,  83;  Kruger  tele- 
gram,  83-86;  at  Heligo- 
land, 86;  loyalty  to  Eng- 
land, 87 ;  Cecil  Rhodes  con- 
sults  about  Cape-to-Cairo 
Railway    and  Telegraph 
line,  88;  visits  England  in 
1899,     90;  reconciliation 
with    Bismarck,    92;  at 
Friedrichsruh,  93 ;  his  opin- 
ion of  Englishmen,  97-98; 
warns  Biilow  against  Hol- 
stein,  98;  his  reception  in 
England    at    Queen  Vic- 
toria's death,  102-104;  at 
Tangier,  107;  at  the  Por- 
tuguese Court,  107;  declines 
to  visit  Morocco,  107;  de- 
cides to  do  so,  108;  recep- 
tion at  Tangier,   108;  at 
Gibraltar,  108 ;  visit  to  Tan- 
gier, 108;  the  construction 


INDEX 


of  the  cathedral  and  Berh'n 
Opera  House,  112;  disagree- 
ment with  conservatives, 
1 1 2-1 14;  at  Windsor,  117; 
Highcliff e  dispatches,  1 1 7, 
119,  121;  "Englishmen  are 
as  mad  as  March  hares," 
118  n.;  Daily  Telegraph 
"interview,"  11 8-1 19;  vis- 
its Eckartsan  and  Donaue- 
schingen,  119;  "tell  the  Em- 
peror the  truth  for  once," 
119;  his  mental  anguish, 
119;  lectured  by  Chancellor 
Bulow,  120;  "The  tear 
flows,  Germania  has  me 
again,"  121 ;  his  attitude, 
128;  fury  of  all  parties 
against,  1 22 ;  appoints 
Bethmann  -  Hollweg  chan- 
cellor, 124;  goes  to  Lon- 
don to  funeral  of  Ed- 
ward VII,  128-130;  his  re- 
ception, 129;  finds  fault 
with  Bethmann,  132;  at 
Pless,  136;  at  Nisch,  137; 
at  Orsova,  137;  meets  Bul- 
garian Tsar,  137;  his  fran- 
chise plan,  135-138;  at 
Corfu,  141,  204;  goes  to 
London  at  the  unveiling  of 
statue  of  Queen  Victoria, 
142;  surprise  at  "verbal 
note"  from  England,  148; 
writes  the  answer,  149;  and 
the  naval  bill,  156-159;  de- 
fends naval  program,  160; 
and  Albania,  163,  165-169  ; 
meets  Tsar  at  Baltisch-Port, 
169-170,  249;  and  von 
Stephan,  171;  the  "White 

355 


Drawing  Room,"  172;  and 
the  Academy  of  Building, 
172-173;  and  the  Central 
( Rhine- Weser-Elbe)  Canal, 
174;  and  the  railways,  175- 
182;  and  the  schools,  183- 
186;  and  forestry,  189;  in- 
terest in  science  and  art, 
196;  Russian  foresight, 
200-201 ;  Assyriology  and 
the  Acheans,  203-207 ; 
at  Corfu,  204,  205,  206, 
249;  relations  with  the 
Catholic  Church,  208-213; 
boycotted  by  Rhenish-West- 
phalian  families,  208 ; 
friendship  for  Pope  Leo 
XIII,  209;  consecration  of 
portal  of  Cathedral  at 
Metz,  210;  welfare  of 
Catholic  subjects,  211-212; 
Union  of  Protestant 
churches,  213;  Doctor  Dry- 
sander's  influence  over,  214; 
presents  "Dormition"  to 
German  Catholics  at  Jeru- 
salem, 216;  and  the  Bene- 
dictine monks,  216,  217, 
218;  letter  to  Hollmann, 
219-222;  his  theology,  220; 
relations  with  army  and 
navy,  223-245;  at  Vienna, 
246 ;  his  journey  to  Norway, 
247-248;  Tsar's  treachery 
toward,  249;  evidence  war 
had  been  prepared  for  in 
France,  England,  and  Rus- 
sia in  spring  of  191 4,  251- 
257;  his  Comparative  His- 
torical Tables  J  251,  253, 
297,  298 ;  abdication  of,  258, 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


280-288;  orders  churches, 
chateaux,  castles,  and  art 
treasures  protected,  260 ;  re- 
ceives papal  nuncio,  263; 
suggests  Pope  make  peace 
offer,  263;  deceived  by 
Vienna,  272,  273;  goes  to 
the  front,  277 ;  note  to  Wil- 
son, 277 ;  rumors  of  abdica- 
tion, 277-278;  Wilson's  ar- 
mistice note,  278 ;  orders  re- 
treat to  Antwerp-Meuse 
line,  279;  retreat  begun, 
279;  joyfully  received  by 
army,  279;  in  danger  from 
aircraft  bombs,  279;  hostile 
attitude  of  people  against, 
280,  282;  Minister  of  In- 
terior Drews  suggests  abdi- 
cation, 281;  "fateful  conse- 
quences of  my  abdication," 
281 ;  refuses  to  abdicate, 
281 ;  sends  Delbriick  to  Ber- 
lin, 282 ;  son  declines  to  sug- 
gest abdication,  282 ;  address 
to  the  Ministry,  282;  ab- 
dication no  longer  to  be 
avoided,  285 ;  abdication 
demanded,  285;  calls  con- 
ference, 286;  wishes  to  pre- 
vent bloodshed,  286 ;  willing 
to  renounce  Imperial  throne, 
but  not  to  abdicate  as  King 
of  Prussia,  286 ;  decision  too 
late,  287;  abdication  sum- 
marily announced,  287;  as 
to  the  abandonment  of  the 
army  by,  287 ;  advised  to  go 
to  neutral  country,  288 ;  sac- 
rifice in  vain,  289;  sorrows 
at  disaffection  in  army  and 


navy,  289 ;  opinions  of  Ger- 
man people  as  to  what  he 
should  have  done,  290;  de- 
cides to  leave  country  for 
country's  good,  291,  294; 
Entente  demands  his  sur- 
render for  trial,  292,  300; 
undecided,  292 ;  surrender 
debated  in  German  circles, 
293 ;  decides  not  to  give  him- 
self up,  294;  letter  from 
Hindenburg,  296-297;  the 
Kaiser's  answer,  297-302; 
silent  in  the  face  of  lies  and 
slanders,  298;  does  not  rec- 
ognize the  validity  of  sen- 
tence pronounced  by  any 
mortal  judge,  300 ;  toasts  the 
French  army,  312;  tries  to 
influence  Nicholas  II,  313; 
Tsar's  obstinacy,  314;  re- 
ceives the  Grand  Duke 
Michael,  314;  suggests  alli- 
ance between  Russia  and 
Germany,  316;  opinion  of 
American  women,  318,  319; 
accuses  Wilson  of  wronging 
Germany,  319;  counts  on 
American  people  making 
good  wrong  done  by  Wilson, 
319;  sees  dark  future  for 
America,  319;  Wilson  first 
to  demand  abdication,  320; 
political  principles,  322 ; 
policy  eminently  peaceful, 
322;  constant  striving  for 
peace,  322-331;  legacies  of 
Bismarck  and  Moltke,  330; 
impervious  to  criticism,  337 ; 
disappointed  in  German  peo- 
ple, 337 ;  conscience  is  clean, 


INDEX 


337;  has  confidence  in  the 
Lord,  337;  his  sympathy 
and  love  for  German  peo- 
ple, 338;  is  homesick,  338. 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  Children's 
Home,  46. 

Kato,  Baron  Takaaki,  68. 

Kiao-Chau,  64-84,  82. 

Kiderlen,  Alfred  von,  132, 
141. 

Kiel,  109,  116,  145,  246,  319, 
324. 

Kirschner,  Miss,  46. 

Kluck,    General  Alexander 

von,  262. 
Knights  of  Malta,  German, 

216. 

Koehler,  K.  F.,  299. 
Kokovzef¥,  Count  Vladimir, 

253. 

Kopp,  Cardinal  George,  208, 

210,  212. 
Korea,  106. 

Krieg  und  Revolution,  285  n. 
Krueznach,  269. 
Krug,  Archabbot,  217. 
Kruger  dispatch,  64,  82-86, 

88,  89,  90,  91,  140. 
"Kulturkampf,"  2,  33,  208, 

209,  212. 


Labor-protective  legislation,  2. 

La  Gaulois,  109. 

Landtag,  138. 

Lascelles,  Sir  Frank,  83  n. 

Law,  international,  301. 

Legislation,  labor-protective,  2, 

Lemberg,  136. 

Lengemark,  187. 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  209;  recep- 


tions of,  209 ;  friendship  be- 
tween Kaiser  and,  209-210, 
218;  Kaiser  asks  to  make 
peace  effort,  261-271. 

Leopold,  King  of  Belgium,  88. 

Leopold,  Prince,  326. 

Le  Quesnoy,  257. 

Lerchenfeld,  Count  Hugo,  96. 

Liberals,  German,  29,  30,  31, 
32,  33,  114,  122,  194,  228; 
English,  310. 

Lichnowsky,  Prince  Karl 
Max,  328. 

Liege,  257. 

Life  of  the  Prince  Consort, 

The,  90. 
Lobanolf,  Prince  Alexei  Boris- 

sowitsch,  61. 
Lochow,  Ewald  von,  261. 
Loe,   Freiherr  Walter  von, 

210. 

Loebell,  Friedrich  Wilhelm 
von,  135,  136. 

London,  recriminations  from, 
71;  Kaiser  visits,  102,  117, 
128,  142;  message  to  Beth- 
mann  from,  159;  Bishop  of, 
264;  favorite  method,  311. 

Lonsdale,  Earl  Hugh  Cecil 
Lowther,  233. 

Lotalingen,  68. 

Lucanus,  Herman  von,  24- 
25,  36. 

Lucas,  Bernard,  215. 

Ludendorff,  General  Erich 
von,  bridge  named  after, 
180;  cannot  guarantee  mili- 
tary .  victory,  273;  de- 
mands preparations  for  ar- 
mistice, 274. 

Lusitania,  75,  136. 


357 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


M 

Machine  gun,  227,  279. 

Mackenzie,  Sir  Morell,  21. 

Madrid  Convention,  iii. 

Mainz,  178,  I79- 

"Maison  militaire,"  22,  23. 

Man  with  the  Hyena's  eyes, 
The,  5. 

Maria  Laach,  abbey  of,  217. 

Marienbad,  177. 

Market,  world,  304,  305; 
money,  317. 

Marschall,  Adolf  von,  82, 
-83  n.,  84,  96. 

Martin,  Sir  Theodore,  90. 

Matin,  Paris,  109. 

Maubeuge,  257,  260. 

Max,  Prince,  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, 277,  278,  280,  281, 
282,  285,  286,  287,  288, 
320,  321,  340. 

Maybach,  Albert  von,  176, 

177. 

Meinecke,  His  Excellency, 
188. 

Melissori  troubles,  141. 

Memoirs,  Bismarck's,  3,  4. 

Mensing,  Admiral,  107. 

Mentality,  English  and  Ger- 
man, 328-329. 

Merchant  Marine,  German, 
48. 

Mercier,  Cardinal,  264. 
Mesopotamia,  89. 
Metternich,  Count  Paul,  104. 
Mexico,  73. 

Michael,  Grand  Duke,  314. 
Michaelis,  von,  37. 
Michell,  Robert,  326. 
Militza,  Grand  Duchess,  252. 


Miquel,  His  Excellency  Jo- 
hanna, 30,  174,  189. 

Mirbach,  Count  William,  253. 

"Misunderstood  Bismarck," 
55. 

Modlin,  136. 
Mokpo,  67. 

Moller,  Theodore  von,  30, 
194. 

Moltke,  Count  von,  6,  176, 
226. 

Moltke,   General  von,  226, 

248,  330. 
Monaco,  Prince  of,  109,  116. 
Montenegro,    142;   king  of, 

252. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  Prof., 
71. 

Morocco,  Sultan  of,  107;  ques- 
tion, 107;  negotiations  con- 
cerning concluded,  1 1 1 ; 
Agreement,  German- 
French,  126,  127;  French 
actions  in,  144-145;  King 
George's  views  on,  145. 

Moscow,  253,  312,  313,  324. 

Most-Favored-Nation  Clause 
No.  17,  III. 

Mountains,  Taunus,  178,  181. 

Mudra,  General  Bruno  von, 
274. 

Muravieff,  Count  Michael, 
66,  67. 

N 

Namur,  257. 
Narva,  18. 

National  Liberals,  29,  31,  33, 
194. 

Naval  bill,  German,  146,  147, 
150,  i5i>  152,  155,  156, 


INDEX 


157,  159,  160,  163,  229, 
231,  232,  233,  235»  236, 
242. 

"Nation  in  Arms,"  135,  276. 

Navy,  Germany,  7,  8,  9,  11, 
51-53,  55,  58,  81,  122,  156, 
161,  224-245,  289,  305, 
320;  English,  10,  105,  241, 
247,  248,  305. 

Needles,  The,  117. 

Netherlands,  The,  and  media- 
tion, 272-273. 

Nicholaievitch,  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  254,  255. 

Nicholas  I,  of  Russia,  172, 
193. 

Nicholas  II,  of  Russia,  13,  19, 
20,  61-62,  67,  79-80;  visit 
to  Potsdam,  141 ;  meets  the 
Kaiser  at  Baltisch-Port, 
169-170,  191,  201,  249;  "I 
shall  stay  at  home  this  year, 
for  we  are  going  to  have 
war,"  r.07,  249;  summer 
plans,  249;  hatred  for  Eng- 
land, 249;  his  perfidy  to- 
ward Kaiser,  249;  meets 
Poincare,  252 ;  SazonofE 
suggests  seizing  Constan- 
tinople, 253;  vacillation  of, 
312,  314,  315;  Kaiser  tries 
to  influence,  313;  drafts  a 
letter  to,  315 ;  treaties  with 
not  endurable,  330. 

Niemann,  Major,  285  n. 

Nisch,  137. 

O 

"Oberkommando,"  239. 
Oberndorff,    Count  Alfred 
von,  286. 


Officer  Corps,  German,  naval, 
51,  52,  53,  112,  230;  non- 
commissioned, 225,  230; 
army,  225,  226;  French, 
306;  Russian,  206. 

Order  of  the  Black  Eagle,  13. 

Osten-Sacken,  Count  Nich- 
olai,  315. 

"Our  armies  will  meet  in  Ber- 
lin," 252. 

P 

Pacelli,  Eugenio,  Papal  Nun- 
cio, 263. 

Palace,  Imperial,  338. 

Paleologue,  M.,  252. 

Pan-Germanism,  71  n. 

Pan-Germanism,  71  n.,  72, 
73. 

Parliament,  British,  45,  106, 
310. 

Payer,  His  Excellency  Fried- 
rich  von,  280. 

Peace,  offers,  by  Germany, 
274;  by  the  Pope,  263;  by 
Austria,  273;  negotiations, 
295,  300. 

Perels,  Privy  Councilor  Ferdi- 
nand, 66,  67. 

Peterhof,  67. 

"Petit  Sucrier"  trial,  21. 

Pfeil,  Count  Richard,  10. 

Philistinism,  187. 

"Piazza,"  266,  267,  269,  270, 
271. 

Pichon,  Stephane,  130. 

Pinon,  Chateau  of,  261,  262. 

Pocket  Manual  for  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  226. 

Podbielski,  Victor  von,  189, 
190,  193. 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Poincare,  President,  252,  257,    Puttkamer,  Robert  Victor  von, 

325.  189. 
Poix,  Princess  of,  261,  262.  ^ 
Poland,  stags  in,  191 ;  union 

of  Galicia  with,  258. 
Poles,  strength  of,  342. 
''Policy  of  encirclement,"  45,     Raschdau,    Privy  Councilor, 

115,   126,  128,  I55>  257,  II. 


Radolin,  Prince  Hugo,  109, 
126. 


307,  308,  323. 
Politics,  intercourt,  I2. 
Pomeranian  Grenadiers,  49. 
Pope.   See  Leo  XIII. 
Popo,  Gross  and  Klein,  7. 
Port  Arthur,  67. 
Portsmouth,  Peace  of,  200. 
Posen,  176. 

Post-Bismarckians,  1 1 1 . 
Potsdam,  248. 
Pound,  English,  317. 
Powers,     great,     303,  306, 
309. 


Ratibor,  Duke  of,  46,  92. 

Reichstag,  45,  59,  84,  86,  95, 
108,  III,  116,  118,  119, 
120,  121,  125,  134,  137, 
161,  194,  228,  229,  230, 
236,  243,  277,  285,  322, 
338. 

"Reichsverdrossenheit,"  55. 
Reinsurance  treaty,  54,  329. 
Reichach,    Hugo,  Freiherr, 

von,  262. 
Relations,  Russo-Prussian,  14, 

26. 


Praschma,   Count  Frederick,     Renvers,  Privy  Councilor  Ru- 


216. 

Problem  of  Japan,  The,  71, 

72,  73  n. 
Prussia,    and    Bavaria,  60; 


dolf,  116. 

Reparations,  318. 

Republic,  French,  17  n.,  Ger- 
man, 283. 


Prussian- Austrian  frontier,  Reval,  126. 

80;  eastern  frontier  threat-  "Revolution  Chancellor,"  280. 

ened  by  Russian  forces,  105 ;  Revolution,  German,  213,  218, 

conditions  in   olden   days,  224,  280,  284,  285,  286, 


184;  financial  reform,  189; 
forestry,  190;  Ministry  of 
Prussian  king,  194;  Upper 


288,  289,  318,  321,  338, 
339;  Russian,  253,  254, 
284,  315. 


House,  197 ;  Protestant  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  252. 
churches,  213;  kings,  223;     Rhine,   178,   179,  217,  286, 


East,  175,  176,  253. 
Przemysl,  136. 
Psychology,  English  national, 

84. 


290,  325,  326. 
Rhodes,  Cecil,  87-89. 
Richter,  Deputy  Eugen,  228, 

229,  236. 


Piickler,  Count  Maximilian,     Richthofen,  Ferdinand,  Frei- 


107. 


360 


herr  von,  65,  100. 


INDEX 


Ripon,  Bishop  ( Boyd-Carpen- 
ter,  W.),  213. 

Roche,  M.  Jules,  116. 

Roman  Catholic  Church,  in- 
terests, 34 ;  Kaiser's  rela- 
tions with,  208-212;  might 
of,  209;  Germany  must  be- 
come sword  of  the,  211; 
elimination  of  the  Pope  and, 
258;  Kaiser's  views  of  the 
power  of,  263-270. 

Rominten,  190,  191. 

Roosevelt,  President  Theo- 
dore, 200. 

Rosebery,  Lord  Archibald 
Philip  Primrose,  233. 

Rotte,  Arnold  (Swiss  ambas- 
sador), 39. 

Rouvier,  Maurice,  109, 
III. 

Rumania,  Bismarck  and,  8; 
campaign,  137;  Queen  of, 
indorses  William  of  Weid 
for  Albanian  throne,  166. 

Russia,  8,  9,  10,  11,  14,  15, 
20,  25,  28;  reinsurance 
treaty  with  Germany,  54, 
329;  and  France,  61;  and 
Kiao-Chau,  65,  74;  naval 
stations,  78;  Tsar  and  Kai- 
ser, 80;  at  Shimonoseki, 
81 ;  Russo-French  proposal 
to  Germany  against  Eng- 
land, 87,  91 ;  Billow  and, 
102;  Chamberlain  suggests 
alliance  between  England 
and  Germany  against,  105, 
310,  311;  a  menace  to  In- 
dia and  Constantinople, 
105 ;  France,  Germany,  and, 
in  the  Far  East  (Shimono- 


seki, 1895),  105;  army, 
105 ;  Russo-Japanese  War, 
106,  200;  Tsar  Nicholas 
visits  Potsdam,  141 ;  rail- 
ways, 179;  Holy  Synod, 
193,  194;  Portsmouth 
Treaty,  200;  Bjoko  agree- 
ment, 201,  249;  mobiliza- 
tion, 207,  247,  255;  field 
kitchen,  227 ;  Tsar's  treach- 
ery toward  Germany,  249; 
he  meets  Poincare,  252 ;  Sa- 
zonoff  suggests  seizing  Con- 
stantinople, 253 ;  Italy 
would  break  away  from 
Austria  and  Germany,  253 ; 
France  to  be  trusted  abso- 
lutely, England  probably, 
253;  evidence  Russian  Em- 
bassy prepared  Bolshevist 
revolution  in  Germany, 
284;  archives,  301;  clamor 
for  an  outlet  on  the  sea  to 
southward,  306;  in  con- 
tinual internal  ferment, 
307;  possibility  of  foreign 
conflict,  307;  enormous  de- 
mand for  loans,  307 ;  French 
gold  in,  307;  and  the 
French  idea  of  revenge, 
307 ;  aim  to  overthrow  Ger- 
many, 307;  grouping  of 
England,  France,  and,  309; 
traditional  friendship  be- 
tween Germany  and,  313; 
weakness  of  Nicholas  II, 
312;  Grand  Duke  Michael 
visits  Berlin,  314;  unreli 
ability  of  troops  in  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  315;  alli- 
ance between  Germany  and. 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


315;   Anglo-Austrian  vic- 
tory over,  327. 
Russo-Prussian  relations,  13. 


Saalburg,  183. 

St.  Cere,  Jacques,  21. 

St.  Petersburg,  13,  16,  25, 
Bulow  at,  97,  192;  Japa- 
nese military  mission  at, 
252;  Poincare  meets  Tsar 
at,  252. 

Saint-Quentin,  Cathedral  of, 
261. 

Samoan  Islands,  89. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  10, 

14,  15;  revanche  pour,  18. 
Salisbury,  Lord,  8,  55,  310. 
Sarajevo  murders,  75. 
Sazonoff,  141,  252,  253,  255, 

256,  257,  299. 
Scheidemann,  Philip,  288. 
Schiemann,   Professor  Theo- 

dor,  107,  199-200,  201. 
Schlieffen,  Count  Alfred,  226. 
Schlutow,    Privy  Councilor 

Albert,  49,  50. 
Schnidrowitz,  Herr,  21. 
Schmidt,  Professor  Erich,  199. 
Schmitz,  Father  Peter,  216. 
Schneller,     Pastor  Ludwig, 

215. 

Schoen,  Wilhelm,  Freiherr 
von,  107,  126. 

Scholz,  Finance  Minister 
Adolf,  188. 

School  reform,  186. 

Schorfheide,  190. 

Schorlemer,  Burghard,  Frei- 
herr von,  33,  190. 


Schulenburg,  Count  Freidrich 
von,  286. 

Schulte,  Doctor  Joseph,  208. 

Science,  German,  196-199. 

Seas,  freedom  of,  318. 

"Secret  treaty"  between  Eng- 
land, America,  and  France, 
72. 

"Sedan,  Revanche  pour,"  18. 
Senden,  Admiral  Gustav  von, 
234. 

Serbia,  75;  Austrian  ulti- 
matum to,  248;  note  to 
Austria,  248;  Russian-Aus- 
trian conflict  of  influence  in, 
306. 

Seven  Years'  War,  121. 
Seydel,  Herr  (Celchen),  30. 
Shall  It  Be  Again?  75,  317. 
Shanghai,  78. 
Shantung,  65,  67,  68. 
Sherbatsheff,  General,  251. 
Shimonoseki,  81,  105. 
Shuvaloff,  Prince,  329. 
Siegfried  line,  272. 
Sigmaringen,  216. 
Silesia,  176. 

Simar,  Archbishop  Hubert, 
208. 

Simons,  Walter,  297. 
Skagaraak  (Jutland),  58,  161, 

231,  242. 
Slaby,  Professor  Adolf,  196- 

197. 

Social  Congress,  Berlin,  39, 
44. 

Social  Democrats,  2,  21,  43, 
122,  285,  286,  287,  339, 
341. 

Socialist  law,  35. 
Social  problems,  40-50. 


362 


INDEX 


Socialists,  35-36,  40-41,  42, 
43,  44,  45,  90,  III,  114, 
122,  268,  269^  283. 

Society  for  the  Rights  of  Man, 
325. 

Society,  Kaiser  Wilhelm,  198, 
199;  German  Orient,  203, 
204,  218,  228. 

Solf,  Wilhelm,  277,  278,  280. 

Somme,  battle  of,  137,  276. 

Source  of  Russian  Enmity,  9. 

South  African  Republic,  83  n. 

Spa,  278,  279,  283,  288. 

Spain,  73,  326. 

Spala,  191,  192. 

Spartacus  group,  284. 

Spithead,  248. 

Stephan,  His  Excellency  Hein- 
rich  von,  171,  172,  173, 
193. 

Sternburg,  Speck  von,  Joseph, 

190,  191. 
Stettin,  47,  49. 
Stocker,    Adolf,  Court 

Preacher,  33. 
Stosch,  Admiral  Albrecht  von, 

47,  48. 

Strassburg,  17. 

Sukhomlinoff,  Vladimir,  256. 
Surrender  for  trial.  Kaiser's, 

292-295- 
''Suum   cuique"  (Hohenzol- 

lern  motto),  43. 
Switzerland,    39,    258,  262, 

273. 

Sylva,  Carmen,  166. 
Szittkohnen,  190. 


Tangier,  Kaiser  at,  107;  re- 
sult of  visit,  108-110,  200 


Tanks,  276,  331,  334- 
Tardieu,  325. 
Theology,  Kaiser's,  220. 
Thiel,  Bishop,  208. 
Thielen,  177. 

Three-Emperor  -  Relationship, 
330. 

Tientsin,  78. 

Tientsin-Peking  line,  67. 

Times,  London,  85. 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  at 
Friedrichsruh,  4,  65;  and 
fleet,  122;  called  into  con- 
sultation, 149,  150,  151, 
153;  takes  part  in  negotia- 
tions, 153-155;  and  the 
naval  bill,  156-159;  suc- 
ceeds Hollmann,  229;  and 
naval  program,  232,  233, 
235,  236,  237;  and  the 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  238, 
239;  and  the  dreadnaught, 
240,  241 ;  and  the  U-boat, 
242;  and  Tsing-tao,  243; 
his  temperament,  244 ;  Beth- 
mann  demands  his  dismissal, 
244. 

Togo,  7,  56. 

Torpedo  boat,  237. 

Trafalgar,  231. 

Treaties,  Berlin,  10,  11,  14; 
Yangtse,  94;  Shimonoseki, 
105 ;  Portsmouth,  200;  Ver- 
sailles, 294,  296,  318,  322, 

331,  333,  334,  335,  342; 

Bucharest,  335;  Brest-Lit- 

ovsk,  335. 
"Trente  et  quarante,"  23. 
Tribunal,    enemy,    and  the 

neutral  tribunal,  292. 
Trott,  von,  183,  198. 


363 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


Tsaritsin,  254. 

Tsarskoe  Selo,  252. 

Tschirschky,  Herr  von,  103. 

Tsing-tao,  64 ;  development  of, 
77,  94,  243. 

Tundutoff,  Prince,  254. 

Turkey,  questions  relating  to 
the  Mediterranean  and,  14; 
Bismarck  and,  28;  Kaiser's 
policy,  28;  German  rela- 
tions with  strengthened,  90 ; 
his  dealings  with,  96;  and 
Albanians,  142,  164;  Kai- 
ser's influence  on,  203. 

Turner,  John  Kenneth,  75, 
3i7>  318. 

U 

U-boat  warfare,  75. 
Ujest,  Duke  of,  46. 
Ultra-Montane  party,  208. 
Ultra-Socialists,  30,  45. 
"Unbeaten  on  land  and  sea,'* 
276. 

Understanding,  Russian-Eng- 
lish, 9;  Anglo-French,  146. 

United  States,  and  England 
and  France,  71  n,  72-74, 
75;  Russian  archives  made 
public  in,  301 ;  attitude  in 
the  war,  308;  "gentlemen's 
agreement"  assures  standing 
beside  England  and  France 
in  World  War,  316;  did 
not  belong  to  Entente  Cor- 
diale,  316;  did  not  contribute 
toward  bringing  on  World 
War,  316;  Germany's  un- 
friendly answer  to  President 
Wilson,    316;    effect  of 


entering  the  war,  316; 
her  right  to  choose,  316; 
President  Wilson's  reasons 
fictitious,  317;  Wall  Street's 
influence,  316;  great  finan- 
cial profit,  317;  Germany 
protests  against  America's 
violation  of  the  right,  317; 
denial  of  Wilson's  Four- 
teen Points,  318;  misled  by 
English  propaganda,  318; 
Wilson's  unprecedented 
powers,  318;  American 
women,  318,  319;  Germany 
ev^acuated  enemy  territory 
and  surrendered  her  weap- 
ons on  Wilson's  guaranty, 
318;  Kaiser  accuses  Wilson 
of  wronging  Germany,  319; 
counts  on  American  people 
righting  the  wrong,  319; 
unreliability  of  Americans, 
320;  national  egotism,  320; 
Wilson  not  the  American 
people,  322. 

"Unser  Konig  absolut,  wenn 
er  unseren  Willen  tut,"  113. 

Usher,  Roland  G.,  71,  72. 


Valenciennes,  260. 
Valentine,  Rudolf  von,  136. 
Varnbuhler,  Ambassador  Axel 

von,  107. 
Vatican,  The,  89,  209,  264, 

265,  266,  267,  269. 
Vendetta,  163,  164. 
"Verbal  note,"  147-156,  159. 
Vercingetorix,  294,  295. 
Versailles,  294,  296,  318,  322, 

331,  333,  334,  335,  342. 


364 


INDEX 


Versen,  General  Maximilian 

von,  23. 
"Viceroy    of    Christ  upon 

earth,"  270. 
Victor  Emmanuel,  King,  216. 
Victoria,  Queen,  of  England, 

24,  26,  35,  69,  85,  87,  90, 

91,  102,  213,  238. 
Vienna,  273. 

Vindication  of  Great  Britain, 
161. 

Vulcan  Shipyard,  47-50- 
W 

"Waffenstreckung,"  difference 
between,  and  Waffenstill- 
stand,"  277. 

Waldersee,  Count  von,  93, 
226. 

Wales,  Prince  of  (Edward), 

87,  102. 
Wallace,  Sir  D.  Mackenzie, 

115. 

Wall  Street,  317. 
War  and  Revolution,  285  n. 
War  Academy,  St.  Petersburg, 
251. 

War  guilt,  the  question  of, 
291, 296,  298, 299,  300,  301, 
302,  322,  325,  327,  331, 
333,  342. 

War,  Russo-Turkish,  10; 
World,  18,  57,  72,  74,  81, 
161,  162,  186,  207,  227, 
255,  257,  260,  295,  299, 
301,  303,  312,  316,  317, 
322,  325,  327,  331,  333; 
of  1870,  60;  Russo-Japa- 
nese, 79,  106,  200,  201,  249, 
299;  Boer,  83,  86,  90,  91, 

92,  118  n.,  223,  234,  299, 


324;  Boxer,  93;  Seven 
Years',  121;  English  decla- 
ration of,  134;  Balkan,  164; 
causes  of  the  World,  304; 
of  1 91 4  a  consequence  of 
the  War  of  1 870,  325  ;  civil, 
in  Germany,  286,  288-289, 
294,  298,  320. 
Warsaw,  136. 

Weid,  Prince  William  of,  and 
the  Albanian  throne,  165- 
169;  selects  an  English  and 
an  Italian  secretary,  167. 

"Welfare  work"  at  the  Ger- 
man Court,  45. 

Werner,  Admiral  Reinhold, 
184. 

Westphalian  coal  strike,  36- 
37. 

"White  Drawing  Room,"  172. 
"White  men  together  against 

colored  men,"  79. 
Wiesbaden,    178,    179,  180, 

181. 

Wilhelmshafen,  87,  248. 
Wilhelmstrasse,  249. 
William  I,  176,  326. 
William  the  Great,  8,  14,  16, 
22,  25,  39,  40,  63,  176,  201. 
Wilmonski,    His  Excellency 

von,  25. 
Wilpert,  Monsignor,  218. 
Wilson,  President,  against 
Germany  in  191 5,  75 ;  notes 
to  by  Germany,  277;  ar- 
mistice note  of,  278;  un- 
friendly answer  of,  316;  un- 
precedented powers,  318; 
his  Fourteen  Points,  318; 
and  the  English  blockade, 
318;  double  dealing,  319; 


THE  KAISER'S  MEMOIRS 


unreliability  of,  319;  gigan- 
tic wrong  done  Germany, 
319;  trapped  by  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau, 
319 ;  flagrant  breach  of  faith, 
320;  first  to  demand  with- 
drawal of  reigning  dynasty, 
320;  Kaiser  convinced  rea- 
sons were  good,  320;  Presi- 
dent's heavy  guilt,  321. 

Windthorst,  Ludwig,  33. 

Winterfeldt,  General  Henry 
von,  286. 

Wittenberg,  Schloss  Church 
at,  214. 

Wittich,  General  Adolf  von, 

23. 
Witu,  55. 


Wolter,  Archabbot,  216. 
Women,  American,  318,  319. 
World,  Anglo-Saxon,  308. 
Worthley,   General  Stewart, 
117. 

Wiirttemberg,  153. 

Y 

Yacht  Club,  Imperial,  46. 
Yangtse  Treaty,  94. 
"Yellow  peril,"  79,  80,  81. 
"You  will  take  back  Alsace- 
Lorraine,"  252. 

Z 

Zanzibar,  55,  56. 
Zedlitz,  Count,  58. 


THE  END 


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